An experimental study of signaling in auctions with a flexible reserve price

This paper presents the results of an experimental study of preemptive jump bidding in English auctions with a flexible reserve price. While one of the possible explanations for jump bidding is based on signaling arguments, the ability of the seller to adjust his decision to accept an offer based on the bidding history makes the existence of a signaling equilibrium questionable. This paper shows that the seller's ability to set the reserve price after observing the opening bid reduces both jump bidding behavior and the use and interpretation of opening bids as a signaling device.     

Selling goods of unknown quality: forward versus spot auctions

We consider an environment where the sale can take place so early that both the seller and potential buyers have the same uncertainty about the quality of the good. We present a simple model that allows the seller to offer the good for sale before or after this uncertainty is resolved, namely via forward auction or spot auction, respectively. We solve for the equilibrium of these two auctions and then compare the resulting expected revenues. We also consider the revenue implications of insurance in forward auctions.     

Information acquisition and/or bid preparation: A structural analysis of entry and bidding in timber sale auctions

Recently, several auction models with entry have been proposed: in one model ( and ), bidders are assumed to draw their private values after they decide to enter. In another model ( and ), bidders are assumed to learn their values before their entry decisions are made. The entry cost in the latter model can be interpreted as bid preparation cost, while the entry cost in the former model consists of both costs from information acquisition and bid preparation. Moreover, these two models have different implications for important policies, e.g., the optimal reserve price. In this paper we provide a unified structural framework where the two models can be estimated and distinguished using the Bayesian method. We apply our method to analyze Michigan timber sale auctions.     

Contestability of the urban land market: an event study of Hong Kong land auctions

The traditional theory of urban land markets assumes perfect contestability—the absolute freedom of market entry—that compels developers to bid up the land rent to equal the economic profit from land use. This assumption, however, is empirically untested due to the difficulties in measuring the ex ante economic profit of land acquisition. We overcome these difficulties by applying the event-study methodology to Hong Kong government land auctions. When a developer acquires a site at a price below its fair market value, the rationality of the stock market entails a positive abnormal return on the developer’s stock. Our analysis shows evidence of positive expected abnormal returns, indicating an imperfectly contestable land market. We further show that the expected abnormal return increases with the site value and the government land disposal level but decreases with the property market liquidity.     

Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: A misclassification approach

In this paper, we consider nonparametric identification and estimation of first-price auction models when N^∗$N^{\ast }$, the number of potential bidders, is unknown to the researcher, but observed by bidders. Exploiting results from the recent econometric literature on models with misclassification error, we develop a nonparametric procedure for recovering the distribution of bids conditional on the unknown N^∗$N^{\ast }$. Monte Carlo results illustrate that the procedure works well in practice. We present illustrative evidence from a dataset of procurement auctions, which shows that accounting for the unobservability of N^∗$N^{\ast }$ can lead to economically meaningful differences in the estimates of bidders’ profit margins.     

Threshold uncertainty in discrete public good games: an experimental study

A discrete public good is provided when total contributions equal or exceed the contribution threshold. Recent theoretical work shows that an increase in threshold uncertainty will increase (decrease) equilibrium contributions when the public good value is sufficiently high (low). In an experiment designed to test these predictions, I find only limited verification of the prediction. Using elicited beliefs data to represent subjects’ beliefs, I find that behavior is not consistent with expected payoff maximization, however, contributions are increasing in subjects’ subjective pivotalness. Thus, wider threshold uncertainty will sometimes—but not always—hinder collective action.     

Forgive or buy back: an experimental study of debt relief

In recent years, debt relief has once again been pushed to the forefront of political and economic interest. The general consensus is that with less debt burden poor countries suffering from debt overhang will be able devote more resources towards investment thereby promoting their own growth and thus benefit their creditors in the long run. An open question is which mechanism is best to relieve debt burden. In this paper, we adopt experimental methods to study the effectiveness and efficiency of debt forgiveness and debt buyback. We find that creditors tend to reduce more debt under Forgiveness than Buyback. Debtors under Forgiveness are not significantly more reciprocal than under Buyback. After controlling for the amount of debt relief, creditors are significantly worse off under Forgiveness whereas debtors are indifferent between the two schemes. From the viewpoint of promoting debt relief, debt forgiveness appears to be a more effective tool to achieve this goal. Nevertheless, if one is to maximize the overall efficiency, debt buyback is superior to debt forgiveness in making best of each relief dollar.     

