Market Theoretical Frameworks—Which One?*

The problem of choice between theoretical frameworks forms the focal point of this paper. Its intention is to discuss a possible choice between two distinct approaches to the market order—the ‘neoclassical’ and the ‘Austrian’. Firstly, the basis upon which the two theoretical frameworks are distinguished is explained. Secondly, an attempt is made to show that the two are indeed different and to derive the implications of their differences for policy, for the practice of economics as a social science and for human well-being. Finally, a defensible criterion is suggested along with the ensuing choice, and an explanation is offered as to the relevance of such a choice.     

Disability and Economy: A Game Theoretic Approach

This paper takes a game theoretic approach to disability‐related issues by constructing a model that studies the case of hereditary deafness on Martha's Vineyard Island, USA from the seventeenth century to the early years of twentieth, where the island community adjusted itself to the hereditary deafness so that it was not treated as a disability. The model of the present paper has two stages. First of all, there are two types of continua of agents, the deaf and the non‐deaf. In the first stage, the non‐deaf agents become either bilinguals or monolinguals. In the second stage, agents are classified into deaf people, bilinguals and monolinguals. They are then randomly matched to form a trio to play a three‐person bargaining game with infinite horizon, random proposers and language constraints. Two bargaining games are considered. The first one is a majority bargaining game where only two out of three can agree to implement a bargaining outcome. The second one is a unanimity bargaining game where all three agents are required to reach an agreement. The majority game exhibits strategic complementarity, while the unanimity game exhibits strategic substitutability. This paper also takes an inductive approach to examine how prejudice against people with disability may emerge.     

投资者非理性假设下公司金融决策前沿理论评述

随着行为金融理论的逐步发展,市场错误定价的稳定存在已经得到越来越多学者的认可。本文对行为公司金融理论中投资者非理性范式下的前沿理论进行了综述,从投资和融资决策两个方面分析了面对错误时的外部市场定价行为,以及理性的财务决策者如何利用这种市场无效率来为长期股东获利,或迎合非理性投资者预期来实现自己的短期目标。     

Testing Employment Determination in Unionised Economies as a Repeated Game

This paper is an empirical analysis of alternative bargaining theories of wage and employment determination. Using data from manufacturing sectors of the Spanish economy, we find that unions and firms are not myopic and take dynamic considerations into account in the bargaining process. This work is an empirical test of the bargaining model in Espinosa and Rhee (1989) and provides support for their conclusions.     

Liability Insurance and Choice of Cars: A Large Game Approach

If a car, already on the road, is replaced by another one, more expensive to collide with, a negative externality spills over to other drivers. This paper studies such externalities, relating them to insurance and incentives. It formalizes links from liability rules to choice of car. By assumption, insurance is cooperative but car acquisition is noncooperative. Construing drivers' interaction as a large game, the paper considers how a Nash equilibrium—and its efficiency or fairness—is shaped by the underlying liability regime.     

Exhaustibility and Risk as Asset Class Dimensions: A Social Investor Approach to Capital-Resource Economies

This paper develops a framework in which asset class dimensions are extended to include both risk and exhaustibility for explaining the evolution of shadow prices of marginal units of exhaustible natural resources in capital-resource economies. It is shown that the pricing kernel function required for socially valuing marginal units of exhaustible resource, hereafter called the Exhaustion-Stochastic Discount Factor, combines a factor that discounts for risk and another factor that discounts for resource exhaustion over time. The social rate of return on the marginal unit of resource stock adds to the risk-premium an exhaustion premium that accounts for the resource depletion over time. In this setting, the principle of no-arbitrage holds by extending asset-class dimensions to include not only a risk dimension but also an exhaustibility dimension.     

Economies with observable types

We study economies of asymmetric information with observable types. Trade takes place in lotteries. Individuals face a standard budget constraint, while the incentive compatibility constraints are imposed on the production set of the intermediaries. This formalization encompasses moral hazard, as in [Jerez, 2003] and [Jerez, 2005], and private information economies. Equilibrium allocations are constrained efficient, but, contrary to what stated for example in Jerez (2005), the set of equilibrium allocations may be empty and the Second Welfare Theorem may fail. This happens for two reasons. First, constrained efficient allocations may violate the necessary and sufficient conditions of price supportability for the individuals. Second, even when constrained efficient allocation are price supportable, they may fail to be a profit maximizing choice of the firm at the individual supporting prices. To restore existence of an equilibrium the firm has to be restricted to supply allocations with support in the set of incentive compatible contracts.     

Pollution Control in Open Economies: Implications of Within-period Interactions for Dynamic Game Equilibrium

This paper examines a two-country, dynamic game model of pollution control in the presence of economic interactions between countries within a period, as well as the environmental interaction between periods (i.e., a change in the stock of global pollution). These economic interactions emerge because of changes in the terms of trade of polluting goods or the market share of domestic polluting industries. It is shown that if within-period externalities exist, a noncooperative equilibrium may result in a smaller stock of global pollution in the steady state than does international cooperation. Moreover, the properties of equilibrium paths depend on the direction and size of such externalities. In addition, trigger strategy equilibria that achieve the outcome of the collusive solution are examined.     

