Do dictatorships redistribute more?

This paper examines the effect of political institutions on fiscal redistribution for a country-level panel from 1960–2010. Using data on Gini coefficients before and after government intervention, we apply a measure of effective fiscal redistribution that reflects the effect of taxes and transfers on income inequality. Our findings clearly indicate that non-democratic regimes demonstrate significantly greater direct fiscal redistribution. Subsequently, we employ fiscal data in an attempt to enlighten this puzzling empirical finding. We find that dictatorial regimes rely more heavily on cash transfers that exhibit a direct impact on net inequality and consequently on the difference between market and net inequality (i.e., effective fiscal redistribution), whereas democratic regimes devote a larger amount of resources to public inputs (health and education) that may influence market inequality but not the difference between market and net inequality per se. We argue that the driving force behind the observed differences within the pattern on government spending and effective fiscal redistribution is that democratic institutions lead survival-oriented leaders to care more for the private market, and thus to follow policies that enhance the productivity of the whole economy.     

我国居民收入不平等的主要原因：市场还是政府政策？

市场因素和政府收入再分配政策是决定一国居民收入不平等程度的两个重要因素。本文采用中国家庭收入调查（China Household Income Project ,CHIP）住户数据,计算出我国居民市场收入基尼系数与可支配收入基尼系数,并同发达国家进行比较,借此探讨目前我国居民收入不平等是由市场力量造成的,还是政府收入再分配政策力度不足的结果。研究发现,从市场收入基尼系数来看,我国与发达国家之间的差距并不大。由此认为,政府收入再分配政策效果不明显是导致我国居民收入分配不平等状况较发达国家严重的主要原因。加大转移支付等再分配政策力度是缓解和改善目前我国居民收入不平等的主要途径。     

INEQUALITY, REDISTRIBUTION, AND RENT-SEEKING

This paper presents a non-median voter model of redistribution in which greater inequality leads to lower redistribution. Bargaining between interest groups and politicians over exemptions implies that individuals with sufficiently high income will not pay taxes in equilibrium. Therefore, voters will set tax rates low enough so as to control the incentives for rent-seeking. An increase in inequality, by putting more income in the hands of individuals that can buy exemptions, will lead to lower equilibrium redistribution. The model can be used to account for a negative relationship between inequality and growth and provides a new explanation of why the poor do not expropriate the rich in democracies.     

Demand for redistribution,support for the welfare state,and party identification in Austria

This paper describes subjective wage inequality and the demand for redistribution in Austria using individuals’ estimates of occupational wages from the International Social Survey Program. Although these estimates differ widely across individuals, the data clearly show that most individuals would like to decrease wage inequality, relative to the level of inequality which they perceive to exist. The empirical analysis also shows that the demand for redistribution is strongly associated not only with variables describing self-interested motives for redistribution, but also with perceptions of and social norms with respect to inequality. Further, the demand for redistribution is a strong predictor for whether an individual is supportive of redistribution by the state. On the other hand, however, I find almost no evidence for an empirical association between the demand for redistribution and individuals’ party identification.     

MEASURING THE LIFETIME REDISTRIBUTION ACHIEVED BY DUTCH TAXATION, CASH TRANSFER AND NON-CASH BENEFITS PROGRAMS

This paper assesses how the Dutch system of taxation, cash transfers and non-cash benefits redistributes between the rich and the poor. The approach in this paper deviates from the usual approach by incorporating the full life cycle in the measurements, rather than only the annual effects. Moreover, the coverage is larger than is usually the case: the paper takes account of both direct and indirect taxes and direct and indirect benefits. In order to obtain the measurements on redistribution, we use the level of educational attainment to classify the population. We therefore measure, in terms of present values, the average net benefit from government policies for an average representative person of each level of education. The results indicate a sizable redistribution from the rich to the poor and a significant reduction of welfare inequality. The net effect on welfare inequality is, however, substantially smaller than when measured on an annual basis.     

收入不平等、政策偏向与最优财政再分配政策

本文构建的理论模型探讨了收入不平等、政策偏向与最优财政再分配之间的关系。模型显示:政策偏向是收入不平等与财政再分配恶性循环的决定因素。当政策偏向于穷人时,最优财政再分配系统的选择是提高税率,扩大对穷人的转移支付;当政策偏向于富人时,最优财政再分配系统的选择是降低税率,减少对穷人的转移支付。依据中国数据的实证研究发现:(1)中国收入不平等不断恶化,针对恶化的不平等而采取的财政再分配政策效果差,没能扭转不平等恶化趋势,政策偏向严重。(2)税收再分配政策偏向富人,使富人税负相对轻于穷人,居民收入不平等加剧;偏向于穷人的转移支付多为消费券(物),导致越扶越贫。为此,需要从调整所得税和转移支付政策等方面采取相关对策。     

The Impact of Inequality and Redistribution on Growth

In this paper, we reassess the impact of inequality on growth. The majority of previous papers have employed (system) GMM estimation. However, recent simulation studies indicate that the problems of GMM when using non‐stationary data such as GDP have been grossly underestimated in applied research. Concerning predetermined regressors such as inequality, GMM is outperformed by a simple least‐squares dummy variable estimator. Additionally, new data have recently become available that not only double the sample size compared to most previous studies, but also address the substantial measurement issues that have plagued past research. Using these new data and an LSDV estimator, we provide an analysis that both accounts for the conditions where inequality is beneficial or detrimental to growth and distinguishes between market‐driven inequality and redistribution. We show that there are situations where market inequality affects growth positively while redistribution is simultaneously beneficial.     

