TRANSFERABLE WATER ENTITLEMENTS WHICH SATISFY HETEROGENEOUS RISK PREFERENCES

Irrigators in Victoria have a water entitlement which is composed of a highly secure water right and additional water which may be purchased if available. Water entitlements in NSW are based on the irrigated area with the actual volume of water received in any year depending almost entirely on seasonal conditions. Musgrave and Lesueur (1973) argued that these entitlements could be replaced by a portfolio of entitlements, with each type of entitlement in the portfolio guaranteeing a nominated minimum value of water at a different probability. Thus, irrigators could purchase a portfolio of water entitlements which would suit their individual risk preferences. The purpose in this paper is to show how a water authority can construct a portfolio of water entitlements which satisfies these requirements and also to demonstrate that the entitlements in the portfolio satisfy a first degree stochastic dominance relationship. A worked example is presented in which these results are illustrated.     

Third‐party effects of water trading and potential policy responses*

A key feature of water policy reform in Australia has been the separation of water access entitlements from land titles and the establishment of markets for water. However, the separation of water entitlements from land failed to account for a number of characteristics that were implicit in the joint right. This has given rise to a number of third party effects as water is traded in an incomplete market. This paper describes four third‐party effects of water trade; reliability of supply, timeliness of delivery, storage and delivery charges, and water quality and examines policy responses to address these effects. The discussion draws on the concepts of exclusiveness and rivalry to determine the applicability of property rights and other solutions to the third‐party effects of trade. It is likely that many of the third‐party effects of trade discussed in this paper do not warrant policy intervention at the national or state level, but intervention at the local level may be warranted. The costs of addressing some third‐party effects may outweigh the benefits. Where there are significant gains from trade, the existence of these third‐party effects should not been seen as a reason to impede trade.     

An economic assessment of options for operating within plantation forestry water entitlements and tightening cap and trade policy

The Green Triangle (GT) region of southern Australia is one of only two jurisdictions globally to licence plantation forestry's groundwater use. In response to declines in groundwater resources caused by historical plantation expansion, reductions in forest water allocations (~50%) are likely for some parts of the region, presenting novel challenges for forest managers in maintaining revenues and timber flows. This article presents a mathematical programming model evaluation of water trade opportunities for plantation forest owners to adapt to reduced water entitlements and explores how tightening groundwater policy could affect forestry returns and land use mix for the region. Results suggest that even absent opportunity to sell water, relatively limited 11% reduction in return could be expected for a large (−50%) water entitlement and (−48%) land-use change out of forestry. Results suggest that opportunities for forestry companies to sell water entitlements may allow them to maintain or even increase combined returns from forestry and water sales. Whilst the results highlight the adaptive capacity of the plantation forestry sector to operate within reduced water entitlement, a significant sectoral and regional economy adjustment would be likely. The discussion focusses on the potential to realise optimisation model-identified adaptation opportunities accounting for real-world thin markets, transaction costs and market friction.     

Water policy reform in Australia: lessons from the Victorian seasonal water market*

The nature of the seasonal water market is examined using a theoretical model and empirical evidence from the Victorian market. Drivers of the seasonal opportunity cost of water include the underlying nature of investment in the industry made in the context of risky entitlement yields; and the timing and nature of information regarding seasonal water availability and rainfall. Seasonal water markets facilitate the re‐allocation of water availability according to this short‐run opportunity cost. Evidence from the market suggests that transactions costs are low and most of the existing constraints to trade in seasonal allocations are the result of hydrological conditions. Analysis of market data suggests that the price response of the market to water availability is much more pronounced in years of low rainfall. The implications of the paper for wider policy reform are that attention should be paid to improving property rights for the management of intertemporal risk before other reforms, such as broadening of permanent water markets and institutionalising environmental flows, are implemented. This is because these other reforms will change the spatial and temporal pattern of water use and thus affect reliability, which underpins the value of water in irrigated agriculture.     

Issues in defining property rights to improve Australian water markets

This article discusses the key practical issues associated with defining property rights to water use, in the context of broadening the scope of the market for transferable water entitlements. In particular, the third party impacts of water trade and the need for improved water trading rules are discussed. Some of the issues associated with defining the reliability of water rights, including the design of appropriate dam management policies, are also discussed. The article concludes with some positive suggestions for the policy debate.     

Capturing benefits from water entitlement trade in salinity affected areas: A role for trading houses?

While there is potential for substantial benefits from water entitlement trade, external effects such as salinity may mean that traders cannot capture these benefits. This paper demonstrates that by creating a trading house as a single seller of water entitlements, with trade profits distributed to buyers, it is possible to achieve an allocation of entitlements which gives a social outcome higher than that possible from atomistic competition for entitlements. Such an outcome may be comparable to an optimally set uniform charge for water entitlements, but the trading house mechanism has the advantage that it makes use of trade to generate information on the optimal level of charging in the presence of salinity.     

