Collusive outcomes in price competition

In this paper we provide a sufficient condition for collusive outcomes in a single-shot game of simultaneous price choice in a homogeneous product market with symmetric firms and strictly convex costs. We also prove the counterintuitive result: if the second derivative of the cost function is nonincreasing in output, it is easier to sustain collusion when the number of firms increases.     

Strategic Choice of the Price Structure and Entry Deterrence Under Price Cap Regulation

This paper shows that a price‐capped firm under the threat of entry in some of the markets it serves can strategically manipulate its price structure to deter entry. In doing so, the regulated firm uses the price cap constraint as a commitment device to an aggressive pricing behaviour in case of entry. A (dynamic) price cap generally entails that the prices allowed today are a function of the previous‐period prices and that the tighter is the constraint on each price, the larger is the quantity sold of this good in the previous period. Hence, the regulated firm may strategically choose its price structure before entry to place a tighter regulatory control on the prices set in the (potentially) competitive markets and to make it optimal to charge in these markets – in case of entry – prices so low that entry is unprofitable.     

Entry Deterrence and Entry Accommodation Strategies of a Multiproduct Firm Regulated with Dynamic Price Cap

In this paper we study the way a multiproduct firm, regulated through a dynamic price cap, can develop a price strategy that uses the regulatory policy to deter entry. We consider a firm that initially operates as a monopolist in two markets but faces potential entry in one of the markets. We conclude that the regulated firm can have the incentive to block the entry. This strategy leads to the reduction of the price in both markets. However, the final effect of the entry deterrence strategy on total consumer surplus is not always positive.     

发电侧有限竞争阶段上网电价规制设计

本文对发电侧有限竞争阶段上网电价规制设计进行了研究,首先提出了规制设计的总体思路,然后根据菜单规制原理和启发式方法对上网电价进行了规制设计,并用算例分析证明规制设计的可行性和有效性,最后得出结论。     

基于价格上限的输配电价格管制模型改进研究

由于输配电环节具有自然垄断特性,因此必须接受监管,但随着电力的市场化改革,旧有的监管机制存在一定缺陷,而基于绩效的价格管制模型又不能直接适用于我国的国情。本文提出了一种基于价格上限的价格管制改进模型,在一般价格上限模型中引入电能质量因子,从而很好地克服了该模型导致质量恶化的缺陷,提高了模型的适用性。文中还详细介绍了电能质量因子的确定问题,并对该质量因子进行了算例分析。     

共同代理框架下转售价格控制的反垄断竞争效应研究

转售价格控制一直是备受争议的纵向约束手段,也是反垄断部门重点关注的对象。本文以茅台和五粮液被处罚为出发点,研究在共同代理框架下上游制造商对产品进行广告宣传和推广等活动中采用转售价格控制是否具有反竞争效应的问题。结果表明：如果拥有全部的讨价还价能力,制造商在共同代理框架下没有动机使用转售价格控制;此外,两部定价可以使制造商达到默契合谋的结果,而与是否采用转售价格控制无关。尽管如此,转售价格控制的使用应该被反垄断部门予以禁止。     

产品差别化、价格战与合谋

随着中国市场化改革的不断深入,价格战成为各行各业企业间不断上演的舞台剧。文章旨在从产品差别化与企业间合谋的相互关系出发,来分析企业频繁选择价格竞争而难以进行合谋的原因,即产品垂直差别水平的降低将使合谋难以维持,价格战容易爆发。因此,解决价格战的途径之一是中国企业应该加大自主创新的能力,提高产品垂直差别化程度。     

Cartel Stability in a Delivered Pricing Oligopoly

Using the spatial price discrimination framework, the relationship between the locations of firms and their ability to collude is investigated. Gupta and Venkatu (2002) show that in a duopoly model agglomeration at one point is the most stable location. We find that agglomeration stabilizes the cartel when there are three firms, too. When there are more than three firms, however, agglomeration of all firms is never the most stable location. With four firms, the following location pattern produces the most stable cartel: two firms at one point and the other two at the farthest point from the first two.     

