EXPLAINING INTRAPERIOD ACCOUNTING CHOICES: THE REPORTING OF CURRENCY TRANSLATION GAINS AND LOSSES

Prior to the introduction of an Australian Accounting Standard relating to the treatment of foreign currency items, we find agreement among firms on the method of translating foreign subsidiaries' assets and liabilities, but no such agreement on the method of reporting the resulting gain or loss. The reporting choice represents an intraperiod accounting decision. We show that this choice is a function of the demand for ex ante optimal risk sharing agreements between management and shareholders, although auditor identity and firm size are also found to influence the choice of reporting method. We model the policy choice as both a dichotomous and a more finely graded three-way problem, introducing to the accounting literature an experimental technique designed to test for the existence of any mutual dependence between alternatives.     

ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM

This paper develops three basic economic principles for effective corporate governance: (1) information accuracy and timeliness, (2) management accountability, and (3) auditor independence. Accuracy and timeliness of information is critical to providing market participants with the data necessary to monitor and evaluate managers. Management accountability focuses on strengthening the incentives of managers to act in shareholders' interests and on increasing the likelihood and magnitude of punishment for wrongdoing. Auditor independence reduces the incentives and likelihood that auditors would give managers more leeway to undertake fraudulent or questionable acts.
The author provides a preliminary assessment of how well legislative reforms, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, regulatory changes at the SEC, and private sector responses such as those from self-regulatory organizations like the NYSE and NASDAQ, conform to these economic principles. The paper concludes by commenting on current proposals from the SEC on "shareholder democracy" and emphasizing the importance of balancing private and public regulatory responses.     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE: A COMPARISON OF GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.

Contrary to assertions that there are fundamental differences in the efficiency of "market-based" and "relationship-oriented" corporate governance systems, this article presents evidence that the German, Japanese, and American systems appear about equally effective in disciplining poor managerial performance. For example, both the job security and total compensation of German and Japanese managers appear to be tied to stock performance and current cash flows- measures that some would refer to as "short-term"-to roughly the same extent as those of U.S. managers. Furthermore, the punishments and rewards for German and Japanese managers are not more sensitive to sales growth-a measure some would refer to as "long-term"-than those of their U.S. counterparts.
But, if there is no clear difference between the three governance systems in responding to poor stock and earnings performance, there is one important difference: the U.S. system is more effective than the German and Japanese systems in discouraging successful companies from overinvest-ing. One reason for this is the fact that U.S. managers hold much larger equity positions than managers in Japan and Germany. Another important factor, however, is the difficulty faced by Japanese companies in returning capital to their shareholders. Dividends are minimal; and, until 1995, it was illegal for a Japanese company to repurchase its stock.     

公司治理中的“激励不足”和“激励不到”

我国以建立现代企业制度为目标,逐步引入了一系列公司机制,取得了相当的成绩,但同时有一些机制尚未有效运转,从而影响了公司治理机制的效果。从制度的引入、制定到真正发挥作用,需要一定的时间,我们不能忽视现存的两个问题,那就是“激励不足”和“激励不到”。因为“激励不足”     

完善公司治理 力保工行平稳运行

工商银行不仅有着＂全球最盈利、市值最大银行＂的光辉业绩,而且被赋予＂最优秀、最受尊重的银行＂,这些光环背后的强大因素究竟有哪些？良好的公司治理是稳健运行、价值持续增长的保证;深厚的企业文化是蓬勃发展的动力;积极履行社会责任是提升企业竞争力的重要途径;此外,内审与纪检监察工作的积极推进为健康发展提供了有效的保障。详情请看《公司治理》、《金融文化》、《廉政建设》、《社会责任》栏目。     

THE TIMELINESS OF CORPORATE REPORTING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOUTH ASIA

This study examines the timeliness of corporate annual reporting in three South Asian countries, namely, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. Based on a large sample of 558 annual reports for the year 1998, it is found that around 90% of the companies’ balance sheet end date falls in June and December in Bangladesh, March in India, and June and September in Pakistan. The audit lag is 162 days, 92 days and 145 days in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, respectively. While the audit lag, preliminary lag and total lag are significantly lower in India compared to Bangladesh and Pakistan, a substantial proportion of companies take more time than allowed by the Companies Act in each country. A multivariate regression analysis indicates that financial year-end date is a significant determinant in each country. The size of the audit firm, as measured by the factor loading of audit fees, number of reporting entity audited by an audit firm and international linkage, indicates large audit firms take significantly less time in India and Pakistan. Profitability and corporate size are significant determinants only in Pakistan. There is no statistical evidence to support monitoring hypothesis, as proxied by Zmijeski’s financial condition index. The 2nd stage regression results suggests that only audit lag is significantly associated with the time taken by companies to submit their annual reports to the Stock Exchange and to hold the annual general meeting in each country. The results suggest that timeliness can be improved by reducing the delays in verifying the year-end accounts. Possible explanations for these findings along with limitations and implications are provided.