Motivation crowding‐out and green‐paradox‐like outcomes

We analyze the effectiveness of environmental policy in a framework in which households’ utility is determined by both private and social components, representing their extrinsic and intrinsic motivations to undertake green actions, respectively. Environmental policy, in the form of a subsidy aiming to incentivize the adoption of a green technology, on the one hand, directly increases households’ extrinsic motivation, while, on the other hand, indirectly decreases their intrinsic motivation. We show that, provided that the indirect effect dominates, the policy leads to crowding‐out of intrinsic motivation which ultimately undermines the effectiveness of the policy itself. Specifically, despite its positive effect on environmental outcomes in the short run, the policy will lead to a deterioration in long‐run environmental outcomes, giving rise to a reverse green‐paradox‐like outcome. Moreover, even in the case in which the direct effect dominates, provided that the indirect effect is large enough, the policy will generate a deterioration in short‐run environmental outcomes. These results clearly suggest that the optimal design of environmental policy is particularly complicated since it requires to take into account also its effects on intrinsic motivation.     

Time preferences,cognitive abilities and intrinsic motivation to exert effort

The experimental literature has found a positive relationship between patience and performance in cognitive tests that are not incentivized by money. It has also been shown that unincentivized cognitive tests capture not only cognitive ability (CA), but also intrinsic motivation related to the test takers’ personality traits. In order to determine whether the relationship between patience and test scores is driven by intrinsic motivation or CA, we run an experiment in which subjects take either incentivized or unincentivized cognitive tests. We find that while incentivized test scores positively correlate with patience, the unincentivized scores are not related to the time preferences of our subjects. The observed correlation between patience and cognitive test scores therefore seems to be driven by CA rather than by intrinsic motivation related to personality traits.     

服务型领导供求匹配一致性与创造力：内在动机与主动性人格的作用

服务型领导有效性取决于领导者和下属双方匹配的一致性,但现有研究局限于仅从领导或下属单一视角考察服务型领导的影响。基于个体-环境匹配理论,对服务型领导供求匹配一致性与创造力的关系进行分析,探讨追随者内在动机的中介作用与追随者主动性人格的调节作用。通过对200个领导与726个员工的配对数据进行多项式回归与响应面分析,结果发现：与服务型领导低匹配（低供给-低需求）相比,追随者的内在动机在服务型领导高匹配（高供给-高需求）时更高;服务型领导供求匹配通过追随者内在动机影响创造力;追随者主动性人格在服务型领导供求匹配与追随者内在动机之间并不存在显著调节作用。     

CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND THE MONETARY INSTRUMENT PROBLEM

We study the monetary instrument problem in a dynamic noncooperative game between separate, discretionary, fiscal and monetary policy makers. We show that monetary instruments are equivalent only if the policy makers' objectives are perfectly aligned; otherwise an instrument problem exists. When the central bank is benevolent while the fiscal authority is short‐sighted relative to the private sector, excessive public spending and debt emerge under a money growth policy but not under an interest rate policy. Despite this property, the interest rate is not necessarily the optimal instrument.     

辱虐管理与员工主动创新行为研究：基于动机和能力信念视角

基于动机和能力信念视角，构建辱虐管理与员工主动创新行为的多重中介模型，并以成渝双城经济圈内保险、证券、银行等金融行业中的336名企业基层员工为研究对象，对该理论模型进行实证检验。结果发现：辱虐管理对员工主动创新行为具有显著负向影响。其中，内在动机、亲社会动机、自我效能感在两者之间均发挥部分中介作用。即辱虐管理会降低员工内在动机、亲社会动机及自我效能感，而较低水平的内在动机、亲社会动机及自我效能感又会进一步降低员工的主动创新行为。     

消费者自愿在线反馈行为的效用分析——基于马斯洛人类动机理论的考察

自愿的在线反馈行为是网络消费中的普遍现象，其背后隐藏着一个重要的经济学问题，即公共品的私人自愿供给。为了更深入地研究消费者自愿进行在线反馈的动因，并相应探讨私人自愿提供公共品的原因，本文以马斯洛人类动机理论为基础，建立了自愿在线反馈行为的效用模型，并利用网络问卷数据对模型进行验证。研究结果表明，自愿在线反馈行为是消费者在效用和成本之间理性选择的结果，公共品的私人自愿供给方式具有理性基础。本文拓展了传统效用函数的内涵，深化了对公共品私人自愿供给和马斯洛动机理论的认识，也为网络消费平台的信用体系建设提供了新思路。     

The growth–distribution nexus in a mixed regime of education with a status motive: On the macroeconomics of the welfare state

We develop a growth model with human capital accumulation to study the effects of status-driven motivation on individuals' choice between public or private education. This choice interacts with and exacerbates the effects of status, with implications for growth and distribution. More motivated individuals work harder and choose private education. In a majority voting/median voter setup, individuals choose a public education size for which there is no trade-off between long-term growth and inequality. We also highlight the conflict of interest between individuals with respect to the size of the public education sector and the tax rate that supports it. We thus highlight important interactions between the macroeconomy, social attitudes and educational institutions and derive results of interest in a variety contexts. We end by drawing policy conclusions among which, the idea that in democracies, higher growth and lower inequality are mutually compatible when the government promotes public education.     

