Product regulations and persistence of profits: OECD evidence

In competitive markets, profits deviating from the norm will not persist for extended periods. If unimpeded, entry and exit of firms should restore profits to competitive levels. This dynamic process is influenced by regulations that temporarily or permanently impede competition. We study how product market regulations (PMR)—as measured by the OECD—affect competition by their impact on the profit persistence (Wölfl et al. in Ten years of product market reform in OECD countries-insights from a revised PMR indicator, 2009, Product market regulation: extending the analysis beyond OECD countries, 2010). To examine profit dynamics, we follow the methodology developed by Mueller (Economica 44(176):369–380, 1977), which measures both the short run persistence of profits and the long run permanent rents. The method can be used to measure: (1) short run transitory rents; (2) long run permanent rents. To this end we use firm level data from 30 OECD countries over the period 1998–2013. Results show that PMR increase the permanent rents of firms but we find no significant effect on short run profit persistence. We conclude that PMR negatively influence competition and increase permanent rents, resulting in misallocation of resources.     

Globalization and labor market institutions: International empirical evidence

A widespread concern is that labor market institutions erode in the course of globalization, which, in turn, decreases employment and wages. By using panel data and cross-sectional data, I investigate the influence of globalization on labor market regulation. I use the indicators of labor market institutions by Gwartney et al. (2012) and the KOF indices of globalization. To deal with potential reverse causality, I employ a system GMM panel estimator and use a constructed trade share as proposed by Frankel and Romer (1999) as an instrumental variable for globalization in cross-sectional models. The results do not show that globalization induced labor market deregulation.     

Information gatekeepers: theory and experimental evidence

We consider a model where two adversaries can spend resources in acquiring public information about the unknown state of the world in order to influence the choice of a decision maker. We characterize the sampling strategies of the adversaries in the equilibrium of the game. We show that as the cost of information acquisition for one adversary increases, that person collects less evidence whereas the other adversary collects more evidence. We then test the results in a controlled laboratory setting. The behavior of subjects is close to the theoretical predictions. Mistakes are relatively infrequent (15%). They occur in both directions, with a higher rate of over-sampling (39%) than under-sampling (8%). The main difference with the theory is the smooth decline in sampling around the theoretical equilibrium. Comparative statics are also consistent with the theory, with adversaries sampling more when their own cost is low and when the other adversary??s cost is high. Finally, there is little evidence of learning over the 40 matches of the experiment.     

Household search choice: theory and evidence

Since the work by Stigler (1961) on the economics of information in the early 1960s, economists have paid closer attention to the role of search for information. However, search methods are not considered in the theory of portfolio choice. We present a model of investor search behaviour in order to provide a framework by which to evaluate our empirical evidence on the role of search in portfolio selection and performance. We study two types of search methods: informal and professional. We show that the income, wealth and risk preference of households influence their search choice.     

Regret in auctions: theory and evidence

The sealed-bid first-price auction of a single object in the case of independent privately-known values is the simplest auction setting and understanding it is important for understanding more complex mechanisms. But bidders bid above the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium theory prediction. The reasons for this “over bidding” remain an unsolved puzzle. Several explanations have been offered, including risk aversion, social comparisons, and learning. We present a new explanation based on regret and a model that explains not only the observed over bidding in sealed-bid first-price auctions, but also behavior in several other settings that is inconsistent with risk aversion. The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation.     

A revisionist view of the economic implications of child labor regulations

The conventional neoclassical wisdom predicts that banning, restricting, or improving the working conditions of child labor will increase the costs of production, thereby diminishing the competitiveness of those jurisdictions that legislate against child labor. However, from a behavioral theoretical perspective this need not be the case when a productivity differential favoring adult labor exists which at least compensates for the pay differential between child and adult labor, and where the increased cost of child labor is compensated for by their increased productivity. In this case, legislating against child labor will not have the negative economic consequences predicted by the conventional wisdom. The cost of such restrictions, however, will then fall largely on the family income of affected families unless compensated for by sufficient increases in real adult wages, increases in the adult labor force participation rate, or other sources of income. This paper was revised while the author was Visiting Scholar with the Center for North American Studies, Duke University. Thanks go to two anonymous referees and Louise Lamontagne for their comments and suggestions. The standard caveat applies.     

