Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies

This paper studies a simultaneous-move infinite-horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort. The delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives: in each period the principal rewards the manager according to her performance. We show that when the cost of delegation is low relative to profits, the principal can attain the precommitment price plan in a perfect rational expectations equilibrium. The paper analyzes the robustness of this result under alternative specifications of timing and objectives. We also provide a numerical characterization of the equilibrium strategies for the case of linear-quadratic payoffs.     

Superneutrality, indeterminacy and endogenous growth

In this paper, we explore the possibility of having money as a source of indeterminacy in endogenous growth models. We adopt the simple Ak model of endogenous growth to be the main analytical vehicle whose balanced growth paths do not display local indeterminacy. Money is introduced via either a general cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint or a pecuniary transactions costs (PTC) technology. It is shown that local indeterminacy of the dynamics is due to the presence of an intertemporal substitution effect on capital accumulation that works against and dominates the conventional inflation effect of Tobin [1965, Money and economical growth. Econometrica 33(4), Part 2, 671]. If money is growth-rate superneutral, then the intertemporal substitution effect is absent so that local indeterminacy cannot occur. Finally, the strength of the intertemporal substitution effect depends positively on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption.     

Bounded rationality in laboratory bargaining with asymmetric information

Summary. This paper reports an experiment on two-player sequential bargaining with asymmetric information that features some forces present in multi-round monopoly pricing environments. Buyer-seller pairs play a series of bargaining games that last for either one or two rounds of offers. The treatment variable is the probability of continuing into a second round. Equilibrium predictions do a poor job of explaining levels of prices and treatment effects. As an alternative to the conventional equilibrium model, we consider models that allow for bounded rationality of subjects. The quantal response equilibrium model captures some of the important features of the results.Received: 30 April 2003, Revised: 10 December 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C78, D82, D42, C91. Correspondence to: Timothy N. CasonThis research was funded in part by the National Science Foundation (SBR-9809110). The experiments were run at the Economic Science Laboratory of the University of Arizona and the Krannert Laboratory for Experimental Economic Research at Purdue University, using the z-Tree software developed at the Institute for Empirical Research at the University of Zurich (Fischbacher [8]). David Cooper, Rachel Croson, Charles Noussair, an anonymous referee, and conference participants at the Economic Science Association and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory meetings provided helpful comments. Timothy ONeill Dang, Thomas Wilkening and Marikah Mancini provided expert research assistance.     

Are consumers forward looking? Evidence from used iPhones

This study examines the impact of planned obsolescence – the introduction of new models to make existing models obsolete – on secondary markets for mobile phones. Using data of over 320,000 used iPhones listings on Thailand’s largest online marketplace, we document that iPhone prices decrease with age, around 2.8–3.2% for each passing month. We find no evidence that the price decline accelerates after launches of new models (i.e. obsolescence), lending support to the view that consumer in durable goods markets are rational and forward looking.     

Individual preferences and the effect of uncertainty on irreversible investment

This paper considers a relationship between investment behavior and an agent’s preferences in a stochastic one-sector growth model with irreversible investment. Further, it explores the effect of uncertainty in investment policies by using a non-expected utility function. Since uncertainty has an impact on investment policies not only through an option value but also through a risk-adjusted time preference rate in a general equilibrium framework, it is significant to distinguish the two preference parameters of the agent. While the previous partial equilibrium models with irreversible investment have exhibited a negative relationship between the desired capital stock and uncertainty, this paper implies that it is possible to generate a positive relationship for the appropriate parameters. This shows that the results of Hartman and Abel have been robust even in a general equilibrium model.     

