Agglomeration Economies,Division of Labour and the Urban Land‐rent Escalation: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Urbanisation

A general equilibrium model with increasing return to labour specialisation and economies of transaction agglomeration is developed to address the residential land‐rent escalation associated with the urbanisation process, which is in turn endogenised as a result of the evolution of the division of labour. The interplay among the geographical pattern of transactions, trading efficiency and the network size of the division of labour plays a crucial role in our story of urbanisation. We show that: as transaction conditions are improved, the equilibrium level of division of labour and individuals specialisation levels increase; the urban land‐rent increases absolutely as well as relative to that in the rural area, the relative per capita lot size of residence in the urban and rural areas decreases; the diversity of occupations in the urban area and the population share of urban residents increase; and the productivity of all goods and per capital real income increase.     

FDI and Income Inequality—Evidence from Latin American Economies

This paper analyzes whether foreign direct investment (FDI) has contributed to the wide income gaps in Latin America. Panel cointegration techniques as well as regression analysis are performed to assess the impact of inward FDI stocks on income inequality among households in Latin American host countries. The panel cointegration analysis typically reveals a significant and positive effect on income inequality. There is no evidence for reverse causality. The findings are fairly robust to the choice of different estimation methods, sample selection and the period of observation.     

Disability and Economy: A Game Theoretic Approach

This paper takes a game theoretic approach to disability‐related issues by constructing a model that studies the case of hereditary deafness on Martha's Vineyard Island, USA from the seventeenth century to the early years of twentieth, where the island community adjusted itself to the hereditary deafness so that it was not treated as a disability. The model of the present paper has two stages. First of all, there are two types of continua of agents, the deaf and the non‐deaf. In the first stage, the non‐deaf agents become either bilinguals or monolinguals. In the second stage, agents are classified into deaf people, bilinguals and monolinguals. They are then randomly matched to form a trio to play a three‐person bargaining game with infinite horizon, random proposers and language constraints. Two bargaining games are considered. The first one is a majority bargaining game where only two out of three can agree to implement a bargaining outcome. The second one is a unanimity bargaining game where all three agents are required to reach an agreement. The majority game exhibits strategic complementarity, while the unanimity game exhibits strategic substitutability. This paper also takes an inductive approach to examine how prejudice against people with disability may emerge.     

Market Theoretical Frameworks—Which One?*

The problem of choice between theoretical frameworks forms the focal point of this paper. Its intention is to discuss a possible choice between two distinct approaches to the market order—the ‘neoclassical’ and the ‘Austrian’. Firstly, the basis upon which the two theoretical frameworks are distinguished is explained. Secondly, an attempt is made to show that the two are indeed different and to derive the implications of their differences for policy, for the practice of economics as a social science and for human well-being. Finally, a defensible criterion is suggested along with the ensuing choice, and an explanation is offered as to the relevance of such a choice.     

Testing Employment Determination in Unionised Economies as a Repeated Game

This paper is an empirical analysis of alternative bargaining theories of wage and employment determination. Using data from manufacturing sectors of the Spanish economy, we find that unions and firms are not myopic and take dynamic considerations into account in the bargaining process. This work is an empirical test of the bargaining model in Espinosa and Rhee (1989) and provides support for their conclusions.     

投资者非理性假设下公司金融决策前沿理论评述

随着行为金融理论的逐步发展,市场错误定价的稳定存在已经得到越来越多学者的认可。本文对行为公司金融理论中投资者非理性范式下的前沿理论进行了综述,从投资和融资决策两个方面分析了面对错误时的外部市场定价行为,以及理性的财务决策者如何利用这种市场无效率来为长期股东获利,或迎合非理性投资者预期来实现自己的短期目标。     

Cordon Pricing and Land‐Use Regulation

This study explores the simultaneous imposition of cordon pricing and land‐use regulations in a continuous and closed monocentric city with homogeneous households. Results reveal the optimal level of a single cordon toll and its location and the optimal floor area ratio (FAR) regulation, clarifying what distortions remain in the existence of cordon pricing and FAR regulation. Among other results, this paper shows that, with an optimal cordon toll, FAR regulation should alternate between a minimum and a maximum regulation, both inside and outside the cordon line.     

