The policy mix in the US and EMU: Evidence from a SVAR analysis

We use a SVAR approach to the effects of fiscal and monetary policies, as well as their interactions (policy mix) for the US and the Euro Area (EMU). Overall, our results show that these two cases are different from each other. First, while in the case of the US there is evidence of Keynesian monetary policy, the same is not true in the case of the EMU. Second, considering the effects of the global economic and financial crisis, there is evidence of non-Keynesian fiscal policy in the case of the EMU (expansionary fiscal consolidation), while it does not hold in the case of the US. Third, there is evidence supporting the traditional inverse relationship between monetary policy interest rates and inflation in the case of the US, whereas in the case of the EMU there is a price puzzle (frequent in SVAR studies). Fourth, the baseline model seems to be robust in the case of the US, when considering the effects of the economic and financial crisis 2007–2009, while the opposite holds in the case of the EMU. However, in both cases, the policies seem to act as complements. Another similarity appears when analysing the relationship between public spending and taxation, where there is evidence supporting a fiscal retrenchment.     

Monetary and fiscal policy under deep habits

Allowing habits to be formed at the level of individual goods – deep habits - can radically alter the fiscal policy transmission mechanism as the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups this implies can result in government spending crowding-in rather than crowding-out private consumption in the short run. We explore the robustness of this mechanism to the existence of price discrimination in the supply of goods to the public and private sectors. We then describe optimal monetary and fiscal policy in our New Keynesian economy subject to the additional externality of deep habits and explore the ability of simple policy rules to mimic fully optimal policy. We find that the presence of deep habits at empirically estimated levels can imply large externalities that significantly affect the conduct of monetary and tax policy. However, despite the rise in government spending multipliers implied by deep habits, government spending is barely used as a stabilisation tool under the optimal policy.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the course of the world economy in 1988 was a product not so much of the stock market crash of October 1987 but of the reaction to the crash. Monetary policy and to a lesser extent fiscal policy were eased and consumer spending responded to cuts in interest rates and rising real incomes. With the world recovery in its sixth year, capacity pressures began to emerge and investment also boomed, helped by a lower cost of capital. As a result of this strong private sector demand, OECD output increased 4 per cent in 1988 as a whole and industrial production and world trade rose even more rapidly. Against the background of buoyant demand and output, inflationary fears have resurfaced. Since the spring monetary authorities in most countries have been tightening policy, raising interest rates by early 1989 above the levels which helped bring about the stock market crash. Their aim is to effect a slowdown in demand before a significant upward movement in inflation and inflationary expectations takes hold. In our judgement the present policy stance will achieve its aim of a "soft landing" for the world economy. The pick-up in world inflation is contained below 5 per cent and by the second half of this year inflation eases, paving the way for a relaxation of monetary policy. Output growth slows from 4 per cent to 3 percent in 1989 and 2 per cent in 1990, picking up again as interest rates are lowered in 1991–2.     

The Conduct of Monetary Policy Without Monetary Aggregates

A central dilemma for the monetary authorities is how to determine monetary policy. The increasing unreliability of monetary aggregates has led over the past few years to less concern for monetary targeting, both in the UK and elsewhere, and a greater influence for the exchange rate on monetary policy. But in the UK, most recently, there has been a move away from setting monetary policy in relation to the exchange rate and external considerations in favour of setting monetary policy in relation to domestic demand. Not surprisingly, this shift has occurred at a time of rising concern about domestic overheating. It illustrates the dilemma of whether monetary policy should be driven by domestic demand considerations or by external, exchange rate considerations. This dilemma is not just confined to the UK for it is a real source of conflict underlying the Louvre Accord and its successors that seek to determine G7 exchange rates in a cooperative manner. In what follows, we argue that exchange rate developments should have an appreciable influence on monetary policy, since this is helpful in attaining stable inflation. But we also suggest that this influence should not go too far, since this stability of inflation may be at the expense of stability of domestic demand and output. Targeting of exchange rates within narrow bands is unlikely to be desirable, unless fiscal policy can be used more flexibly to stabilize domestic demand. This suggests that, in the period up to the spring, the use of monetary policy to hold the £/JDM exchange rate within narrow limits may have been overdone. More seriously, international exchange rate agreements among the G7 countries are likely to founder under adverse market pressures, unless current imbalances in fiscal policy are adjusted. In the absence of greater flexibility in fiscal policy, policy makers will have to trade off domestic and exchange rate considerations in determining monetary policy. An important outstanding issue that needs further consideration is what indicators should be used for monetary policy, in a world in which monetary aggregates provide unreliable signals.     

