企业参与自愿环境协议的驱动力探析

环境问题日益成为困扰一个国家发展的瓶颈.区别以往的强制管理手段,企业自愿减排、自愿达成环境管理目标已经成为今天环境管理的主要工具之一,自愿环境协议就是建立在企业自觉自愿基础上,以契约形式承诺改进环境质量的环境政策工具,已经成为环境管理的新模式, “企业为什么会选择参与自愿协议”已成为环境管理研究的新问题.文章从经济的、非经济的因素对现象背后的驱动因素进行系统识别,为进一步实证研究做好理论铺垫.     

我国自愿环境协议的第三方主体选择及其职能安排刍议

自愿环境协议在环境管制的实务中得以流畅运用,政府与企业以外的第三方主体对企业环境绩效所进行的评估功不可没。在我国,可由政府对从事环境服务业的法人实体开展资质认证,依此判断这些组织机构是否具备为协助政府与企业实施自愿环境协议所必要的环境审计能力,并根据所获得的结论建立第三方协议参与者官方认证资源库。通过认证的第三方在自愿环境协议中负责对企业进行环境审计、环境目标执行计划书评审和履约绩效监督,企业购买此类环境服务的费用享受公共财政的支持。     

自愿环境协议的经济学分析——一个企业单边联合供给模型

环境政策领域使用较为普遍的管制方法是命令-控制工具和市场类工具,但现实中涌现越来越多的自愿性环境保护协议。通过建立私人企业单边联合供给模型,对该现象进行经济学分析,为由大量企业自发合作和形成自愿环境协议的不可能性提供理论支持,并模拟给出自愿环境协议的最优规模和大小。     

自愿环境协议(VEAs)纯威胁博弈模型的构建与分析

以社会福利最大化为前提,对VEAs产生的经济机理进行了研究,构建了纯威胁式模型,考证了在VEAs下企业与政府经过博弈达成的污染治理水平。研究发现,VEAs的产生和最后达成是企业与政府讨价还价能力分配及立法要求威胁的大小共同作用的结果,结论认为法律法规的威胁是促使VEAs产生的直接动力。     

中国自愿和非自愿外汇储备的实证分析

我国外汇储备保持持续快速增长态势,目前已成为仅次于日本的第二大外汇储备国。在此背景下,中国的外汇储备问题引起了广泛的关注。本文从外汇储备的来源结构出发,将外汇储备划分为自愿储备和非自愿储备,分析我国外汇储备增长的来源。文章在对外商直接投资、证券投资、其他投资、净误差和遗漏项等账户进行分析的基础上,估算和确定了国际收支平衡表中的具体项目对自愿储备和非自愿储备的实际贡献,指出我国外汇储备的变动在一定程度上是由非自愿的外汇储备变动引致的。文章最后探讨了自愿和非自愿外汇储备所带来的经济影响,并提出了相应的政策建议。     

系统论视野下我国应对气候变化立法研究

气候变化是人类面临的一个空前复杂的综合性问题.我国易受气候变化影响,面临着国际应对气候变化的减排压力,而我国应对气候变化立法供给严重不足,无法系统应对气候变化.我国有必要借鉴国际和域外国家应对气候变化立法经验,以生态中心主义理念为指导,运用系统论的理论和方法修订《环境保护法》,实现对各环境介质的系统保护,制定应对气候变化专门法及配套法规、规章,完善相关法律法规,实现对气候变化的系统性立法防治,保持气候系统结构和功能总体平衡稳定.     

中国适应气候变化的科技政策变迁与展望

适应气候变化的科技政策是该领域科技活动的重要保障。以2007—2020年期间212份适应气候变化的中央科技政策文件作为分析样本,采用共词和聚类方法,分析不同时期适应性科技政策主题聚焦点演进和变化。研究结果显示,“技术研发”“技术成果应用推广”“资金保障”“监测应急能力发展规划”“水利科技发展支持”等主题发生了明显的政策逻辑变迁。整体来看,适应性科技政策呈现密切结合国家气候适应战略演进而深化发展的特点,未来中国适应气候变化的科技政策应进一步引导适应技术科研方向,助力气候适应科技成果转化,提供财政、信息等资源支持。     

自愿型环境规制如何影响企业生存？

作为传统环境规制的重要补充,自愿型环境规制旨在鼓励企业在政府强制要求之外承担额外的环境责任。不同于以往的短期效果研究,本文从企业生存的长期视角讨论了自愿型环境规制的治理效果。基于国家认证认可监督管理委员会披露的绿色认证数据和中国工业企业数据库,本文采用Cox比例风险模型和倾向得分匹配方法分析了自愿型环境规制对企业生存能力的影响及其作用机制。研究结果显示：自愿型环境规制对企业生存能力有显著提升作用;自愿型环境规制主要通过增加政府补贴和改善政企关系提升企业生存能力;自愿型环境规制更有助于提升非国有企业和高污染企业生存能力,且正式环境规制强度越大,自愿型环境规制对企业生存能力的提升作用越强。以上结论不仅为自愿型环境规制在长期演化过程中促进经济绿色转型的政策效果提供了经验证据,还能为政府优化环境规制体系设计提供重要依据。     

企业无形资产信息自愿披露现状及建议

无形资产信息是投资者评价企业尤其是高科技企业价值的关键,大量无形资产在强制性披露的框架下难以呈现于投资者眼前,应鼓励上市公司自愿披露更多无形资产相关信息。然而,目前企业无形资产信息自愿披露水平普遍较低,究其原因,既有无形资产自身特点方面的原因,又有制度、市场以及上市公司自身的原因。因此应从以下三个方面着手改善无形资产信息的自愿披露现状：完善公司治理结构;鼓励企业进行自愿信息披露;加强对上市公司自愿信息披露的监管。     

