Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions

This paper tests the behavioral equivalence of a class of strategically-equivalent mechanisms that also do not differ in terms of their procedures. In a private value setting, we introduce a family of mechanisms, so-called Mechanism (α), that generalizes the standard first-price sealed-bid auction. In Mechanism (α), buyers are asked to submit a value which will then be multiplied by α to calculate the bids in the auction. When α =?1, Mechanism (α) is the standard first-price sealed-bid auction. We show that for any α, calculated bids should be identical across mechanisms. We conduct a laboratory experiment to test the behavioral equivalence of this class of mechanisms under different values of α. Even though the procedure and environment do not change across auctions, we do not observe the same bidding behavior across these strategically-equivalent mechanisms. Our research can inform mechanism design literature with respect to the design of optimal mechanisms.     

Revenue equivalence and income taxation

This paper considers the classical independent private values model of auction theory in the presence of income taxation. We show that revenue equivalence remains valid if income taxes are proportional. Progressive and regressive taxes lead, in general, to asymmetries between bidders with the well-known consequence that revenue equivalence no longer holds. However, if symmetry of the bidders is maintained, progressive (regressive) income tax implies a higher (lower) expected revenue in first-price than in second-price auctions. Financial support by theDeutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is gratefully acknowledge.     

First price package auction with many traders

This paper studies a first price package auction in which multiple sellers participate in addition to multiple buyers. We generalize the notion of the profit-target strategy which is first introduced as a truthful strategy in a first price package auction with a single seller by Bernheim and Whinston (1986b). We then show that the set of equilibrium payoffs in profit-target strategies is equal to the bidder-optimal core, and is also equal to the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria. Using this result, we find that any equilibrium payoff vector is weakly Pareto-dominated by the VCG payoff vector for buyers, and that the Walrasian competitive equilibrium payoff vector is weakly Pareto-dominated by some equilibrium payoff vector for buyers, even if goods are substitutes. This contrasts with the first price package auction with a single seller, in which it is shown that if goods are substitutes, then those three outcomes are payoff-equivalent.     

Proportional distribution schemes

An amount of income can be obtained jointly by m agents, the ith agent's share of income being θ_i. The income and the utilities of each agent are functions of the state of nature. Each agent has a probability measure over the states of nature. An efficient proportional distribution is one which is (1) Pareto optimal and for which (2) the expected proportion of income agent i recieves divided by θ_i is independent of i. It is shown that if the attitudes are strictly concave then there exists exactly one proportional distribution scheme. Furthermore, in special cases, each agent expects to recieve an income that exceeds his share.     

Descending price multi-item auctions

We propose a simultaneous descending price auction mechanism to sell multiple heterogeneous items, each owned by a distinct seller, to a number of buyers. Each buyer has known private valuations on items, and wants at most one item. We show that if the sellers follow a descending price offer procedure and the buyers follow a greedy strategy for accepting the offers, the auction results in a nearly efficient allocation, and terminates close to a competitive equilibrium price vector. The descending price offer strategy of the sellers is close to a Nash equilibrium. However, we show that the buyers are better off waiting in our auction. There is a maximum limit (corresponding to the minimum competitive equilibrium price vector) till which they can wait without running into the risk of not winning any item. If the buyers wait within this limit, the prices can be brought arbitrarily close to a uniquely defined competitive equilibrium price vector.     

The winners and losers of tax reform: An assessment under financial integration

I quantify the macroeconomic and redistributive effects of the unilateral elimination of the capital income tax in a two-country, heterogeneous-agent incomplete markets model with progressive labor income taxes. Home, by implementing the reform, induces government responses where labor income is taxed in Home and mostly subsidized in Foreign. In addition, post-reform price dynamics reduce Home’s wealth and suppress households’ ability to do consumption smoothing, with negative effects on the majority—particularly on the poor. In turn, Foreign accumulates wealth, and price movements work particularly in favor of the poor. As a result, a large majority in Home prefers the status quo whereas Foreign supports the reform unanimously. These findings are robust to alternative scenarios where (i) the borrowing constraints are relaxed, (ii) both countries jointly eliminate capital income taxes, (iii) foreign interest income is taxed, and (iv) Home capital income tax is reduced from 40% to 35%.     

