不确定性、风险态度与内生权威

本文依循奈特有关不确定性和权威的思想,为内生权威问题提供了一个正式的模型。我们证明：团队成员间的风险态度差别越大,该团队就越可能形成等级制结构,其成员中的风险偏好者成为领导者,风险规避者成为追随者。团队成员间认知水平差别越大,该团队越可能形成等级制结构,其中认知水平高的成员成为领导者,认知水平低的成为追随者。     

企业投融资决策内生机制的实证研究:税收利益与破产成本的视角

笔者以2001年～2009年708家中国上市公司为样本,从税收利益与破产成本的视角实证研究了企业投融资决策之间的内生机制.实证结果发现:受税收利益的作用,负债融资会显著地增加企业的投资支出,这种正向作用在高负债水平下将交得不再显著;为了利用负债利息税盾的价值促进作用,投资会增加企业的负债融资,但是受高负债水平下高破产成本的影响,这种促进作用变得不再显著;考虑到折旧的税盾替代效应,折旧将会弱化投资对负债融资的促进作用,并最终导致高折旧企业投资支出与负债融资负相关的关系.     

ESG评级分歧与债务资本成本

ESG(环境、社会责任和公司治理)是当前公司金融的重要研究内容。对于ESG表现的考察依赖于ESG评级,但目前一个广泛存在的问题是不同ESG评级机构给出的评级存在着较大的分歧,其影响和对策尚待研究。本文首次检验了ESG评级分歧对上市企业债务资本成本的影响,并探讨背后的机制。结果表明,ESG评级分歧较高的企业有着更高的债务资本成本。本文进一步分析了2019年香港交易所进行的ESG信息披露规则改革的政策冲击,和ESG评级分歧在不同信息披露规范性企业中的影响,发现企业ESG信息披露的不规范是导致该效应的重要因素,市场认为企业ESG真实表现背离评级均值的风险高,因而要求一个额外的风险溢价。此外,结合文献中关于企业权益融资成本的证据,本文发现尽管评级分歧使企业债务资本成本增加,但由于该分歧同时增加了权益融资成本,故企业债务融资比例不降反升。本文从企业融资决策的视角,为ESG评级分歧产生的后果和作用机制提供了一定的证据支持,并且具有重要的政策含义：由于ESG评级分歧负面影响的机制在于让市场认为其信息披露不规范,因此解决评级分歧负面影响的关键在于建立ESG信息披露标准来引导企业规范披露,并引导企业积极...     

财政利益分歧与中国养老保险制度变迁

中国养老保险制度①经历了三个发展阶段.从制度变迁的角度出发,中国养老保险制度作为一个制度矩阵,中央政府、地方政府以及政府部门在制度供给过程中也有自身利益的考虑,养老保险制度改革直接或间接地触及了财政利益在他们之间的重新分配,包括经济资源和经济优势的重新分配,从而影响了他们的偏好及选择,进而再次影响到养老保险制度改革.这种影响表现为养老保险制度改革的增量性和路径依赖性.为推动养老保险制度进一步改革,必须要正确处理各级政府间、政府各部门间的财政利益分歧.     

工程成本管理中的信息交流与成本预测

成本管理是指在满足工程质量、工期等合同要求的前提下，对项目实施过程中所发生的费用，通过计划、组织、控制和协调等活动实现预定的成本目标，并尽可能地降低成本费用的一种科学的管理活动。成本管理的内容很广泛，贯穿于项目管理活动的全过程和每个方面，从项目中标签约开始到施工准备、现场施工、直至竣工验收，每个环节都离不开成本管理工作，就成本管理的完整工作来说，可以划分为计划系统、预算系统、财务系统相配合、协调的统一过程：首先，需要为三个相对独立的系统建立共同的信息交换语言，使它们之间有一个可以交换数据资源的信息平台；然后工程造价师根据施工合同和计划进度作出成本预测，作为项目施工过程中的成本控制目标：财务系统中的成本责任中心的会计师对日常成本开支进行归集、控制，与目标成本作对比，分析差异存在的原因，寻找解决的途径，并提交决策层业绩报告。下面主要就成本管理过程中的信息交流、目标成本预测制定两方面进行阐述。     

浅析思想政治教育中自我利益与成员利益问题

个人的存在是个体性和社会性相结合的二重存在,这一二重性决定了个人利益的两种形式:自我利益与成员利益。社会越发展,个人作为"主体"、作为"自我"的意识越强烈,自我利益就越发凸显。与此同时,社会的发展也使人与人之间的联系越来越密切,个人的"成员"烙印越来越深。对个人来说,自我利益与成员利益之间的分歧是客观存在的,但是,社会的稳定与发展却亟需二者的统一。如何处理二者之间的关系是思想政治教育中的重要问题,文章将就此进行分析。     

基于信息交流技术的组织权威演化机制

沿袭巴纳德组织理论关于信息交流技术对组织权威影响的思路，对组织权威的本质进行了讨论，在此基础上，进一步讨论了信息交流技术对组织权威演化进程的影响。     

我国破产重整程序中有担保债权人利益保护的规制

在破产法的沿革中,破产法的核心目标就是保护债权人的利益,重整制度只不过兼顾了其他利害相关主体的利益,但重整制度毕竟是一项十分复杂的制度,其以挽救营运价值或者最大化破产财产的价值为终极目标,能否达到立法目的,取决于有效地解决各利益相关方的利益冲突,而有担保债权人的利益保护是重整制度考量的重中之重。     

