Public Versus Private Insurance with Dual Theory: A Political Economy Argument

This paper analyzes the political support for public insurance in the presence of a private insurance alternative. The public insurance is compulsory and offers a uniform insurance policy. The private insurance is voluntary and can offer different insurance policies. Adopting Yaari's [Econometrica, 55, 95–115, 1987] dual theory to expected utility (i.e., risk aversion without diminishing marginal utility of income), we show that adverse selection on the private insurance market may lead a majority of individuals to prefer public insurance over private insurance, even if the median risk is below the average risk (so that the median actually subsidizes high-risk individuals). We also show that risk aversion makes public insurance more attractive and that the dual theory is less favourable to a mixed insurance system than the expected utility framework. Lastly, we demonstrate how the use of genetic tests may threaten the political viability of public insurance.     

Flood insurance literacy and flood risk knowledge: Evidence from Portland,Oregon

Flood costs are escalating due to climate change and increased development in hazardous areas. Flood insurance plays a critical role in financial recovery, but there is very little research on how well consumers understand flood insurance policies. Poor insurance literacy could lead to suboptimal risk management decisions. This paper presents some of the first evidence on homeowner flood insurance literacy from a survey of residents in Portland, Oregon. We find that while a basic understanding of general insurance terms is widespread, details about flood insurance policies are not well-understood and many respondents do not know the specific terms of their policy. Residents of the 100-year floodplain are more likely to know that their homeowners’ insurance does not cover flooding, but do not have substantially better understanding or knowledge of specifics about their policy than those outside the floodplain. We also find that the majority of survey respondents did not learn about their flood risk or the cost of flood insurance until after making an offer on their property.     

Erklärungsansätze für vertragswidriges Verhalten Versicherungsnehmern aus Sicht der ökonomischen Theorie

The two main purposes of this paper are an introduction to the economic analysis of insurance fraud and furthermore a derivation of factors that determine fraudulent behavior of policyholders on insurance markets. Consequently, we analyze the strategic decision problems of insurance companies and the policyholders and identify some factors that can help to reduce fraudulent behavior. In this context we evaluate two derived starting points for the combat against insurance fraud: fraud detection systems and a consequent charge policy of detected defrauders. We illustrate that both points can help to reduce the cost of fraud. Furthermore, we enhance our earlier analysis with respect to the empirical fact that some individuals care about fairness or — in the insurance fraud context — the legitimacy of their actions. Surprisingly, in some market situations these concerns of some policyholders do not lead to a lower fraud probability. Finally, we discuss how and to what extent insurance companies can influence such ethical concerns of policyholders. On that score, we distinguish insurance specific and insurance unspecific factors and their impact on the consumers attitudes towards insurance fraud.     

Optimal Insurance With Costly Internal Capital

We introduce costly internal capital into a standard insurance model, in which a risk‐averse policyholder buys insurance from a risk‐neutral insurer with limited liability. The unique optimal contract and internal capital lead to a strictly positive probability for insurer default. Some risks are uninsurable in that the insurer chooses not to provide insurance against such risks. An increase in the cost of capital may lead to a higher optimal amount of internal capital. The results extend to multiple policyholders in a symmetric setting. Our extension of the classical model to include costly internal capital provides a fruitful approach to many real world insurance markets.     

失业保险与公司财务杠杆

我国劳动力市场化程度日益加深导致劳动者职业转换愈加频繁,失业保险的作用日益突出。本文探究了失业保险金水平对企业财务杠杆的影响。运用2009—2019年上市公司数据进行实证分析,结果发现失业保险金上升会导致公司财务杠杆下降。渠道检验显示,提高失业保险金可以降低员工失业风险溢酬,公司劳动力成本下降,公司有更多自由现金流和盈利进行内源融资和偿还债务,公司财务杠杆下降。进一步分析发现,失业保险金的作用在失业率高的地区更加显著。主要结果在分别运用《社会保险法》和《关于调整失业保险金标准的指导意见》构造双重差分模型和工具变量解决内生性问题、更改模型设置、排除投资水平影响、删除特殊省份、更换样本期间后,依然成立。本文结果说明加大失业保险保障力度有助于降低企业财务风险。     

Pluralismus und versicherung — eine Einführung

Insurance markets and economic financial theory are characterised by a growing diversification and pluralism. A structure is needed to describe the diversification of theory and practice of insurance business. This paper develops such a structure. In addition it shows how new theoretical concepts have lead to new products and new organisational structures on insurance markets. The development in the past decade has shown a close interaction between economic theory and insurance practice. This paper tries to show this interaction by refering to the pluralism of insurance markets.     

