Theory of Competition Policy: A Confrontation of Economic,Political and Legal Principles

Thorstein Veblen was a founding father of original, or old, institutional economics. The social and evolutionary usage of things and thoughts are at the center of Veblen's approach. In his studies, he dealt with psychological, social, anthropological and economic issues. The psychological content of Veblen's writing takes instinctive and habitual issues into consideration. The proposal of this paper is to revisit the psychology of Veblen's conspicuous consumer. In such a task, this paper discusses the role of observation and cognition in habit building, and their influence on the conspicuous consumer. It also introduces a psychological explanation of the importance of the leisure class to the conspicuous consumer. In order to build the analysis, this paper takes into account elements of Albert Bandura's vicarious learning. These elements are introduced to highlight vicarious observation as a key component of Veblen's conspicuous consumer.     

Foreign Direct Investment and the Political Economy of Protection

This paper makes the point that an import-competing industry may not want maximal protection. The reason is that a high level of protection encourages inward foreign direct investment, which could be even less desirable than import competition. A government captured by the domestic import-competing industry consequently will set the level of protection low enough to limit direct foreign entry. This paper also establishes results regarding the form of protection. Voluntary export restraints are shown to be the domestic industry's desired means of protection, because leaving export rents with foreigners inhibits foreign direct investment.     

Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments

This paper investigates the impact of political lobbying on the choice of environmental policy instruments. It is argued that the prevalence of pollution emission standards over more efficient policy instruments may result from rent seeking behaviour. The model further predicts that when an emission standard is used to control pollution, rival political parties have an incentive to set the same standard. There is therefore a convergence of policies. Moreover, it is shown that emission taxes are more likely to be supported and proposed by political parties which represent environmental interest groups. This feature appears to accord with the observed support for environmental taxes by Green parties in Europe, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere.     

地方政府竞争的博弈行为与流域水环境保护

地方政府间竞争促进了区域经济增长问题,但是带来了许多流域环境污染问题。结合我国当前地方政府的竞争行为特征,建立地方政府的环境保护投资博弈模型,探究了地方政府之间的竞争对流域水环境保护投资方面的影响。分析表明,地方政府基于自身利益最大化的行为会使得环保投资不足,带来类似囚徒困境的环境污染问题。因此,要使得流域水污染治理投入不足问题得到有效解决,鼓励地方政府竞争的政策应该被重新认识,通过制定相应的制度安排和政策措施来约束地方政府在流域水环境保护方面采取竞争策略,引导地方政府在流域水环境保护方面采取合作行为,最大限度地把地方利益有机整合到全流域利益当中去。     

Political Economy and Organizational Leadership: A Hope-based Theory

Unlike other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, economics has neglected leadership. This paper proposes that a distinctive leadership role is to facilitate the development of hope so that organizational members can sustain their commitments. The conceptual grounding for this approach can be found in the work of Amaryta Sen, Albert Hirschman and Jon Elster, who have tried to explain the effect of commitment and emotions on behavior. It is also proposed here that the authority organizational leaders have to call meetings gives them the capacity both to influence social interactions to carry out this role, and to gauge the organization's cultural strength and its members' receptiveness to inspirational information that can shape the choice of leadership styles.     

A Multi-Objective and Multi-Design Evaluation Procedure for Environmental Protection Forestry

A unique and important application of a comprehensive and practical multi-objective evaluation framework is presented which goes far beyond traditional cost-benefit analysis (CBA). It is characterized by transparency which is not always the case for methods beyond CBA. The application is geared to the evaluation of environmental protection forestry with several alternative designs. The framework suggested consists of five key steps integrating orthodox cost-benefit analysis and the analytical hierarchy process developed by Saaty (1980). It is shown to be a flexible framework which can coherently function with a mixture of both monetary and physical units of measurement. The framework is applied to a consideration of alternative designs for the Three Norths Shelter Belt (TNSB) in China.     

On Political Competition: Democracy, Opinion and Responsibility

In this paper, I consider the influence of political competition on opinion. After reflecting on the notion opinion as a concept in the economic analysis of politics, I turn to Hayek's Constitution of Liberty and consider his argument for democracy on the grounds that it is the form of government which best promotes progress in opinion. Yet Hayek's claim that democratically formed opinion improves is unsubstantiated. I turn to accounts of expressive voting thereafter to show why opinions which are realised in the form of votes may be anything other than propitious to democratic culture. I then return to Hayek and consider what becomes of opinion in Law, Legislation and Liberty. His claim that opinion improves under democratic institutions is no longer of great significance to him. Indeed, his account of the rise of bargaining politics provides evidence against the claim that opinion improves. I conclude by asking how democracy can be shielded from opinion, that is, how opinion might be improved in ways which go beyond Hayek's model of political competition outlined in Constitution of Liberty. To this end, I look to accounts of deliberative democracy and expressive politics for support.     

A Spatial Theory of News Consumption and Electoral Competition

We characterize the optimal editorial positions of the media in a model in which the media influence both voting behaviour and party policies. Political parties are less likely to choose partisan policies when more voters consume informative news. When there are two media outlets, each should be slightly biased relative to its audience in order to attract voters with relatively extreme views. Voter welfare is typically higher under a duopoly than under a monopoly. Two media outlets under joint ownership may provide more diverse viewpoints than two independent ones, but voter welfare is not always higher.     

