Americanism and financial accounting theory – Part 2: The ‘modern business enterprise’, America's transition to capitalism,and the genesis of management accounting

The paper uses accounting evidence to explore when and how capitalism came to America. It continues the search for capitalists in American history begun in ‘Americanism and financial accounting theory. Part 1: Was America Born Capitalist?’ Part 1 concluded that America was not ‘born capitalist’ in Marx's sense, and that the capitalist mentality had not appeared in farming even by the late 19th century, on southern slave plantations by the Civil War, or in manufacturing enterprises by the 1830s. This paper (Part 2) challenges Alfred Chandler's thesis that the ‘modern business enterprise’ brought ‘a new type of capitalism’ from around the mid-19th century. It re-examines accounting evidence from the Boston textile mills, the railroads, and the iron and steel industry. It concludes that the Boston Associates who historians often see as ‘proto-capitalists’, the ‘managerial capitalists’ Chandler sees on the railroads, and the ‘entrepreneurial capitalists’ he sees in the iron and steel industry and elsewhere, remained semi-capitalists because their capitals and workers were not ‘free’. The paper re-examines the ‘costing renaissance’, the introduction and spread of product costing, standard costing, ROI and flexible budgets, and the evidence in Chandler's and Johnson and Kaplan's studies of the DuPont Powder Company and General Motors. This suggests that capitalism only appeared in America by around 1900, after more than two decades of intense conflict between ‘capital and labour’, and became established by the 1920s. This is the critical turning point in American business history, not the appearance of ‘managerial capitalism’, the paper argues. It concludes that America did not catch up with British capitalism until the late 1920s because its ruling elite faced an ideological problem created by its exceptional transition from a society of simple commodity producers and semi-capitalists, particularly the threat of popular socialism. The final paper, Part 3: ‘Adam Smith, the rise and fall of socialism, and Irving Fisher's theory of accounting’, argues that Fisher made a seminal contribution to solving this problem, but his legacy is a pathological theory of financial accounting.     

从镀金时代的美国看垄断对社会矛盾的激化

“镀金时代”即美国19世纪后期，这是美国从自由资本主义向垄断资本主义过渡的时期。美国资本主义从自由竞争到垄断的过程，是经济发展和市场竞争的结果，总体上看利大于弊，应视为历史的进步。但与此同时，垄断导致了诸多社会问题，工人、农民和消费者受害尤深，反抗运动此起彼伏，是镀金时代美国社会矛盾激化的最主要原因之一。目前，中国经济中的垄断现象也很突出，而且同样在激化社会矛盾，镀金时代的美国经验可资借鉴。     

Was America born capitalist? A counter view

This paper is a response to Part 1 of Rob Bryer's analysis of American business consciousness in the period prior to the mid-1800s. It argues that RB's historical model for tracking the transition to capitalism in the US based on accounting signatures is too simplistic, and that the evidence he presents is ambiguous, relying as it does on the interpretation of secondary sources. The paper questions RB's unique definition of capitalism as well as his conception of a clear point of divide between the capitalist and pre-capitalist worlds, and argues that the capitalist mentality or spirit existed in America long before the early 20th century based on current evidence.     

Americanism and financial accounting theory – Part 3: Adam Smith,the rise and fall of socialism,and Irving Fisher's theory of accounting