制药企业广告投资、研发投入与创新药绩效

在药品市场竞争日益激烈的背景下,如何协调广告战略与研发战略之间的关系,提高创新药市场绩效成为制药企业面对的重要问题.本文构建双寡头制药企业的研发-价格竞争博弈模型,探究制药企业的广告战略、研发战略和政府价格管制政策对于不同类型企业研发激励、药品定价、市场份额、创新利润和创新药市场绩效的综合影响机制.研究发现,当且仅当广告投资和研发投入之间存在\"挤入\"效应时,实施广告战略才可能为企业带来竞争优势,但广告投资过大将导致企业利润的损失;其次,当且仅当广告投资效率较高时,实施广告战略才能增进创新药市场绩效;最后,价格管制政策和广告战略对企业利润产生综合影响,在一定条件下,价格管制能够强化广告战略对实施企业利润的增进效果,广告战略则有助于改善价格管制对实施企业市场份额的不利影响.     

Bertrand Price Undercutting: A Brief Classroom Demonstration

The author presents a brief classroom demonstration illustrating Bertrand price undercutting. The demonstration is appropriate for micro principles and intermediate- and upper-level undergraduate classes, as well as graduate classes in micro, industrial organization, and game theory.     

Trouble in Market Paradise: Development of the Regional Transmission Operator

Regional transmission organizations (RTOs) have evolved from “power pool” arrangements between utilities to complex organizations that operate a region’s transmission system and power markets. These RTOs are administered with only peripheral public input. This paper reflects on how RTOs, as a result, have developed very complex market structures that few can or do understand. An RTO’s capacity construct is used to illustrate the point of this complexity and ad hoc nature. The paper also discusses reforms that are needed to align the RTOs behavior with Harry M. Trebing’s public interest regulatory philosophy.     

政府基础设施投资与居民收入关系的实证研究

政府支出的目的之一就是改善人民群众的生活条件,增加居民收入。基于中国1980—2009年的时间序列数据进行实证研究,通过协整检验、Granger因果检验和误差修正模型的建立来分析政府基础设施投资支出与城镇居民收入的关系。结果发现政府基础设施投资支出与城镇居民收入具有长期的均衡关系,且政府基础设施投资支出是城镇居民收入的Granger原因（反向不成立）。     

粮食价格预警模型与风险防范机制研究

随着我国粮食购销市场化的加速推进,影响粮食安全的各种不确定因素增多.笔者在对粮食价格运行状态的类型进行界定的基础上,构建了粮食价格预警的控制论模型,分析了粮食价格调控系统的构成.这一系统包括模型系统和专家系统两部分.模型系统又包括信息采集系统、信息分析与推断系统、风险识别系统、信息输出与警报系统、预控对策系统等.笔者还设计了三种粮食价格定量调控模型,并对构建粮食价格风险防范机制提出了建议.     

能源基础设施项目土地价格的确定——以电网工程为例

本文在对现行土地价格计算方法分析研究的基础上,提出了项目经济评价中土地价格的确定方法,并以电网建设项目为例,给出了项目财务评价中土地费用及国民经济评价中土地影子价格的计算原则与方法,使项目投资者能较为准确合理地计算能源基础设施项目投资组成中的土地费用,提高项目经济评价的可靠性。     

对基础设施领域引入竞争机制的思考

基础设施领域存在的各种问题及当前国内外的经济环境决定了中国基础设施领域有必要引入竞争机制、理论发展、技术经济条件的变化以及国内外已有的成功的改革实践均表明基础设施领域引入竞争机制是可行的。基础设施领域可通过增加生产者数量、实行激励性规制、利用潜在进入者和替代产品的威胁等多种方式引入竞争机制。     

Returns on Investments in Energy-saving Technologies Under Energy Price Uncertainty in Dutch Greenhouse Horticulture

Conventional net presentvalue calculations evaluating the profitabilityof investments in energy-saving technologies inDutch horticultural outlays predict a muchhigher rate of adoption of these technologiesthan is actually observed. This paper tries toexplain this gap by applying a real optionsframework. Hurdle rates for investments in twotypes of energy-saving technology are estimatedusing simulated future revenue streams, givenuncertainty regarding energy prices and energytax policies. Hurdle rates found in this wayare on average about 1.76 times the hurdlerates that result from net present valuecalculations. Furthermore, this paper tests thepredictive value of the theory by estimating alogit model. This model relates the incidenceof having invested in an energy-savingtechnology to the difference between the returnon investment and the hurdle rate. Thepredictive power turns out to be encouraging,as the statistical tests indicate that higherhurdle rates tend to reduce rates of technologyadoption.