ECC合同中的"争端解决"程序

国际工程项目实施过程中,尽管合同双方都尽力避免争端事件的发生,但由于国际工程规模大、周期长、技术复杂、管理难度大,不可避免地会遇到许多在合同中无法找到解决办法的问题,这些问题常常在合同当事人之间产生争端,继而引起合同当事人一方向另一方提出索赔。 按传统工程施工合同,如 ＦＩＤＩＣ合同,ＩＣＥ合同,这类争端首先应提交雇主聘用的咨询工程师（我国称监理工程师）来处理。 过去几十年国际工程管理的实践证明,合同双方对咨询工程师解决争端应采取的独立公正态度一直持怀疑态度,因而争端的最终解决往往采用既耗时又耗资…     

ECC合同中的"缺陷改正"程序

英国土木工程师学会1995年11月出版的第二版“工程施工合同”（TheEngineeringandConstruc-tionContract，简称ECC合同）核心条款第4条对工程“缺陷”及其“缺陷改正”程序作出了明确的规定，这有利于合同各方共同努力以达到工程预定的质量目标。工程“缺陷”的定义ECC合同核心条款第11.2（15）款明确指出,“缺陷”是指不符合工程信息的工程，即不符合招标文件中对合同工程所作出的规定和说明，或不符合招标文件中对承包商实施工程所采用方法的要求。若承包商承担部分工程的设计，“缺陷”也指承包商负责设计的那部分工程不符合当今适用…     

ECC合同中的"补偿事件"及处理

补偿事件起因 英国土木工程师学会1995年11月出版的“工程施工合同”（简称ECC合同）将承包商可以向雇主索赔的事件称为“补偿事件”（Compensation Events）。ECC合同中的“核心条款”第60．1条列举了“补偿事件”的18种情况,可归纳为：雇主风险事件;雇主未履约的事件;项目经理／监理工程师的指令引起的事件;实际施工条件／气候条件变化引起的事件。具体为： 1．雇主风险主要有六类,如ECC合同第80．1条所述。 ①雇主提供的设计错误风险; ②雇主提供材料设备带来的风险; ③不可抗力引起雇主设备、材料的损失和损坏的风险; ④雇…     

ECC中的"早期警告"

１９９５年１１月英国土木工程师学会出版的第二版新工程合同（ＮＥＣ）系列中的工程施工合同（ＥｎｇｉｎｅｅｒｉｎｇａｎｄＣｏｎｓｔｒｕｃｔｉｏｎＣｏｎｔｒａｃｔ，简称ＥＣＣ合同）是有别于传统工程施工合同的一套新工程施工合同条件。其宗旨和指导思想是：合同双方有义务进行合作，以减少或避免争端，促进工程项目良好的管理。合同条件中的“早期警告”（ＥａｒｌｙＷａｒｎｉｎｇ）程序是一项有利于工程项目良好管理的措施。内容１．ＥＣＣ合同条件中的核心条款第１６条规定，“早期警告”指合同当事人双方，即承包商和业主的项目…     

基金定投:万变不离分摊风险

<正>股神巴菲特说,"如果你不愿意持有一只股票10年,请不要拥有它1分钟",可见,即便是"火眼金睛"的股神,在选择买入后,面对跌宕起伏的资本市场,仍需要经受时间的考验。中国股民在经历了A股2007年从6100点直接摔倒2008年1700点的悬崖后,不得不重新思考风险在投资过程中的重要性。     

谈国企经营中的合同风险

随着我国加入WTO过程中开发了国际市场,企业所面临的市场环境发生了深刻的变化.市场竞争在给企业带来发展机遇的同时.也带采了日益增多的风险,尤其是合同风险增加,给不少国有企业带来难以弥补的损失.本文从国有企业的合同风险处理方法入手,再叙述了国有企业经营中出现的合同风险的种类,最后对以上的问题进行以强化自身为主的解决办法.希望为国有企业经营中的合同风险防范起到一定得作用.     

企业采购合同中的法律风险控制

设备物资采购是企业最常见的交易行为,作为采购方的企业如何在签订合同过程中有效控制法律风险,是值得关注的问题。本文阐述了采购合同签订需注意的法律问题,并说明采购企业只有在加强制度建设的同时,强化执行者的责任意识和角色意识,才能将法律风险控制落到实处。     

高校管理中的"程序正义"

随着高校的扩招,高校和高校学生管理已经成为社会注目的焦点和公共话题,然而,高校学生管理中的程序瑕疵却成为诱发高校与学生矛盾的一个主要因素,在高校学生管理中实现"程序正义".是解决这一问题的有效途径.     