Estimating Savings and Growth Functions in Developing Economies: A Simultaneous Equations Approach

There is a two-way influence between the savings rate on the one hand and some of its determinants on the other (i.e. a problem of simultaneity exists). This study specifies a general production function to generate a growth rate function, and estimates savings and growth equations simultaneously. A Hausman specification test examines the correct system specification, and determines whether 2SLS or 3SLS is the appropriate estimation technique. The results show that a simultaneous equations model is a better estimation technique (2SLS or 3SLS) than a single equation system (OLS), and that the full-information method (3SLS) provides better estimates than a limited-information method (2SLS). [C30]     

Liability Insurance and Choice of Cars: A Large Game Approach

If a car, already on the road, is replaced by another one, more expensive to collide with, a negative externality spills over to other drivers. This paper studies such externalities, relating them to insurance and incentives. It formalizes links from liability rules to choice of car. By assumption, insurance is cooperative but car acquisition is noncooperative. Construing drivers' interaction as a large game, the paper considers how a Nash equilibrium—and its efficiency or fairness—is shaped by the underlying liability regime.     

Exhaustibility and Risk as Asset Class Dimensions: A Social Investor Approach to Capital-Resource Economies

This paper develops a framework in which asset class dimensions are extended to include both risk and exhaustibility for explaining the evolution of shadow prices of marginal units of exhaustible natural resources in capital-resource economies. It is shown that the pricing kernel function required for socially valuing marginal units of exhaustible resource, hereafter called the Exhaustion-Stochastic Discount Factor, combines a factor that discounts for risk and another factor that discounts for resource exhaustion over time. The social rate of return on the marginal unit of resource stock adds to the risk-premium an exhaustion premium that accounts for the resource depletion over time. In this setting, the principle of no-arbitrage holds by extending asset-class dimensions to include not only a risk dimension but also an exhaustibility dimension.     

Pollution Control in Open Economies: Implications of Within-period Interactions for Dynamic Game Equilibrium

This paper examines a two-country, dynamic game model of pollution control in the presence of economic interactions between countries within a period, as well as the environmental interaction between periods (i.e., a change in the stock of global pollution). These economic interactions emerge because of changes in the terms of trade of polluting goods or the market share of domestic polluting industries. It is shown that if within-period externalities exist, a noncooperative equilibrium may result in a smaller stock of global pollution in the steady state than does international cooperation. Moreover, the properties of equilibrium paths depend on the direction and size of such externalities. In addition, trigger strategy equilibria that achieve the outcome of the collusive solution are examined.     

Economies with observable types

We study economies of asymmetric information with observable types. Trade takes place in lotteries. Individuals face a standard budget constraint, while the incentive compatibility constraints are imposed on the production set of the intermediaries. This formalization encompasses moral hazard, as in [Jerez, 2003] and [Jerez, 2005], and private information economies. Equilibrium allocations are constrained efficient, but, contrary to what stated for example in Jerez (2005), the set of equilibrium allocations may be empty and the Second Welfare Theorem may fail. This happens for two reasons. First, constrained efficient allocations may violate the necessary and sufficient conditions of price supportability for the individuals. Second, even when constrained efficient allocation are price supportable, they may fail to be a profit maximizing choice of the firm at the individual supporting prices. To restore existence of an equilibrium the firm has to be restricted to supply allocations with support in the set of incentive compatible contracts.     

Economies with price-dependent preferences

With the exception of existence, not much is known of economies where individual preferences may depend on prices. We show that the main properties of competitive equilibria that fall under the general heading of qualitative comparative statics remain true when preferences are price-dependent, provided that the total resources are allowed to vary in the parameter space. The equilibrium set is a smooth manifold diffeomorphic to a Euclidean space; the natural projection is a smooth proper map, with topological degree one; equilibria always exist, and are locally unique for an open and dense set of economies.     