财政与规制管理竞争——理论与实证

经济竞争并不仅仅是私营经济部门的主要特征:政府自身同样积极参与竞争以吸引新的商业投资、就业和收入以鼓励经济发展。此外,这是一个有争议的重大问题。某些观察家把这种竞争看作是一种导致实力削弱的“竞相向下限造就”的破坏性力量,结果造成伴有公众     

Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy

If better informed voters receive favourable policies, then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting. This paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups. The increasing-returns-to-scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups, such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests, and groups that are valuable to advertisers. This news bias alters the trade-off in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy. The paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics. The model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters.     

Global Competition for Mobile Resources: Implications for Equity, Efficiency and Political Economy

International integration of markets for labor and capital hasfar-reaching policy implications in economies where governmentspursue extensive programs of redistribution through tax andtransfer policies. The large fiscal impacts that result frommovement of high- and low-income populations, as well as ofcapital, affect the benefits, costs, and political payoffs ofredistributive policies, creating incentives for fiscal competitionthat may limit the extent of redistribution over time. Migrationand capital flows are dynamic adjustment mechanisms, analysisof which can shed light on the consequences of structural changessuch as globalization of factor markets and EU enlargement.(JEL codes: H0, J0)     

A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement

This paper analyzes agreements between governments that determine the division of policy-making power between central and regional governments. Our analysis demonstrates that initial circumstances and political risks affect the degree of centralization that will be adopted, and that asymmetric forms of federalism are often consequences of ongoing negotiations between regional and central governments over the assignment of policy-making authority. We analyze three settings where gains from constitutional exchange may exist: (i) the under-centralized state, (ii) the over-centralized state, and (iii) the constitutional convention. In each case, an asymmetric form of federalism is the predicted outcome, although the degree of asymmetry differs according to starting point. Modern and historical examples are used to illustrate the relevance of our analysis.     

瑞典环境保护的政策与目标

瑞典是世界上实施环境保护最为严格的国家之一,政府致力于建设绿色福利国家。瑞典政府环境保护的总目标是实现可持续发展,在一代人时间范围内,为后代留下一个没有环境问题的社会。为此,瑞典政府制定了零污染的环境保护政策和一系列明确的环境保护目标以及实现这些目标的战略与措施,为全国各部门、各地方的环境规划与行动提供统一框架,是瑞典所有环境相关发展的规范。本文介绍了瑞典环境目标的沿革与16项环境质量目标的具体内容,可供政府有关部门参考与借鉴。     

Employment Protection and Product Market Competition

A firm facing employment protection will defend its market position more fiercely than a rival firm operating without such restrictions. However, ex ante such firms may be more reluctant to expand. For the benchmark case of contest competition, the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position.     

Voluntary Environmental Agreements and Competition Policy

Voluntary environmental agreements are oftensuspected to promote collusive practicesbetween participating firms. The paperaddresses the antitrust implications ofGermany's voluntary Dual Management System forPackaging Waste Collection and Recycling (DSD). It uses analytical tools of the economictheory of the firm to examine features ofDSD's governance structure that were oftenidentified to impede competition. While thepaper does not argue that DSD performs asefficiently as a hypothetical solution in amore competitive setting, it shows that thesefeatures have an economic rationale from theviewpoint of the theory of the firm. Thegeneral conclusion is that it is necessary tocarefully analyze the institutional fine-tuningof a voluntary agreement in order to derive theoverall impact stemming from a formal lack ofcompetition. A more case-to-case-oriented,institutional research approach could thereforefruitfully supplement model-driven, theoreticalanalyses of voluntary environmental agreementsand their effect on market competition.     

When Competition is Not Enough: Consumer Protection

Rather than market structure, it is the nature of the goods and services and the cost of obtaining and processing information that may place consumers in a poor bargaining position. The article outlines the key provisions for consumer protection in Australia, Part V of the Trade Practices Act. It discusses search costs, and the factors that limit search, and explains how the conduct of suppliers (or others) may reduce search costs. Asymmetry of information is identified as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for misleading consumers. When products are sub standard or are used incorrectly, they may harm consumers or cause property damage and in some circumstances this may be best addressed via product liability laws. The article concludes by considering how firms or industries can be more pro-active in relation to consumer protection.     

Employment and Environmental Protection

One of the most pressing problems in an economy intransition is that of unemployment. Hitherto the`costs' of this unemployment have either focused onthe value of the lost production, or on the costs tothe government of supporting the unemployed. From asocial viewpoint this is inappropriate. In this paper,we discuss the costs of unemployment in terms of theirimpacts on human welfare, particularly the healtheffects. On the positive side, as inefficient industries areshut down and as production responds to marketpressures, wasteful government subsidies are reduced,as is the level of environmental pollution. Clearly,therefore, there is a trade-off between theenvironmental and economic benefits on the one handand the welfare costs of unemployment on the other.In this paper, a simple model is developed to analyzethis trade-off. A single firm has a short-runproduction function in which output is dependent onthe level of employment. The present position ischaracterized by `inefficiency' in that the firm ismaking a loss and overproduction is taking place.Environmental damage is a function of the level ofoutput. The efficient production point is known, asare the efficiency prices.The problem to be solved is to minimize the costs ofmoving to the efficient point. The papercharacterizes the efficient dynamic path and givessome illustrations of such a path for the coal sectorin Russia, for given values of the efficiency losses,the environmental costs of using coal and the costs ofunemployment.