The Welfare Impact of Self-supplied Water Pricing in Canada: A Computable General Equilibrium Assessment

This paper uses a computable general equilibrium model to assess the welfare cost of changing the method of water allocation in Canada towards one that uses prices to ration demand. We model the introduction of a price on both water that is abstracted as well as water that is consumed (that is abstracted, and not returned to the source). We estimate that reducing water consumption by 25 % would require imposition of a price on water consumption of around $$\$0.21/\text{ m }^{3}$$ . Similarly, introduction of a water abstraction charge of about $$\$0.013/\text{ m }^{3}$$ would be sufficient to reduce water abstraction by 25 %. We find that if revenues from water pricing are returned in lump sum to households, the introduction of water pricing would result in a modest welfare loss. When revenues from water pricing are used to offset existing taxes, we find a gain in welfare corresponding to a ‘strong double dividend.’     

Efficient menu structures for pricing interruptible electric power service

A menu of interruptible service offerings provides a means for matching the reliability of electric power to the preferences of consumers with diverse interruption costs. Appropriately designed pricing induces a distribution of customer service selections such that the welfare loss (i.e., total interruption cost) of all customers is minimized, when averaged over a distribution of shortfall situations. This paper derives one and two dimensional price menus that consider lost service time and interruption frequency as separate attributes. The relative efficiencies of three types of menus are compared and discussed.     

Social welfare loss due to second-best pricing: an application to the Portuguese telecommunications

The telecommunications industry is usually characterized by low marginal costs and significant fixed costs which are the conditions for the inefficiency of marginal cost pricing. In such cases theory postulates that optimal pricing is obtained by maximizing welfare subject to a restriction of viability of the firm: the second-best pricing scheme. The possible welfare losses due to second-best pricing varies according to the values of marginal costs, prices and demand elasticities. This paper analyses to what extent the second-best pricing has been achieved in the Portuguese telecommunications firm CTT, over the period 1950#150;1984 as well as the magnitude of the price-cost margins and welfare losses created. We obtained empirical evidence of the presence of economies of scale, a welfare loss estimate of 1% of the telecommunications receipts and a result that price was 40% greater than marginal cost. We concluded that price regulation and public ownership of the firm did not seriously affect social welfare over the sample period (it should be noted that it is the non-digital and fixedwire infrastructure period). Therefore, it is important to study the impact of new digital and non-wire technologies and new services provided in the old regulatory scenery.     

The Demand for Water: Consumer Response to Scarcity

Provision of water raises several issues for municipal utility companies and other suppliers, including reliability of supply in arid regions or during droughts, equity issues that arise because water is literally a necessity, and heterogeneity in consumer response to regulatory policy. We combine experimental and survey responses to investigate demand for water. The experiments simulate water consumption from a potentially exhaustible source, revealing heterogeneous demand for water. We estimate econometrically water demand for different consumer groups. A regulator could use estimates of disaggregated demand to attain conservation goals by designing an incentive compatible pricing system. The example given achieves a conservation goal while minimizing enforcement costs and welfare loss.     

ESTIMATING WELFARE IN INSURANCE MARKETS USING VARIATION IN PRICES

We provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection. We then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance. Such variation, together with quantity data, allows us to estimate the demand for insurance. The same variation, together with cost data, allows us to estimate how insurer's costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price. The slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and nature of selection, and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare. We illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employer-provided health insurance from one specific company. We detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small, in both absolute and relative terms.     

Optimal pricing and capacity choice for a public service under risk of interruption

We develop rules for pricing and capacity choice for an interruptible service that recognize the interdependence between consumers’ perceptions of system reliability and their market behavior. Consumers post ex ante demands, based on their expectations on aggregate demand. Posted demands are met if ex post supply capacity is sufficient. However, if supply is inadequate all ex ante demands are proportionally interrupted. Consumers’ expectations of aggregate demand are assumed to be rational. Under reasonable values for the consumer’s degrees of relative risk aversion and prudence, demand is decreasing in supply reliability. We derive operational expressions for the optimal pricing rule and the capacity expansion rule. We show that the optimal price under uncertainty consists of the optimal price under certainty plus a markup that positively depends on the degrees of relative risk aversion, relative prudence and system reliability. We also show that any reliability enhancing investment—though lowering the operating surplus of the public utility—is socially desirable as long as it covers the cost of investment.     

Measuring welfare losses from interruption and pricing as responses to water shortages: an application to the case of Seville

Supply cuts and pricing policies can be used to ration water. The appropriateness of a given policy depends on the losses in social welfare which it generates. We find some drawbacks with the only method in the previous literature which deals with the issue of measuring welfare losses under supply cuts. We propose an alternative method. We compare the welfare losses under supply cuts and a pricing policy during the drought period of 1992–1996 in Seville, Spain, using both methods, and find that the results vary widely from one method to the other.      