Economies with a two-sector representation

Summary In both theoretical and empirical research it is a common practice to partition the economy into (at least) two sectors in order to conduct partial-equilibrium analysis. One merely hopes that general-equilibrium consequences will not obviate all of the analysis of the sector or market in question. In this paper we consider market demand functions which have a two-sector representation. In such economies the aggregate compensated demands in any one sector depend only on prices in that sector, the vector of utilities, and a scalar aggregate which in turn may depend upon everything. In particular, prices in the other sector appear only through this aggregate. In a single-consumer economy this division into two sectors carries with it no further implications. However, when there are three or more consumers, economies with a two-sector representation, which may contain public as well as private goods, must fall into a small number of broad classes which are quite restrictive. This means that the two-sector assumption is far less innocuous than one might have previously believed and that there are some phenomena which simply cannot be investigated in this framework.This research has been supported by the SSHRCC with a research grant and by leave fellowships to all three authors for the year 1984–85. Since then all three authors have been in part supported by various SSHRCC grants. In 1989–90 Blackorby was also partly supported by a Senior Killam Fellowship. The first version was written while all three of us were at CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, 1984–85. Later versions were written at the University of British Columbia (Blackorby and Schworm), the University of Western Ontario (Schworm), Université Libre de Bruxelles (Davidson), Queen's University (Davidson), Université d'Aix-Marseille II (Davidson), Université d'Aix-Marseille III (Blackorby) and finally GREQE-EHESS (Blackorby and Davidson). We thank all of them for their support. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the 1986 Canadian Economic Theory Meetings, the Nuffield Conference on Measurement and Modelling in Economics-May, 1987, the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, the Université de Montréal, University of Saskatchewan, and the University of California at Riverside. We have benefited from the comments of the participants in these seminars, and from those of two anonymous referees.     

Economies with Multiple Public Projects

This paper discusses a general equilibrium model of an economy with multiple separately provided public projects. We assume an additively separable cost structure and consider valuation equilibria with separated finance systems, one for each collective good. Under non-Euclidean representation we show the decentralization of Pareto efficient allocations by valuation equilibria and the equivalence of the core and the set of nonnegative valuation equilibria. In the case of Euclidean representation, every Pareto efficient allocation is shown to be supported as an affine valuation equilibrium that is characterized by a personalized price per unit of each public good and a personalized lump sum tax or subsidy. These results complement and clarify already established insights into Lindahl pricing and its generalizations developed in the literature.     

The Second Welfare Theorem in Economies with Non‐Walrasian Markets

The standard version of the second welfare theorem assumes that market operations produce Walrasian outcomes. Therefore, if there are individuals who can manipulate prices, the conclusion of the second welfare theorem is questionable. In this paper, we address the decentralization of a Pareto‐optimal allocation, when markets are non‐Walrasian. Our objective in this paper is to develop a game which can implement Pareto‐optimal allocations as Nash equilibria of strategic exchange in markets. In this way, we develop a version of the second welfare theorem for economies where markets are strategic.     

Subjective conditional probabilities—A new approach

A new technique for estimating the joint probability of a pair of future events is presented. In contrast with the approach previously suggested by Mitchell and Tydeman, the new approach uses a five-outcome model rather than an eight-outcome model and hence requires fewer subjective estimates from the respondents. Conditions for pairwise consistency are discussed.     

既有大型公建节能改造中的进化博弈论分析

运用进化稳定策略为核心的进化博弈方法,对目前我国既有大型公共建筑节能改造工作进行研究,分析得出政府与产权方之间在节能改造问题中的进化博弈解。     

复杂产品系统合作创新博弈分析

运用博弈理论,建立并分析了复杂产品系统合作创新的单次博弈模型和重复博弈模型。得出:在一次性合作的情况下,系统集成商的奖励难以有效激励合作单位积极合作,而惩罚可促使合作单位选择积极合作;在长期合作关系下,系统集成商可结合奖惩制度并利用声誉机制来约束合作单位的机会主义行为。     

Recycling Redux: A Nash–Cournot Approach

We consider an industry characterized by simultaneous competition between the producer of a primary good, and N recylers who are Cournot rivals. Two important factors influence the effect of recycling on the equilibrium outcome and on the primary producer's market power: the structure of production costs, and the time lag between primary production and recycling. The presence of the recycling sector may increase the market power of the primary producer, as conventionally measured by the Lerner index. Some of the results raise doubts about the appropriateness of the Lerner measure of market power in certain contexts.     

Economies of scale in households' cash balances: A series of empirical tests

Here is tested on a sample of FRench chwque deposits in 1966 the hypothesis of economies of scale in the households cash balances. These economies of scale when compared to those expected from theoretical models (Allais, Baumol) turn out to be relatively small. It is suggested that this slight result is due to the fact that the value of the transactions of the studied accounts differ more because of the average value of the effective operations than because of the number of these operations.     

Inflation in Open Economies with Complete Markets

This paper uses an overlapping generations model to analyze monetary policy in a two-country model with asymmetric shocks. Agents insure against risk through the exchange of a complete set of real securities. Each central bank is able to commit to the contingent monetary policy rule that maximizes domestic welfare. In an attempt to improve their country’s terms of trade of securities, central banks choose to commit to costly inflation in favorable states of nature. In equilibrium the effects on the terms of trade wash out, leaving both countries worse off. Countries facing asymmetric shocks may therefore gain from monetary cooperation.     

能力经济:一种新的理论假说

从企业的角度，如何评价战略的优劣，这是战略管理研究者的主要任务之一。企业本上是能力的集合体，能力经济决定了企业战略选择。企业能力经济可以包容规模经济和两种不同的范围经济，揭示了企业可持续竞争优势的更深层次的共有来源。