Integrated economic-hydrologic water modeling at the basin scale: the Maipo river basin

Increasing competition for water across sectors increases the importance of the river basin as the appropriate unit of analysis to address the challenges facing water resources management; and modeling at this scale can provide essential information for policy makers in their resource allocation decisions. This paper introduces an integrated economic‐hydrologic modeling framework that accounts for the interactions between water allocation, farmer input choice, agricultural productivity, non‐agricultural water demand, and resource degradation in order to estimate the social and economic gains from improvement in the allocation and efficiency of water use. The model is applied to the Maipo river basin in Chile. Economic benefits to water use are evaluated for different demand management instruments, including markets in tradable water rights, based on production and benefit functions with respect to water for the agricultural and urban‐industrial sectors.     

PROPERTY ENTITLEMENTS AND PRICING POLICIES FOR A MATURING WATER ECONOMY

The Australian water economy is entering a mature phase characterised by inelastic supply of 'new' water and the need for expensive rehabilitation of aging projects. Thus, the policy focus will turn increasingly toward ways of restraining water demand and reallocating existing supplies. A prima facie case is made that the efficiency loss from current water pricing and allocation policy is significant. After considering the relevant welfare economics theory, the theory of administered prices and marketable property rights and some American proposals for reform, a system of transferable water entitlements is proposed and developed.     

Water rights for variable supplies*

The relative merits of different systems of property rights to allocate water among different extractive uses are evaluated for the case where variability of supply is important. Three systems of property rights are considered. In the first, variable supply is dealt with through the use of water entitlements defined as shares of the total quantity available. In the second, there are two types of water entitlements, one for water with a high security of supply and the other a lower security right for the residual supply. The third is a system of entitlements specified as state‐contingent claims. With zero transaction costs, all systems are efficient. In the realistic situation where transaction costs matter, the system based on state‐contingent claims is globally optimal, and the system with high‐security and lower security entitlements is preferable to the system with share entitlements.     

The role of the commonwealth environmental water holder in annual water allocation markets

In recent years, the Government of Australia has bought back a significant amount of water entitlements in the Murray‐Darling Basin (MDB) through its Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder (CEWH) agency. This has been a welcome development, as it is an efficient way of securing water for the environment in the basin. However, the question of how to best manage water holdings held by the government is as yet unresolved. In particular, the question of whether and how should the CEWH engage in water markets is still grappling the government and academia alike. This paper addresses that question by evaluating total benefits to a range of water users, including the environment, under a variety of hydro‐climatic conditions. This is approached through running simulations based on environmental benefit function that varies with prevailing hydro‐climatic conditions. The findings indicate that the benefits are greater when CEWH actively participates in annual water allocation market and that such participation enables the CEWH to secure most water when it is needed the most by the environment. This suggests that policy should encourage the CEWH to further explore opportunities to engage with the water markets to the benefit of communities and the environment in the MDB.     

Exit fees and termination fees revisited: funding irrigation infrastructure in a manner compatible with water trade*

It has long been recognised that the mechanism for funding irrigation infrastructure in Australia may be incompatible with efficient trade in the rural water market. If the revenue received by an irrigation operator is dependent on the volume of water entitlements held in the operator’s region, out‐of‐region permanent water sales threaten the operator’s revenue stream, potentially leading to higher charges on remaining irrigators, encouraging an inefficient ‘rush for the exit’. In response, irrigation operators have imposed restrictions on permanent water trade, such as exit fees and termination fees, to protect their revenue stream. Previous economic analysis has suggested that exit fees, in particular, are a barrier to efficient trade in the water market and should be abolished. In contrast, this paper argues that allowing irrigators to cancel their water delivery rights without fees or charges leads to inefficient trade in the water market, hinders efficient on‐farm investment in sunk complementary assets and leads to inefficient network rationalisation decisions. Instead, the revenue stream of irrigation operators should be insulated from water trade decisions, through high termination fees, tying irrigation charges to the land, or tagging the obligation to pay delivery charges to the new owner of the traded water.     

Land Market Imperfections and Agricultural Policy Impacts in the New EU Member States: A Partial Equilibrium Analysis

This article analyses how transaction costs and imperfect competition in the land market affect the welfare effects of agricultural subsidies in the new Eastern Member States of the European Union. Benefits of land subsidies end up with landowners in new Eastern Member States also with imperfections in the new Eastern Member States land markets. With unequal access to subsidies, small tenant farmers may even lose out from the subsidies. Decoupling of payments shifts policy rents to farmers, but constrains productivity-enhancing restructuring. Using reserve entitlements to mitigate this effect reduces the intended benefits on distortions and target efficiency.     

农业水权市场综合框架体系及案例分析

以较为成熟的水权市场建设和水权制度改革理论与实践为支撑,以对多个农业水权市场的实地调研为基础,提出融合制度基础、经济动力、交易参与人、第三方保护和设施基础等5大模块,涵括14个要素的农业水权市场综合框架体系,阐明了各要素之间的内在联系。以澳大利亚维多利亚州、智利Limarí流域和中国石羊河流域为例,在农业水权市场综合框架体系下对3个国家农业水权市场进行分析,进而从水权法律体系、水资源产权管理制度、水权信息共享度、水权交易媒介等多个方面总结出建立健全农业水权市场的必要条件及建议,旨在给我国积极探索建立农业水权市场的决策者们提供参考。     

An endogenous growth model for the evolution of water rights systems

This article presents a model to help explain the transition path from one water management system to another, typically a commons framework to one of tradable permit‐based property rights. Furthermore, drawing from transaction cost literature, the model demonstrates how this takes place when externalities (the strain on water resources) become severe enough to warrant the increased transaction costs inherent with more complex water rights management frameworks.     

