论国际银团贷款中的交叉违约条款

交叉违约条款是国际银团贷款合同中广泛采用的条款。本文探讨了交叉违约条款的概念、理论依据、意义和限制。交叉违约条款的依据在于预期违约,意义在于赋予银行平等受偿地位和维持债务的稳定性。由于交叉违约条款的不当使用可能致使债务人陷于困境,交叉违约条款是可以通过法定和约定的方式进行限制的。     

论国际银团贷款中的交叉违约条款

交叉违约条款是国际银团贷款合同中广泛采用的条款.本文探讨了交叉违约条款的概念、理论依据、意义和限制.交叉违约条款的依据在于预期违约,意义在于赋予银行平等受偿地位和维持债务的稳定性.由于交叉违约条款的不当使用可能致使债务人陷于困境,交叉违约务款是可以通过法定和约定的方式进行限制的.     

银行开展国内间接银团贷款业务的法律探讨

随着银行业提高信贷资产流动性、建立贷款风险分散策略及盘活存量贷款的需要,国内间接银团贷款应运而生。本文从分析国内间接银团贷款的特点入手,剖析了隐名式、非隐名式间接银团贷款的性质,并分别对牵头行、参加行开展国内间接银团贷款业务的法律风险如借款人与担保人风险、信息披露风险、牵头行诚实履行合同风险、参加行维权风险等进行了深刻分析,提出了规置国内间接银团贷款当事人权益、防范国内间接银团贷款法律风险的措施及建议。     

国际银团贷款市场的新发展

国际银团贷款市场的新发展中国银行国际金融研究所宗良银团贷款，又称辛迪加贷款，是由一家或几家银行牵头，多家银行参加，在一项贷款协议中按同一条件向同一借款人发放的中长期贷款。它开始于６０年代的美国，流行于７０年代，８０年代初受拉美国家债务危机的影响，有所...     

突发事件视角下我国商业银行个人住房抵押贷款违约风险研究

文章基于H商业银行2001年1月至2021年4月的个人住房抵押贷款数据,探讨在房地产调控政策趋严的宏观背景下,突发事件对商业银行个人住房抵押贷款违约率的影响情况,进一步研究突发事件影响下不同职业借款人违约风险的变化情况。研究发现,一方面,突发事件导致商业银行个人住房抵押贷款的违约风险显著上升;另一方面,在突发事件的影响下,不同所有制企业的职工个人住房抵押贷款违约风险有所差异,工作单位性质为民营企业及个体工商户的借款人违约风险>工作单位性质为国有企业的借款人违约风险>工作单位性质为事业单位的借款人违约风险。H商业银行2001年1月至2021年4月的个人住房抵押贷款数据回归分析结果支持以上结论。     

新形势下个人贷款理性违约风险分析

一、个人贷款理性违约的概念违约风险是指银行在经营抵押贷款业务时面临的借款人因各种原因主动或被迫停止偿还部分或全部贷款的信贷风险。按借款人违约的主动性和被动性,可分为理性违约和被迫违约。所谓理性违约,即借款人觉得放弃继续还款可带来更大的利益时的违约行为。一般情况下,只有当房价出现下跌,特别是当跌幅超过借款人购房所支付全部费用时,借款人就容易选择停止继续支付贷款;另一种理性违约表现为提前还款,即当贷款利率下降时,借款人基于费用考虑选择提前偿还部分或全部贷款的情形,提前还款会增加银行成本,减少收益,但不会产生大的贷款风险。     

浅议国内银团贷款发展

银团贷款又称辛迪加贷款,国际上通用银团贷款的定义是指获准经营信贷业务的多家银行或其他金融机构组成银团,基于相同的贷款条件,采用同一贷款协议,向同一借款人提供的贷款或其他授信。根据中国银行业监督管理委员会2007年8月11日印发的《银团贷款业务指引》,银团贷款是指由两家或两家以上的银行基于相同贷款条件,根据同一贷款协议,按约定时间和比例,通过代理行向借款人提供的本外币贷款或授信业务。     

互联网金融背景下“软信息”对于违约行为的影响——基于Logit模型

互联网金融背景下,网络平台积累了越来越多的用户行为信息,而且这些信息与借款人提供的传统信息之间存在较大差异。如何有效地利用这些信息来降低借款人与投资人之间信息的不对称,对于提高风险控制水平、预判违约行为发生的可能性具有重要意义。借助拍拍贷平台提供的海量数据,从"软信息"的角度出发,探索其与借款人违约行为的关系。实证分析结果表明:当借款人在申请借款时修改信息的数目高于12项时,违约的机会概率会提高;当借款人在贷款成交之前修改内容的天数越多、修改时距离成交的日期越近时,违约的机会概率相应会越高。而当借款人最近3个月在社交网络存在去欧洲或者美国旅游的信息,或者填写借款信息的完整程度较高时,相应的违约机会概率则较低。     

