Laying off credit risk: Loan sales versus credit default swaps

How do markets for debt cash flow rights, with and without accompanying control rights, affect the efficiency of lending? A bank makes a loan, learns if it needs monitoring, and then decides whether to lay off credit risk. The bank can transfer credit risk by either selling the loan or buying a credit default swap (CDS). With a CDS, the originating bank retains the loan's control rights; with loan sales, control rights pass to the loan buyer. Credit risk transfer leads to excessive monitoring of riskier credits and insufficient monitoring of safer credits. Increases in banks' cost of equity capital exacerbate these effects. For riskier credits, loan sales typically dominate CDS but not for safer credits. Once repeated lending and consequent reputation concerns are modeled, although CDSs remain dominated by loan sales for riskier credits, for safer credits they can dominate loan sales, supporting better monitoring (albeit to a limited extent) while allowing efficient risk sharing. Restrictions on the bank's ability to sell the loan expand the range in which CDSs are used and monitoring is too low.     

Deposit insurance and credit union lending

We exploit an exogenous change in the coverage of insured deposits following the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (2008) to investigate the impact of deposit insurance on the volume, composition and quality of credit union lending. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find changes in the volume, composition and riskiness of credit union lending. Specifically, we find that affected credit unions increase total and unsecured lending, leading to a decline in loan quality. Overall, our results suggest that an increase in the maximum coverage of insured deposits induces credit unions to lend more at the expense of loan quality.     

Supervisory shocks to banks' credit standards and their macroeconomic impact

Credit standards reported in the Bank Lending Surveys (BLS) of the European Central Bank (ECB) summarize banks’ sentiment about credit market tightness, and they strongly comove with credit growth. This paper introduces a new external instrument that captures an exogenous source of variation in credit standards, allowing us to identify a structural shock that negatively affects the credit supply. The instrument accounts for mandatory rotations of external auditors within credit institutions of nine euro-area countries. By estimating local projections, this paper finds that an unexpected supervisory measure at the banking-system level features significant dynamic causal effects at the macroeconomic level, which are also state-dependent.     

Changes in bank lending standards and the macroeconomy

Identifying macroeconomic effects of credit shocks is difficult because many of the same factors that influence the supply of loans also affect the demand for credit. Using bank-level responses to the Federal Reserve's Loan Officer Opinion Survey, we construct a new credit supply indicator: changes in lending standards, adjusted for the macroeconomic and bank-specific factors that also affect loan demand. Tightening shocks to this credit supply indicator lead to a substantial decline in output and the capacity of businesses and households to borrow from banks, as well as to a widening of credit spreads and an easing of monetary policy.     

The effect of credit guarantees on credit availability and delinquency rates

We use new data to examine whether credit guarantees affect economic incentives and whether they affect the credit available to small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). We find that firms that have both guaranteed and non-guaranteed loans are 1.67% more likely to miss payments on their guaranteed loans, but are not more likely to default on these loans. These findings suggest that guarantees affect firms’ incentives to repay loans but not their long-term performance. We also find that firms selected into the guarantee programs are 1.17% more likely to default on their loans compared with similar firms that borrow without guarantees. Since we find evidence that long-term performance is not affected by guarantees, the higher default rates among firms selected into the guarantee programs must be the consequence of adverse selection. We also find that credit guarantees increase the aggregated amount of credit; in particular, one additional dollar of guarantees increases the total credit for SMEs by US$ 0.65.     

Banking deregulation and credit risk: Evidence from the EU

This paper studies the effect of banking deregulation on credit risk. Its theoretical model shows that a bank is willing to invest more resources in screening borrowers when there is an entry threat, even though loan rates are driven lower. Thus, deregulation may result in improved loan quality and lower credit risk. This result is tested using bank-level balance sheet data and macroeconomic data for the European Union. The data reveal that competition intensified after the completion of the Second Banking Directive, while loan quality improved in most markets. Evidence is found that the loan quality improvement is associated with lower interest margin.     

How changes in market conditions affect screening activity,credit risk,and the lending behaviour of banks

The global financial crisis dramatically transformed the market conditions in the banking industry. We construct a theoretical model of spatial competition that considers the differential information between lenders and loan applicants to explore how changes in the market structure affect the lending behaviour of banks and their incentives to invest in screening and how this, in turn, affects the level of credit risk in the economy. Our findings reveal that enhanced competition reduces lending cost thus encouraging the entry of new customers in credit markets. Also, that the transportation cost that loan applicants are required to pay to reach the bank of their interest shrinks with respect to the degree of competition. We further lend support to the view that stiffer competition has an increasing impact on the level of credit risk. Notably, we find that competition strengthens the incentives of banks to engage in screening activity and that screening serves as a protection mechanism that can provide banks with a shield against bad loans. Overall, when market conditions are substantially distorted, this has a dilutive impact on the incentives mechanism of banks to screen their applicants. We provide empirical evidence which is consistent with the conceptual underpinnings of our theoretical model and the obtained findings.     

