A comparison of different contract forms for consumers with switching costs and changed preferences

This paper compares three contract forms, including short-term contract with price discrimination, short-term contract without price discrimination, and long-term contract with price commitment for consumers with switching costs and changed preferences. We find that long-term contract generates the largest profit for firms. Moreover, we find that switching costs make the market more competitive when consumers have changed preferences, and the higher the switching costs, the more competitive. Our theory combines linear-city duopoly and switching-cost model and the results are consistent with literature, for example price commitment is valuable. Our findings shed light on the practice of different forms of dynamic pricing in various industries including telecommunication industry and airline industry.     

Price discrimination and price dispersion in a duopoly

This paper analyses the problem of price discrimination in a market where consumers have heterogeneous preferences both over a horizontal parameter (brand) and a vertical one (quality). Discriminatory contracts are characterized for different market structures. It is shown that price dispersion, i.e. the observed range of prices for each class of customers, increases almost everywhere as competition is introduced in the market.     

Should Mobile Marketers Collect Data Other Than Geo‐Location?*

We take today's mobile marketing data landscape as a starting point and consider a duopoly model of third‐degree price discrimination in which firms can complement geo‐location information with data on consumer flexibility of varying quality. We show that, depending on consumer heterogeneity, higher‐quality flexibility data affect profits according to three different patterns. In equilibrium, both firms tend to acquire data if the data are of high quality, while only one acquires data if the data quality is low. Firms are likely to gain from additional data if consumers have similar preferences and/or when data are precise. Although social welfare (weakly) improves, consumers can be harmed.     

Revisiting the welfare effects of eliminating business cycles

We investigate the welfare effects of eliminating business cycles in a model with substantial consumer heterogeneity. The heterogeneity arises from uninsurable and idiosyncratic uncertainty in preferences and employment status. We calibrate the model to match the distribution of wealth in U.S. data and features of transitions between employment and unemployment. In comparison with much of the literature, we find rather large effects. For our benchmark model, we find welfare effects that, on average across all consumers, are of a bit more than one order of magnitude larger than those computed by Lucas [Lucas Jr., R.E., 1987. Models of Business Cycles. Basil Blackwell, New York]. When we distinguish long- from short-term unemployment, long-term unemployment being distinguished by poor (and highly procyclical) employment prospects and low unemployment compensation, the average gain from eliminating cycles is as much as 1% in consumption equivalents. In addition, in both models, there are large differences across groups: very poor consumers gain a lot when cycles are removed (the long-term unemployed as much as around 30%), as do very rich consumers, whereas the majority of consumers—the “middle class”—sees much smaller gains from removing cycles. Inequality also rises substantially upon removing cycles.     

Inflation Expectations and Monetary Policy Surprises*

We estimate monetary policy surprises for European consumers over time, based on monetary policy changes that were unanticipated according to consumers’ stated beliefs. We find that such monetary policy surprises have the opposite impact on inflation expectations from the impact found when assuming that consumers are well informed. Relaxing the latter assumption by focusing on consumers’ stated beliefs, unanticipated increases in the interest rate raise inflation expectations before the 2008 financial crisis. This is consistent with imperfect information theoretical settings where interest rate hikes are interpreted as positive news about the state of the economy by consumers who know that policymakers have relatively more information.     

Task Routineness and Trade Policy Preferences

Understanding the formation of individual trade policy preferences is a fundamental input into the modeling of trade policy outcomes. Surprisingly, past studies have found mixed evidence that various labor market and industry attributes of workers affect their trade policy preferences, even though recent studies have found that trade policy can have substantial impacts on workers' incomes. This paper provides the first analysis of the extent to which task routineness affects trade policy preferences using survey data from the American National Election Studies. We find significant evidence that greater task routineness leads workers to be much more supportive of import restrictions, consistent with recent evidence on how trade openness puts downward pressure on employment and wages for workers whose occupations involve routine tasks. In fact, other than education levels, task routineness is the only labor market attribute that displays a robust correlation with individuals' stated trade policy preferences. We also provide evidence that there are some interactions between the economic and non‐economic factors in our study. For example, women's trade policy views are much more invariant to their labor market attributes than men, suggesting that women's views on this issue are driven more by personal and ideological beliefs than men.     

Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis

In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction channels. When subjects play both roles in such experiments, a positive correlation between first- and second-mover behavior is frequently reported. We find that the observed correlation primarily originates via an indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs through a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. Specifically, beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. However, we also find evidence for a direct, preference-based channel. When first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have predictive power regarding their first moves.     