Do Extrinsic Incentives Undermine Social Norms? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Energy Conservation

Policymakers use both extrinsic and intrinsic incentives to induce consumers to change behavior. This paper investigates whether the use of extrinsic financial incentives is complementary to intrinsic incentives, or whether financial incentives undermine the effect of intrinsic incentives. We conduct a randomized controlled trial that uses information interventions to residential electricity customers to test this question. We find that adding economic incentives to normative messages not only does not strengthen the effect of the latter but may reduce it. These results are consistent with recent theoretical work that suggests a tension between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives.     

Public sector motivation and development failures

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the relationship between public sector motivation and development. In the model the public sector produces a public good and workers are heterogeneous in terms of public sector motivation (PSM). Wages in the private sector increase with the quality of the public good. In this context, public sector wage premia (PSWP) have two opposite effects: low PSWP helps screen workers with PSM into the public sector, while high PSWP helps motivate workers to be honest. Raising PSWP may not improve the quality of governance and multiple equilibria might arise. The model highlights that the relative importance of workers selection and provision of ”on the job” incentives in the public sector varies in systematic ways with wages in the private sector. We provide anecdotal and original empirical evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions and discuss some policy implications for public sector reforms in developing countries.     

Optimal Dissent in Organizations

We model an organization as a two-agent hierarchy: an informed Decision Maker in charge of selecting projects and a (possibly) uninformed Implementer in charge of their execution. Both have intrinsic preferences over projects. This paper models the costs and benefits of divergence between their preferences, that is, dissent within the organization. Dissent is useful to (1) foster the use of objective (and sometimes private) information in decision making and (2) give credibility to the Decision Maker's choices. However, dissent comes at the cost of hurting the Implementer's intrinsic motivation, thereby impairing organizational efficiency. We show that dissent can be optimal, in particular, when information is useful and uncertainty is high. Moreover, dissent remains an optimal organizational form even when Implementers can choose their employer or when Decision Makers have real authority over hiring decisions.

Workers do, and managers figure out what to do.
                                            F. Knight (1921)

     

Consumer support for environmental policies: An application to purchases of green cars

This paper focuses on how consumer motivation can be tapped in order to encourage the adoption of cleaner technologies. Consumers are heterogeneous — they may be guided by intrinsic motivation or extrinsic motivation. While information provision policies (such as the energy label for cars) may be effective in encouraging certain consumers to adopt green cars, financial incentive schemes (such as subsidies or fines) may be more persuasive for extrinsically-motivated consumers. We develop a dynamic theory of adoption of environmental innovations, in which information-provision policies are followed by financial incentives (first ‘carrot’, then ‘stick’ incentives). Analysis of a survey dataset of Swiss households observes considerable heterogeneity in terms of support of information-provision or financial incentive policies, in line with our conjectures. Our results will be of particular interest to policymakers interested in guiding consumers towards cleaner technologies.     

DO MONETARY REWARDS CROWD OUT THE INTRINSIC MOTIVATION OF VOLUNTEERS? SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR ITALIAN VOLUNTEERS

ABSTRACT 1 : The paper studies the determinants of regular volunteering, taking its cue from the previous literature on extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. Its main contribution lies in the analysis of the role of monetary rewards in influencing intrinsic motivation. It uses frameworks that allow empirical hypotheses to be made about the effects of monetary rewards, intrinsic motivation and the combined term on volunteer labour supply. With an Italy‐based survey, the paper shows, controlling for endogenous bias, that monetary payments as well as intrinsic motivation have roles in the real‐life decision to supply volunteer work, but monetary rewards do not crowd out intrinsic motivation.     

On the incentive effects of monitoring: evidence from the lab and the field

Several experimental studies have shown that the crowding-out effect of monitoring may outweigh its disciplining effect through intrinsic motivation destruction, thereby reducing effort. However, most of these experiments use numeric effort tasks that subjects may not be intrinsically motivated to complete. This paper aims to analyze the incentive effects of monitoring using a real-effort task for which intrinsic motivation is more likely to exist. We conducted two similar experiments, in the lab in Montreal and in the field in Ouagadougou. In contrast to the lab, subjects in the field are unaware they are taking part in an experiment.     

