The Use of Dynamic Financial Analysis to Determine Whether an Optimal Growth Rate Exists for a Property-Liability Insurer

Prior research on the aging phenomenon has demonstrated that new business for property‐liability (P‐L) insurers generates high loss ratios that gradually decline as a book of business goes through successive renewal cycles. Although the experience on new business is initially unprofitable, the renewal book of business eventually becomes profitable over time. Within this context, insurers need to manage their exposure growth in order to maximize long run profitability. Dynamic financial analysis (DFA), a relatively new tool for P‐L insurers, utilizes Monte Carlo simulation to generate the overall financial results for an insurer under a large number of scenarios. This article uses a publicly available DFA model—along with the estimated market value of an insurer, based on 1990–2001 data for stock P‐L insurers and underlying financial variables—to determine optimal growth rates of a P‐L insurer based on mean–variance analysis, stochastic dominance, and constraints on leverage.     

Foreign Ownership and Non‐Life Insurer Efficiency in the Japanese Marketplace

Traditional shareholding patterns in Japan have experienced significant change beginning in the early 1990s. Since that time, foreign institutional shareholding has increased significantly largely at the expense of domestic financial institution ownership. This article examines whether these changes in ownership patterns share a relationship with insurer performance in the non‐life insurance market. Using data from 1992 to 2005, we assess performance in terms of efficiency measures using data envelopment analyses (DEA) techniques. Our results show that higher levels of domestic financial institution ownership in Japan are associated with insurer inefficiency. Relative to that relationship, the foreign ownership–insurer efficiency relationship is found to be positive. Additionally, we find that the disparity between those relationships has become more acute since 2001 when the Japanese non‐life insurance market experienced significant consolidation.     

Contingent Commissions,Insurance Intermediaries,and Insurer Performance

This research investigates the relationship shared by contingent commission usage and insurer performance. We assess performance using both frontier efficiency and financial performance measures. Our findings reveal that the relationship is complex and varies across differing insurer business models. We find that nonusers of contingent commissions are more cost and revenue efficient than are users of contingents. However, among insurers that use contingents, relatively higher levels of use are associated with more efficient operations and also better financial performance. Additionally, these findings are conditioned on the type of distribution system the insurer employs.     

Do insurers respond to active purchasing? Evidence from the Massachusetts health insurance exchange

Health insurance markets face continued challenges with high premiums and limited insurer competition. We describe a unique set of “active purchasing” policies used by Massachusetts' pioneer health insurance exchange to shape the rules of competition and reward lower-price insurers with additional customers. We provide evidence that these policies significantly influenced insurer pricing. Between 2010 and 2013, over 80% of insurer prices were set exactly at or within 1% of pricing thresholds created by active purchasing policies. A key “limited choice” policy was associated with a 16%–20% reduction in average insurance prices relative to comparison markets in 2012–2014. Insurers achieved these price cuts partly through cost reductions via narrower provider networks and partly through reduced profit margins.     

Epistemic uncertainty in catastrophe models—A base level examination

In this paper, we evaluate sources of variation in the output from catastrophe models with emphasis on the epistemic uncertainty in modeled expected losses. Using building data from the 34 buildings that comprised the California Northridge campus at the time of the Northridge earthquake, we explore the sensitivity of estimated average annual losses obtained from a cat model to the quality of model input. Namely, we consider how changes in four key model assumptions—building locations, building height, construction type, and the event catalog—affect cat model loss estimates. We find that accurate information on some input variables is critical (e.g., all steel construction) and the interaction between input variables should not be discounted. Our results have important implications for insurer decisions that are informed by the output of catastrophe models—product pricing, portfolio diversification and underwriting decisions, negotiations and discussions with regulators and similar activities with capital market participants. The financial impact of improving data quality and targeting data related to key model inputs for that insurer when at scale is not trivial. As such, this paper provides an impetus for establishing and improving benchmarks for model inputs.     