地下水可交易水权制度框架及其作用研究

为解决地下水超采与浪费问题,研究在地下水管理中引入可交易水权制度,认为通过地下水水权交易,可以满足新进入者用水需求,有效地控制整个区域的地下水可开采总量。通过用水户之间的水权交易,可促进地下水资源在各用水主体间优化配置。为保障这一制度的运行,建议建立地下水可交易水权制度组织保障体系及法律保障体系。     

Short-Run Supply Responses in the U.S. Beef-Cattle Industry

This article investigates the response of beef-cattle producers to changes in the price of cattle. Previous research has suggested that there may be a negative short-run supply response to a permanent increase in the price of cattle. We build a dynamic, rational expectations model that separates the markets for fed and unfed beef. This separation generates predictions that the supply response is generally positive, even for permanent shocks in the short run, and nests the negative supply response as a special case for appropriately restricted demand shocks.     

Incentives and static and dynamic gains from market reform: rice production in Vietnam

This article develops a dynamic model to account for the enhanced incentive effects that result from market reform through a move toward private property rights and competitive markets. Reform is captured through an emerging profits function which depends on effective prices and incentives to work harder. Static and dynamic output gains from reform are derived through increases in total factor productivity and induced capital accumulation. The model is applied to rice production in Vietnam over the period 1976–94. The more extensive is market reform, the larger the effects found on rice output, the capital stock and transitional growth rates, suggesting that incentives and more competitive markets matter greatly.     

Policy review of water reform in the Murray–Darling Basin,Australia: the “do's” and “do'nots”

The water reforms undertaken in the Murray–Darling Basin, Australia since 2007 have been viewed as a model for other countries seeking to respond to water insecurity. Here, a policy review is provided of this water reform and whether it delivers on key environmental objectives in the 2007 Water Act (the Act). The evaluation includes a review of the 2012 Basin Plan, a key instrument of the Act, and complementary policies associated with the acquisition of water entitlements for the environment via direct (reverse tenders) and indirect (infrastructure subsidies) means. Using the objects of the Act as a benchmark, an evaluation is provided of the following: (i) planned reductions in irrigation water extractions in the 2012 Basin Plan; (ii) risks associated with the 2018 amendments to the Basin Plan that, collectively, allow for an increase in irrigation water extractions of some 22 per cent, relative to the sustainable diversion limits specified in the 2012 Basin Plan; (iii) Basin‐scale environmental outcomes achieved, as of the end of 2018; and (iv) economic effects of direct and indirect methods of acquiring water for the environment. Findings from the review generate the “Do's” and “Do Nots” of water reform for Australia, and possibly other countries, when managing the trade‐offs between water for irrigation and the environment.     

Pricing-to-market in NSW rice export markets

The Ricegrowers' Cooperative Limited is a single-desk seller of NSW Japonica rice on the export market. Confidential monthly price data supplied by the Cooperative were used to examine 'pricing-to-market' in four of its major export markets. The hypothesis of a competitive market was rejected. The Cooperative has been able to vary mark-ups over different markets and with respect to the importer's currency in each market. The exchange rate results in particular suggest that the Cooperative has been able to exercise market power to obtain price premiums.     

Spot water markets and risk in water supply

Water availability patterns in semiarid regions are typically extremely variable. Even in basins with a highly developed infrastructure, users are subject to unreliable water supplies, incurring substantial economic losses during periods of scarcity. More flexible instruments, such as voluntary exchanges of water among users, can help users to reduce risk exposure. This article looks at the effects of spot water markets on the economic risk caused by water availability variations. Our theoretical and empirical risk analyses are based on the random profits of water users. Profit probability density functions are formally and graphically characterized for both water sellers and buyers under several possible market outcomes. We conclude from this analysis that, where water supply is stochastic, water markets unambiguously reduce both parties' risk exposure. The empirical study is conducted on an irrigation district in the Guadalquivir Valley (Southern Spain), where there is a high probability of periods of extreme water scarcity. Water demand functions for the district representative irrigators and a spatial equilibrium model are used to simulate market exchanges and equilibrium. This programming model is combined with statistical simulation techniques. We show that the profit probability distribution of a representative irrigator is modified if water exchanges are authorized, leading to risk reductions. Results also indicate that if the market were extended to several districts and users that are subject to varying hydrological risk exposure, extremely low‐profit events would be less likely to occur. In sum, we show that exchanging water in annual spot markets can reduce farmers' economic vulnerability caused by water supply variability across irrigation seasons. These results support the water policy reform carried out in Spain in 1999 to allow for voluntary water exchanges among right holders.