中美能源合作的成就、分歧与对策

中美建交以来,能源合作不断取得进展,但中美之间能源合作的分歧始终制约着双方能源合作的顺利健康发展。如何化解中美能源合作的分歧,本文从分析中美能源合作的成就和面临的挑战入手,提出了深化中美双方今后能源合作的对策,以利于拓展双方的共同利益,为中美能源合作奠定更有建设性的基础。     

普遍利益、特殊利益与行政支出的利益归宿

文章对1978-2006年我国行政支出归宿于社会公众的普遍利益与归宿于公职人员的特殊利益进行了系统的经验估计和分析。研究表明:其一,从整体水平看,受预算制度不完善等因素的影响,在这29年间,按可比价格计算,我国行政支出归宿于公职人员的特殊利益高达40%,而归宿于社会公众的普遍利益仅为60%。其二,从时间趋势看,随着财政观念从积累型财政向消费型财政的转型,行政支出归宿于公职人员的特殊利益所占比重日益扩大,在2000年之后甚至超过了50%。     

Endogenous Persuasion with Costly Verification

In this paper, I study a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver with evidence that is generated via public or private experimentation. Under public experimentation, any experimental outcome is revealed, and under private experimentation the sender can hide adverse outcomes. The sender can design the properties of the experiments. The receiver chooses whether to verify at a cost the design of the experiment with which the revealed outcome was generated. I find that communication breaks down under public experimentation if there is no restriction on the experiment's design, and that persuasion is possible under private experimentation.     

Authority and Communication in Organizations

This paper studies delegation as an alternative to communication. We show that a principal prefers to delegate control to a better informed agent rather than to communicate with this agent as long as the incentive conflict is not too large relative to the principal's uncertainty about the environment. We further identify cases in which the principal optimally delegates control to an "intermediary", and show that keeping a veto–right typically reduces the expected utility of the principal unless the incentive conflict is extreme.     

Interest Group Lobbying and the Delegation of Policy Authority

In a signalling model of lobbying the politicians' decision whether to delegate policy authority and an interest group's choice between lobbying politicians or bureaucrats are investigated. Only bureaucrats are able to assess policy-relevant information coming from the interest group, but their interests may differ from those of politicians. In equilibrium politicians weigh the benefits of an informed policy decision against bureaucratic drift. We obtain that delegation occurs only when the bureaucracy is not too much biased and when the stakes of the interest group are not too high . Still, politicians sometimes prefer a biased bureaucracy and the interest group to have a larger stake. The model also predicts that interest groups typically lobby politicians to further delegation.     

Endogenous Money,Fiscal Policy,Interest Rates and the Exchange Rate Regime: Correction

This note suggests two corrections that might usefully be made to the analysis in an earlier article with the same title. The corrections have no direct bearing on the original argument (which had to do with disputes about modern money theory, or MMT) but do seem important for the future development of an alternative monetary theory.     

Costly investment, complementarities and the skill premium

We propose a new framework to analyse the relationship between the relative high-skilled labour endowment, the skill premium and economic growth. Building on Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), we introduce physical capital; internal costly investment in both capital and R&D; and complementarities between intermediate goods. We only find a positive relationship between the relative labour endowment and both the skill premium and economic growth within determined intervals of relative labour endowment values, which vary with the absolute productive advantage of high over low-skilled labour. The model thus accommodates theoretically mixed empirical results on the relative labour endowment-skill premium relationship. We further find that the impact on both the relative labour endowment and the skill premium of a rise in investment costs or in the complementarities degree depends on: (i) the absolute productivity advantage of high over low-skilled labour; and (ii) the relative labour endowment.     

Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision with Endogenous Interest Groups

This paper studies public goods provision when agents differ in earning abilities as well as preferences. Heterogeneity in skills makes redistribution desirable and generates an equity-efficiency trade-off. If tax revenues are devoted to a public good, this trade-off is affected in such a way that income transfers are less desirable. High-skilled individuals thus have an incentive to exaggerate their preferences for public goods. Analogously, low-skilled individuals lobby against public good provision. A requirement of collective incentive compatibility eliminates these biases. It implies that income transfers are increased whenever a public good is provided and are decreased otherwise.     

权力与利益视角下的学术同行评议制度优化研究

作为学术评价系统中最为普遍和盛行的组织制度或方法,同行评议的合法性与公正性历来存在争议。考察与其相关的主体权力的产生及相互间的制约与博弈过程,可以大致了解同行评议制度设计的依据与逻辑;现实中存在的利益冲突又引发了同行评议对学术伦理的挑战。因此,在协调好权力结构时设计一个良性的制度框架,并就利益冲突问题提出相关治理策略,是完善和优化同行评议制度的关键。     

Costly pollution abatement, competitiveness and plant location decisions

The NAFTA debate included assertions that were used as arguments against trade and investment liberalization. (1) Trade liberalization increases production sensitivity to environmental restrictions (‘environmental dumping’?). (2) Investment liberalization, leading to multinational firms, similarly increases the production and welfare response to costly environmental restrictions. I find that: (1) Trade liberalization increases production sensitivity to costly environmental restrictions, but arguments against liberal trade on welfare grounds do not follow. (2) Multinationals do not increase the production-reallocation effect caused by environmental restrictions or regulations. In addition, I find a great difference between restrictions that fall on fixed costs and restrictions that fall on marginal costs.     

Costly Search, Capacity Constraints, and Bertrand Equilibrium Price Dispersion

This article analyzes the impact of transaction (search) costs and capacity constraints in an almost competitive market with homogeneous firms that compete on price. We characterize conditions under which Nash equilibria with price dispersion exist; in equilibrium, firms play pure strategies in prices and consumers adopt a symmetric mixed search strategy. Price dispersion is possible even though consumers all have the same search cost and valuation for the item and prices charged by all firms are common knowledge.