Consumer discrimination and the firm's demand for black labor

This paper analyzes the firm's demand for labor in markets characterized by racial prejudice on the part of consumers. It is seen that the consumer discrimination concept leads to empirically testable implications regarding employment policies of firms. Moreover, unlike previous models of taste discrimination, it is found that racial discrimination need not be unprofitable; will not result in segregation of workers; and will not yield wage equality between black and white workers.     

Effects of income and social awareness on consumer WTP for social product attributes

Recent developments in environmental and animal welfare issues, and the introduction of new production practices may have affected consumer attitudes and preferences toward differentiated product choice. Factors such as animal well-being, environmentally friendly production, and the use of antibiotics appear to be increasingly core consumer concerns. We link the aforementioned with Maslow's hierarchy of needs suggesting that the higher income consumers should be more altruistic in their consumptive behavior and test this by evaluating consumer preferences for these attributes in pork chops. We also test whether social consciousness of the consumers translates into choice behavior. Data was obtained by choice experiment surveys and mixed logit estimation was used to estimate consumers' willingness-to-pay for the credence attributes. Results reveal that both, higher income and socially aware consumers are on average willing to pay higher premiums for the antibiotic-free attribute, but not for other two social attributes. Also, the group of higher income consumers is highly heterogeneous in their preferences, whereas socially aware consumers tend to be more homogeneous in their preferences.     

消费者对产品评价影响因素之研究——品牌形象与知觉风险所扮演的中介角色

消费者对产品之概念,经常因个人之人格特质、习惯、偏好及受环境的影响,产生极大的差异化,且随着产品不断创新,使消费者对产品属性逐渐产生信息不对称之情形,故在选购产品时无法有明确的标的做为参考之依据,因而往往受到外部线索或外在刺激之影响进行购买行为。以往研究外部线索的相关议题中,皆只谈到单一外部线索或两种外部线索对产品评价进行讨论,因此本研究将过去学者所提到之外部线索加以整合形成概念性架构,加以探讨外部线索对消费者购买行为之影响。本研究共发放350份问卷,有效回收问卷253份,利用结构方程模式(SEM)以验证性因素分析检验各构面之效度,检定结果各构面均具有足够的收敛效度与区别效度,并进一步验证整体模式配适度,验证结果显示整体模式配适标准达检定水平,表示本研究的理论模型可获得支持,且代言人可信度、享乐主义、促销活动、品牌形象等外部线索对产品评价皆有正向显著的影响,分析结果亦显示品牌形象对享乐主义与产品评价之间具有中介效果,及知觉风险对品牌形象与产品评价之间亦具有中介效果,更凸显了品牌形象与知觉风险所扮演的重要角色。另外,从本研究发现,消费者在搜寻外部线索时,品牌形象在消费者心中占了相当重要的地位,过去惯用的营销手法...     

宗教信仰、政治身份与企业投资偏好

文章运用企业家宗教信仰的直接调查数据,考察了企业家的个人宗教信仰对企业投资活动的影响。研究发现,相对于研发型投资,有宗教信仰的企业家偏好于风险相对较小的关系型投资;不同类型的宗教信仰对企业投资偏好具有不同的影响,笃信东方宗教的企业家相对于笃信西方宗教的企业家更加偏好于关系型投资;企业家的宗教信仰对投资偏好的影响因企业家是否具有政治身份而有所不同,相对于有政治身份的企业家,没有政治身份的企业家的宗教信仰会更加显著地正向影响关系型投资,表明政治身份可能会弱化宗教信仰在关系型投资中的作用。     

Strategic Quality Decisions by Heterogeneously Informed Suppliers — The Role of "Noise Consumers"—

In a differentiated oligopoly market, it is often the case that consumers' ex post preferences over different product qualities depend upon the state of nature which is not yet observable to the consumers at the time of purchase. One of the most typical examples is a market for durable goods or long-term service contracts, where the state is indeed a future state which has not yet realised when the transaction is made. To analyse such situations, this paper models a two-stage game, in which multiple suppliers move first to choose the quality of their products based upon their idiosyncratic information about the state. Consumers then observe these products, update their beliefs about the state, and decide which products to purchase. Counterintuitively, suppliers' incentives to reveal their private information are higher when there is a fraction of consumers whose prior about the state is moderately inaccurate, than when every consumer has better prior information. Hence the presence of such "noise consumers" can make all consumers better off, even including noise consumers themselves.     