Voluntary Environmental Agreements and Competition Policy

Voluntary environmental agreements are oftensuspected to promote collusive practicesbetween participating firms. The paperaddresses the antitrust implications ofGermany's voluntary Dual Management System forPackaging Waste Collection and Recycling (DSD). It uses analytical tools of the economictheory of the firm to examine features ofDSD's governance structure that were oftenidentified to impede competition. While thepaper does not argue that DSD performs asefficiently as a hypothetical solution in amore competitive setting, it shows that thesefeatures have an economic rationale from theviewpoint of the theory of the firm. Thegeneral conclusion is that it is necessary tocarefully analyze the institutional fine-tuningof a voluntary agreement in order to derive theoverall impact stemming from a formal lack ofcompetition. A more case-to-case-oriented,institutional research approach could thereforefruitfully supplement model-driven, theoreticalanalyses of voluntary environmental agreementsand their effect on market competition.     

Voluntary Environmental Agreements vs. Emission Taxes in Strategic Trade Models

The purpose of the paper is to narrow the gap between the widespread use of voluntary agreements and research on the rationale of such approaches. A topical example are voluntary agreements of many industries to reduce carbon dioxide emissions because of global warming. If the industry anticipates that taxes and fees will be introduced in the coming years, it seems rational to act in advance in order to mitigate the tax levels.The conventional approach in strategic trade and tax models was to look at a two-stage game where governments set taxes first and then firms react. In such a policy regime the government is concerned about the international competitiveness of its firms and sets taxes below marginal damages. In this paper, we consider a policy regime with a reversed timing. Firms commit themselves in the face of emission taxes to abatement efforts and to lower levels of the environmentally intensive output. Then the government introduces the tax. Under this timing of strategies the tax is equal to marginal damage. Firms waive profit and reduce output in order to use less of the polluting input. The reward for this behavior will be a less strict use of policy instruments and hence lower abatement costs in the near future.     

Overcompliance and Voluntary Agreements

Voluntary agreements with industry offer many examplesof overcompliance with respect to environmentalstandards. Such phenomena seem to be irrational butappear less surprising considering firms' strategiesare aimed to internalise environmental quality. Wemodel the choice of the environmental quality ofproducts in a one-shot game between a monopolist andconsumers, to show the existence of inefficientequilibria where quality is low because of moralhazard. The firm can, however, change its' equilibriumstrategy in a repeated but finite game, in order tobuild an environmental reputation if we suppose thatconsumers' information is not only imperfect withregard to quality, but also incomplete with respect toany environmental constraint that may affect thebehaviour of firms (like the threat either of astricter regulation or of potential entry). In atwo-period model, we show the existence of a perfectBayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies where thefirm can revert to the production of green products inorder to influence consumers' beliefs and acquire anenvironmentally friendly reputation. Due to thepeculiarity of environmental information (greenproducts are credence goods), we claim that anexplicit agreement is also necessary in order toestablish monitoring and controlling procedures toverify the performance of firms. These procedures canexplain per se the diffusion of voluntary agreementsthat are nevertheless self-enforcing because of thereputation effect.     

Research Frontiers in the Economics of Climate Change

Academic and policy debates over climate change risks and policies have stimulated economic research in a variety of fields. In this article I briefly discuss eight overlapping areas of current research in which further effort is particularly warranted. These areas include decision criteria for policy; risk assessment and adaptation; uncertainty and learning; abatement cost and the innovation and diffusion of technology; and the credibility of policies and international agreements. Further analysis in these areas not only will advance academic understanding but also will provide insights of considerable importance to policymakers.     

Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality

The last decade has seen a dramatic increase in the use of voluntaryapproaches (VAs) to environmental protection, which has spurned agrowing literature on the relative merits of voluntary vs. mandatoryapproaches. This paper draws on that literature to discuss both thetheoretical and empirical issues that arise in the evaluation orassessment of a particular VA. We consider both the environmentaleffectiveness and the efficiency of this policy approach. Our aim is toaid policymakers in evaluating a specific program or in thinking aboutthe use and design of a VA. We identify some key features that arelikely to increase both the effectiveness and the efficiency of VAs.     

Voluntary Agreements and Non-Verifiable Emissions

If pollution is observable, but some emissions cannot be verified by court,voluntary agreements between a regulator and an industry may bewelfare-improving compared to second-best emission taxes. Such agreementsdiffer from direct regulation in a non-trivial way. The first-best optimummay be included in the set of possible agreements, even if it is notattainable using tax instruments. The non-verifiability may, for example, beassociated with delimitation problems in defining the pollution tax base.     

气候变化背景下污染者负担原则的适用

污染者负担原则作为环境法的基本原则,通过明确环境责任主体、责任范围为环境问题的解决指明了方向。气候变化作为新型环境问题,其所具有的复杂性、全球性以及不均衡性对污染者负担原则的适用提出了新的要求:气候变化背景下要求更加全面完整的把握污染者负担原则,充分挖掘其隐性公正性,要求重新界定污染者的内涵,实现负担的实质正义。基于此种要求,文章提出了从受益者负担消费者负担以及共同但有区别的责任三个角度来适用该原则的建议。     

气候变化全球治理的处境、困境与路径

应对气候变化的全球治理无疑是当今世界最受关注的治理实践。与人们的期望相背,气候治理的实践一直都是并将在可见的将来都会是举步维艰的。之所以如此,是由气候治理的内在困境所决定的;因此,有效的治理路径只能是立足于现实困境之上的谨慎探索。     

Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements

We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper we assess the stability of water allocation agreements using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that a decrease in mean river flow decreases the stability of an agreement, while an increased variance can have a positive or a negative effect on stability. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules. These results hold for both constant and flexible non-water transfers.