A Gini decomposition analysis of inequality in the Czech and Slovak Republics during the transition1

Disposable income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient and using the Family Budget Survey data, increased very little, and by a similar amount, from 1989 to 1993 in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This surprising result is examined with an analysis of changes in the channels of redistribution and Gini decomposition. We find that the sizeable increase in overall inequality due to changes in the wage earnings component is mitigated by changes in the tax and transfer components in both republics. As for the relative effects of government policies, changes in the transfer component contributed more than changes in the tax component to lowering the growth of inequality in the Czech Republic, while the reverse was true for Slovakia.     

Redistributive policy,inequality and growth

Does redistribution increase inequality? Is inequality harmful for growth? Both questions have recently been addressed in a number of single-tax models. In this paper, I examine the relationship between policy, growth and inequality when income and inherited wealth can be taxed at different rates. In the model, parents accumulate human capital and a return-bearing, storable good in order to increase the quality of their children. Inequality arises because the learning ability of children is stochastic. Redistributive labor income taxation has a negative impact on short- and long-run growth while taxation of inherited stocks increases growth. Effects of both taxes on income inequality are ambiguous. A switch from income to inheritance taxation may increase average utility of all generations involved. I calculate a structure-induced equilibrium of the political process by means of a stochastic simulation of the model. In the short run initial wealth-inequality can stimulate growth, while initial inequality of the endowment with human capital is harmful for growth.     

Determinants of governmental redistribution: Income distribution,development levels,and the role of perceptions

We empirically investigate the relationship between income inequality and redistribution, accounting for the shape of the income distribution, different development levels, and subjective perceptions. Cross-national inequality datasets that have become available only recently allow for the assessment of the link for various sample compositions and several model specifications. Our results confirm the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis, but suggest that the relation between market inequality and redistribution is even stronger when using perceived inequality measures. The findings emphasize a decisive role of the middle class, though also approving a negative impact of top incomes. The Meltzer-Richard effect is less pronounced in developing economies with less sophisticated political rights, illustrating that it is the political channel through which higher inequality translates into more redistribution.     

Trade,growth and income redistribution: A case study of India

The concern of this exercise is with the effectiveness of trade policies and their assessment in achieving economic growth and income equality. A link between growth and equality is provided through employment. If there is substantial increase in employment, the inequality of income distribution is likely to be reduced. Thus, trade by bringing about higher levels of production and employment may reduce income inequality. We have applied a closed input-output model to the Indian data to estimate the interrelationships between trade, growth and income redistribution. It has been found that employment opportunities could be raised substantially through redistribution as well as through export promotion in developing countries such as India, if capital and foreign exchange constraints are not binding. Import substitution, however, does not turn out to be as effective a strategy to achieve these goals.     

THE REDISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE INFLATIONARY PROCESS IN JAPAN, 1955–75*

It is often discussed that inflation introduces a substantial, arbitrary and regressive redistribution of income and wealth under even mild inflation. But after a quarter century of experience with inflation in postwar Japan, very little is known about these costs of inflation on an empirical basis. Due to the complexity of the evaluation of the redistributional impact on Japan, the present paper analyzes the effects of inflation on individuals or groups as wage earners, debtors and creditors, taxpayers, and holders of real estate. The main results of the present investigation suggest that the Japanese inflation for 1955–75 did not seem to introduce much inequality in the income (flow) account in the economy, but that the inequality between households has appeared more in the wealth (stock) account, especially between the house-owner groups and non-house-owner groups. These observations are mainly derived from the following investigations; (i) the wage lag hypothesis about inflation, even if not wrong, does not seem acceptable when applied to the entire period (1955–75) as well as to each of the five sub-periods; (ii) there has been a substantial transfer of real purchasing power from households to non-financial corporations, and, to a lesser extent, to government entities in the debtor-creditor redistribution; (iii) among households, the most substantial redistribution takes place from the non-houseowners to houseowners with land, because of the huge amount of capital gains from the rapid increase in the price of real estate relative to the prices of other assets or the consumer price index, except for the last three years of rampaging inflation.     