保险周期存在性的协整模型检验：基于中国市场的分析

本文对宏观经济波动可能引致保险周期的内在机理作了理论分析,然后利用协整模型并辅以误差修正模型验证了中国的现实情况,发现保险行业运行在长期来看与经济体系的发展较为一致,其周期特性得到间接证明,但经济的短期扰动对保险行业影响不大,同时,保险经营业绩与利率变动负相关,产险业的发展与宏观经济的联系不太紧密。     

巨灾保险市场风险识别模式的有效性分析——基于多期的巨灾保险合同研究

在市场化的巨灾保险机制运行过程中,信息不对称所引发的风险识别问题容易导致巨灾保险合同偏离最优均衡状况进而诱发市场失灵,因此,合理有效的识别投保人的风险类型显得尤为重要。在以信息经济学中的逆向选择与信号传递理论为基础,利用不完全动态信息博弈模型对巨灾保险中的风险识别模式进行研究后的结果表明,后验风险识别模式同样可以有效甄别投保人的风险状况,风险分离均衡后的巨灾保单可以在多期的合同中达到精练贝叶斯均衡。     

Sicherungssysteme für Finanzdienstleistungsunternehmen im europäischen Vergleich – Theorieperspektive

The contribution discusses the design of guarantee schemes for financial services firms, with a focus on insurance guarantee schemes. It lists reasons that contribute to the development of guarantee schemes, especially stemming from a market failure risk. It further describes the pros and cons of ex-ante and of ex-post premium payments, and sets out arguments for and against risk based premiums of insurance guarantee schemes. The contribution also investigates whether the existence of insurance guarantee schemes might lead to a more risky insurance firm policy. Finally it examines in how far consumer protection based on insurance guarantee schemes prevents consumer protection based on market discipline that should be achieved by the third pillar of Solvency II.     

Cream Skimming: Innovations in Insurance Risk Classification and Adverse Selection

We demonstrate how innovations in insurance risk classification can lead to adverse selection, or cream skimming, against insurers that are slow to adopt such pricing innovations. Using a model in which insurers with insufficient pricing data cannot differentiate between low‐ and high‐risk policyholders and therefore charge both the same premium, we show how innovative insurers develop new risk classification data to identify overcharged low‐risk policyholders and attract them from rival insurers with reduced prices. Less innovative insurers thus insure a growing percentage of high‐risk customers, resulting in adverse selection attributable to their informational disadvantage. Next, we examine two cases in which “Big Data” innovations in risk classification led to concerns about cream skimming among U.S. auto insurers. First, we track the rapid adoption of credit‐based insurance scores as pricing variables in personal auto insurance markets. Second, we examine the growing popularity of usage‐based insurance programs like telematics, plans in which insurers use data on policyholders’ actual driving behavior to set prices that attract low‐risk customers. Issues associated with the execution of such pricing strategies are discussed. In both cases, we document how rival insurers quickly adopt successful innovations to reduce their exposure to adverse selection.     

Capital Allocation for Insurance Companies—What Good IS IT?

In their 2001 Journal of Risk and Insurance article, Stewart C. Myers and James A. Read Jr. propose to use a specific capital allocation method for pricing insurance contracts. We show that in their model framework no capital allocation to lines of business is needed for pricing insurance contracts. In the case of having to cover frictional costs, the suggested allocation method may even lead to inappropriate insurance prices. Beside the purpose of pricing insurance contracts, capital allocation methods proposed in the literature and used in insurance practice are typically intended to help derive capital budgeting decisions in insurance companies, such as expanding or contracting lines of business. We also show that net present value analyses provide better capital budgeting decisions than capital allocation in general.     

Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital Markets: a Review and Synthesis

We review theory and evidence relating to herd behaviour, payoff and reputational interactions, social learning, and informational cascades in capital markets. We offer a simple taxonomy of effects, and evaluate how alternative theories may help explain evidence on the behaviour of investors, firms, and analysts. We consider both incentives for parties to engage in herding or cascading, and the incentives for parties to protect against or take advantage of herding or cascading by others.     

Simultaneous borrowing of information across space and time for pricing insurance contracts: An application to rating crop insurance policies

Changing climate and technology can often lead to nonstationary losses across both time and space for a variety of insurance lines including property, catastrophe, health, and life. As a result, naive estimation of premium rates using past losses will tend to be biased. We present three successively flexible data‐driven methodologies to nonparametrically smooth across both space and time simultaneously, thereby appropriately incorporating possibly nonidentically distributed data into the rating process. We apply these methodologies in estimating U.S. crop insurance premium rates. Crop insurance, with global premiums totaling $4.1 trillion in 2018, is an interesting application as losses exhibit both temporal and spatial nonstationarity. We find significant borrowing of information across both time and space. We also find all three methodologies improve both the stability and accuracy of crop insurance premium rates. The proposed methods may be of relevance for other lines of insurance characterized by spatial and/or temporal nonstationary losses.     