A previous paper (Part 1) rejected the conventional wisdom that America was ‘born capitalist’ and the historians’ consensus that it had become capitalist by the early-19th century; another (Part 2) rejected Chandler's thesis that the ‘modern business enterprise’ brought a ‘new form of capitalism’ to America from the 1840s. The accounting evidence suggests that America began to make the transition to capitalism around 1900 in a period of intense conflict between ‘capital and labour’ generated by ‘big business’ from the 1880s, a process not completed until the 1920s. This paper (Part 3) examines the consequences for America's political ideology and financial accounting theory. America's exceptional transition, it argues, explains the history of its political ideology, and this history explains Irving Fisher's theory of accounting. Section A argues that America lagged behind Britain because it started from a society of simple commodity producers and semi-capitalists, which created an exceptional ideological problem for its ruling elite. Big business generated hostility from workers, farmers and small employers – expressed in labour movements, ‘populism’, socialism, and ‘progressivism’ – and created an ideological problem by contradicting the ‘independent producer’ ideology of workers and farmers, and the ‘individual liberalism’ of small manufacturers and merchants, both underwritten by Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. The paper argues that Smith's theory of price articulates as semi-capitalist accounting, which explains his popularity in America until the appearance of big business in the 1880s. Socialism and progressivism became political forces in America from 1900 to around 1920. Progressivism produced ‘corporate liberalism’, the ideological counter to socialism that corporations could be made ‘socially responsible’ by government regulation and ‘publicity’ to ensure they earned only ‘fair’ returns, but this left two problems. First, socialists argued that no profit was ‘fair’, and second, fear of the ‘labour danger’ made American financial reports secretive and conservative. Section B argues that Irving Fisher responded to these problems with a theory of accounting, which he developed as a refutation of Marx and the American brand of socialism advocated by Eugene Debs, the threateningly successful presidential candidate of the Socialist Party of America. An important but neglected reason for socialism's abrupt collapse around 1920, it argues, was that the socialists lost the intellectual argument with the middle classes, and that Fisher's theory played an important role in this defeat. Fisher was a vigorous self-publicist, strongly influenced the teaching of economics and accounting in the universities and, the paper argues, changed the language of American accounting. Fisher claimed that accounting practice supported his theory of ‘capital’ and ‘income’, but the paper shows he did not understand double-entry bookkeeping or the accountants’ ‘cost theory of value’, and therefore divorced accounting from the reality of business transactions. As his theory underlies the FASB's framework, the paper concludes that Fisher's legacy to the world is a pathological theory of financial accounting.     

How Continental Bank outsourced its "crown jewels."

No industry relies more on information than banking does, yet Continental, one of America's largest banks, outsources its information technology. Why? Because that's the best way to service the customers that form the core of the bank's business, says vice chairman Dick Huber. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Continental participated heavily with Penn Square Bank in energy investments. When falling energy prices burst Penn Square's bubble in 1982, Continental was stuck with more than $1 billion in bad loans. Eight years later when Dick Huber came on board, Continental was working hard to restore its once solid reputation. Executives had made many tough decisions already, altering the bank's focus from retail to business banking and laying off thousands of employees. Yet management still needed to cut costs and improve services to stay afloat. Regulators, investors, and analysts were watching every step. Continental executives, eager to focus on the bank's core mission of serving business customers, decided to outsource one after another in-house service--from cafeteria services to information technology. While conventional wisdom holds that banks must retain complete internal control of IT, Continental bucked this argument when it entered into a ten-year, multimillion-dollar contract with Integrated Systems Solutions Corporation. Continental is already reaping benefits from outsourcing IT. Most important, Continental staffers today focus on their true core competencies: intimate knowledge of customers' needs and relationships with customers.     

What's a business for?

In the wake of the recent corporate scandals, it's time to reconsider the assumptions underlying American-style stock-market capitalism. That heady doctrine--in which the market is king, success is measured in terms of shareholder value, and profits are an end in themselves--enraptured America for a generation, spread to Britain during the 1980s, and recently began to gain acceptance in Continental Europe. But now, many wonder if the American model is corrupt. The American scandals are not just a matter of dubious personal ethics or of rogue companies fudging the odd billion. And the cure for the problems will not come solely from tougher regulations. We must also ask more fundamental questions: Whom and what is a business for? And are traditional ownership and governance structures suited to the knowledge economy? According to corporate law, a company's financiers are its owners, and employees are treated as property and recorded as costs. But while that may have been true in the early days of industry, it does not reflect today's reality. Now a company's assets are increasingly found in the employees who contribute their time and talents rather than in the stockholders who temporarily contribute their money. The language and measures of business must be reversed. In a knowledge economy, a good business is a community with a purpose, not a piece of property. If, like many European companies, a business considers itself a wealth-creating community consisting of members who have certain rights, those members will be more likely to treat one another as valued partners and take responsibility for telling the truth. Such a community can also help repair the image of business by insisting that its purpose is not just to make a profit but to make a profit in order to do something better.     

