The empirical relationship between ownership characteristics and audit fees

The present study examines the empirical relationship between ownership characteristics and audit fees. The basic premise is that the level of ownership sophistication and the extent to which ownership is large and substantial impact the effectiveness of stockholder monitoring on corporate affairs including the financial reporting process. Furthermore, high managerial ownership firms may experience a decline in agency problems in financial reporting due to a decrease in managerial propensity to misreport financial results. By employing a cross-sectional least squares regression analysis for a sample of 358 New York Stock Exchange-listed firms audited by the Big Five auditors, we find evidence of a significantly positive relationship between diffused institutional stock ownership (i.e., having less than 5% individual shareholding) and audit fees, and a significantly negative relationship between institutional blockholder ownership (i.e., having 5% or more individual shareholding) and audit fees. Finally, we document that managerial stock ownership is negatively associated with audit fees. We do not, however, find evidence of any relationship between noninstitutional blockholder ownership (with at least 5% individual stock ownership) and audit fees. The study's main results hold in various specification tests including when the effects of board-related and audit committee variables are factored in the analysis. Based on the observed relationship between the ownership variables and audit fees, we suggest that the ownership characteristics of a firm as a part of its governance mechanism constitute an important determinant of audit fees.

The impact of PCAOB international registration on audit quality and audit fees: Evidence from China

Despite the importance of registration with the PCAOB, there is surprisingly little academic research on the registration process and its impact on audit outcomes (Abernathy et al., 2013). The PCAOB allows registration of audit firms from non-US countries. However, China and a few other countries do not allow the PCAOB to conduct inspections of audit firms. We take advantage of this setting to investigate whether PCAOB-registered audit firms improve audit quality in the absence of inspections and whether they charge an audit fee premium. Our findings indicate that audit quality increases following PCAOB registration and that clients pay higher audit fees for audits by PCAOB-registered firms.     

The impact of audit committee expertise on audit quality: Evidence from UK audit fees

Governance regulators currently place great emphasis on ensuring the presence of financial expertise on audit committees (Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002; UK Corporate Governance Code 2010–2016). Underlying this is a belief that greater expertise enhances the effectiveness of audit committees and, by extension, the quality of the external audit. This study investigates the impact of audit committee expertise on one measure of audit quality - audit fees paid by FTSE350 companies. Our analysis finds that audit committees possessing greater levels of financial expertise are associated with higher audit fees. When we segregate financial expertise between accounting and non-accounting, we find that the positive impact identified is driven by non-accounting expertise. Furthermore, when we separate FTSE100 and FTSE250 firms we find the impact of financial expertise is confined to FTSE250 firms. Our findings are important as they highlight the usefulness of segregating financial expertise between specialists and non-specialists, something which regulators in the UK and in the USA currently do not do. Our findings also highlight the potential value of audit committee expertise in smaller as opposed to larger listed firms, suggesting that the value of expertise to audit quality depends on the specific financial reporting challenges firms face.     

Audit market concentration,audit fees,and audit quality: A cross-country analysis of complex audit clients

Regulators around the world are concerned about the potentially harmful effects of high audit market concentration on audit pricing and quality. However, results in the overall literature have failed to reach consensus on this issue. We contribute to this debate by arguing that the audit market is segmented and that concentration in the Big 4 segment of the market leads to higher audit pricing. Accordingly, our analyses use international data and focus on concentration within the Big 4 group of firms across countries. We find that audit fees are increasing in our concentration measure for clients where the barriers to entry by competing auditors are higher, as proxied by client size, international operations, and IFRS use. Finally, we find evidence that audit quality is decreasing in Big 4 market concentration for these types of engagements. This indicates a wealth transfer from shareholders to audit firms when auditor concentration is high because these complex clients are charged more, but receive audits that are of lower quality.     