Insurance law and incomplete contracts

We analyze how insurance law can mitigate moral hazard by allowing insurers to reduce or cancel coverage in some circumstances. We consider an incomplete contract setting in which the insurer may obtain information related to the policyholder's behavior through a costly audit of the circumstances of the loss. Court decisions are based on a standard of proof such as the balance of probabilities. We show that an optimal insurance law brings efficiency gains compared to the no-audit case. We also highlight the conditions under which the burden of proof should be on the insured, provided that insurers are threatened with sanctions for bad faith.     

Do insurers adjust prices for the adoption of loss prevention technologies? Evidence from Danish municipal contracts

Using data from 40 Danish municipalities on building characteristics, loss prevention technologies, insurance claims, and insurance bids from 2008 to 2019, we investigate whether and how loss prevention technologies influenced contract prices. The insurance bids cover a variety of municipal buildings across a range of risks including fire, water leakage, and building security as well as structure detection and alarm systems. The study shows that the magnitude of historical claims may affect both pricing offers and interest in loss prevention technologies. We do not find that loss prevention technologies have any significant influence on contract price. This suggests inefficiencies in the market from imperfect information.     

Harmful events and misconducts in financial organizations: Human biases and root causes

We conduct a large scope field investigation of 19 major incidents in 19 large European insurance and banking institutions, based on 116 post-event interviews with managers and top executives over a two-year period. We demonstrate the power of the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) method for detecting human biases documented by the behavioral finance, the organizational behavior and occupational psychology literatures. These biases constitute key operational risk factors these organizations. We find that organizational biases (such as a breach of psychological contract) take center stage as root causes of incidents in these organizations. We also find that banks are more exposed to emotional biases (fear and greed) and insurance companies more subjected to cognitive conservatism as root cause biases. This research has direct implications regarding how banks and insurance companies may cope with regulations that put a greater emphasis on measuring and controlling operational risk and specifically misconduct risk.     

我国农业保险市场失衡分析——基于效用理论视角

本文在分析农业保险发展现状的基础上,基于马斯洛需求层次理论、风险偏好理论及风险规避程度度量理论,建立农户风险态度呈动态变化的效用函数曲线,推导出政府对农业保险补贴的上限和下限,得出结论:政府补贴过低无法达到刺激农户购买欲望转化为有效需求;但政府对农业保险的补贴并不是越多越好,超过一定限度,反而引发更为严重的道德风险,并...     

Insurance loss coverage and social welfare

Restrictions on insurance risk classification may induce adverse selection, which is usually perceived as a bad outcome, both for insurers and for society. However, a social benefit of modest adverse selection is that it can lead to an increase in ‘loss coverage’, defined as expected losses compensated by insurance for the whole population. We reconcile the concept of loss coverage to a utilitarian concept of social welfare commonly found in the economic literature on risk classification. For iso-elastic insurance demand, ranking risk classification schemes by (observable) loss coverage always give the same ordering as ranking by (unobservable) social welfare.     

A Gentle Introduction to Risk Aversion and Utility Theory

While the topics of risk aversion and utility theory have been discussed extensively in the academic literature on risk and insurance, this literature does not include a pedagogical discussion that is widely accessible for classroom use. This article provides a practical introduction to risk aversion that is designed for readers with little prerequisite course work in economics or statistics. We describe a simple model of insurance demand that can be applied to the property, liability, life, and health insurance markets. We also demonstrate how risk aversion affects a variety of real-life insurance decisions made under conditions of uncertainty, including how much the market will bear to pay for insurance administrative expenses and how demand varies for different types of auto insurance coverage. Exercises and practice problems are provided so that readers can test their mastery of the concepts presented in the article. An instructional note on using this article to teach risk aversion in the classroom is also provided.     

Insurance demand in the presence of loss-dependent background risk

We analyze insurance demand when insurable losses come with an uninsurable zero-mean background risk that increases in the loss size. If the individual is risk vulnerable, loss-dependent background risk triggers a precautionary insurance motive and increases optimal insurance demand. Prudence alone is sufficient for insurance demand to increase in two cases: the case of fair insurance and the case where the smallest possible loss exceeds a certain threshold value (referred to as the large loss case). We derive conditions under which insurance demand increases or decreases in initial wealth. In the large loss case, prudence determines whether changes in the background risk lead to more insurance demand. We generalize this result to arbitrary loss distributions and find conditions based on decreasing third-degree Ross risk aversion, Arrow–Pratt risk aversion, and Arrow–Pratt temperance.