The state of American management

Every year, the president of the United States offers his State of the Union address. Here, from one of the most respected managers in America, is a report on the State of American Management. The state of management, says Walter B. Wriston, is good. Despite the predictions of America's decline, our economy continues to prosper. That is because of this fundamental truth: the United States is the only country in the world that renews itself daily. This is the Age of Pluralism, and U.S. business is based on pluralism. The spirit of the entrepreneur has entered the mainstream of U.S. management, transforming bureaucracy and emphasizing leadership. Today's top executives need to be more like politicians than the number-crunchers of yesterday. At the same time, information is flowing more freely, so corporations are eliminating layers of managers who were really just transmission lines. And top managers are learning to listen to the people who are closest to the work. Everyone today is a knowledge worker. The accelerating pace of knowledge has put a greater premium than ever on talent. Globalization is a big part of this new world. From the manager's viewpoint, globalization means that "you're in a marketplace where you're suddenly waking up with a guy...from a country you're not too sure where it is, who's eating your lunch in your hometown." To understand global competition, managers in large and small companies need broad vision. Finally, to deal with change, U.S. managers must confront some issues at home. For instance, our accounting systems are obsolete, both in companies and in our national accounts.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

Latin America in the rearview mirror

Latin American countries are the only Western countries that are poor and that are not gaining ground on the U.S. This paper evaluates why Latin America has not replicated Western economic success. We find that this failure is primarily due to TFP differences. Latin America's TFP gap is not plausibly accounted for by human capital differences, but rather reflects inefficient production. We argue that competitive barriers are a promising channel for understanding low Latin TFP. We document that Latin America has many more international and domestic competitive barriers than do Western and successful East Asian countries. We also document a number of microeconomic cases in Latin America in which large reductions in competitive barriers increase Latin American productivity to Western levels.     

What economic democracy for degrowth? Some comments on the contribution of socialist models and Cuban agroecology

While degrowth is about reducing energy and material flows in the economy while sustaining basic human needs, capitalism fosters the opposite trend. How then is degrowth to be implemented on a large scale? In line with different critical intellectual traditions, we argue that degrowth is unlikely to occur within an economy based on capital accumulation and free market of assets. Our objective is then to preliminarily investigate the links between economic structures, democratic principles, and degrowth. We do this, firstly, by briefly exploring some of the main theoretical models of economic democracy in order to find out their potential for achieving sustainable degrowth. In our view, models of self-managed socialism have the best potential for this. Secondly, we intend to learn some empirical lessons from a countrywide experience: Cuban agroecology, today's largest real-life experience of agroecological “degrowth”. Our hypothesis is that the Cuban economy, which limits the private accumulation of capital and of productive assets, is in a better position for achieving forms of sustainable degrowth than capitalist economies, but that it would be even more so with more democracy. The Cuban agricultural system faces the challenge to free itself from the central planning tradition. This could be achieved by following the current process of giving increasing autonomy to small producers. Specifically, we argue that small-scale farmer cooperatives have the best potential for achieving the degrowth-oriented goals of agroecology.     

积极探索 理性发展 实现双赢——2008年同业银行理财产品市场特点及启示

（一）信托贷款类产品成为理财市场的主导 2008年，各行理财产品发行数量保持稳定增长，但受资本市场大幅下挫、投资者风险意识增强以及银监会加大商业银行理财业务规范整改力度等因素的影响，理财产品的品种结构普遍发生显著变化。自二季度开始，风险相对较低、收益相对稳定的信托贷款类产品大幅增加，     

美国金融监管改革法案解读与启示

次贷危机暴露了美国现行金融监管制度的缺陷,使美国对其监管理念和监管体系进行反思.<多德--弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法案>是美国在危机后进行大规模金融监管改革的立法尝试.新设金融稳定监管委员会防范系统性风险、成立消费者金融保护局、加强金融衍生品监管、终结金融机构大而不能倒状况等立法内容折射出美国金融监管理念的革新.我国应适度借鉴美国金融监管改革立法优质内核,完善我国金融监管法律制度建设.     

中国金融不能照搬美国自由化模式——国际金融危机的一条根本教训

美国引发的国际金融危机,从反面给我国的金融体制创新提供一面镜子.鉴此,必须从根本上认识此次危机的社会制度原因,把握现代资本主义发展的阶段特征及其在金融领域的表现形式,廓清中国特色社会主义金融与美国资本主义金融六个方面的根本区别,坚持我国金融制度建设与创新的正确方向,处理好借鉴别人与自我完善的关系,决不能照搬美国自由化金融的模式.     