A panel data model for subjective information on household income growth

Subjective expectations about future income changes are analyzed, using household panel data. The models used are extensions of existing binary choice panel data models to the case of ordered response. We consider static models with random and fixed individual effects. We also look at a dynamic random effects model which includes a measure for permanent and transitory income. We find that income change expectations strongly depend on realized income changes in the past: those whose income fell, are more pessimistic than others, while those whose income rose are more optimistic. Expected income changes are also significantly affected by employment status, family composition, permanent income, and past expectations. Expectations are then compared to the head of household’s ex post perception of the realized income change for the same period. The main finding is that rational expectations are rejected, and that in particular, households whose income has decreased in the past underestimate their future income growth.     

Competitive search markets for durable goods

Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used to achieve separation. Received: August 24, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000     

Indeterminacy with almost constant returns to scale: capital-labor substitution matters

Summary. This paper shows, in the benchmark one-sector Ramsey model, that indeterminacy and sunspots may occur when externalities are small, provided that capital and labor are more substitutable than in the usual Cobb-Douglas specification. Key to the results are the general formulations of both preferences and technology that we consider. In particular, indeterminacy is shown to occur under almost constant returns to scale provided that both concavity of utility for consumption is small enough and labor supply is close to indivisible. An important implication of the results is that, when labor supply is positively sloped, indeterminacy does not necessarily require the equilibrium wage-hours locus to be upward sloping.Received: 16 June 2004, Revised: 8 March 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C62, D58, D91, E32.This is a companion paper of “Sunspots in real business-cycle models: completing calibration”, with new results that have emerged from extending the analysis contained in the latter article. The author would like to thank, without implicating, Bruno Decreuse, Andrew Postlewaite, Alain Venditti, Yi Wen, participants at the 2003 Society for Economic Dynamics Meeting, as well as C.D. Aliprantis, the Editor, and an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions.     

Cycles and multiple equilibria in the market for durable lemons

Summary. The paper investigates the nature of market failure in a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970) where identical cohorts of a durable good enter the market over time. In the dynamic model, equilibria with qualitatively different properties emerge. Typically, in equilibria of the dynamic model, sellers with higher quality wait in order to sell and wait more than sellers of lower quality. The main result is that for any distribution of quality there exist an infinite number of cyclical equilibria where all goods are traded within a certain number of periods after entering the market. Received: December 21, 2000; revised version: September 5, 2001     

Advance disposal fee vs. disposal fee: A monopolistic producer’s durability choice model

This study examines how the timing of waste disposal fee collection affects the producer’s choice of built-in product durability and social welfare in a durable-goods monopoly model. We categorize the waste disposal fee policies into two: advance disposal fee (ADF) policy and disposal fee (DF) policy. We show that a DF policy has two opposing effects on durability. Firstly, a DF policy gives the producer an incentive to increase durability in order to delay the households’ waste disposal and to discount future payments of the disposal fee (the payment-discounting effect). Secondly, a DF policy creates an incentive for consumers to dump waste illegally in order to mitigate the payment of the disposal fee, and gives the producer an incentive to reduce durability in order to avoid market saturation and the associated future price cuts (the illegal-dumping effect). When the disposal fee is low, the payment-discounting effect dominates the illegal-dumping effect under a DF policy, leading to the enhancement of durability. In this case, from a social welfare viewpoint, a DF policy may be more desirable than an ADF policy if the environmental damage associated with illegal dumping is not serious. However, when the disposal fee is high, a DF policy induces more illegal dumping, reduces durability, and inflicts more environmental damage. Therefore, an ADF policy is more socially desirable than a DF policy when the disposal fee is high. Moreover, we consider an oligopoly case and find that an ADF policy is more socially desirable in an industry with smaller market power.     

Convergence speed and preference externalities in a one-sector model with elastic labor supply

In a one-sector model with elastic labor supply where consumption and leisure externalities are incorporated, we examine the impact of preference externalities on convergence speed.     

Is food consumption a good proxy for nondurable consumption?

This paper examines whether there is a discrepancy in estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution using food consumption instead of nondurable consumption data. We show that a discrepancy exists and that the discrepancy increases as nondurable consumption increases.