谨防施工总承包合同中的"陷阱"

近年来,在国际工程承包市场上,一些国家的政府业主在基础设施项目的建设过程中,为避免因聘请专业设计咨询公司而支付昂贵的费用,开始尝试将设计和工程施工进行一体化招标,即所谓的设计-施工总承包,并沿用FDIC的《生产设备和设计-施工合同条件》,即新"黄皮书"作为通用合同文本.     

FIDIC合同条件中的索赔和争端解决程序

FIDIC土木工程施工合同条件的显著特点之一是，不要求承包商在其投标报价中将不可预见的风险因素和大笔可能发生的应急费用包括进去，而是主张如果确实发生了此类事件，则由雇主进行赔偿或支付此类费用，这为承包商的施工索赔提供了一个空间。它要求承包商对突发或应急事件反应迅速，及时维护自身的权益。第二，合同条件属于重新计量合同，即承包商只需在合同中给出每一单项工程的单价，然后再根据雇主预先估算的工程量计算出合同总价，在实施合同中承包商所完成的实际工作量要通过实际测量来核实。当实际工程量的增加或减少对承包商合同…     

项目融资合同文件体系及其管理

项目融资由于参与方众多,该融资合同文件数量庞大而且关系复杂.目前针对项目融资合同文件体系的研究多集中于对单个合同文本具体内容的研究,缺乏对合同文件体系全面、系统地研究.本文分析了项目融资过程中的合同文件间的关系,提出了主合同和从合同的概念,并且探讨了项目融资合同文件体系管理的目的、内容和流程.     

An axiomatic approach to choice under uncertainty with catastrophic risks

This paper analyses decision under uncertainty with catastrophic risks, and is motivated by problems emerging from global environmental risks. These are typically low-probability events with major irreversible consequences. For such risks, the Von Neumann–Morgenstern (NM) axioms for decision making under uncertainty are not appropriate, since they are shown here to be insensitive to low-probability events. The paper introduces an alternative set of axioms requiring sensitivity to both low- and large-probability events. Through a new representation theorem in functional analysis, the results characterize all the operators whose maximization leads to the fulfillment of these axioms. They involve a convex combination of expected utility and a criterion based on the desire to avoid low probability and potentially catastrophic events. It is shown that the new axioms help resolve the Allais paradox. Open questions about risk aversion, games under uncertainty and calculus of variations are discussed.     

国际石油合作项目中的政治风险及其管理

作为一个国家重要的战略物资,石油往往与政治紧密联系。到海外投资石油项目,企业将面临着由于项目所在国的政治条件发生变化而给项目带来的损失,有时甚至导致项目的失败,这种风险就是项目的政治风险。项目的政治风险可分为两大类:一类表现为国家风险,即项目所在国政府由于某种政治原因或外交政策上的原因对项目实行征用、没收,或者对项目产品实行禁运、联合抵制、中止债务偿还等;另一类表现为国家政治、经济、法律稳定性风险,即项目所在国在外汇管理、法律制度、税收制度、劳资关系、环境保护、资源主权等与项目有关的敏感性问题的立法不健…     

Efficient risk sharing,non-marketable labor income and fixed-wage contracts

This paper seeks to explain fixed-wage labor contracts. The traditional rationale that fixed wages represent an implicit sale of ‘wage insurance’ by risk-neutral firms to risk-averse workers is rejected as being incompatible with the fact that firms are owned by risk-averse investors. Instead, it is shown that fixed-wage contracts might arise from the non-marketability of labor income. When human capital is not marketable, it becomes optimal to shift all the risk in production onto the firm, since trading in equity markets enables efficient allocation of the uncertainty. The fixed-wage contract shifts the risk to equity owners and in fact replicates the first-best equilibrium that would emerge if individuals were paid their realized marginal product and allowed to trade shares in human capital.     

On employment,wage and risk sharing in labor contracts

This note studies risk sharing in labor contracts when the price of the firm's product is uncertain. It demonstrates that if the firm adjusts employment at its own discretion, then the wage should not in general be constant, but should be constant only if the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas type.     