我国银团贷款业务浅析

一、我国银团贷款业务的发展状况银团贷款，又称辛迪加贷款．或国际银团贷款．它是由一、两家银行牵头，吸收多家银行参加，组成一个银行集团，共同对某国借款人提供巨额资金的国际性贷款。银团贷款通常由“牵头行”（代理行）负责组团、谈判、认购及推销贷款份额、安排贷款进度等事宜，可另由一至两家银行作为“副牵头行”协助工作，其它“参加行”只承担贷款份额，贷款的权益和风险按参加行承担的份额来确定。银团贷款业务站创于70年代初，经过20多年的发展，已为众多国家和企业所接受，成为一些银行办理国际中长期信贷业务的主要贷款方式…     

固定利率住房抵押贷款违约行为及其定价研究

固定利率住房抵押贷款的信用风险主要是违约风险,基于理性期权的定价模型往往会低估借款人的违约概率.通过分析违约成本及非理性违约因素,可以确定借款人违约时贷款机构收回的现金流,得到固定利率住房抵押贷款定价的期望值模型,并得出模型的求解方法.     

Development costs capitalization and debt financing

This study investigates debt market effects of research and development (R&D) costs capitalization, using a global sample of public bonds and private syndicated loans issued by public non‐financial firms. Firstly, we show that firms capitalize larger amounts of R&D in a year when they exhibit a propensity for issuing bonds, rather than borrowing funds privately from the syndicated loan market, in the subsequent year. Secondly, we provide evidence that capitalized R&D investments reduce the cost of debt. We infer that debt market participants are able to identify firms’ motives for R&D capitalization, as we find a reduction in the cost of debt only for those firms that do not show indications of employing R&D capitalization for earnings management reasons. Indeed, only for this sub‐sample of firms, the amount of capitalized R&D contributes positively to future earnings. We confirm that R&D capitalization is positively associated with audit fees and thus can be deemed to be a signaling device. Lastly, we find that it is the amount of R&D a firm is expected to capitalize and not the discretionary counterparts, which facilitates a firm's access to public debt markets, reduces bond and syndicated loan prices, and contributes to future benefits.     

Small Firm Capital Structure and the Syndicated Loan Market

We show that small firms using syndicated loans for their mid- and long-term financial needs have significantly higher leverage than firms that do not borrow in this market. This difference cannot be attributed to firm characteristics like the availability of growth opportunities, asset tangibility, R&D spending, profitability and net sales that are known to influence capital structure. We also find that the capital structure of other firms that borrow in the syndicated loan market is not different from those that do not. We show that already highly leveraged small firms are more likely to borrow in the syndicated loan market than other firms. The higher debt in the capital structure of small firms that rely on syndicated loans consequently can be attributed to the availability of capital rather than demand for capital, as shown more generally by Faulkender and Petersen (Rev Financ Stud 19(1):45?C79, 2006).     

Discussion of “Hedge commitments and agency costs of debt: evidence from interest rate protection covenants and accounting conservatism”

Beatty, Petacchi, and Zhang investigate the role of two hedge commitment mechanisms??interest rate protection covenants and accounting conservatism??in reducing agency costs of debt. Using a large sample of syndicated loan agreements, they provide evidence that borrowers required to hedge interest rate risk through interest rate protection covenants receive lower interest rate charges. However, borrowers who voluntarily hedge interest rate risks receive lower rates only if they implement conservative financial reporting. The authors conclude that the benefits of hedging are realized only when borrowers can credibly commit to maintain hedge positions once a syndicated loan is issued. While the evidence provided by the authors is novel and interesting, I argue that the empirical assessment of hedge benefits is more complex. In addition, there are still some important open issues left unanswered that could be tackled by future research.     

Global equity offerings and access to domestic loan market: U.S. evidence

This study examines whether and to what extend global equity offerings at the IPO stage may affect issuing firms' ability to borrow in the domestic debt market. Tracking bank loans taken by U.S. IPO firms in the domestic syndicated loan market, we observe that global equity offering firms experience more favorable loan price than that offered to their domestic counterparts. This finding holds for a set of robustness tests of endogeneity issues. We also find that, compared with their domestic counterparts, global equity offering firms are less likely to have financial distress, engage more in international diversification, and are more likely to wait a longer time to apply for syndicated loans.     

Financial crises and the composition of cross-border lending

We examine the composition and drivers of cross-border bank lending between 1995 and 2012, distinguishing between syndicated and non-syndicated loans. We show that on-balance sheet syndicated loan exposures, which account for almost one third of total cross-border loan exposures, increased during the global financial crisis due to large drawdowns on credit lines extended before the crisis. Our empirical analysis of the drivers of cross-border loan exposures in a large bilateral dataset leads to three main results. First, banks with lower levels of capital favor syndicated over other kinds of cross-border loans. Second, borrower country characteristics such as level of development, economic size, and capital account openness, are less important in driving syndicated than non-syndicated loan activity, suggesting a diversification motive for syndication. Third, information asymmetries between lender and borrower countries became more binding for both types of cross-border lending activity during the recent crisis.     