Bilateral redistribution

We explore the implications of three basic and intuitive axioms for income redistribution problems: continuity, no transfer paradox and stability. The combination of the three axioms characterizes in the two-agent case a large family of rules, which we call threshold rules. For each level of total income in society, a threshold is considered for each agent. It is impossible for both agents to be below their respective thresholds. If an agent’s income is below the threshold, the difference is redistributed from the other agent; otherwise, the rule imposes laissez-faire.     

Fertility, Labor Force Participation and the Relative Income Hypothesis:

Abstract . AN empirical test with Canadian data was made of the relative income hypothesis which states that fertility and labor force participation depend upon relative income, where relative income refers to the current family income level relative to the family's desired income level. The interpretation of the desired income level is modified slightly to mean that it is determined not by the past parental income, as originally formulated, but by contemporaneous income levels of other age groups. An empirical model of labor force participation is estimated for the post-war period. The results on the whole tend to provide empirical support for the relative income hypothesis. The post-war baby boom, which led to a decline in the income of young adults relative to that of older age groups, had the effect of increasing participation rates of young adults, especially of young (married) women.     

On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions

Theoretical models of multi-unit, uniform-price auctions assume that the price is given by the highest losing bid. In practice, however, the price is usually given by the lowest winning bid. We derive the equilibrium bidding function of the lowest-winning-bid auction when there are k objects for sale and n bidders with unit demand, and prove that it converges to the bidding function of the highest-losing-bid auction if and only if the number of losers n−k gets large. When the number of losers grows large, the bidding functions converge at a linear rate and the prices in the two auctions converge in probability to the expected value of an object to the marginal winner.     

Why a pandemic recession boosts asset prices

Economic recessions are traditionally associated with asset price declines, and recoveries with asset price booms. Standard asset pricing models make sense of this: during a recession, dividends are low and the marginal value of income is high, causing low asset prices. Here, I develop a simple model which shows that this is not true during a recession caused by consumption restrictions, such as those seen during the 2020 pandemic: the restrictions drive the marginal value of income down, and thereby drive asset prices up, to an extent that tends to overwhelm the effect of low dividends. This result holds even if investors misperceive the economic forces at work.     

Maximizing bidder surplus in simultaneous online art auctions via dynamic forecasting

This paper presents a novel intelligent bidding system, called SOABER (Simultaneous Online Auction BiddER), which monitors simultaneous online auctions of high-value fine art items. It supports decision-making by maximizing bidders’ surpluses and their chances of winning an auction. One key element of the system is a dynamic forecasting model, which incorporates information about the speed of an auction’s price movement, as well as the level of competition both within and across auctions. Other elements include a wallet estimator, which gauges the bidders’ willingness to pay, and a bid strategizer, which embeds the forecasting model into a fully automated decision system. We illustrate the performance of our intelligent bidding system on an authentic dataset of online art auctions for Indian contemporary art. We compare our system with several simpler ad-hoc approaches, and find it to be more effective in terms of both the extracted surplus and the resulting winning percentage.     

Bundling and the Reduction of the Winner's Curse

The paper studies the effects of bundling on the bidding strategies and seller revenues in auctions when the bidders have common values for the objects. Bundling of objects before the auction reduces the problem of the winner's curse, and the bidders bid more aggressively. This does not mean that a bundled auction is always better for the seller's revenue. Indeed, there is another effect that makes the bundled auction preferable (from the seller's standpoint) if and only if the number of bidders is small. While this is the only effect present in an independent-private-values model, it does not vanish when bidders have pure common values for the objects. The paper concludes that a bundled auction is unambiguously better for the seller than separate auctions when the number of bidders is small.     

Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses

A house allocation rule should be flexible in its response to changes in agents’ preferences. We propose a specific notion of this flexibility. An agent is said to be swap-sovereign over a pair of houses at a profile of preferences if the rule assigns her one of the houses at that profile and assigns her the other house when she instead reports preferences that simply swap the positions of the two houses. A pair of agents is said to be mutually swap-sovereign over their assignments at a profile if the rule exchanges their assignments when they together report such ‘swap preferences’. An allocation rule is individually swap-flexible if any pair of houses has a swap-sovereign agent, and is mutually swap-flexible if any pair of houses has either a swap-sovereign agent or mutually swap-sovereign agents. We show for housing markets that the top-trading-cycles rule is the unique strategy-proof, individually rational and mutually swap-flexible rule. In house allocation problems, we show that queue-based priority rules are uniquely strategy-proof, individually swap-flexible and envy non-bossy. Varying the strength of non-bossiness, we characterise the important subclasses of sequential priority rules (additionally non-bossy) and serial priority rules (additionally pair-non-bossy and pair-sovereign).     

小议上海私车牌照额度拍卖

上海私车牌照额度拍卖机制自实施伊始,即饱受争议。无论其合法性、合理性、拍卖收入流向及拍卖政策实施效果等方方面面均受到人们的质疑。在此质疑声中,上海私车牌照额度拍卖价格冲破了9万的关口。而作为缓解大城市交通拥堵的重要举措,为从源头上控制机动车拥有量而实施的私车牌照额度拍卖制度,上海市政府对其寄以重望。基于此,本文对上海私车牌照额度拍卖政策的实质及实施历程进行了梳理和分析,以期厘清概念。     

A numerical representation of preferences with intransitive indifference

It is shown that, under certain conditions on a preference relation on a subset X of R^m, there exist real-valued functions u and v on X such that x is preferred to y if and only if u(x)>v(y). This generalises the familiar representation of preferences by a utility function in the case where the preference and indifference relations are transitive. The continuity of the functions u and v is also discussed.     

The Penn-Balassa-Samuelson effect through the lens of the dependent economy model

The positive correlation between per capita income and cross-country price levels is called the “Penn-Balassa-Samuelson effect.” The most influential explanation of this effect centers around sectoral output productivities as the determinant of the relative price of nontraded goods. The interaction between the change in relative prices and the change in per capita income, the dynamic PBS effect, is less well known. This paper extends the Turnovsky and Sen (1995) model of a small open economy by adding external economies into the production function. The model's dynamics accord well with several features of the empirical data on the dynamic PBS effect.     

The non-existence of smooth demand in general banach spaces

We study the questions of existence and smoothness of demand functions with an infinite number of commodities. The main result obtained, under some hypothesis, is: if a C¹ demand exists in a commodity space B, then B can be given an inner product structure. For example, if B is L_p, 1p∞, and if there exists a C¹ demand function defined on B then p must be 2. Another result is: if a demand function exists, defined for all prices p and income, then the commodity space must be reflexive. For example, if B is L_p and a demand function exists on B, defined for all prices and incomes then 1<p<∞. We also study the cases L_∞ and L₁ with weaker assumptions. We finish the paper proving that the demand function is always defined for a dense set of prices and convenient incomes.     

Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms

In models without transfers, we show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, can only take ordinal, but not cardinal information into account. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain restrictions.     

Continuous representation of a preference relation on a connected topological space

Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the existence of two continuous real valued functions u and v on a connected topological space X endowed with a preference relation ≺ (i.e., an asymmetric binary relation) such that y is preferred to x if and only if v(y)>u(x). It is shown that these conditions - a slight generalization of the usual ones encountered in classical utility theory - entail the existence of such a continuous representation u, v with u and v continuous utility functions for two complete preorders intimately connected with the preference relation ≺.     

The effect of non-pecuniary motivations on labor supply

People value work not only as a means of earning income to satisfy their consumption needs but also as a direct source of satisfaction for its socio-psychological effects (non-pecuniary benefits). I show that once non-pecuniary effects of working time are incorporated in the standard labor-supply model: (i) the wage rate under-estimates (over-estimates) the true opportunity cost of non-work/leisure time when working time has non-pecuniary benefits (costs), (ii) non-pecuniary work motivations can substitute for monetary wages as work incentives, (iii) at very low wage rates, work can become a net source of utility, and (iv) the implied shape of labor-supply curve differs starkly from those implied by standard theory. I identify conditions under which a greater non-pecuniary work motivation induces a larger supply of labor, and examine the effects of non-wage income on supplies of paid work and voluntary work when there are non-pecuniary benefits associated with both types of work.