From families to formal contracts: An approach to development

This paper develops a theory in which individuals can use one of two types of human/social capital to enforce contracts: “Local capital” relies on families and other personal networks; “market capital” relies on impersonal market institutions such as auditors and courts. Local capital is efficient when most trading is local, but only market capital can support trading between strangers that allows extensive division of labor and industrialization. We show that economies with a low cost of accumulating local capital (say, because people live close together) are richer than economies with a high cost of accumulation when long distance trade is difficult, but are slower to transition to impersonal market exchange (industrialize) when long distance trade becomes feasible. The model provides one way to understand why the wealthiest economies in 1600 AD, China, India, and the Islamic Middle East, industrialized more slowly than the West. We report an array of historical evidence documenting the pre-industrial importance of family and kinship networks in China, India, and the Islamic world compared to Europe, and the modernization problems linked to local capital.     

An introduction to the Millennium Project

The pace, complexity, and globalization of change requires attention to the future. The change of millennia — the coming of the year 2001 — provides an opportunity, a psychological focus, for a global review of past achievements and problems and a unique chance to assess and reflect on future issues and opportunities.Unfortunately, there is as yet no mechanism or information utility to support a worldwide effort to study past achievements and problems or future issues and opportunities. Although there are many individual, isolated, special purpose, and one-time study efforts underway, there is no international system that can provide coherence or continuity to these studies, including feedback and sharing of information, and, in particular, the systematic exploration of future possibilities and policy alternatives. With growing interest in the future, the spread of instantaneous and global communications, the advent of powerful new nondeterministic modeling techniques, the ability to evoke, capture, and share information and perceptions with systematic questioning techniques and software, the proliferation of data bases, and knowledge visualization, it is now possible for futurists, scholars and others around the world to interact globally and take a fresh look at the future possibilities and policies in ways not previously possible.As the World Bank provides an ongoing system for research and feedback to improve economic policy, so too the United Nations University could provide an ongoing system for the improvement of futures research and its application to the policy process. According to a series of interviews, questionnaires, and meetings with leading futurists and scholars around the world, the proposed “Millenium Project” has the potential to become such a system.This study had as its principal objective determining the design of an information system that could effectively tap contributors, worldwide, to focus on lessons of the past that bear on world issues and the potential of future developments for intensifying or mitigating these and future issues. The first phase of the feasibility study was both methodological and substantive. Worldwide panels of experts contributed their judgments about the method or process of organizing the project; and the system that emerged from this interaction was applied in a prototype study to the issues of growing world population and the environment.During the first phase of the feasibility study, we found that:

1. 1. The Millennium Project is feasible and likely to be helpful to many institutions in examining and resolving policy issues at several levels. An overview of the project design and objectives appears in Section 2 of this article.

2. 2. Organizations that have an issues scanning function, or have a mandate to keep abreast of a broad range of futures thinking, have a need for access to a non-political, scholarly, and international system of future studies. Such organizations have requested continued participation in the second and third phase of this feasibility study, as well as establishing formal relations with the full Millennium Project.

3. 3. While several questions remain, the design features of a system to collect judgments using the Delphi process that were suggested by the international panel (outlined elsewhere in this report) form a straight forward operational system. Among the remaining questions are the design and use of international information systems and data bases, integration with quantitative techniques such as system modeling, the requirements for special study teams, and institutionalization and financial support. The design of the operational system is described in detail in Section 3 of this report.

4. 4. Cost estimates have been made for establishing international panels and collecting and analyzing information they provide using the Delphi process. Several assumptions are required. If a maximum of four topics are addressed in a particular year, each of the four panels consists of 150–200 people, the staff is kept to a base of three people with an additional 1.5 per panel, and advisors are paid an honorarium of $1.500, then the cost of this element of the full scale Project is likely to be approximately $900,000 per year. While communications modes are important in terms of timing and information access, the costs of communications are the smallest of the Project's cost elements. Detail of our cost estimates appear in Section 7 of this report.

This is not the final feasibility study report, but only a report on part of Phase I. As such, it contains our initial findings about how the Project might be organized. We welcome comments from the reader. Please consider this as work in progress.     

Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement

We consider a financing game where monitoring is costly, non-contractible and allowed to be stochastic. The optimal contract, which is debt, induces creditor leniency and strategic defaults on the equilibrium path, consistent with empirical evidence on repayment and monitoring behavior in credit markets. Our paper is the first where the optimal contract is debt and default is not synonymous with bankruptcy.