Dealing with a liquidity trap when government debt matters: Optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy

How does the need to preserve government debt sustainability affect the optimal monetary and fiscal policy response to a liquidity trap? To provide an answer, we employ a small stochastic New Keynesian model with a zero bound on nominal interest rates and characterize optimal time-consistent stabilization policies. We focus on two policy tools, the short-term nominal interest rate and debt-financed government spending. The optimal policy response to a liquidity trap critically depends on the prevailing debt burden. While the optimal amount of government spending is decreasing in the level of outstanding government debt, future monetary policy is becoming more accommodative, triggering a change in private sector expectations that helps to dampen the fall in output and inflation at the outset of the liquidity trap.     

The fiscal and monetary response to COVID‐19: What the Great Depression has – and hasn't – taught us

Although some regard the New Deal of the 1930s as exemplifying an aggressive fiscal and monetary response to a severe economic crisis, the US fiscal and monetary policy responses to the COVID‐19 crisis have actually been far more substantial – and, so far, much more effective in reviving aggregate spending. Although many fear that these responses, and the large‐scale increase in bank reserves especially, must eventually cause unwanted inflation, the concurrent sharp decline in money's velocity has thus far more than offset any inflationary effects of money growth, while forward bond prices reflect a general belief that inflation will remain below 2 per cent for at least another decade. Notwithstanding the growth of the Fed's balance sheet, Fed authorities can always check inflation by sufficiently raising the interest return on bank reserves. Nonetheless, recent developments have heightened the risk of ‘fiscal dominance’ of monetary policy at some point in the future.     

The UK and the Eurozone: Sovereign Debt Management and Monetary Policy

Events in the wake of the ‘credit crunch’ can be understood only against institutional structures within which interdependent monetary and fiscal policy are administered. In the Eurozone, the attempt to keep a central monetary authority (together with its associated national central banks) independent from 17 diverse fiscal authorities was flawed. When sovereign debt approaches unmanageable levels, the Maastricht Treaty presents austerity as the single option. In the UK, the electorate has an opportunity to choose between monetary financing (inflation) and fiscal consolidation (austerity). Policy choices within the Eurozone and the UK are set against Keynes's focus on unemployment and more recent concerns to retain (or restore) price and/or financial stability.     

Monetary policy with interest on reserves

I analyze monetary policy with interest on reserves and a large balance sheet. I show that conventional theories do not determine inflation in this regime, so I base the analysis on the fiscal theory of the price level. I find that monetary policy can peg the nominal rate, and determine expected inflation. With sticky prices, monetary policy can also affect real interest rates and output, though higher interest rates raise output and then inflation. The conventional sign requires a coordinated fiscal–monetary policy contraction. I show how conventional new-Keynesian models also imply strong monetary–fiscal policy coordination to obtain the usual signs. I address theoretical controversies. A concluding section places our current regime in a broader historical context, and opines on how optimal fiscal and monetary policy will evolve in the new regime.     

Political Macroeconomics: A Survey of Recent Developments

The paper surveys political macroeconomics, covering its development from Rogoff's conservative central banker to the most recent discussions of monetary policy and institutional design. Topics include the inflation-stabilization trade-off, central bank independence with escape clauses and overruling with costs, inflation targets, performance contracts for monetary authorities, and the consequences of output persistence for these issues. Further topics are the political business cycle when output is persistent, the political macroeconomics of fiscal policy, the government spending bias, and the game-theoretic interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. All work is discussed within a coherent analytical framework.     

Monetary union: European lessons,Latin American prospects

This paper analyzes the long-run sustainability of monetary unions. We infer from the EMU experience that for monetary union to be sustainable, fiscal policy rules are necessary. That does not imply a formal Stability Pact, however. Labor market flexibility is more important for sustainability than cross-border labor mobility. Sound financial markets are another precondition. Lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean include, first, that the benefit-cost balance of a shift to monetary union is much less favorable in Latin America and the Caribbean than in Europe and, most important, that the region is some distance away from satisfying the necessary conditions for monetary union. That leaves dollarization as a limited option for small countries and floating rates combined with inflation targeting for much of the rest.     

The First Unified Budget What Should Mr. Clarke Do?