Code of ethics quality and audit fees

Using a sample of U.S. firms from 2003 to 2018, we examine the effect of an audit client’s code of ethics quality on audit fees. We find that clients with a lower code of ethics quality pay significantly higher audit fees, suggesting that auditors perceive such clients as riskier and charge greater risk premiums. We also find that such clients have higher litigation risk and auditors spend greater effort when auditing such clients. Our study is among the first to demonstrate the role of a client’s code of ethics quality in audit pricing. Overall, our findings are consistent with codes of ethics being useful to auditors in assessing managers’ financial representations and providing value to firms.     

Audit fees and audit adjustments: evidence from Welsh local authorities

This paper exploits the availability of pre-audit financial statements to investigate the scale and incidence of audit adjustments and their impact on audit fees in Welsh local authorities. Adjustments to the politically-sensitive general fund, which represent a significant proportion of all adjustments, are associated with increased audit fees. The authors also found that audit adjustments on average result in more conservative reporting of the surplus/deficit and the balance on the general fund, with the number and value of downward adjustments exceeding those of upward movements.     

How audit effort affects audit quality: An audit process and audit output perspective

Using a unique dataset of audit days in China from 2006 to 2011, this paper examines the relationship between audit effort and audit quality from the perspective of audit process and audit output. The results show that audit effort significantly increases the probability of audit adjustments, which inhibits positive earnings management and improves the quality of audited financial statements. We also find that audit effort does not have a significant effect on the issuance of modified audit opinions overall, but that a modified audit opinion is more likely to be issued in the absence of an audit adjustment. Furthermore, we find that the impact of audit effort on audit quality is attenuated when clients are more complex and when audit firms are larger. Collectively, our evidence suggests that audit effort plays an important role in improving audit quality by influencing audit process and audit output. Our study extends the literature on the impact of audit effort on audit quality in emerging markets, and the conclusions have important implications for the improvement of China’s audit market efficiency.     

The vanishing searches and audit fees: Evidence from Google's withdrawal from China

I investigate the impact of the disruption of free information access via search engines on audit fees using a quasi-natural experiment provided by Google's withdrawal from China. Employing a difference-in-differences design, I document an increase in audit fees for firms with overseas business relative to firms without overseas business after Google's withdrawal. The results are robust to matched samples, placebo tests, alternative specifications, excluding alternative explanations and different event windows. This trend in audit fees suggests that Google's withdrawal hampers firms' foreign information streams and increases audit risk and audit effort. Consistent with this argument, after Google's withdrawal, firms with overseas business conduct more earnings management, pay more abnormal audit fees and experience longer audit report lags. Furthermore, the increase in audit fees is greater for firms with poor information environments, more retail investors or non-Big 4 auditors. My findings suggest a potential auditing cost of restricting the free flow of public foreign information about firms.     

Internal control risk and audit fees: Evidence from China

This study examines the association between internal control risk and audit fees under the voluntary adopting regime of the Basic Standard of Enterprise Internal Control in China. We find that audit fees are positively related to disclosed internal control weaknesses (ICWs). In particular, they are significantly associated with non-financial reporting-related, but not with financial reporting-related, ICWs.Our results also indicate that voluntary assurance in internal control reports can mitigate higher audit fees associated with ICWs. Our study provides timely evidence relating to the debate on whether the scope of internal control should be expanded to non-financial reporting-related areas.     

Ownership structure and dividend policy: Evidence from Italian firms

Abstract

This paper reports on empirical investigations into the relationship between dividend policy and ownership structure of firms, using a sample of 139 listed Italian companies. Ownership structure in Italy is highly concentrated and hence the relevant agency problem to analyse seems to be the one that arises from the conflicting interests of large shareholders and minority shareholders. This paper therefore attempts to test the rent extraction hypothesis by relating the firm’s dividend payout ratio to various ownership variables, which measure the degree of concentration in terms of the voting rights of large shareholders. The hypothesis that other non-controlling large shareholders may have incentives to monitor the largest shareholder is also tested. The results of the empirical analysis reveal that firms make lower dividend payouts as the voting rights of the largest shareholder increase. Results also suggest that the presence of agreements among large shareholders might explain the limited monitoring power of other ‘strong’ non-controlling shareholders.     