Financial forecasting and risky decisions: an experimental study grounded in Prospect theory

This study employed prospect theory to examine relationships between effort invested in developing financial forecasts and risk taking. Results of an experimental study indicated that the more effort subjects invested in developing forecasts, the more likely they were to use those forecasts as their reference points when evaluating venture performance. Results also indicated that subjects who used forecasts as their reference points and exerted greater effort developing those forecasts were more likely to take risky actions when performance fell below their reference points. This study is the first to link effort to the type of reference point used and the first to link effort and the use of financial forecasts to risky decisions. In addition, it is one of only a few studies to employ prospect theory to examine risk taking decisions subsequent to start-up. Its results enhance our understanding of risk taking, prospect theory and reference points.

     

Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions

This paper tests the behavioral equivalence of a class of strategically-equivalent mechanisms that also do not differ in terms of their procedures. In a private value setting, we introduce a family of mechanisms, so-called Mechanism (α), that generalizes the standard first-price sealed-bid auction. In Mechanism (α), buyers are asked to submit a value which will then be multiplied by α to calculate the bids in the auction. When α =?1, Mechanism (α) is the standard first-price sealed-bid auction. We show that for any α, calculated bids should be identical across mechanisms. We conduct a laboratory experiment to test the behavioral equivalence of this class of mechanisms under different values of α. Even though the procedure and environment do not change across auctions, we do not observe the same bidding behavior across these strategically-equivalent mechanisms. Our research can inform mechanism design literature with respect to the design of optimal mechanisms.     

Semi-nonparametric estimation of independently and identically repeated first-price auctions via an integrated simulated moments method

In this paper we propose to estimate the value distribution of independently and identically repeated first-price auctions directly via a semi-nonparametric integrated simulated moments sieve approach. Given a candidate value distribution function in a sieve space, we simulate bids according to the equilibrium bid function involved. We take the difference of the empirical characteristic functions of the actual and simulated bids as the moment function. The objective function is then the integral of the squared moment function over an interval. Minimizing this integral to the distribution functions in the sieve space involved and letting the sieve order increase to infinity with the sample size then yields a uniformly consistent semi-nonparametric estimator of the actual value distribution. Also, we propose an integrated moment test for the validity of the first-price auction model, and an data-driven method for the choice of the sieve order. Finally, we conduct a few numerical experiments to check the performance of our approach.     

A final price prediction model for english auctions: a neuro-fuzzy approach

Online auction has now been a popular mechanism in setting prices for internet users. However, auction price prediction, involving the modeling of uncertainty regarding the bidding process, is a challenging task primarily due to the variety of factors changing in auction settings. Even if all the factors were accounted for, there still exist uncertainties in human behavior when bidding in auctions. In this paper, three models, regression, neural networks and neuro-fuzzy, are constructed to predict the final prices of English auctions, using real-world online auction data collected from Yahoo-Kimo Auction. The empirical results show that the neuro fuzzy system can catch the complicated relationship among the variables accurately much better than the others, which is of great help for the buyers to avoid overpricing and for the sellers to facilitate the auction. Besides, the knowledge base obtained from neuro fuzzy provides the elaborative relationship among the variables, which can be further tested for theory building.     

Social support among heterogeneous partners: an experimental test

This paper studies how dyadic social support is affected by heterogeneity of the partners. We distinguish heterogeneity with respect to three parameters the likelihood of needing support; the benefits from receiving support; and the costs of providing support. Hypotheses are based on a game-theoretic analysis of an iterated support game. First, we predict that heterogeneity in one of the parameters hampers social support. Second, we predict that under heterogeneity with respect to two of the parameters, support is most likely if there is a specific heterogeneous distribution such that heterogeneity in one parameter ‘compensates’ for heterogeneity in the other parameter. If there is no compensation social support is even more hampered. The hypotheses have been tested by experimental data with a mixed within-subject, between-subject design. The data gives support to the hypotheses.     