On the Welfare Effects of Eliminating Business Cycles

We investigate the welfare effects of eliminating business cycles in a model with substantial consumer heterogeneity. The heterogeneity arises from uninsurable and idiosyncratic uncertainty in preferences and employment, where, regarding employment, we distinguish among employment and short- and long-term unemployment. We calibrate the model to match the distribution of wealth in U.S. data and features of transitions between employment and unemployment. Unlike previous studies, we study how business cycles affect different groups of consumers. We conclude that the cost of cycles is small for almost all groups and, indeed, is negative for some.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C68, D31, D61, E32.     

Efficiency and equilibrium when preferences are time-inconsistent

We consider an exchange economy with time-inconsistent consumers whose preferences are additively separable. If consumers have identical discount factors, then allocations that are Pareto efficient at the initial date are also renegotiation-proof. In an economy with a sequence of markets, competitive equilibria are Pareto efficient in this sense, and for generic endowments, only if preferences are locally homothetic.     

Contribution to a public good under subjective uncertainty

This paper examines how voluntary contributions to a public good are affected by the contributors' heterogeneity in beliefs about the uncertain impact of their contributions. It assumes that contributors have Savagian preferences that are represented by a two‐state‐dependent expected utility function and different beliefs about the benefit that will result from the sum of their contributions. We establish general comparative statics results regarding the effect of specific changes in the distribution of beliefs on the (unique) Nash equilibrium provision of the public good, under certain conditions imposed on the preferences. We specifically show that the equilibrium public good provision is increasing with respect to both first‐ and second‐order stochastic dominance changes in the distribution of beliefs. Hence, increasing the contributors' optimism about the uncertain benefit of their contributions increases aggregate public good provision, as does any homogenization of these beliefs around their mean.     

Beliefs and Public Good Provision with Anonymous Contributors

We analyze a static game of public good contributions where finitely many anonymous players have heterogeneous preferences about the public good and heterogeneous beliefs about the distribution of preferences. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, the only individuals who make positive contributions are those who most value the public good and who are also the most pessimistic; that is, according to their beliefs, the proportion of players who most like the public good is smaller than it would be according to any other possible belief. We predict whether the aggregate contribution is larger or smaller than it would be in an analogous game with complete information and heterogeneous preferences, by comparing the beliefs of contributors with the true distribution of preferences. A trade‐off between preferences and beliefs arises if there is no individual who simultaneously has the highest preference type and the most pessimistic belief. In this case, there is a symmetric equilibrium, and multiple symmetric equilibria occur only if there are more than two preference types.     

Dumping in a Linder Model of Trade with Multiple Retail Channels

The last decade has witnessed an accelerating adoption of AD laws by LDCs and their increasing usage against developed countries. Our model of third degree price discrimination with heterogenous consumers that have differing preferences for quality in the two countries suggests that this is likely to continue. Duopolistic interaction may yield bilateral dumping, or unilateral dumping in either direction, under free trade. Even when dumping is unidirectional, there is a compelling basis for the introduction of AD laws by both governments. This mitigates competition, which is beneficial for both firms, and portends pessimism for an abatement of this recent proliferation of AD laws and complaints.     

Efficient allocations under ambiguity

Important implications of the expected utility hypothesis and risk aversion are that if agents have the same probability belief, then consumption plans in every efficient allocation of resources under uncertainty are comonotone with the aggregate endowment, and if their beliefs are concordant, then the consumption plans are measurable with respect to the aggregate endowment. We study these two properties of efficient allocations for models of preferences that exhibit ambiguity aversion using the concept of conditional beliefs, which we introduce in this paper. We provide characterizations of such conditional beliefs for the standard models of preferences used in applications.     

Working time and wage rate differences: Revisiting the role of preferences and labor scarcity

In the labor economics literature, discrimination is often defined as occurring when identically productive workers, placed in the same working conditions, are assigned contracts involving, in particular, different hourly wage rates. This paper applies contract theory to explain how in some circumstances such differences take place, even if contract discrimination and productivity differences are strictly ruled out. It is assumed that worker types differ only in their consumption/leisure preferences and in their availability. A labor cost-minimizing firm offers a menu of labor contracts, and lets workers self-select. The model reveals external effects between types and the possibility of a paradoxical situation in which less demanding workers obtain a higher wage rate. A mixed employment regime always requires a minimum number (a quantum) of most demanding workers.