Revisiting the redistribution hypothesis with perceived inequality and redistributive preferences

It is a long-standing puzzle whether or not changes in economic inequality lead to changes in redistribution. However, there has been a lack of conclusive evidence about this relationship. Moreover, redistributive preferences as an intervening factor between inequality and redistribution, which are taken for granted implicitly or explicitly in redistribution theories, have been largely overlooked in the existing analyses. Besides, recent comparative studies of inequality and redistribution have started paying attention to inequality perceptions that deviate from actual inequality. Thus, this inquiry aims to reconstruct the classical redistribution theory by employing perceived inequality and preferences for redistribution and to test the reformulated redistribution hypotheses. One of the most challenging efforts for the analysis is to develop a country-level measure of perceived inequality. To this end, the Gini coefficient of perceived social position (perceived Gini) was first created by using data from 16 rounds of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 1987 to 2014), covering 34 OECD countries. The empirical results show robust evidence that perceived inequality, not actual inequality, is significantly associated with redistributive preferences, while preferences for redistribution do not translate into any type of redistribution.     

Understanding Changes in the Distribution and Redistribution of Income: A Unifying Decomposition Framework

In recent decades income inequality has increased in many developed countries but the role of tax and transfer reforms is often poorly understood. We propose a new method allowing for the decomposition of historical changes in income distribution and redistribution measures into: (i) the immediate effect of tax‐transfer policy reforms in the absence of behavioral responses; (ii) the effect of labor supply responses induced by these reforms; and (iii) a third component allowing us to explore the effect of changes in the distribution of a wide range of determinants, including the effect of employment changes not induced by policy reforms. The application of the decomposition to Australia reveals that the direct effect of tax‐transfer policy reforms accounts for half of the observed increase in income inequality between 1999 and 2008, while the increased dispersion of wages and capital incomes also played an important role.     

Decentralized Governance,Constitution Formation,and Redistribution

What determines the relative strength of central and regional governments? Why do centers engage in more or less geographically based economic redistribution? And why do some centers redistribute from urban to rural areas while others do the opposite? This research answers these questions with reference to decentralized politics at key constitutional moments. Much contemporary research underscores the importance of the intergovernmental balance of power – be it in taxing authority or decision making autonomy – on economic outcomes. Many features of that balance are rooted in bargains struck at the time of constitution writing. Here, I suggest that the key ingredients in such bargains are the number of conflicting geographically salient factor endowments, the distribution of inter-regional inequality, and the degree of intra-state inequality within rural and urban regions. The greater the level of factoral conflict, the more elites who engage in constitutional negotiations are likely to constrain the central government by providing for substantial regional veto authority. Higher levels of inter-regional inequality heighten demands for inter-regional redistribution. Given some level of regional demand for central redistribution, whether its net effect is in favor of urban or rural regions will depend on the coalitional implications of inequality within regions. I examine the argument in light of the U.S., Argentine, and Indian processes of constitution formation.     

What drives the cross‐country growth and inequality correlation?

Abstract.  We present a neo‐classical model that explores the determinants of growth‐inequality correlation and attempts to reconcile the seemingly conflicting evidence on the nature of the growth‐inequality relationship. The initial distribution of human capital determines the long‐run income distribution and the growth rate by influencing the occupational choice of the agents. The steady‐state proportion of adults that innovates and updates human capital is path dependent. The output elasticity of skilled‐labour, barriers to knowledge spillovers, and the degree of redistribution determine the range of steady‐state equilibria. From a calibration experiment we report that a skill‐intensive technology, low barriers to knowledge spillovers, and high degrees of redistribution characterize the industrial countries with a positive growth‐inequality correlation. A negative correlation between growth and inequality arises for the group of non‐industrial countries with the opposite characteristics. JEL classification: E1, O4     

Redistribution and entrepreneurship with Schumpeterian growth

We examine the effects of redistributive taxation on growth and inequality in a Schumpeterian model with risk-averse agents. There are skilled and unskilled workers, and the growth rate is determined by the occupational choice of skilled agents between entrepreneurship and employment. We show that redistribution provides insurance to entrepreneurs and increases the growth rate. The effects on inequality are such that low tax rates increase inequality relative to laissez-faire due to changes in wages, but higher tax rates can simultaneously raise growth and reduce inequality. We contrast the optimal linear income tax with alternative policies for promoting R&D and find that it is preferable on both equity and efficiency grounds.      

Income Distribution and Demand-Induced Innovations

We introduce non-homothetic preferences into an innovation-based growth model and study how income and wealth inequality affect economic growth. We identify a (positive) price effect—where increasing inequality allows innovators to charge higher prices and (negative) market-size effects—with higher inequality implying smaller markets for new goods and/or a slower transition of new goods into mass markets. It turns out that price effects dominate market-size effects. We also show that a redistribution from the poor to the rich may be Pareto improving for low levels of inequality.     

Long-run Growth and Intragenerational Transfer Under Capital Market Imperfections

The purpose of this paper is to provide a long-run growth model linking growth to income distribution between lenders and borrowers in an environment where enforcement of loan contracts is imperfect. The equilibrium under costly verification implies a smaller growth rate, relative to the symmetric-information economy. Intra-generational transfer of income is shown to promote growth so long as the redistribution gives rise to an increase in net worth positions of borrowers.
JEL Classification Numbers: G21, O16, O40