North–South Trade, Income Distribution, and Welfare Effects of R&D Policy

The paper considers an extension of the Flam and Helpman model of North–South trade in which the government of South organizes and pays for R&D activity to reduce the production cost of quality-differentiated products. The main conclusions are the following: South has a welfare incentive to initiate R&D activity under some conditions on effectiveness of R&D in improving the technology. By doing so, South can increase the production of higher-quality differentiated products. North suffers a welfare loss from this R&D except in the case where the effectiveness of South's R&D activity is unusually high.     

Trade costs, international production shifting, and growth

In this paper I present a North-South endogenous growth model in which the impact of globalization on production location and growth can be analyzed. In the model the skilled-labor abundant North is the only innovator in the world. Using the model, I illustrate a scenario that is particularly interesting. Globalization (a reduction in trade costs) leads to a relocation of production to the South in a differentiated-product sector. As a result, more resources are shifted to R&D in the North, and the growth rate in the world increases. The model has several empirically consistent implications, such as rising relative wages of skilled to unskilled labor under globalization in both the North and South. I also discuss the welfare impact of globalization in this model.     

Effects of subsidies on growth and welfare in a quality-ladder model with elastic labor

This paper develops a quality-ladder growth model with elastic labor supply and distortionary taxes to analyze the effects of different subsidy instruments: subsidies to the production of final goods, subsidies to the purchase of intermediate goods, and subsidies to research and development (R&D). Moreover, the model is calibrated to the US data to compare the growth and welfare implications of these subsidies. The main results are as follows. First, we analytically show that an optimal coordination of all instruments attains the first-best outcome. Second, in the calibrated economy, we numerically find that for the use of a single instrument, R&D subsidy is less growth-enhancing and welfare-improving than the other subsidies, whereas for the use of a mix of two instruments, subsidizing the production of final goods and the purchase of intermediate goods is most effective in promoting growth but least effective in raising welfare.     

Imitation and innovation driven development under imperfect intellectual property rights

Developing countries employ about two-fifth of the world's researchers, originate one quarter of world expenditures on R&D, and their inventions are subject to imitation. Nevertheless, the previous literature focuses on North–South setups in which the South is restricted to imitating northern inventions. To analyze the effects of IPR policies on developed and developing countries, we extend this literature to allow not only for southern innovation and imitation of northern goods, but also for imitation targeted at southern innovations. We find the effects of IPRs on R&D and welfare to be non-monotonic and dependent on innovation efficiency and an innovation threshold in the South. For sufficiently strong IPRs the South engages in original R&D and stronger IPRs promote southern innovation, welfare, and a reduction in the North–South wage gap. Below the threshold, a strengthening of IPR protection fails to promote innovation and decreases welfare. Stronger IPRs exclusively for southern firms can benefit both regions by shifting southern resources from the imitation of northern goods to original southern innovation.     

NORTH–SOUTH TRADE WITH MULTINATIONAL FIRMS AND INCREASING PRODUCT VARIETY*

We present a model of North–South trade with multinational firms and increasing product variety. Firms engage in innovative R&D to develop new product varieties in the North, and foreign affiliates of multinational firms engage in adaptive R&D to learn how to produce product varieties in the South. We find that a shift to stronger protection of intellectual property rights in the South induces foreign affiliates of multinational firms to increase their R&D expenditures, results in a faster rate of technology transfer within multinational firms, and increases long‐run consumer welfare in both regions.     

Growth and Trade: The North Can Lose

Several models of growth and trade concludethat a country grows more when trading with a less developedcountry. This article shows that this conclusion depends cruciallyon the assuming homothetic preferences and/or having just twogoods with respect to learning-by-doing. The article presentsa model where the more advanced country (North) can be worseoff after trading with a less developed country (South) becausethe demand pattern of the South is biased toward Northern productswith less learning-by-doing potential. Trade can worsen the welfareif the South is large with respect to the North and/or the preferencefor low-technology goods is high; necessary conditions are thatthe preferences are nonhomotheticity and that the North exportsat least two types of goods. In this context, the article studiesthe welfare of North and South, separating the static from thedynamic gains from trade.     

