Population size and the size of government

We examine the effect of population size on government size for a panel of 130 countries for the period between 1970 and 2014. We show that previous analyses of the nexus between population size and government size are incorrectly specified and fail to consider the influence of cross-sectional dependence, non-stationarity and cointegration. Using a panel time-series approach that adequately accounts for these issues, we find that population size has a positive long-run effect on government size. This finding suggests that effects of population size that increase government size (primarily due to the costs of heterogeneity, congestion, crime and conflict) dominate effects that reduce government size (primarily due to scale economies).     

Fractionalization and the size of government

I study the effect of voters with a group-based social conscience. Voters care more about the well-being of those belonging to their own group than the rest of the population. Within a model of political tax determination, both fractionalization and group antagonism reduce the support for redistribution. Whereas within group inequality increases support for redistribution, inequality between groups has the opposite effect. These results hold even if a poor group forms a majority. Using a panel constructed from US micro data, I find support for the hypothesis that within race inequality increases redistribution while between race inequality decreases redistribution.     

The size and composition of government expenditure

This paper tests several leading hypotheses on determinants of government expenditure. The purpose is to avoid omitted variables bias by testing the prominent theories in a comprehensive specification, to identify persistent puzzles for the current set of theories, and to explore those puzzles in greater depth by looking at the composition of government expenditure and the level of government at which it takes place as well as its magnitude. Using Government Financial Statistics data from the IMF covering over 100 countries from 1970–2000, I look at cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in government expenditure and both individual categories of expenditure (such as defense, education, health care) and different levels of government (central, and local). Among other results, I find a new explanation for Wagner's Law, widespread evidence that preference heterogeneity leads to decentralization rather than outright decreases in expenditures, that a great deal of the expenditure associated with increased trade openness is not in categories that explicitly insure for risk, and evidence that both political access and income inequality affect the extent of social insurance.     

Decentralization and regional government size in Spain

The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of fiscal decentralization on the size of regional governments in Spain, by controlling for economies of scale, interregional heterogeneity and institutional framework. We study it over 1985 to 2004 using a panel dataset of seventeen spanish regions. The results can be easily summarized. Firstly, it supports the classic public goods theory of a trade-off-between the economic benefits of size and the costs of heterogeneity. Secondly, it doesn??t reject the ??Leviathan?? hypothesis and neither does the ??common pool?? hypothesis. Thirdly, by contrast, the paper partly rejects the ??Wallis???? hypothesis. It argues that government size is mediated by financial resources obtained through intergovernmental grants, consistent with welfare economics and positive economic policies. We conclude that later advances in the decentralisation process must be compatible with the goal of reducing fiscal imbalances that emanate from the vertical structure of fiscal power.     

Government size,government debt and globalization

This article empirically investigates the effect of globalization on government size and debt. Using panel heterogeneous cointegration techniques to a panel of developing and developed countries, it finds that globalization reduces government size and debt. In terms of components of globalization, government size is found to increase with trade openness but decreases with financial, social and political globalization. On the other hand, government debt increases with financial and trade openness but decreases with social and political globalization. The evidence is robust to different estimation methods and different samples. Our data also indicate unidirectional causality running from globalization measures to government size and debt.     

Democratic reversals and the size of government

While the fiscal and redistributive consequences of democracy is one of the central debates in political economy, most empirical studies analyze this question solely in the context of transitions to democracy. In this paper, we explore the consequences to taxation of democratic reversal using the systematic disenfranchisement of African Americans in the US South between 1880 and 1910. Following the federally-imposed extension of the franchise to the former slaves during Reconstruction (1865–1877), Southern states erected a series of legal restrictions, such as literacy tests and poll taxes, aimed primarily at preventing Southern African Americans from registering to vote. Using an original dataset of local and state taxes and a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, we demonstrate that the adoption of literacy tests for voting eligibility in each state was followed by a significant decline in tax revenues that is highly correlated to the share of each county's population who was African American. We also find that black disenfranchisement led to a shift of the tax burden onto urban counties and a greater reliance on indirect taxation. Our results survive a battery of robustness checks, alternative specifications and additional tests of the redistributionist thesis. The findings are not only consistent with standard models of redistribution following democratization, but also indicate that the elasticity of taxes with respect to enfranchisement is substantial and larger than the one suggested by the cross-national literature.     