Desperately Seeking θ's: Estimating the Distribution of Consumers Under Increasing Block Rates

This paper shows that increasing block rate pricing schedules usually applied by water utilities can reduce the efficiency and equity levels. To do this, we first present a two step method to estimate the demand and to recover the distribution of consumer tastes when increasing block rate pricing is used. We show that in this case the tariff induces a pooling equilibrium and customers with different taste parameters will be observed to choose the same consumption level. Second, we show that a two-part tariff that neither reduces the revenue for the firm nor increases the aggregate level of water consumption increases the welfare and equity levels in relation to an increasing block rates schedule.     

Structural Estimation of Variety Gains from Trade Integration in Asia

This article studies the variety gains of trade integration in Asia. Adopting a heterogeneous firm model of trade of monopolistic competition allowed us to estimate not only the welfare gains because of country specialisation, but also the variety gains arising from trade integration. The underlying structural parameters were estimated econometrically, based on a large panel of firm‐level data for the Asian economies (ORIANA). Our empirical findings suggest that, when relaxing the assumption of firm homogeneity and accounting for export market entry costs, the gains from trade integration are higher than in conventional models with representative firms.     

Price-Cap Regulation and Inefficiency in Relative Pricing

The allocative efficiency properties of three price-cap schemes are compared. The scheme that uses lagged quantities in the price index and has a fixed cap works well when the firm is myopic but generates inefficient relative prices otherwise. With myopia prices are efficient and welfare is higher than with equal pricing, but the gain to the firm comes at the expense of lower consumer surplus. When the firm is not myopic pricing can be so inefficient that steady-state welfare is below the no-regulation level.     

Partial privatization in mixed duopoly with price and quality competition

We analyze price and quality competition in a mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing private firm competes against a state-owned public firm. We first show that the welfare-maximizing public firm provides a lower quality product than the private firm when they are equally efficient. In order to maximize social welfare, government manipulates the objective of the public firm that is given by a convex combination of profits and social welfare. It is demonstrated that an optimal incentive of the public firm is welfare maximization under the absence of quality competition, but it is neither welfare maximization nor profit maximization under the presence of quality competition. The result supports a completely mixed objective between welfare and profit maximizations or partial privatization of the public firm.      

Monopoly pricing when consumers are antagonized by unexpected price increases: a “cover version” of the Heidhues–K?szegi–Rabin model

This paper reformulates and simplifies a recent model by Heidhues and K?szegi (The impact of consumer loss aversion on pricing, Mimeo, 2005), which in turn is based on a behavioral model due to K?szegi and Rabin (Q J Econ 121:1133?C1166, 2006). The model analyzes optimal pricing when consumers are loss averse in the sense that an unexpected price hike lowers their willingness to pay. The main message of the Heidhues?CK?szegi model, namely that this form of consumer loss aversion leads to rigid price responses to cost fluctuations, carries over. I demonstrate the usefulness of this ??cover version?? of the Heidhues?CK?szegi-Rabin model by obtaining new results: (1) loss aversion lowers expected prices; (2) the firm??s incentive to adopt a rigid pricing strategy is stronger when fluctuations are in demand rather than in costs.     

Regulation and the provision of quality to heterogenous consumers: The case of prospective pricing of medical services

This paper analyzes the welfare implications of fixed-price regulation of services in a model in which consumers are heterogenous and a firm can endogenously quality discriminate. We consider two different scenarios: The first scenario is when the consumer is also the payer. The second scenario is when the payer (usually the government) is not the consumer. Our major result is that fixed-price regulation causes a distributional welfare loss. We show that it is not possible for fixed-price regulation to induce providers to supply all consumer types with the first-best quality even under perfect information, under either pricing scenario. We show that high and low demand types may receive more than their respective first-best qualities, less than their first-best qualities, or one type may receive more and the other type less depending on the level of the regulated price. It is always true that when consumers are payers, quality is higher for both types than when consumers are not the payers. In this paper, we motivate and discuss the results in terms of price regulation of hospitals where consumers are patients and patient types vary by severity of illness.     

The Value of Household Water Service Quality in Lahore,Pakistan

Most existing literature focuses on the benefits of establishing basic drinking water access for unserved populations, the extensive water supply margin. In contrast, this article examines the intensive margin—the benefits of improving water service to under-served households, a growing population in developing country cities. We use contingent valuation to estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for improved piped water quality and reductions in supply interruptions among a sample of 193 households in Lahore, Pakistan. The distribution of WTP is described using parametric and non-parametric models. Results indicate that households in Lahore are willing to pay about 7.50 to7.50 to 9 per month for piped water supply that is clean and drinkable directly from the tap—comparable to the monthly cost of in-home water treatment, and about three to four times the average monthly water bill for sample households using piped water. Estimates of WTP for reducing supply interruptions are both smaller and more difficult to interpret, since a significant fraction of the estimated WTP distribution for supply improvements is negative. All of our WTP estimates are well below 4% of monthly household income, the World Bank’s benchmark upper bound for affordable water service.     