Mr. Clarke has the distinction of presenting the first Unified Budget, an innovation introduced by his predecessor. He does so against a subdued inflation outlook and a recovery from recession that has been proceeding since the first half of last year. But he is also aware that there are risks to this favourable outlook: European recession may slow growth, and there is the worry that underlying inflation may breach the Government's 4 per cent ceiling. III this Viewpoint, we argue that the Chancellor should go further that his predecessor in curbing public borrowing, aiming for a reduction of sonic £4-5bn; this fiscal contraction could be accompanied by a further 0.5 per cent reduction in interest rates, or more if the recovery shows signs of faltering. A rebalancing of monetary and fiscal policy in this way reduces the risks associated with a high level of public borrowing, can help in reducing the excessive level of consumption (private and public) in the UK economy, and offers the best means of maintaining a competitive exchange rate without inflation. A curious feature of the first Unified Budget is that, having moved tax decisions to the autumn, the Chancellor appears to have ruled out further government spending cuts beyond those agreed by the Cabinet before the summer: with more favourable inflation arid the public sector pay limit, there would seem to be scope for a further reduction in the Control Total. On the revenue side, the Chancellor should seek to raise revenues in such a way that does not adversely affect incentives. Here he has several options: to extend the VAT net; to eliminate income tax allowances or reduce them to the 20p rate of tax; or to introduce new user charges. There is also the opportunity, one year on from the UK's exit from the ERM, to restate the basis for a sustainable macroeconomic framework. This should include a rebalancing of monetary and fiscal policy, and a move to enhance the powers of the Bank of England but with parliamentary accountability.     

Monetary policy regimes and the term structure of interest rates

US monetary policy is investigated using a regime-switching no-arbitrage term structure model that relies on inflation, output, and the short interest rate as factors. The model is complemented with a set of assumptions that allow the dynamics of the private sector to be separated from monetary policy. The monetary policy regimes cannot be estimated if the yield curve is ignored during estimation. Counterfactual analysis evaluates importance of regimes in policy and shocks for the great moderation. The low-volatility regime of exogenous shocks plays an important role. Monetary policy contributes by trading off asymmetric responses of output and inflation under different regimes.     

Impacts of Monetary, Fiscal and Exchange Rate Policies on Output in China: A Var Approach

Applying the VAR model and using the interest rate as a monetary policy variable, we find that in the long run, output in China responds negatively to a shock to the interest rate, the real exchange rate, government debt, or the inflation rate, and it reacts positively to a shock to government deficits or lagged own output. When real M2 is chosen as a monetary policy variable, long-term output in China responds positively to a shock to real M2 or lagged own output, and it reacts negatively to a shock to the real exchange rate, government debt, or government deficits. Its response to a shock to the inflation rate is negative when government debt is used and is positive when government deficits are considered. In the short run, fiscal policy is more important than monetary policy in three out of four cases. In the long run, monetary policy is more influential than fiscal policy in three out of four cases. Therefore, the government may consider conducting monetary and fiscal policies differently in the short run and long run. The government needs to be cautious in pursuing deficit spending as its long-term impacts depend on the monetary variable employed. The policy of maintaining a relatively stable exchange rate is appropriate as the depreciation of the Yuan may hurt the economy in the short run.JEL Classifications: E5, F4, H6     

Alternative monetary policies and fiscal regime in new EU members

I investigate the relevance of a fiscal regime for disinflation in new EU member states (NMS). I generalize the framework of [Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., 1995. Exchange rate dynamics redux. Journal of Political Economy 103, 624–660] to incorporate the non-Ricardian fiscal regime and two monetary feedback rules: inflation targeting and depreciation targeting. Euro accession requires disinflation and stabilization of the exchange rate and thus restrictive monetary policy. The model illustrates that a sustainable and prudent fiscal policy is a necessary condition for successful stabilization of inflation. Thus, the lack of prudent fiscal policy, through its effects on inflation, may undermine the EMU accession of large NMS even when their fiscal outcomes fall within the Maastricht range.     

Monetary Targets and the World Economy

The dominant obsessions to watchers of the world economy at the moment are the weakness of the US dollar and the fear that the world economy is stagnating. In this ‘Briefing Paper’ we seek to put both events into the same intellectual framework, and to show that they are the consequence of monetary policies which are not logically related to each other, nor to a common objective of bringing world inflation steadily down to an acceptable level. Specifically, the US - which for reasons outlined below can warrant monetary growth rather below the world average if it is to preserve some dollar stability - is showing an above average outturn in its monetary aggregates. Germany and Japan, which can accommodate increases well above the average, are in fact adopting monetary targets which are leading to exchange rate appreciation, arid a reduction in both countries' expectations for real growth. The dangers for the world economy in this situation are very serious, particularly at a time when further dollar devaluation could be risky both from the viewpoint of US inflation wide the dollar's role as the key reserve asset. It could lead at worst to US protectionism and a monetaryled recession, rein forcing the slow growth rates already being widely predicted in 1978 for many other industrial countries. However, we show in this ‘Briefing Paper’ that this is not a necessity outcome of the present situation, given three vital perceptions. The first, required by statesmen as much as by technicians. is that the recent stagnation in European & Japanese output and exchange rate instability are essentially a monetary phenomenon, requiring essentially monetary (rather than fiscal) remedies. The second is acceptance of the need and practicability of some monetary consignation, based on reasonably common objectives among the major countries regarding inflation, bands for exchange rate movement and red rates of growth. the third, at the most practical level, is agreement on the actual monetary numbers which broadly reconcile these objectives and also take account of the very different ‘unwanted’ rates of monetary growth between countries which reflect their different underlying conditions of output, productivity and demand for money. It is the (ambitious) aim of this ‘Briefing Paper’ to substantiate these perceptions and to provide the numbers mound which a consideration of monetary policies can be framed. The numbers are necessarily based on trends established over a number of years and need to be supplemented by detailed understanding of each country's financial status But the monetary targets provided do, in our judgement, embody trade-offs between inflation, growth and exchange rate movements which should broadly satisfy national ambitions, and reset the world economy on a worthwhile growth path during 1978 or 1979.     