Der Kausalitätsgegenbeweis des Versicherungsnehmers

According to Section 28 para. 3 of the revised German VVG (Insurance Contract Law), a policyholder may prove that his breach of duty did not cause a disadvantage for the insurer by means of so-called causality counter-evidence. In contrast to the former provision, this possibility obtains even in case of an intentional breach. Therefore, in the future, causality counter-evidence will increase in importance—especially with regard to notice and information duties and duties to keep subjective risks to a minimum. However, the new provision does not impose an unfair burden on the insurer: if the causality counter-evidence is successful, the insurer must pay only the actual costs required under the contract. The insurer’s interest in prevention is protected insofar as the introduction of causality counter-evidence is generally precluded in case of malice.     

Funding conditions and insurance stock returns: Do insurance stocks really benefit from rising interest rate regimes?

We examine funding conditions and U.S. insurance company stock returns. Although constrained funding conditions, signaled by restrictive Federal Reserve monetary policy, correspond with increases in the future payouts of fixed‐income securities held by insurance firms and potentially provide value through the liability side of insurer balance sheets, they also decrease the values of securities currently held in insurer portfolios. Prior research finds that restrictive policy has a negative effect on equity returns in general. Our results suggest the negative impacts of constrained funding environments outweigh the potential positives, as insurance company stock returns are significantly lower during periods of constrained funding. This effect varies within a given funding state and also across insurer type. The effect is strongest during the first 3 months of a constrained funding environment and for life and health insurers—insurer types with longer portfolio durations. For property and liability (P&L) insurers, lower stock return performance only exists in the first 3 months of a constrained funding environment. In the subsequent months, P&L insurers actually have higher stock returns during constrained periods, consistent with their typically shorter duration asset portfolios, which are more quickly rolled over into new higher‐yielding securities.     

Expected exponential utility maximization of insurers with a Linear Gaussian stochastic factor model

In this paper, we consider the problem of optimal investment by an insurer. The wealth of the insurer is described by a Cramér–Lundberg process. The insurer invests in a market consisting of a bank account and m risky assets. The mean returns and volatilities of the risky assets depend linearly on economic factors that are formulated as the solutions of linear stochastic differential equations. Moreover, the insurer preferences are exponential. With this setting, a Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation that is derived via a dynamic programming approach has an explicit solution found by solving the matrix Riccati equation. Hence, the optimal strategy can be constructed explicitly. Finally, we present some numerical results related to the value function and the ruin probability using the optimal strategy.     

Optimal investment-reinsurance with dynamic risk constraint and regime switching

We study an optimal investment–reinsurance problem for an insurer who faces dynamic risk constraint in a Markovian regime-switching environment. The goal of the insurer is to maximize the expected utility of terminal wealth. Here the dynamic risk constraint is described by the maximal conditional Value at Risk over different economic states. The rationale is to provide a prudent investment–reinsurance strategy by taking into account the worst case scenario over different economic states. Using the dynamic programming approach, we obtain an analytical solution of the problem when the insurance business is modeled by either the classical Cramer–Lundberg model or its diffusion approximation. We document some important qualitative behaviors of the optimal investment–reinsurance strategies and investigate the impacts of switching regimes and risk constraint on the optimal strategies.     

Creating Customer Value in Participating Life Insurance

The value of a life insurance contract may differ depending on whether it is looked at from the customer's point of view or that of the insurance company. We assume that the insurer is able to replicate the life insurance contract's cash flows via assets traded on the capital market and can hence apply risk‐neutral valuation techniques. The policyholder, on the other hand, will take risk preferences and diversification opportunities into account when placing a value on that same contract. Customer value is represented by policyholder willingness to pay and depends on the contract parameters, that is, the guaranteed interest rate and the annual and terminal surplus participation rate. The aim of this article is to analyze and compare these two perspectives. In particular, we identify contract parameter combinations that—while keeping the contract value fixed for the insurer—maximize customer value. In addition, we derive explicit expressions for a selection of specific cases. Our results suggest that a customer segmentation in this sense, that is, based on the different ways customers evaluate life insurance contracts and embedded investment guarantees while ensuring fair values, is worthwhile for insurance companies as doing so can result in substantial increases in policyholder willingness to pay.     