会计信息失真的博弈分析

会计信息失真包括合法失真和非法失真两个方面。本试从博弈论的角度对会计信息失真的原因进行探讨，并在此基础上指出加强会计监管和完善会计准则制度是解决这一问题的主要途径。     

Macroeconomic Policy Design in the European Monetary Union: A Numerical Game Approach

Optimal economic reactions of European policy-makers on exogenous shocks are determined by simulating a global macroeconomic model under different institutional arrangements. In particular, it is investigated whether discretionary or rule-based policies and whether non-cooperative or cooperative policies for Europe result in a better performance as measured by intertemporal objective functions. The results show that the answers to these questions depend strongly on the nature of the shock to which European economies are exposed. For a negative supply shock, rule-based policies dominate, whereas for a negative demand shock, cooperative fiscal policy-making within the European Monetary Union gives the best results.     

Exchange Rate Volatility and Output Volatility: A Theoretical Approach*

This paper makes an attempt to determine the factors influencing exchange rate and exchange rate uncertainty, as well as output and output variability. In the context of a small open economy under flexible exchange rates regime it is found that the level both of exchange rate and output is affected by monetary and inflationary shocks, as well as shocks in government spending, output, and trade balance. Further, the uncertainty of exchange rate and output is associated positively with the uncertainty of all shocks while the contemporaneous occurrence of selected shocks imposes either a positive or negative impact on exchange rate and output volatility. Finally, it is shown that the effect of the determinants either of exchange rate volatility or output volatility is very sensitive to the parameter values.     

完善个人所得税制:理论与制度探讨

目前，我国高低收入群体的个人收入差距、城乡居民的个人收入差距、东部与中西部居民的个人收入差距巳客观存在并呈扩大之势。本首先对其现状进行概括分析，并指出人们在认识个人所得税调节收入差距上的误区以及个人所得税产生作用的前提。其次，作在对个人所得税进行经济学分析的基础上为个人所得税制改革提供了理论依据。最后，对完善我国个人所得税的制度设计提出了几点建议。     

Economies with a two-sector representation

Summary In both theoretical and empirical research it is a common practice to partition the economy into (at least) two sectors in order to conduct partial-equilibrium analysis. One merely hopes that general-equilibrium consequences will not obviate all of the analysis of the sector or market in question. In this paper we consider market demand functions which have a two-sector representation. In such economies the aggregate compensated demands in any one sector depend only on prices in that sector, the vector of utilities, and a scalar aggregate which in turn may depend upon everything. In particular, prices in the other sector appear only through this aggregate. In a single-consumer economy this division into two sectors carries with it no further implications. However, when there are three or more consumers, economies with a two-sector representation, which may contain public as well as private goods, must fall into a small number of broad classes which are quite restrictive. This means that the two-sector assumption is far less innocuous than one might have previously believed and that there are some phenomena which simply cannot be investigated in this framework.This research has been supported by the SSHRCC with a research grant and by leave fellowships to all three authors for the year 1984–85. Since then all three authors have been in part supported by various SSHRCC grants. In 1989–90 Blackorby was also partly supported by a Senior Killam Fellowship. The first version was written while all three of us were at CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, 1984–85. Later versions were written at the University of British Columbia (Blackorby and Schworm), the University of Western Ontario (Schworm), Université Libre de Bruxelles (Davidson), Queen's University (Davidson), Université d'Aix-Marseille II (Davidson), Université d'Aix-Marseille III (Blackorby) and finally GREQE-EHESS (Blackorby and Davidson). We thank all of them for their support. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the 1986 Canadian Economic Theory Meetings, the Nuffield Conference on Measurement and Modelling in Economics-May, 1987, the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, the Université de Montréal, University of Saskatchewan, and the University of California at Riverside. We have benefited from the comments of the participants in these seminars, and from those of two anonymous referees.