Audit firm merger and the strategic response by large audit firms

We examine the impact of a change in the audit industry structure in China as a result of two recent mergers involving large non-Big 4 audit firms. The ‘New Big’ audit firms, Ruihua and BDO Lixin, became the third and fourth largest audit firms in China following audit firm mergers, outranking both EY and KPMG in terms of total audit revenues in 2013. We find a significant audit fee and audit quality increase for the New Big audit firms relative to the Big 4 audit firms following the mergers. While this finding could be interpreted as an increase in quality as a result of audit firm consolidation, we find that this net effect is due to a decrease in audit fees and audit quality for the Big 4 following the mergers, rather than an increase in audit fees and audit quality by the New Big audit firms. We discuss the implications of our findings for various regulators.     

Insider ownership, ownership concentration and investment performance: An international comparison

This article makes two important contributions to the literature on the incentive effects of insider ownership. First, it presents a clean method for separating the positive wealth effect of insider ownership from the negative entrenchment effect, which can be applied to samples of companies from the US and any other country. Second, it measures the effects of insider ownership using a measure of firm performance, namely a marginal q, which ensures that the causal relationship estimated runs from ownership to performance. The article applies this method to a large sample of publicly listed firms from the Anglo-Saxon and Civil law traditions and confirms that managerial entrenchment has an unambiguous negative effect on firm performance as measured by both Tobin's (average) q and our marginal q, and that the wealth effect of insider ownership is unambiguously positive for both measures. We also test for the effects of ownership concentration for other categories of owners and find that while institutional ownership improves the performance in the USA, financial institutions have a negative impact in other Anglo-Saxon countries and in Europe.     

Government ownership and the capital structure of firms: Analysis of an institutional context from China

Emerging economies provide interesting scenarios for examining how institutional context influences the financing behavior of firms. In this study, we examine the capital structure of Chinese listed firms following the Split-Share Structure Reform of 2005. This reform allowed a reduction of government ownership by making government shares tradable. We find that the impact of government ownership on leverage is dependent on whether the government is the largest shareholder in a firm and whether the government ownership is through a parent state-owned enterprise. In addition, we document that the largest non-government shareholder positively influences leverage. Overall, our results reveal that the largest controlling shareholder, either government or non-government, has a significant impact on the capital structure of Chinese firms.     

The impact of board composition and family ownership on audit committee formation: Evidence from Hong Kong

This study investigates empirically the relationship between three major corporate governance attributes (family shareholding, non-executive directors and independent chairman) and the existence of audit committees across a sample of 397 publicly traded firms in Hong Kong. The results show that at a medium level of family shareholding (between 5% and 25%), the convergence-of-interest effect is dominant and the existence of audit committees decreases. At a high level of family shareholding (more than 25%), the entrenchment effect is dominant and as a result, the existence of audit committees increases. In addition, we show that the response of investors to audit committee existence is not dependent upon family shareholding when there is an independent chairman. The findings of our study also suggest that there is a positive association between the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the corporate board and audit committee existence. In addition, the results show that the positive association between independent non-executive directors is stronger for firms with an independent chairman. Implications of these findings for regulators are discussed.     

Audit fee lowballing: Determinants,recovery, and future audit quality

Prior research on the link between lowballing (LB) of audit fees and audit quality is inconclusive. Using more recent data and an innovative design, we define LB engagements as those where the audit fee discount is at least 30 percent. We consider three research questions to understand the possible link between LB and audit quality. First, we investigate whether the two variables that are often associated with auditor independence in the literature—non-audit fees and client importance—are related to LB. Second, we test whether lowballing auditors recoup initial audit fee discounts in the future period. Lastly, we investigate the relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. We find that non-audit fees in the first year of engagement are negatively related to the propensity to LB. LB is significantly positively related to client importance for client firms switching from a non-Big N to another non-Big N auditor while the relation is insignificant for client firms switching from a Big N to another Big N auditor. The results of non-audit fees and client importance indicate that economic dependence does not motivate audit firms to lowball. Further, lowballing auditors tend to recoup their initial fee discounts in subsequent periods via increases in audit fees. Using multiple measures of audit quality, we do not find a significant relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. Overall, contrary to regulators’ concerns, our results suggest that LB does not impair audit quality.     