论银行业务实践中的授信额度合同

在商业银行业务实践中,授信额度合同尽管尚不属于主流的合同形式,但在银行各个业务领域中均有其适用的案例,在一些范围内甚至被用作主流合同的替代形式。由于没有明确的法律规定界定其涵义,商业实践中也尚未成为一种商业惯例。因此,授信额度合同给银行和客户的权利义务带来了一些不确定的因素。本文从授信额度合同的特征出发,重点讨论了授信额度合同的法律性质,并对审判实践中存在的未约定额度使用期限时授信额度合同的效力、授信额度合同的担保及有关诉讼程序问题,从实务角度进行了分析,并提出了相应观点。     

Bank stability and the price of loan commitments

Firms insure themselves from liquidity shocks by contracting on credit lines from banks. I document novel empirical evidence on how the risk of contract nonperformance by banks is priced. Firms pay a higher price for loan commitments from safer banks. A one standard deviation increase in the cross-sectional mean of bank capital increases the commitment fees by 5%. To investigate a potential causal effect of lender stability on commitment fees, I exploit exogenous variation in the market value of banks’ assets from natural disasters. The sensitivity of the fees is higher for firms with higher short-term liabilities and higher income uncertainty.     

Investment and bank credit recovery after banking crises

In this paper, we aim to investigate (a) the dynamic adjustment of investment-to-GDP ratio and bank credit-to-GDP ratio following banking crisis episodes; (b) whether the adjustment of investment and bank credit ratios varies with several country and crisis characteristics. Based on a sample of 79 developed and emerging countries over the 1973–2010 period, our results suggest that in the aftermath of banking crises, investment ratio declines but swiftly recovers to its pre-crisis level within two to three years. Bank credit declines significantly and remains stagnated even in the medium run. In terms of country characteristics, we find that investment and bank credit ratios decline significantly more in advanced countries and countries with higher level of capital openness. In addition, investment ratio declines significantly more in countries with higher level of financial development. Finally, we split the banking crises episodes into two categories: those preceded by a domestic credit boom or a surge in net capital inflows, and those that were not preceded by such booms. We find that dynamic adjustment of investment and bank credit ratios differs substantially across the two groups. Existence of a credit boom or a surge in capital inflow in the run-up to the crisis intensifies the length and depth of the decline in investment and bank credit ratios. In fact, we find no statistically significant decline in investment following banking crises that were not preceded by a credit boom or a surge in capital inflows. These results imply that deleveraging is costly to the economy.     

Securitization,competition and monitoring

We analyze the impact of loan securitization on competition in the loan market. Using a dynamic loan market competition model where borrowers face both exogenous and endogenous costs to switch between banks, we uncover a competition softening effect of securitization that allows banks to extract rents in the primary loan market. By reducing monitoring incentives, securitization mitigates winner’s curse effects in future stages of competition thereby decreasing ex ante competition for initial market share. Due to this competition softening effect, securitization can adversely affect loan market efficiency while leading to higher equilibrium profits for banks. This effect is driven by primary loan market competition, not by the exploitation of informational asymmetries in the secondary market for loans. We also argue that banks can use securitization as a strategic response to an increase in competition, as a tool to signal a reduction in monitoring intensity for the sole purpose of softening ex ante competition. Our result suggests that securitization reforms focusing exclusively on informational asymmetries in markets for securitized products may overlook competitive conditions in the primary market.     

Tightening credit standards: the role of accounting quality

Over the latest 20 years, the average credit rating of U.S. corporations has trended down. Blume et al. (1998, Journal of Finance, 53, 1389–1413.) attribute this trend to a tightening of credit standards by agencies. We reexamine the observed decreases in credit ratings in several ways. First, we show that this downward trend does not apply to speculative-grade issuers. Second, our analysis of investment-grade issuers suggests that the apparent tightening of standards can be attributed primarily to changes in accounting quality over time. After incorporating changing accounting quality, we find no evidence that rating agencies have tightened their credit standards.

Bank capitalization and lending behavior after the introduction of the Basle Accord

In this paper, we provide evidence that banks with a low level of capitalization have reduced their commitment with respect to lines of credit after the introduction of the Basle Accord. A bank's lending behavior reflects its level of commitment towards borrowers, which in turn affects the level of effort it exerts on screening and monitoring the activities of borrowers. We find that the post-Basle Accord market reaction to the announcement of lines of credit issued by banks with a low level of capitalization is significantly lower than the reaction to other types of bank credit announcements. We interpret this result as evidence that some banks have a low level of commitment associated with lines of credit after the Basle Accord.

A darker side to decentralized banks: Market power and credit rationing in SME lending

We use loan-level data to study how the organizational structure of banks impacts small business lending. We find that decentralized banks—where branch managers have greater autonomy over lending decisions—give larger loans to small firms and those with “soft information.” However, decentralized banks are also more responsive to their own competitive environment. They are more likely to expand credit when faced with competition but also cherry pick customers and restrict credit when they have market power. This “darker side” to decentralized banks in concentrated markets highlights that the level of local banking competition is key to determining which organizational structure provides better lending terms for small businesses.     