Grenzen der Auskunfts- und Belegpflicht in der D&O Versicherung

A large number of claims brought under German D&O insurance regard Insured vs. Insured cases, i.e. claims brought by the company against its own directors and officers (Executive Directors, Supervisory Board Members etc.). After notification of and examination by the insurer of such an insured event, the insurer will in most cases opt to grant the insured defence cover in order to fight off the claim. The insurer hereby expresses that it regards the claim of the company (= its own policyholder) against the board member (= the insured) to be without merit. This situation—where the policyholder is at the same time the damaged party—though typical under (German) D&O-policies is uncommon for liability insurance cover in general. It, thus, raises the issue as to the limits of the policyholder’s duty to disclose information. The scope of said obligation is not unlimited. It rather has to be ascertained pursuant to Sect. 31 VVG (German Insurance Contract Act), by taking into account the policyholder’s interests in commercial and industrial confidentiality and the burden of poof as provided by Sect. 93 para. 2 AktG (German Stock Companies Act). In case legal proceedings ensue between the company and the insured, and, as a consequence, the insurer exercises its obligation to conduct the case for the insured or the insurer joins the lawsuit on the side of the insured (by declaring a Third Party Notice [Streiverkündung]), the insurer clearly becomes an adversary to the company. Under such circumstances, the company is irrevocably released from its duty to disclose information.     

Interest Rate Risk and Equity Values of Life Insurance Companies: A GARCH–M Model

The importance of managerial decisions related to interest‐sensitive cash flows has received considerable attention in the insurance literature. Consistent with the interest‐sensitive nature of insurer assets and liabilities, empirical research has shown that insurer insolvency is significantly related to interest rate volatility. We investigate the interest rate sensitivity of monthly stock returns of life insurers based on a generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic in the mean (GARCH–M) model. We examine three different portfolios (equally weighted, risk‐based, and size‐based) with binary variables to explicitly account for varying interest rate strategies adopted by the Federal Reserve System. Results based on data for the period 1975 through 2000 indicate that life insurer equity values are sensitive to long‐term interest rates and that interest sensitivity varies across subperiods and across risk‐based and size‐based portfolios. The results complement insolvency research that links insurer financial performance to changes in interest rates.     

博弈论视角下公估人的理性选择及外部约束

保险公估人是保险业发展不可缺少的重要组成部分,但“公估不公”始终是公估行业发展中的一个难题。作为一种典型的承揽关系,保险人与公估人之间存在着信息不对称,以及由此带来的道德风险。本文从博弈论的角度,构建公估人和保险人之间的策略型博弈,通过求解纳什均衡发现,公估人的理性选择并不总是诚实公正。因此,只有加强外部约束,才能实现...     

Moral Hazard in Reinsurance Markets

This article attempts to identify moral hazard in the traditional reinsurance market. We build a multiperiod principal–agent model of the reinsurance transaction from which we derive predictions on premium design, monitoring, loss control, and insurer risk retention. We then use panel data on U.S. property liability reinsurance to test the model. The empirical results are consistent with the model's predictions. In particular, we find evidence for the use of loss‐sensitive premiums when the insurer and reinsurer are not affiliates (i.e., not part of the same financial group), but little or no use of monitoring. In contrast, we find evidence for the extensive use of monitoring when the insurer and reinsurer are affiliates, where monitoring costs are lower.     

Umwelthaftung, Umwelthaftpflichtversicherung und Umweltschutz

It is accepted in jurisprudence that liability has — as a side-effect — the aim to prevent damages, but up to now there has been no scientific proof that it works. There is no dispute that liability in tort is suitable for prevention, some approaches making cuts on the suitability of strict liability for this purpose. If liability insurance coverage is reasonable it is advantageous to the environment. German pollution liability coverage conditions at least provide adequate avenues: The insured is urged to present a risk index which is important for a risk analysis relevant to the current situation. The duty to give notice of claim and to acquire instructions from the insurer can help to minimize damage. The insurer has the right to ask the insured to improve his precautions. It would also deter environmental hazards if minor pollution which does not result unexpectedley or accidentally as well as misfeasance is excluded. The inclusion clause for such pollution and for developmental risks is not effective if the insured does maintain high safety and prevention standards. However it is counterproductive that, in the insurer’s understanding, salvage costs are not covered and at the same time they are not included in the environmental liability coverage.     