Fund ownership and stock price informativeness of Chinese listed firms

We examine the impact of mutual fund ownership on stock price informativeness in China. Existing evidence shows that stock price informativeness is low in China, and attributes this to firms’ lack of disclosure incentives under the weak investor protection institutional environment. Mutual funds are more sophisticated and influential than individual investors to monitor firms, and thus serve as an external governance mechanism to improve corporate transparency. However, the impact of mutual funds in China can also be moderated by state ownership of listed firms, which reduces firms’ dependence on outside investors for capital. Indeed, we find that mutual fund ownership is positively related to share price informativeness, but this effect is less pronounced among state-controlled firms. The main policy implication from our findings is that mutual funds contribute to the corporate information environment of emerging economies but further privatization of listed firms would be needed to realize greater benefit.     

Unintended costs of a dual regulatory environment: Evidence from state-level cannabis legalization and bank audit fees

Since 2014, a number of U.S. states have legalized business activities related to the production, distribution, and use of recreational cannabis. These activities remain illegal at the U.S. federal level, creating a dual regulatory environment. The uncertainty related to the enforcement of federal cannabis laws affects businesses located in legalizing states, particularly federally-insured banks. Applying a difference-in-differences approach to a matched sample of banks in legalizing and non-legalizing states, we document an increase in audit fees incurred by banks located in legalizing states after cannabis legalization. This finding is consistent with increased auditor effort and engagement risk being an unintended consequence of state-level recreational cannabis legalization. In supplemental analysis, we find that the relation between banks’ audit fees and cannabis legalization was greater for banks having larger increases in banking activity, suggesting that audit fees increased primarily for banks that may be engaging in relationships with cannabis-related businesses.     

CFO narcissism and audit fees: Evidence from listed companies in China

This paper examines the effects of CFO narcissism on audit fees in China. Using the size of CFO signatures in annual audit reports to measure individual narcissism, we find that CFO narcissism is associated with higher audit fees. We find empirical evidence that CFO narcissism significantly increases the audit fees of listed companies, and this effect is stronger in state-owned enterprises. This paper also explores the mediating effects of financial information and the engagement of prestigious Big-4 and Big-10 firms. The results show that companies with narcissistic CFOs have lower quality financial information and prefer more prestigious firms, which leads to higher audit fees. This research highlights the importance of CFO narcissism in corporate performance and provides new evidence that will be useful for listed companies that plan to hire senior executives.     

State ownership and adjustment speed toward target leverage: Evidence from a transitional economy

Using a quantile regression approach and 5,374 Vietnamese firm-year observations from 2000 to 2016, this paper examines the effect of state ownership on the speed of adjustment SOA toward target leverage across various levels of capital structure. The findings consistently show that these effects on SOA vary depending on the leverage level. The relationship is negative for low-leveraged firms, positive for high-leveraged firms, but insignificant in the central area of leverage distribution. Moreover, the negative effects are greater than the positive effects.     

The formation and early development of German audit firms

This paper examines the emergence of audit firms in Germany through an analysis of contemporary sources. Special attention is paid to the range of services offered, their legal forms and ownership structure. In Germany, the demand for external audits developed because the corporate supervisory boards had been unable to fulfil their monitoring task satisfactorily. As a consequence of the major economic crisis of 1929-1931 and the collapse of large corporations caused by the fraudulent actions of managing directors, statutory audits for stock corporations were introduced in 1931. The first German audit and trust company, the Deutsche Treuhand-Gesellschaft, was established much earlier in 1890. Like other trust companies which emerged from 1905 onwards, it was owned by large banks. After the First World War, large commercial groups on the one hand, and the state on the other hand, started to form their own audit firms. Most of the audit and trust companies used the legal form of a corporation. Originally, the main activities of the trust companies were trustee activities and audits. Subsequently, they also offered tax and business advisory services. These features (a broad range of services offered, the corporation as the dominant legal form, and clients who are also owners) help us to understand key characteristics of modern German audit firms such as their limited liability to third parties.