Central Bank Independence and Co-ordinating Monetary and Fiscal Policy

In this article, Stephen Hall, Brian Henry and James Nixon review the arguments that granting a central bank independence to set monetary policy leads to low inflation. An important extension to the standard analysis considers the problem which may arise if monetary and fiscal policy are then not co-ordinated. A strategic analysis is needed to assess this. Using such a framework in an empirical analysis, the authors find that an uncoordinated policy may lead to less growth than a co-ordinated policy, and the main effects of this lack of co-ordination are an overvalued exchange rate and a reduction in net trade.     

Lack of confidence,the zero lower bound,and the virtue of fiscal rules

In the presence of the zero lower bound, standard business cycle models with a Taylor-type monetary policy rule are prone to equilibrium multiplicity. A drop in private sector confidence can drive the economy into a liquidity trap without any change in fundamentals. I show, in the context of a standard New Keynesian model, that it is possible to design Ricardian fiscal spending rules that insulate the economy from such expectations-driven liquidity traps. In the case of price adjustment costs, desirable fiscal rules ensure that a drop in confidence does not lead to a decline in real marginal costs. In the case of nominal wage adjustment costs, desirable fiscal spending rules ensure that a drop in confidence does not lead to a decline in the ratio of the marginal rate of substitution between private consumption and hours worked relative to the real wage rate.     

Local fiscal multipliers and spillover effects: Evidence from Philippine regions

Fiscal policy in developed countries has been a rich topic since the Great Recession. However, research has remained limited for developing countries despite their similar use of fiscal policy and concerns about the efficiency of public spending. To help address this research gap, this paper provides a case study of multiplier effects of local government spending in regions in the Philippines as well as spillover effects of local government spending across regions. An instrumental variable based on the country’s intergovernmental transfer system is used to identify regional public spending in panel regressions. The local fiscal multiplier is estimated to be above one, where a 1-peso rise in spending by local government units in a region corresponds to a 1.2-peso rise in regional output. Multiplier effects are highest for capital expenditures and appear to be primarily driven by the services sector. Spillover effects are comparatively large, at around 1.8–2.0, highlighting the important role of domestic trade when stimulating regional economic activity.     

The impact of adjustment and stabilization policies on infrastructure spending in Central America

During the 1980s and 1990s the countries of Central America experienced protracted fiscal crises and debt repayment problems which resulted in the implementation of structural adjustment agreements. Apart from attempting to reestablish fiscal balance and to control inflation, the proponents of adjustment policies sought to enhance growth by de-emphasizing the wasteful aspects of state spending while maintaining public expenditures on physical and human capital, which were believed to promote private sector productivity. By comparing a pre-debt crisis period with the period given by debt crisis and adjustment, the study reveals that the shares of government spending on human and, particularly, physical infrastructure dropped precipitously during the adjustment period. At the same time, the shares devoted to defense and subsidy categories—as well as interest payments on external debt—generally registered notable gains. The experience of adjustment policies in Central America indicated that substantial discrepancies existed between the idea and the reality.     

THE 1981 BUDGET

In this Forecast Release we examine the short-term prospects for the UK economy in the light of the Budget and other developments. Compared with our February forecast the Budget has raised taxes by about £2 bn but it has also increased public expenditure by a similar amount The net effect on the PSBR, compared with our February forecast, is therefore small, especially if the Treasury's estimates for nationalised industry profits and/or public sector wages prove over-optimistic. We therefore believe that the outturn for the PSBR in 1981-82 could be close to the figure of £12 bn presented in our last forecast.
We also believe that the prospects for output and inflation are little changed The Budget by itself will have raised prices by about 1 per cent compared with our previous forecast but because we had probably over-estimated indirect tax receipts, the net effect on prices is small For output, the likely reduction in consumers' expenditure is more or less offset by higher public spending. We continue to expect a fall in output between 1980 and 1981 of 1–11/2 per cent, inflation during the year at about 10 per cent, a current account surplus of £3 bn, monetary growth of 8 to 9 per cent and a PSBR of £12 bn.