The ties that bind: Bank relationships and small business lending

The importance of bank relationships for small firms’ ability to raise external finance is well-documented, yet the mechanism through which relationships improve access to capital markets has received little empirical attention. This paper uses hand-collected, proprietary data from a mid-sized bank in the United States to identify the channels that strengthen the relationship between a small business and its bank. In contrast to earlier work that focuses on the role of relationships in alleviating information and incentive problems in lending, I find that the source of value in relationship banking is not limited to enhanced monitoring. Exploiting a unique feature of this dataset, I examine two channels of relationship strength that directly measure the stream of non-lending profits generated from (1) the non-credit services cross-sold to the borrower, and (2) the additional bank clients referred by the borrower. I document that non-lending profitability empirically determines the risk-adjusted terms of lending. In models of loan price that already include both the bank’s proprietary risk rating and traditional risk proxies, non-lending profits significantly improve explanatory power and account for up to half of the total explained variation. Conditional on risk profile, a one-standard deviation increase in aggregate non-lending profits lowers the loan interest rate by 32 basis points and increases access to credit by 26%.     

Does bank competition alleviate credit constraints in developing countries?

Whether competition helps or hinders firms’ access to finance, particularly in the developing world, is in itself a much debated question in the economic literature and in policy circles. This paper considers the consequences of bank competition on credit constraints using firm level data covering 69 developing and emerging countries. In addition to the classical concentration measure, competition is assessed by computing three non-structural measures (Boone indicator, Lerner index and H-statistic). The results show that bank competition alleviates credit constraints and that bank concentration measure is not a robust predictor of a firm’s access to finance. The study highlights that bank competition not only leads to less severe loan approval decisions but also reduces borrower discouragement.     

中国银行业竞争与非金融企业影子银行化

本文结合非金融企业影子银行化的形成机制以及中国金融市场发展的特征事实,从“供给侧”和“需求侧”双重视角探究银行竞争如何抑制非金融企业影子银行化。以2003—2019年中国非金融上市企业为研究样本,分析发现,银行竞争能够显著降低非金融企业影子银行化。进一步以放松中小商业银行分支机构市场准入为标志事件构造准自然实验,基于双重差分法的计量结果为识别银行竞争对非金融企业影子银行化的抑制效应提供了稳健的经验证据。机制分析发现,银行业竞争通过弱化“信贷扭曲”和“监管套利”两个维度的作用机制抑制非金融企业影子银行化。异质性分析表明,银行竞争对非金融企业影子银行化的抑制作用在融资约束较高和投资机会较少的样本中尤为明显。     

Bank loan loss accounting treatments,credit cycles and crash risk

Banks that follow conditional conservatism in their loan loss accounting treatments benefit from a reduction in crash risk. The key discretionary loan loss accounting channels are provisions and allowances. We show that conditional conservatism reduces crash risk of small banks during periods of credit contraction and boom. Interestingly, for large banks, crash risk is not reduced by more conservative accounting even for those with higher levels of opacity. Hence regulation prompting for more conservative bank loan loss accounting does not present a significant opportunity to limit systemic effects arising from abrupt price declines in the stocks of large banks.     

Accounting and control in Barclays Bank (DCO): the lending to Africans episode

This paper analyses the accounting, control and operational consequences of a pre-independence experiment by Barclays Bank (DCO) in the British Nigerian colony to liberalize its credit policy towards Africans. This was partly an attempt to develop African business, an area previously neglected by foreign banks. The new policy also appeased Africans who believed that the colonial banks discriminated against them. This experiment resulted in 'alarming' bad debts and led to a reappraisal of the bank's accounting, control and operational procedures. The paper highlights the limitations of internal controls in an era of change.     

中国委托贷款弥补了正规信贷不足吗？

本文利用手工搜集整理的委托贷款这一独特数据,从正规信贷周期视角切入实证考察我国影子银行运作问题。结果表明,委托贷款这一影子银行机制呈现出鲜明的逆信贷周期特点,当正规信贷收缩时,企业发放委托贷款的概率和规模都显著增加。进一步研究发现:一方面,从企业层面看,与正规信贷宽松时期相比,正规信贷紧缩时民营企业等体制外企业获得委托贷款的概率及规模都显著增加;另一方面,从地区层面看,与正规信贷宽松时期相比,正规信贷紧缩时委托贷款更多流向正规信贷缺口较大的省份。另外,从风险层面看,委托贷款违约概率显著高于同期银行不良贷款率,而且,与国有企业等体制内企业相比,民营企业等体制外企业获得的委托贷款违约概率相对更大。这些结果表明,委托贷款这一影子银行机制是对正规信贷不足的市场反应,正规信贷紧缩促使委托贷款资金流向融资约束较大地区和企业的同时也推高了影子银行风险。本文提供了委托贷款逆信贷周期特点的新鲜证据,有助于厘清影子银行在金融体系中发挥的作用及其风险含义,从而对委托贷款等影子银行监管相关问题提供借鉴。