DO TAX CUTS ENCOURAGE RENT SEEKING BY TOP CORPORATE EXECUTIVES? THEORY AND EVIDENCE

This paper explores the role of tax policy in shaping incentives for executive effort (labor supply) and rent seeking within the firm. We develop a theoretical model that distinguishes between effort and rent‐seeking responses to income taxes, and provides a framework to estimate a lower bound for the rent‐seeking response. Using executive compensation and governance data, we find that rent seeking represents an important component of the response to changes in tax rates, especially among executives in firms with the worst corporate governance. (JEL D31, G30, H21)     

Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency

Summary. A service is produced for a set of agents. The service is binary, each agent either receives service or not, and the total cost of service is a submodular function of the set receiving service. We investigate strategyproof mechanisms that elicit individual willingness to pay, decide who is served, and then share the cost among them. If such a mechanism is budget balanced (covers cost exactly), it cannot be efficient (serve the surplus maximizing set of users) and vice-versa. We characterize the rich family of budget balanced and group strategyproof mechanisms and find that the mechanism associated with the Shapley value cost sharing formula is characterized by the property that its worst welfare loss is minimal. When we require efficiency rather than budget balance – the more common route in the literature – we find that there is a single Clarke-Groves mechanism that satisfies certain reasonable conditions: we call this the marginal cost pricing mechanism. We compare the size of the marginal cost pricing mechanism's worst budget surplus with the worst welfare loss of the Shapley value mechanism. Received: October 26, 1998; revised version: December 3, 1999     

A Political‐Economic Account of Global Tariffs

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the relative importance of three distinct factors that motivate redistributive government policy: tariff revenues, consumer welfare, and producer profits. We generalize Grossman and Helpman's (1994, American Economic Review 84: 833–850). protection‐for‐sale model by positing that government places different weights on these components of the welfare of its polity when it decides which industries to protect and to what extent. Employing tariff data from 40 countries, the predictions from this model are used to estimate these weights. The results are surprising in their range and variety. Developing countries with weak tax systems often weigh tariff revenue heavily, while more developed countries weigh producer interests the most. Very few hold consumer welfare dear.     

Demand for Piped and Non-piped Water Supply Services: Evidence from Southwest Sri Lanka

In many countries water supply is a service that is seriously underpriced, especially for residential consumers. This has led to a call for setting cost recovery policies to ensure that the tariffs charged for water supply cover the full cost of service provision. Identification of factors driving piped and non-piped water demand is a necessary prerequisite for predicting how consumers will react to such price increases. Using cross-sectional data of 1,800 households from Southwest Sri Lanka, we estimate water demand functions for piped and non-piped households using appropriate econometric techniques. The (marginal) price elasticity is estimated at  − 0.15 for households exclusively relying on piped water, and at  − 0.37 for households using piped water but supplementing their supply with other water sources. The time cost elasticity for households relying on non-piped water only is estimated at  − 0.06 on average, but varying across sources. For both piped and non-piped households, we find evidence of substitutability between water from different sources. We discuss the implications of these results in terms of pricing policy.     

Cable Service and Its Implicit Marginal Valuation

The objective is to estimate the implicit marginal value of channel offerings by cable systems in the USA. Hedonic analysis is a convenient framework in which to explore the relationship between the price of cable service and the channels offered by a cable system. Two separate hedonic equations are estimated-- one for the price of analog cable service and one for the price of digital cable service. With regard to the price of analog cable service, the implicit marginal valuation is statistically significant and positive for just 15 of 106 channel offerings and negative for seven channels. For the price of digital cable service, the implicit marginal valuation is statistically significant and positive for just eleven of 105 channel offerings and negative for five channels. The results suggest that a subscriber's utility would be enhanced by a pricing structure different from the typical approach used by cable systems today of offering a bundled package consisting of several channels. One alternative is to allow consumers to subscribe to just those programming services for which they have a positive implicit marginal value (i.e. an a la carte pricing structure).     

Firm/interruptible gas pricing patterns in a regulated environment

Conclusion This study provides empirical tests for the effects of rate base regulation, curtailment priorities, fuel clauses, and elected commissioners on firm/interruptible gas pricing patterns. These regulations do alter observed pricing patterns with curtailment priorities, fuel clauses, and elected commissioners all producing net social gains. Rate of return regulation imposes social costs resulting in a net decrease in social welfare. Ignoring the political influences upon regulators, regulation generally encourages consumption at the peak relative to the off-peak. Nonetheless, overall social welfare is improved if all four types of regulatory characteristics are present, since most rates are reduced from their monopoly levels.