Determinants of Secondary Market Prices for Developing Country Syndicated Loans

This paper presents our investigation of the factors that determine secondary market prices of developing country syndicated loans. Trading volume in this market has almost doubled yearly from 1985 to 1988 while average market prices declined from 73% to 41% of par value during the same period. We find that loan values depend on a country's solvency rather than its liquidity and show that a country's adoption of a debt conversion program significantly decreases its loans' market prices. Furthermore, the debt moratoria by Brazil and Peru, as well as the developing-country-specific provisions made by U.S. banks, impact loan prices negatively.     

Syndicated Loans

This paper analyzes the market for syndicated loans, a hybrid of private and public debt, which has grown at well over a 20% rate annually over the past decade and which totaled over $1 trillion in 1997. We identify empirically the factors that influence a bank or nonbank's decision to syndicate a loan and the determinants of the proportion of the loan sold in the event of syndication. The evidence reveals a loan is more likely to be syndicated as information about the borrower becomes more transparent, as the syndicate's managing agent becomes more “reputable”, and as the loan's maturity increases. The lead manager holds larger proportions of information-problematic loans in its own portfolio. Loan syndications, like loan sales, appear to be motivated, in part, by capital regulations, and the liquidity position of the agent bank influences the likelihood of syndication, but not the extent. Our results confirm that information and agency problems affect the salability of debt claims and the extent to which a loan is “transaction oriented” rather than “relationship oriented” in the sense of A. Boot and A. Thakor (2000, J. Finance54, 679–713). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G20, G21, G24.     

STRUCTURING LOAN SYNDICATES: A CASE STUDY OF THE HONG KONG DISNEYLAND PROJECT LOAN

The volume of global syndicated loans has increased from $413 billion in 1990 to $2.195 trillion in 2000, making it not only the largest source of corporate funds in the world but also one of the fastest growing. Yet despite the size of this market and its importance as a source of corporate funds, there has been relatively little research on syndicated lending and little understanding of the structuring intricacies underlying these deals.
In this article, the author analyzes the process by which Hongkong International Theme Parks Limited (HKTP), an entity jointly owned by The Walt Disney Company and the Hong Kong Government, raised HK $3.3 billion (approximately US $425 million) in the syndicated loan market to finance part of the construction and operation of its Hong Kong Disneyland theme park and resort complex. Using this case study of the HKTP financing, the article moves beyond the overly simplistic (albeit theoretically tractable) models of debt choice favored by academics and begins to explore the dynamics and consequences of various real-world debt structures. Rather than focusing on the credit analysis or documentation issues, the author focuses on the structuring and distribution issues because they are both less well understood and provide interesting insights into debt management.     

The Informational Role of the Media in Private Lending

We investigate whether a borrower's media coverage influences the syndicated loan origination and participation decisions of informationally disadvantaged lenders, loan syndicate structures, and interest spreads. In syndicated loan deals, information asymmetries can exist between lenders that have a relationship with a borrower and less informed, nonrelationship lenders competing to serve as lead arranger on a syndicated loan, and also between lead arrangers and less informed syndicate participants. Theory suggests that the aggressiveness with which less informed lenders compete for a loan deal increases in the sentiment of public information signals about a borrower. We extend this theory to syndicated loans and hypothesize that the likelihood of less informed lenders serving as the lead arranger or joining a loan syndicate is increasing in the sentiment of media‐initiated, borrower‐specific articles published prior to loan origination. We find that as media sentiment increases (1) outside, nonrelationship lenders have a higher probability of originating loans; (2) syndicate participants are less likely to have a previous relationship with the borrower or lead bank; (3) lead banks retain a lower percentage of loans; and (4) loan spreads decrease.     

Institutional demand pressure and the cost of corporate loans

Between 2001 and 2007, annual institutional funding in highly leveraged loans went up from $32 billion to $426 billion, accounting for nearly 70% of the jump in total syndicated loan issuance over the same period. Did the inflow of institutional funding in the syndicated loan market lead to mispricing of credit? To understand this relation, we look at the institutional demand pressure defined as the number of days a loan remains in syndication. Using market-level and cross-sectional variation in time-on-the-market, we find that a shorter syndication period is associated with a lower final interest rate. The relation is robust to the use of institutional fund flow as an instrument. Furthermore, we find significant price differences between institutional investors’ tranches and banks’ tranches of the same loans, even though they share the same underlying fundamentals. Increasing demand pressure causes the interest rate on institutional tranches to fall below the interest rate on bank tranches. Overall, a one-standard-deviation reduction in average time-on-the-market decreases the interest rate for institutional loans by over 30 basis points per annum. While this effect is significantly larger for loan tranches bought by collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), it is not fully explained by their role.