Informations- und Beratungspflichten des Versicherers nach der VVG-Reform

The insurer’s duty to enable the customer to come to an appropriate decision, providing advice and information, is a central topic of the reform of the German insurance contract law. The obligations of intermediaries given by the Directive 2002/92/EC on insurance mediation are transferred to insurers and thereby enlarged in some aspects. The duty to give advice in §6 I 1 VVG depends on the objective circumstances of each individual case depending upon either the complexity of the insurance contract and problems in understanding its terms, or the characteristics and situation of the customer. Therewith, the regulation both refers to former jurisdiction and exceeds it by implementing a duty for the insurer to ask for the demands and the needs of the customer. Without reason in the special case the customer has to disclose his need for advice to obtain it. During the term of the contract the insurer is only obliged to give advice if he knows or — acting diligently — could know the needs of the policy-holder. On a European level further duties to inform and advise could help to achieve an effective internal insurance market.     

Retained Asset Accounts and Creditor Reactions to an A.M. Best Change

A variety of research has investigated the impact of rating changes on stakeholder and firm behavior. This article provides a unique setting to analyze the effect for both stock and mutual firms and with a class of nontraditional investors, owners of retained asset accounts (RAAs). These individuals become creditors of the insurer upon receipt of life insurance proceeds, which are held in the general accounts of the insurer. The funds receive limited guaranty fund and no Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation protection, thus subjecting the owner to the financial risk of the insurer. Some owners of RAAs may not understand the risk; thus, it is unclear if these owners act as other creditors to changes in the financial stability of the insurer. This provides a setting to analyze reaction to firm risk, as reflected in ratings changes, to stakeholders other than stockholders or customers. We find that RAA owners do act in a manner consistent with traditional investors. Specifically, we find that abnormal retention in the RAAs indicates significant declines in the level of accounts open and funds deposited in the year following a threshold downgrade (falling below an A–) of the A.M. Best rating.     

Optimal reinsurance and portfolio selection: Comparison between partial and complete information models

We consider partial and complete information models to investigate how partial information has a unique quality over complete information for insurers. We find that optimal reinsurance and investment strategies for the partially informed insurer depend on prior beliefs, whereas those for the completely informed insurer do not. In addition, information quality can affect insurer behaviour, mainly through the relative difference between risk-adjusted market premium and risk-adjusted insurance premium projected on the financial markets. Numerical results indicate that partial information increases the conservativeness of insurer strategies.     

When does relationship lending start to pay?

This paper empirically characterizes relationship lending using data from more than 20,000 loans of a Spanish bank to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The study analyzes the pricing determinants of loans to firms based on the entire previous bank–firm relationship, allowing for the identification of nonlinear pricing patterns in the bank–firm relationship. We show that firms only start capitalizing the gains of relationship lending when the relationship extends beyond two years. This reduction in the loan rate spread charged is driven by the opaque firms, for which the acquisition of “soft” information is especially relevant. Finally, we find that relationship lending significantly mitigates the increased costs of refinancing loans along two dimensions: relationship duration and having additional contracts—other than loans—with the bank.     

Are female CEOs associated with lower insolvency risk? Evidence from the US property-casualty insurance industry

This paper investigates the relationship between female CEOs and insolvency risk of US property-casualty insurance companies. We show that female CEOs are associated with lower insurer insolvency propensity, higher z-score, and lower standard deviation of return on assets. These findings are robust to alternative econometric specifications to address potential endogeneity concerns and self-selection issues, including propensity score matching, the instrumental variable approach, and the difference-in-difference approach. Furthermore, we find that the impact of female CEOs on insurer insolvency risk is moderated by firm capitalization, the presence of female directors, and political conservatism of insurers' home states.