Job security regulations and the dynamic demand for industrial labor in India and Zimbabwe

Government permission is required to dismiss or lay off even a single worker in India and Zimbabwe. Dynamic labor demand equations, derived from a CES cost minimization model, are estimated for 64 manufacturing industries in these two countries. The data reveal a substantial reduction in demand for workers but no slowing in adjustment of number of employees following enactment of the labor laws. In India, no comparable reduction in labor demand occurred in small scale plants uncovered by the job security regulations. Among larger Indian plants, the drop in labor demand is estimated to be largest in industries where: coverage of the legislation is more extensive, private ownership dominates, and there are fewer union members.     

Bank ownership structure,regulations and risk-taking: evidence from commercial banks in Pakistan

This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of the theories concerning the influence of ownership structure on bank risk-taking in the presence of regulations in Pakistan. The sample used in this paper comprises a panel data of 26 banks in Pakistan, for the period from 2000 to 2014. The analysis provides evidence that increase in ownership concentration leads to an increase in bank risk-taking. Managerial ownership is associated with high risk-taking at low and high levels of managerial ownership while at intermediate level, managerial ownership has negative impact on bank risk-taking. Different types of ownership of banks in Pakistan have different impact on risk-taking. While government, family and institutional ownership have a positive impact on bank risk-taking, foreign ownership has a negative impact on bank risk-taking. Furthermore, the results show that capital regulations are important in influencing bank risk-taking with regard to higher ownership concentration. The findings of this paper suggest that the relation between bank risk-taking and capital regulations typically depends on the type of ownership.     

Austrian business cycle theory: Empirical evidence

The Austrian approach to business cycles has been seldom examined in econometric terms. This paper first reviews the essentials of that approach and the recent application of the Austrian business cycle theory in the economics literature. Quarterly data for Germany, USA, England and France, 1980:1 through 2006:1, are used to explore business cycle facts and relations between terms structure of interest rates, relative prices, composition of aggregate expenditure and real GDP. Results are consistent with the hypothesis of the Austrian business cycle theory that monetary policy shocks explain cycles. The changes in term structure of interest rates and composition of aggregate expenditure are large enough to explain changes in aggregate economic activity.

Bargaining in the transfer market: theory and evidence

This paper examines the transfer market for association football players as operated in the English Football League using transfer data for the 1990–91 season. After describing the purposes and procedures involved in the transfer system together with the motives of the participants, we apply two-person bargaining theory to analyse the determination of transfer fees. The data and estimation procedures are explained and the results reported and interpreted. Our analysis suggests that the Nash bargaining theory captures the salient features of the bargaining process in the footballer's transfer market.     

Nonlinear economic growth: Some theory and cross-country evidence

This paper aims to test the existence of different growth regimes, that is of different relationships between growth rate and income level. We propose a simple nonlinear growth model and test its empirical implications by estimating Markov transition matrices and stochastic kernels. We show that growth is indeed nonlinear: a first phase of slow or zero growth is followed by a take-off and, finally, by a phase of deceleration. We discuss the relevance of these results with respect to the issue of convergence and reversibility of development, in the light of models of structural change and technological diffusion.     

Transition to FDI openness: Reconciling theory and evidence

Empirical studies quantifying the economic effects of increased foreign direct investment (FDI) have not provided conclusive evidence that they are positive, as theory predicts. This paper shows that the lack of empirical evidence is consistent with theory if countries are in transition to FDI openness. Anticipated welfare gains lead to temporary declines in domestic investment and employment. Also, growth measures miss some intangible FDI, which is expensed from company profits. The reconciliation of theory and evidence is accomplished with a multicountry dynamic general equilibrium model parameterized with data from a sample of 104 countries during 1980–2005. Although no systematic benefits of FDI openness are found, the model demonstrates that the eventual gains in growth and welfare can be huge, especially for small countries.     

Taxation and corruption: theory and firm-level evidence from Uganda

This article develops a simple framework to analyse the negotiation over bribe and tax payments during the tax collection process. We show that the larger the bribe a firm offers to a tax collector, the larger the tax rebate it gets. More particularly, we show that the negotiation over bribe and tax payments hinges on four other factors: firms’ official liabilities, detection, firms’ negotiation power and red tape costs imposed on firms. Some of the predictions from the theoretical model are tested using firm-level data from Uganda. We find that bribe and tax payments are inversely related, thereby supporting the hypothesis of a negotiation taking place between firms and tax collectors. In particular, a 1% point increase in average bribe payments per employee is associated with a 7% point reduction in average amount of tax payments per employee. Results are robust to various instruments dealing with the endogenous relationship between bribes and taxes.     