I was greedy,too

Americans are outraged at the greediness of Wall Street analysts, dot-com entrepreneurs, and, most of all, chief executive officers. How could Tyco's Dennis Kozlowski use company funds to throw his wife a million-dollar birthday bash on an Italian island? How could Enron's Ken Lay sell thousands of shares of his company's once high-flying stock just before it crashed, leaving employees with nothing? Even America's most popular domestic guru, Martha Stewart, is suspected of having her hand in the cookie jar. To some extent, our outrage may be justified, writes HBR senior editor Diane Coutu. And yet, it's easy to forget that just a couple years ago these same people were lauded as heroes. Many Americans wanted nothing more, in fact, than to emulate them, to share in their fortunes. Indeed, we spent an enormous amount of time talking and thinking about double-digit returns, IPOs, day trading, and stock options. It could easily be argued that it was public indulgence in corporate money lust that largely created the mess we're now in. It's time to take a hard look at greed, both in its general form and in its peculiarly American incarnation, says Coutu. If Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan was correct in telling Congress that "infectious greed" contaminated U.S. business, then we need to try to understand its causes--and how the average American may have contributed to it. Why did so many of us fall prey to greed? With a deep, almost reflexive trust in the free market, are Americans somehow greedier than other peoples? And as we look at the wreckage from the 1990s, can we be sure it won't happen again?     

How market smarts can protect property rights

Intellectual property comprises an ever-increasing fraction of corporate wealth, but what's the good of that if an ever-increasing fraction of the property is copied or stolen? Faced with developing countries' limited and inadequately enforced patent and copyright laws, some companies are resorting to market-based strategies to protect their intellectual property. These include preempting or threatening competitors, embedding intellectual property in environments that can be protected, bundling insecure intellectual property with its more secure cousins, and actually entering the businesses that pose a threat. The authors urge companies coping with weak property rights to follow a decision tree when choosing which strategies to use and when: Start by thinking of the strategies that will protect your business's core. If, for example, a first-mover advantage is within reach, making yourself more committed to intellectual property could be the answer. If you and your rivals are equally matched, ask yourself, "Can those that threaten me with copying be copied in turn?" The knowledge that each of you can hurt the other may dampen the competitive intensity or even lead to voluntary sharing of property. If these solutions fail or don't apply, try forging a connection with a product or business closely related to your own. Doing so may prevent a valued asset from falling into a rival's hands or make the asset harder to misappropriate. This approach can even help you expand your piece of the market pie or reduce the cost of making the threatened product, perhaps to the point where you can compete against pirated goods. Finally, if there still doesn't seem to be a way of making money from your threatened product, you may choose to move into the very business that has hurt your own. Such strategies are behind the economics of successful companies like Intel and NBC, say the authors.     

Americanism and financial accounting theory – Part 1: Was America born capitalist?

This paper (Part 1), and two related papers (Part 2: The ‘modern business enterprise’, America's transition to capitalism, and the genesis of management accounting; and Part 3: Adam Smith, the rise and fall of socialism, and Irving Fisher's theory of accounting), explore historical links between American ideology and Irving Fisher's theory of accounting. They explain Fisher's theory as the product of America's exceptional transition to capitalism and the ideological consequences. Part 1 uses Marx's theories of the transition in England, of colonisation, and of ideology, to construct an accounting history model of America's transition to capitalism that identifies the dominant social relations of production and calculative mentalities, and uses them to predict the accounting signatures and political ideologies we should observe if the theories are correct. Parts 1 and 2 test the model. Part 3 explores the ideological consequences of America's transition, for America and financial accounting. Scholars generally assume that America was ‘born capitalist’; historians argue it became capitalist sometime from the late 18th to early 19th centuries. The model, however, identifies early farmers as ‘simple commodity producers’ who, it predicts, kept only single entry accounts of debt, and had a ‘producer’ ideology of ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’. It identifies planters and manufacturers as ‘semi-capitalists’ – part merchant capitalist and part simple commodity producer – who it predicts calculated ‘profit’ as consumable surplus, pursued the ‘simple rate of profit’, controlled only prime costs, and had an ideology of ‘individualism’ that combined the producers’ ideology with the merchants’ ‘laissez-faire’. Part 1 re-examines evidence from accounts to around the mid-19th century, which confirms that farmers were not capitalists and that even the most advanced merchants, manufacturers and planters were semi-capitalists. Part 2 searches for capitalists in the second half of the 19th century. It re-examines evidence from the accounts of the Boston Associates who historians have seen as ‘proto-industrial capitalists’; from the railroads heralded by Chandler as the beginning of ‘managerial capitalism’; and from ‘entrepreneurial capitalists’ like Andrew Carnegie who created the large corporations that conquered America from the 1880s. Their financial accounts and cost management systems reveal the same semi-capitalist mentality found in the early 19th century. Re-examination of the ‘costing renaissance’ in the 1890s and evidence from the DuPont Powder Company and General Motors from 1900 to 1920, suggests that only from around 1900, after escalating conflict between ‘capital and labour’, did the capitalist mentality appear in new management accounting systems focused on ‘return on investment’. Part 3 shows that the accounting evidence closely correlates with the history of American political ideology. It argues that Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations dominated American politics until the late 19th century because it theorised a nation of simple commodity producers and semi-capitalists. It explains the delay in America's transition compared to Britain's, and the decline in the popularity of laissez-faire from the 1880s, as consequences of this exceptional starting point. ‘Big business’ capitalism created an ideological problem for America's ruling elite, particularly the threat of socialism from around 1900 to 1920. Part 3 argues that Fisher's neoclassical theory of ‘capital’ and ‘income’, designed as a critique of Marx, responded to this problem and played an important role in undermining middle class support for socialism. Fisher said he based his theory on accounting practice, particularly double entry bookkeeping, but Part 3 shows he did not use or understand it, which divorced his accounting from reality. American history's legacy to the world, the papers therefore conclude, is a pathological theory of financial accounting.     