Skill distribution and income disparity in a North‐South trade model

Abstract. What are the impacts of free trade agreement on the welfare of different types of workers in a developed country? What is the impact of free trade on a developed country's income disparity? What is the effect of free trade on the skill distribution of a developed country? The objective of this paper is to address the above questions in a two‐sector general‐equilibrium North‐South trade model in which both countries produce one final good and one high‐tech intermediate input. The final good is produced with the use of a high‐tech intermediate input and unskilled workers. Horizontally differentiated skilled workers produce the high‐tech intermediate input. Each country is populated by a continuum of unskilled workers with differential potential ability. Workers in the North and South can acquire skills by investment in training or education. Thus, skill distribution in the North and South is determined endogenously in the model through a self‐selection process. I characterize two different types of equilibria: a closed‐economy equilibrium without trade and a free trade equilibrium. Then, I investigate the impact of free trade, in the presence of training costs, on the skill distribution within each country, income disparity, and social welfare. JEL classification: D63, F10, J31     

Vertical specialization in North–South trade: Industrial relocation,wage and welfare

This paper presents a North–South trade model with vertically linked industries and examines how declining costs of trade across stages of production encourage vertical specialization and affect wages and welfare. As trade costs fall below a threshold, the production of all final goods relocates to the South and vertical specialization emerges. In some industries, production of intermediate goods also relocates against comparative costs because of benefits of co‐location, and further declines in trade costs lead to reshoring. A country may temporarily lose from falling trade costs, but both countries can be better off after trade costs fall sufficiently.     

R&D policy with layers of economic integration

This paper examines whether the optimal unilateral R&D policy for an open economy is a subsidy or a tax. It constructs a general equilibrium model with three successive layers of international integration: (a) trade in goods, (b) trade in technologies with international R&D spillovers and (c) internationally-coordinated R&D policy. Trade in technologies introduces the possibility that an R&D subsidy will have such strong, negative terms-of-trade effects that it harms domestic welfare. Numerical simulations of the OECD show this is a possibility for the US and Japan. With international R&D spillovers a domestic R&D subsidy may reduce domestic innovation.     

International Transmission of Government Spending,Monopolistic Competition and North-South Trade

This paper utilises a North–South general equilibrium model where South exports an intermediate good to North in exchange for differentiated goods. The model is used to examine international transmission of government spending and its welfare implications. It is shown that an increase in government spending in North (South) can increase (decrease) the number of differentiated goods produced, thereby decreasing (increasing) the degree of monopoly power in North. Furthermore an increase in government spending in South can decrease the welfare North, but the impact of an increase in government spending in North the welfare of South cannot be unambiguously determined. [F11, H41]     

HOW THE GLOBALIZATION OF R&D COMPETITION AFFECTS TRADE AND GROWTH

The implications of international R&D competition on trade and growth are investigated. The model is one in which a separate R&D sector competes with the manufacturing sector to secure human capital, and technology is licensed to manufacturers by the winner of a pre-emptive R&D competition. The results show that globalization of R&D competition leads to trade between countries (even identical countries), because the result of competition leads to a reallocation of human capital between sectors. The winning country exports technology and traditional goods, while the loser exports manufactured goods. Globalization with indiscriminate technology licensing increases the world's economic growth rate.     

Do South–South preferential trade agreements undermine the prospects for multilateral free trade?

Due to trade diversion, there have been concerns expressed over the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that include South countries. In this paper, we compare welfare across different geographic configurations of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) and examine their implications for the stability of multilateral free trade. While North–North PTAs do tend to yield higher global welfare than South–South PTAs, a single South–South FTA may make free trade more sustainable than any other single agreement. With pre‐existing North–North agreements and a large enough cost asymmetry between regions, an additional South member or a new South–South agreement always makes free trade harder to sustain.     

On the Growth and Welfare Effects of Defense R&D

In the United States, defense R&D share of GDP has decreased significantly since 1960. To analyze the implications on growth and welfare, we develop an R&D‐based growth model that features the commonly discussed crowding‐out and spillover effects of defense R&D on civilian R&D. The model also captures the effects of defense technology on (a) national security resembling consumption‐type public goods and (b) aggregate productivity via the spin‐off effect resembling productive public goods. In this framework, economic growth is driven by market‐based civilian R&D as in standard R&D‐based growth models and government‐financed public goods (i.e., defense R&D) as in Barro (1990). We find that defense R&D has an inverted‐U effect on growth, and the growth‐maximizing level of defense R&D is increasing in the spillover and spin‐off effects. As for the welfare‐maximizing level of defense R&D, it is increasing in the security‐enhancing effect of defense technology, and there exists a critical degree of this security‐enhancing effect below (above) which the welfare‐maximizing level is below (above) the growth‐maximizing level.     

Wage bargaining,trade and growth

We construct a North-South product-cycle model of trade with fully-endogenous growth and union wage bargaining. Economic growth is driven by Northern entrepreneurs who conduct R&D to innovate higher quality products. Northern production technologies can leak to the South upon successful imitation. The North has two sectors: a tradable industrial goods sector (manufacturing) where wages are determined via a bargaining process and a non-tradable sector (services) where wages are flexible. The South has only a tradable industrial goods sector where wages are flexible.We find that unilateral Northern trade liberalization, in the form of lower Northern tariffs on industrial goods, increases the rate of innovation but decreases both the bargained wage in the industrial sector and the flexible wage in the service sector. The wage effects are relative to the Southern wage rate. We also consider a variant of the model with Northern unemployment, driven by a binding minimum wage in the non-tradable service sector. In this case, Northern tariff cuts decrease the innovation rate and the bargained wage rate. In addition, the Northern unemployment rate increases. The model thus highlights the role of labor market institutions in determining the growth and labor market effects of tariff reductions. We also study the effects of unilateral Southern trade liberalization.     