Voter turnout and the size of government

This paper uses Swedish and Finnish municipal data to investigate the effect of changes in voter turnout on the tax rate, public spending and vote-shares. A reform in Sweden in 1970, which overall lowered the cost of voting, is applied as an instrument for voter turnout in local elections. The reform increased voter turnout in Sweden. The higher voter turnout resulted in higher municipal taxes and greater per capita local public spending. There are also indications that higher turnout decreased the vote share for right-wing parties. I use an individual survey data set to conclude that it was in particular low income earners that began to vote to a greater extent after the reform.     

Workers' investment funds and the dynamic inefficiency of capitalism

This paper examines the effects of the partial transfer of control over the investment decision from capitalists to workers, which is an essential feature of plans to establish workers' investment funds, in a two-class model of capitalism formulated as a differential game. It is shown that the institutional change which provides the workers with means to invest their savings directly, instead of having to use the capitalists as agents for accumulation, improves economic efficiency. As a consequence, the economy saves, invests, grows and consumes more than the pure capitalist society, which is characterized by the Keynesian separation of saving and investment decisions.     

Migrant remittances and fertility

This study examines the role of migrants’ remittances in developing countries’ fertility transition. Employing an unbalanced panel of South Asian countries and controlling for various economic and socio-demographic factors, we find that remittances are significantly associated with a lower number of children born to women of childbearing age. This suggests the remittances’ substitution effect to be at play rather than the income effect, and may result from decreased need for children for financing the household’s future needs as well as from better access to healthcare and contraceptive methods available to migrant households. Remittances’ association with fertility appears to be more important than the transfer of fertility norms from migrants’ host countries. The monetary aspects of international migration may therefore be more important for the region’s demographic transition than social remittances.     

The probability,size and uses of remittances from urban to rural areas in India

This paper examines the important determinants of the decision to remit and of the amount remitted by migrants in Delhi to their place of origin. The findings are compared with those obtained for Kenya by Knowles and Anker. The comparative exercise helps us to identify universal patterns of remittance behaviour from those which are time, place and sample specific. The paper also throws light on the validity of infering technological change in agriculture in rural areas from data on uses of remittances.     

Centralization and the size of government in Canada

The determinants of the growth of government in Canada over the period 1926–90 are examined. Of particular interest is whether changes in the degree of centralization have affected the public sector's share of GDP. Unlike other studies using time-series data, the effect of decentralization toward the provincial/state and toward the local levels of government are measured separately. Empirical estimates provide strong support for the conclusion that citizen mobility acts as an important constraint on the growth of government.     

Long‐Term Impact of Minimum Wages on Workers’ Careers: Evidence from Two Decades of Longitudinal Linked Employer–Employee Data

We analyze the impact of high youth minimum wages, relying on two decades of linked employer–employee data and a major law change. Alternative treatment/control groups follow from two strands of the literature, one tracking low‐skilled workers employed before the law change, who are eligible for a large wage increase, and one tracking the employment of full cohorts, whether working or in school when the law changed. High minimum wages led to a short‐term wage gain, which faded over time. They did not jeopardize employment prospects. Changes in the hours worked by part‐time workers point to increased job attachment.     

Trade openness and government size of small developing countries

This paper examines the causal effect that trade openness has on government size in small developing countries (SDCs). We use the construction of the trade cost variables based on Baltic Dry Index in primary goods as instruments of trade openness to address the endogeneity issue. We find that the increase in trade openness leads to an increase in government size: a 1 percent expansion in trade openness (trade GDP ratio) raises government consumption over GDP ratio by approximately 0.1–0.2 percentage points on average. Its quantitative significance emphasizes the importance of rethinking the costs and benefits of trade openness for SDCs.     

Economic performance,government size,and institutional quality

This paper studies the empirical link between government size, institutions and economic activity using a panel of 140 countries over 40 years. Our results, robust under different econometric techniques, show mostly a negative effect of government size on output, while institutional quality has generally a positive impact. Moreover, the detrimental effect of government size on economic activity is stronger the lower institutional quality, and the positive effect of institutional quality on output increases with smaller government sizes.     