Financial instability in Latin America

In this paper I deal with a number of issues related to financial instability in Latin America. I first discuss, from a macroeconomic research perspective, what I believe are some of the most important policy issues faced by the Latin American nations. These include the effectiveness of controls on capital inflows, the effect of exchange rate depreciation on output, and the international transmission of the business cycle. Second, I argue that the economic research agenda on Latin America should not ignore history. In Latin America, more so than in any other region in the world, there has been a self-destructing tendency for repeating history.     

商业银行个人理财业务研究与展望

理财业务是商业银行推进综合化经营战略的重要载体和提高中间业务收入的重要手段。我国商业银行理财业务尚处于起步阶段,当前具有以信托贷款类产品为主导,产品预期收益趋向合理,分层服务体系开始构建等特点。产品风险揭示不足、品种结构不合理以及粗放式发展等问题仍然存在。我国商业银行需要重新考察和研判市场方向,发挥理财业务对经营转型的重要作用;打造卓越品牌形象与特色服务,获取客户的持久信任与忠诚;加大创新力度,探寻理财市场发展新空间;同时,由单一产品向综合平台转变,由大众化产品向分层次服务转变;建立健全理财业务风险管理体系。     

美国安然事件的经济背景分析

本文分析美国证券公开发行公司如安然披露欺诈财务信息的经济背景。财务作假既不是孤立的也不是偶然的现象。财务作假的关键问题产生于经济环境。首先 ,今天美国经济中生产、流通、分配和消费四个主要环节失去了相互制衡的作用 ;其次 ,不论美国的上市公司制度和公司治理都存在若干缺陷。     

The spirit of capitalism among the income classes

This paper tests the consumption-based capital asset model within the context of the spirit of capitalism. The spirit of capitalism asserts that consumers gain utility not just from consumption of goods and services, but also from the social status obtained from wealth. We examine two asset pricing models developed by Bakshi and Chen (1996) that employ wealth in the utility function, for households sorted by income quintiles. In the first model, households obtain utility from both consumption and the social status that comes from their own wealth. In the second model, households gain utility from both consumption and the social status obtained from their own wealth relative to the wealth of other peer households. Our results indicate that both models are inconsistent with the data regardless of income. However, using cointegration methods as a diagnostic tool, we find that the data are “loosely” consistent with the spirit of capitalism, at least for the upper income quintiles.     

Do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks in banking?

In a dynamic framework it is shown that capital adequacy rules may increase a bank's riskiness. In addition to the standard negative effect of rents on risk attitudes of banks a further intertemporal effect has to be considered. The intuition behind the result is that under binding capital requirements an additional unit of equity tomorrow is more valuable to a bank. If raising equity is excessively costly, the only possibility to increase equity tomorrow is to increase risk today.