Strategic R&D Commitment and the Gains from Trade

This paper examines how trade liberalization affects innovation, profits and welfare in a model of reciprocal markets when firms pre‐commit to research and development (R&D). We establish that the equilibrium is not always unique and show that, with trade, R&D commitment leads to higher levels of innovation, lower profits, higher consumer surplus and higher welfare than when R&D is chosen simultaneously to output levels. Furthermore, if the effectiveness of R&D is sufficiently high, trade always yields higher welfare than autarky, implying that R&D commitment may significantly enhance the welfare gains from trade liberalization.     

Competing engines of growth: Innovation and standardization

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes the form of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers. Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these new goods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlights a number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth and a potential barrier to it. As a result, growth is an inverse U-shaped function of the standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growth and welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal protection of intellectual property rights affecting the cost of standardization vary with the skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that, depending on how competition between innovating and standardizing firms is modelled and on parameter values, a new type of multiplicity of equilibria may arise. Finally, we study the implications of our model for the skill premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North–South trade to intellectual property rights protection.     

Franchise fee,contract bargaining,and economic growth

This paper combines the industrial organization (IO) theory and the R&D-based endogenous growth theory in a model of a successive imperfect competitive economy. The current study assumes that firms between upstream and downstream industries bargain over both the price of intermediate goods and the franchise fee. Findings show that the intermediate goods firm with a R&D sector charges the price equal to the marginal cost. Economic rent may also be partly transferred into the franchise fee determined by the relative bargaining power. In particular, the traditional double marginalization result, such as in Spengler (1950), does not take place here due to the above-mentioned bargaining scheme. Finally, this work shows that final goods firms in vertically linked industries play an important role in an economic growth model. The more bargaining power the final goods firms have (or the more returns to specialization upstream firms have, or the less substitution elasticity the final goods have), the more the economy grows. However, the consumer preference for diversity seemingly does not affect economic growth rate.     

Increased Input Supplies,Government Size,Welfare and Trade in the Presence of Increasing Returns

This paper examines the impact of exogenous changes in the supply of primary factors of production on the relative size of government and welfare in the context of a model where increasing returns are present in the production of an intermediate good. It is shown that an increase in the supply of labor (capital) increases the relative size of government if the share of labor is large (small) in the public sector as compared to the private sector. An increase in the supply of capital increases welfare but the impact of an increase in the supply of labor cannot be unambiguously determined. In the context of a North-South model, the paper also considers the pattern of trade. It is shown that North will export capital-intensive intermediate goods to the South. Received September 13, 2001; revised version received June 1, 2002 Published online: February 17, 2003 I am indebted to Professor Bob Catley and two anonymous referees for invaluable comments and suggestions. However, responsibility of any remaining errors or omissions is mine alone.     

Trade and the Transmission of Technology

This paper integrates earlier studies on the link of productivity and research and development (R&D) in different industries of a closed economy with the more recent emphasis on R&D-driven growth and international trade in open economies. In this framework, technology in the form of product designs is transmitted to other industries, both domestically as well as internationally, through trade in differentiated intermediate goods. I present empirical results based on a new industry-level data set that covers more than 65 percent of the worlds manufacturing output and most of the worlds R&D expenditures between 1970 and 1991. The analysis considers productivity effects from R&D in the domestic industry itself, from R&D in other domestic industries, as well as in the same and other foreign industries. I estimate strong productivity effects both from own R&D spending and R&D conducted elsewhere. The contribution of R&D in the industry itself is about 50 percent in this sample. Domestic R&D in other industries is the source of 30 percent of the productivity increases, and the remaining 20 percent are due to R&D expenditures in foreign industries.     

Examination and Approval of New Patents in an Endogenous Growth Model

This study introduces the examination duration for newly developed goods into a standard R&D-based growth model. Producing such goods requires approval from an authority, and their examination incurs both cost and time. Thus, there is a lag between invention and production. This study investigates the effects of reducing the examination duration on examination backlogs (the number of newly invented goods under examination), economic growth, and welfare. We obtain an inverted-U shaped relationship between backlogs and duration, because reducing the duration decreases backlogs by accelerating the examination process, but simultaneously increases backlogs by promoting R&D and increasing the number of applications. In addition, we demonstrate that reducing the examination duration promotes economic growth. However, a rather short examination duration needs considerable resources as the examination has a higher cost. Thus, an extremely short duration hurts welfare. Our numerical analysis reveals the existence of an optimal examination duration.