Determinants of demand for green products: An application to eco-label demand for fish in Europe

In this paper, we confront the theoretical motivations of the consumption of eco-friendly products and the factors influencing the European perceptions regarding the fact that “fish caught using an environmentally friendly technique may carry a special label”. We take advantage of the recent integration of non-economic elements in the microeconomic analysis of consumers' behavior in order to highlight the factors leading to their demand for green products. Thanks to an original European survey on seafood product carried out on more than 5000 consumers, we test the influence of intrinsic motivation, information, localization and socio-economic factors on the demand for an eco-label for fish.Our results show a significant connection between the desire for eco-labeling and seafood features, especially the freshness of the fish, the geographical origin of the fish and the wild vs farmed origin of the fish. Moreover, we prove the major role played by the fish price. We also demonstrate that the ecological issue regarding fisheries is highly connected to consumer information, intrinsic motivation and socio-economic status: the typical “green fish consumer” is a young woman, well educated, well informed on the state of marine resources and not very trusting of the regulation of the fisheries. Consumers who are aware of the importance of marine resource preservation have the same profile.     

团队中地位威胁真能“威胁”个体创造力吗——创新自我效能感和内在动机的作用

地位在实现个体价值和团队目标等方面有着重要作用,研究团队中地位威胁的影响对激发个体创造性具有重要实践意义。基于资源保存理论,采用问卷调查法获取210份企事业单位的有效样本数据,探讨地位威胁对个体创造力的影响,以及创新自我效能感的中介作用和内在动机的调节作用,结果表明：地位威胁负向影响个体创造力;创新自我效能感能够完全中介地位威胁与个体创造力之间的关系;内在动机调节地位威胁对个体创造力的影响。     

Pro-social motivation,effort and the call to public service

We investigate the interaction of pro-social motivation and wages in pro-social organizations with a novel subject pool, 1700 students destined for the private and public sectors in Indonesia, using a measure of pro-social motivation that exactly matches the mission of the organization. Three novel conclusions emerge. Consistent with a common, but untested, assumption in the theoretical literature, workers with greater pro-social motivation exert higher real effort. However, high pay attracts less pro-socially motivated individuals. Furthermore, we also test whether a real world pro-social organization (the Indonesian Ministry of Finance) attracts pro-socially motivated workers. We find that prospective entrants into the Indonesian Ministry of Finance exhibit higher levels of pro-social motivation than a comparable sample of general workers.     

送转与定向增发：基于市值管理的视角

送转和定向增发是 A 股市场上常见的两种公司行为。文章旨在从市值管理的视角，揭示上市企业送转与定向增发的内在关联及其经济逻辑。研究发现：(1)定向增发企业送转的比例与规模显著高于配对的未增发企业，而且两者的差异在增发后显著大于增发前；(2)在有外部机构投资者参与的定向增发中，企业送转的比例与规模显著高于其他类型的定向增发；(3)企业送转行为会显著影响增发折价，增发后送转企业的增发折价显著低于增发前送转(从未送转)的企业。文章研究表明，送转是 A 股市场上定向增发企业广为使用的一种市值管理手段，送转的规模与时机是企业与外部投资者理性博弈的结果。文章的研究不仅从市值管理角度为我国资本市场上频频出现的上市公司高送转行为提供了经验证据，而且对于监管层制定与送转和定向增发相关的政策具有重要的参考价值。     

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation

A central tenet of economics is that individuals respond to incentives. For psychologists and sociologists, in contrast, rewards and punishments are often counterproductive, because they undermine "intrinsic motivation". We reconcile these two views, showing how performance incentives offered by an informed principal (manager, teacher, parent) can adversely impact an agent's (worker, child) perception of the task, or of his own abilities. Incentives are then only weak reinforcers in the short run, and negative reinforcers in the long run. We also study the effects of empowerment, help and excuses on motivation, as well as situations of ego bashing reflecting a battle for dominance within a relationship.     

The effect of ESCOs on carbon dioxide emissions

Proponents of energy service companies (ESCOs) argue that these firms provide a crucial instrument for delivering improved energy efficiency in public and private sectors, thus contributing to carbon dioxide (CO₂) emission reduction around the world. Do ESCOs reduce CO₂ emissions? To answer this question, we develop an estimating equation, which approximates the IPAT model, from a simple model of production. We estimate a dynamic panel of 129 countries over the period 1980–2007 to show that the ESCOs effectively reduce CO₂ emissions and that this effect increases over time. These findings also prove robust to the inclusion of a set of control variables, different dates of the first ESCO and the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, we discuss energy policy implications.     

民营企业委托代理机制的基石:基于监督的约束激励

民营企业主和职业经理人之间的冲突源于两大问题：一是双方的目标追求不一致，二者双主信息不对称。解决这两大问题的方法，既不是呼吁职业经理人提高自身的道德水平，也不是单纯的激励机制，而是有效的监督和建立在监督基础上的激励和约束机制。