Merchant and regulated transmission: theory, evidence and policy

Economists acknowledge the problems of regulated transmission but have different views on the likely efficiency of merchant transmission. This paper first examines the evidence on alleged market failure and regulatory failure as experienced in practice in Australia, where there have been both regulated and merchant interconnectors. Merchant transmission has generally not exhibited the standard examples of market failure but regulated transmission generally has exhibited the standard examples of regulatory failure. Imperfect information??more specifically, in the form of lack of coordination??has often been a challenge whatever the approach. Experience in Argentina suggests that transactions costs are not a barrier to negotiation and efficient investment determined by users. Policy should seek to improve the regulatory framework and to remove barriers to private initiatives. An important role for regulation is to facilitate coordination between potential providers and users of transmission lines.     

Imitation—theory and experimental evidence

We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are mainly explained by different informational assumptions, and to a lesser extent by different behavioral rules. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant effects of seemingly innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation model predicts the differences between treatments well. The data provide support for imitation on the individual level, both in terms of choice and in terms of perception. Furthermore, individuals’ propensity to imitate more successful actions is increasing in payoff differences.     

Monetary policy arithmetic: reconciling theory with evidence

Abstract.  Empirical evidence indicates that, in countries with low inflation rates, a permanent decrease in inflation rate either has no impact on capital stock and output (superneutrality) or causes them to fall moderately. Existing budget arithmetic models of monetary policy cannot deliver superneutrality. In this paper, we conduct a budget arithmetic analysis of monetary policy using a money demand specification – money in the utility function – that is new to this literature. We find that one simple assumption about utility from money delivers superneutrality, while a more general assumption delivers departures from superneutrality in the direction consistent with the evidence. JEL classification: E60, E13     

Factor price overshooting with trade liberalization: theory and evidence

This paper develops an intra‐industry trade model with skilled and unskilled labor as factors of production, endogenous accumulation of skilled labor and firm heterogeneity in factor intensities to examine the effect of trade reforms on factor prices. Since exporters are more skill intensive than non–exporters, a decrease in trade barriers initially increases wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, as a result of an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. Over time, however, as agents respond to the change in relative wages by investing in skilled labor, the relative wage of skilled labor decreases. Evidence from Chilean plant–level data supports the idea of factor price overshooting with trade liberalization.     

Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence

We examine theoretically and experimentally two countervailing effects of industry concentration in common value auctions. Greater concentration of information among fewer bidders reduces competition but increases the precision of private estimates. We demonstrate that this generally leads to more aggressive bidding. However, the reduction in competition dominates the informational effects, resulting in lower prices. We examine these hypothesized effects experimentally by conducting a series of auctions with constant informational content but distributed among a varying number of bidders. The experimental results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. The authors would like to thank Octavian Carare, Eric Friedman, Luke Froeb, Ron Harstad, Toshi Iizuka, Mike Rothkopf, Charles Thomas, and two anonymous referees, for many useful comments and suggestions.     

Mean reverting financial leverage: theory and evidence from Pakistan

Grounding concepts of the two competing theories of capital structure (trade-off theory, pecking order theory) are quite opposite to each other. Trade-off theory claims that there is an optimal (target) capital structure and firms try to achieve that optimal (target) point. Whereas pecking order theory argues that there is no optimal (target) capital structure but the firms follow a specific pattern of financing. Using the two competing theoretic frameworks, this study applies Fisher-type panel unit root test to an unbalanced panel data of 13 115 firm-year observations of nonfinancial firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange Pakistan spread over 38 years (1973–2010). Overall panel test results, for short-term, long-term, as well as total leverage support trade-off financing behaviour while individual firm results do not. Individual firm results show that only 16% of the firms have short-term target, 25% of the firms have long-term target and 12% of the firms have total target leverage ratio. Further, industry results explain that most of the industries do have target leverage ratios and classification of data into profitable and lossmaking firm-year observations explains that profitable firms clearly follow trade-off financing behaviour while the results for lossmaking firms do not support trade-off financing behaviour. Our study indicates that it is important for the government to ensure policies to develop well-balanced financial markets and to improve accountability systems.