Fiscal policy,government size and EMU business cycle synchronization

We provide new evidence on the effects of fiscal policy and government size on pairwise business cycle synchronization in EMU. A novel time-varying framework is employed to estimate business cycle synchronization and subsequently a panel approach is used to establish the role of fiscal variables in determining the pairwise synchronization observations across time. The findings suggest similarities in the size of the public sector, yet divergence in fiscal policy stance, matter for the determination of business cycle synchronization. Hence, increased fiscal federalism in EMU will contribute to increased business cycle synchronization. Our results remain robust to different specifications and sub-periods.     

Growth maximizing government size,social capital,and corruption

Our paper intersects two topics in growth theory: the growth maximizing government size and the role of Social Capital in development. We modify a simple overlapping generations framework by introducing two key features: a production function à la Barro together with the possibility that public officials steal a fraction of public resources under their own control. As underlined by the literature on corruption, Social Capital affects public officials' accountability through many channels which also affect the probability of being caught for embezzlement and misappropriation of public resources. Therefore, in our endogenous growth model such probability is taken as a proxy of Social Capital. We find that maximum growth rates are compatible with Big Government size, measured both in terms of expenditures and public officials, when associated with high levels of Social Capital.     

Fiscal decentralization and government size: The role of democracy

This paper examines how the level of democracy in a country affects the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size. We argue that political regimes, proxied by their democracy levels, are important for different decentralization theories to predict the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size. We test this argument using panel data from 76 developed and developing countries during 1972–2013. We find strong and robust evidence that fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with government size and that a higher level of democracy tends to mitigate the negative impact of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, our study contributes to the literature by offering a novel insight on mixed results regarding the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size in the literature.     

Multinationals’ profit response to tax differentials: Effect size and shifting channels

This paper provides a quantitative review of the empirical literature on profit‐shifting behaviour of multinational firms. We synthesize the evidence from 27 studies and find a substantial response of profit measures to international tax rate differentials. Accounting for confounding factors by means of meta‐regressions, we predict a tax semi‐elasticity of subsidiary pre‐tax profits of about 0.8. Moreover, we disentangle the tax response by means of financial planning from the transfer pricing and licensing channel. Back‐of‐the‐envelope calculations suggest that transfer pricing and licensing are the dominant profit‐shifting channels.     

Wagner’s Law and Fiscal Illusion: An analysis of state government finances in Brazil

The aim of this article is to analyze state‐level public finances in Brazil. We examine the dynamics of governmental spending in a panel of 26 Brazilian states in search of evidence of Wagner’s Law and Fiscal Illusion Hypothesis. For the period ranging from 2002 to 2015, three methodologies are applied: dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS), fully modified ordinary least squares (FMOLS), and pooled mean group (PMG). The main empirical results found indicate that (1) there is strong evidence of Fiscal Illusion caused by public deficit and by central government transfer grants; (2) there are possible Flypaper Effects; (3) there is no evidence in support of Wagner’s Law; (4) there is low publicness degree of local expenditures; (5) due to Fiscal Illusion, less‐developed Brazilian states tend to be stuck in a public expenditure growth mechanism, especially in expenses related to non‐public goods, which tend to benefit private interests and lobby groups.     

On the size of government spending multipliers in Europe

This article compares the size of government spending multipliers in Europe by applying a panel structural vector autoregression analysis on 11 eurozone and 8 non-eurozone countries using quarterly data from 1991Q1 to 2012Q4. We find that (i) spending multipliers are smaller in eurozone compared to non-eurozone countries, (ii) across the euro area the impact of government spending on GDP has been higher before than after the introduction of the euro, (iii) spending multipliers are larger in the eurozone periphery than in the core countries and (iv) since the beginning of the recent financial crisis, spending multipliers have become larger both for eurozone and for non-eurozone countries. We relate these results to an emerging theoretical literature linking the size of fiscal multipliers to the monetary policy stance. We also discuss the implications of our findings for the effectiveness of fiscal policy in Europe.