Solomon's Dilemma: An experimental study on dynamic implementation

This paper reports an experimental investigation on two mechanisms for the so-called King Solomon Dilemma, where one of them fails to implement the social choice rule dynamically. We compare the two mechanisms in terms of their welfare, incentive and learning properties.Received: 9 October 2000, Accepted: 13 February 2003, JEL Classification: C70, C78The authors are grateful to José Agulló, Paolo Battigalli, Ted Bergstrom, Ken Binmore, Sandro Brusco, Antonio Cabrales, Francesco Feri, Leo Hurwicz, Raffaele Miniaci, Miguel Angel Meléndez, Juan Mora, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero and seminar participants at the universities of Alicante and Trento for stimulating comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for thoughtful comments and, in particular, for raising questions that led to run additional sessions that significantly improved Sect. 4.4. Usual disclaimers apply. The first version of this paper was written while Giovanni Ponti was visiting the Department of Economics at UCSB. He thanks the Department for providing hospitality, encouragement and funding to run some experimental sessions. Financial support was also provided by CICYT (BEC2001-0980) and by the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE).     

On the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium in (k + 1)-st price common value auctions

In a classical result, Milgrom (1981a) established that the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) is a sufficient condition for the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium in (k + 1)-st price common value auctions. We show: (1) If MLRP is violated, then for any number of bidders and objects there exists a distribution of the common value such that no increasing symmetric equilibrium exists; (2) If MLRP is violated, then for any distribution of the common value there exist infinitely many pairs of the number of bidders and the number of objects such that an increasing symmetric equilibrium does not exist; (3) There are examples where an increasing symmetric equilibrium exists even when the signal distribution violates MLRP.     

Democracy and trade: an empirical study

The theoretical discussion on globalization has suggested that there are linkages between democracy and trade, although the direction of influence is less certain. Formal empirical studies remain scarce, and have often focused on the question of whether democratic regimes influence trade policy, as opposed to the actual relationship between democracy and trade. This paper seeks to answer the question, “Do democracies trade more?” by applying the gravity equation to a large dataset of bilateral trade data for the period 1948–1999, while taking into account the role of democracy. It finds that democracy is positively related to trade flows, but only after controlling for trade pair heterogeneity. In addition, it makes the case for studies of this nature to draw a distinction between trade flows in the pre- and post-1990s period of rapid democratization as well as between developed and developing countries.     

Hedonic theory, bid rents, and willingness-to-pay: Some extensions of Ellickson's results

An alternative to Ellickson's multinomial logit model of household bids for dwelling units is derived by making use of observable information on the price paid by the winning bidder. The alternative specification makes it possible to estimate willingness-to-pay for housing attributes, which cannot be obtained from Ellickson's model. Some methodological issues arising from Ellickson's method of grouping households are also examined.     

Profitability under an Open versus a Closed System

This paper explores the conditions under which a monopolist selling a system consisting of a main component and differentiated secondary components can increase profits by allowing competition in the aftermarket for the secondary components. Opening the system in this fashion can increase profits by giving consumers an added incentive to incur the setup cost of purchasing the main component. This paper extends the second-sourcing literature by showing the explicit effects of various parameters of demand on the decision to open the system. The results show that an open system is likely to be more profitable than a closed one when demand for the system is more elastic, when secondary-component variety is more valued, and when the share of the main component in the total system budget of the consumer is high.     

Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: Identification,estimation and application to construction procurements

This article studies a model of asymmetric risk averse bidding within the independent private value paradigm. The inherent asymmetry in cost and risk aversion imposes an original restriction on the observed bid data, an exact equality which leads to the model semiparametric identification and estimation. The unobserved arguments of this equality need to be simulated in order to estimate the bidders’ Constant Relative Risk Aversion or Constant Absolute Risk Aversion parameters and their heterogeneous cost distributions. In the Los Angeles City Hall construction contracts offered between 1994 and 2003, the model and methodology help reveal that financial asymmetries affect the firms’ cost distribution, while experience influences their degree of risk aversion.     

Expatriate compound living: an ethnographic field study

In certain countries, closed expatriate compounds have developed. They serve to provide resident expatriates and accompanying family members with a comfortable and safe environment. Unfortunately, not much is known about compound life since associated empirical research is scarce. Through ethnographic field-work methodology, including interviews and participant observation during a period of 3 months, this exploratory study investigated 16 Danish business expatriates of a large Danish corporation and their families living in the same compound in Saudi Arabia. They shared their spare time and the expatriates had the same working hours in the same subsidiary. Results show that a Danish national group was established and maintained. This in-group dominated life in the compound and at work it may have contributed to the perceptual bias and discriminatory behaviour demonstrated by the Danish expatriates in their management of the foreign national employees. Implications of these findings are discussed in detail.