FTA网络化发展中的“轮轴-辐条”模式:福利效应与中国的参与战略

由不同类型、不同规模的"轮轴—辐条"结构组成的错综复杂的FTA网络成为区域经济一体化的新模式,相关国内外文献较少从微观视角涉及这种新模式的福利效应分析。本文在一般均衡垄断竞争模型基础上,分析了"轮轴-辐条"及其扩展结构下不同地位国家的福利和FTA收益以及影响因素。结果发现:(1)轮轴国与辐条国之间存在不对称收益,轮轴国取得的福利大于辐条国,轮轴有自我强化效应;(2)辐条拓补和多轮轴-辐条结构的福利分配情况复杂,受到产品替代性、贸易互补性、市场份额以及规模报酬递增水平等共同影响;(3)从轮轴-辐条结构进化到全球自由贸易将会增加辐条国的福利和贸易额,降低轮轴国的福利和贸易额。在深入考察FTA网络的构建及其稳定性基础上,墨西哥、韩国、日本、俄罗斯及南非是优先的可选FTA合作伙伴。     

Small Hubs,Large Spokes and Overlapping Free Trade Agreements

The proliferation of overlapping free trade agreements (FTA) in recent years has led to pair‐wise hub‐and‐spokes (HAS) throughout the world. Being avid subscribers to FTAs, many countries in the Asia‐Pacific region, including the United States, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Australia, have become trade hubs to their partners who are in turn relegated to spoke status. In this paper, we question whether being a hub is welfare optimal for a small and open economy such as Singapore compared to membership in a single bilateral FTA or a multi‐member free trade zone. Within this context, we use a computable general equilibrium model to examine the welfare implications of the triangular trade relationship of the United States, Singapore and Japan. This is facilitated by the Japan–Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement, the USA–Singapore Free Trade Agreement, and a hypothetical USA–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement. The analysis is extended to incorporate ‘super‐hub’ effects, that is, the spoke countries could be trade hubs in other HAS systems. Our experiment reveals that hub status generates positive welfare gain and is the highest Singapore can get from the trade configurations considered. Meanwhile, Japan loses more than the USA when both are relegated to spoke status. These findings prove to be robust under different market structures and production technologies, deeper economic integration, ‘super‐hub’ effects, as well as uncertainty in the key model parameters and the extent of trade liberalisation shocks.     

Free trade networks

The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation game. We consider an n-country model in which (possibly asymmetric) countries trade differentiated industrial commodities. We show that if all countries are symmetric, the complete FTA network is pairwise stable and it is the unique stable network if industrial commodities are not highly substitutable. We also compare FTAs and customs unions (CUs) as to which of these two regimes facilitates global trade liberalization, noticing that unlike CUs, each signatory of an FTA can have another FTA without consent of other member countries.     

Migration,Unemployment and Trade

Using an oligopoly model of trade with asymmetric costs, we study the individual and world welfare implications of a hub and spoke trade agreement where the hub country is more efficient than spoke countries. Under a hub and spoke trade regime, the hub country can benefit at the expense of the spokes relative to free trade. Furthermore, if the hub is sufficiently efficient compared to the spokes, such a regime can yield higher global welfare than free trade. Preferential treatment of the efficient hub country in its export markets improves world welfare because it helps allocate a larger share of the world’s output to a low cost location.     

Liberalisation and Protection under Overlapping Free Trade Agreements: Dynamic Interplay between Free Trade Agreements and Investment

Two decades into the most recent wave of regionalism many of its implications remain to be fully understood. A vast literature has explored the impacts of free trade agreements (FTAs) on investment flows, but less attention has been given to how existing patterns of investment alter FTA liberalisation. It is contended here that the dynamic interplay between overlapping FTA areas and the investment sunk in them shapes governments' and firms' positions regarding further FTA liberalisation. During trade negotiations, a country may decide to exclude a sector from FTA liberalisation to prevent (concession prevention) future FTA partners from making similar demands. Concession prevention could also occur when a foreign firm, holding a dominant market position in a host country, relinquishes liberalisation demands in an FTA between host and home countries to prevent its current position being eroded if the host country grants similar (or better) concessions to competing firms from other countries in future FTAs. Conversely, investment sunk into a country's sensitive sector in the territory of partners from previous FTAs could pre‐empt (concession pre‐emption) the protectionist position of that country when it subsequently negotiates FTAs with the investment‐source countries. These arguments were tested in the negotiations around the liberalisation of the automotive industry that Thailand and Malaysia had with Japan in their respective bilateral FTAs. The distinct interaction between investment and the FTAs in which these countries participate resulted either in entrenchment of protectionism in the sector or its liberalisation across subsequent FTAs.     

Tariffs and formation of free trade agreements networks

This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) on the basis of country heterogeneity in the tariff level. We demonstrate that a country's unilateral incentive to form an FTA depends on the relative magnitudes of the (negative) market concession effect and the (positive) market expansion effect, both of which are determined by the tariff levels of the two FTA partner countries. Global welfare is maximised when all country pairs form FTAs. Two countries in equilibrium are more likely to form an FTA when their tariff gap is smaller or when their tariff levels are neither very high nor very low. This finding is robust to several extensions of the model. Our preliminary empirical analysis provides some evidence for the finding.     

Free trade agreements in a small,open country: The case of Norway

Negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) has been a high political priority for Norway. Today, it has agreements with 41 countries outside the European Union (EU)/the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), resulting in one of the world's most extensive FTA networks. FTAs cover about 10% of Norway's trade—a share likely to increase in the future. These agreements eliminate tariffs on a substantial number of traded products and have gradually become more comprehensive, covering an expanding range of non‐tariff areas. Hence, they may have trade‐promoting effects beyond tariff reductions as such. On the other hand, the non‐tariff provisions often do not go further than what has already been dealt with in other international agreements or practised domestically, so their overall effect may be limited.     

Preferential trading arrangements as strategic positioning

We analyze a three-country model of trade negotiations in which countries can form bilateral free trade areas, bilateral customs unions or a trilateral preferential trading arrangement, and can continue negotiating after reaching an agreement. In contrast to the literature on multilateral bargaining, the set of agreements can form a (nonpartitional) network, while in contrast to the network literature, players can reach multilateral agreements. Patient enough countries only reach bilateral agreements if insiders gain more than outsiders, which allows them to manipulate the status quo in subsequent negotiations. However, a hub and spoke pattern may then emerge, and insiders then dissipate the advantages of strategic positioning. We also use variants on the model to explain why a US commitment not to bargain bilaterally sustained progress at GATT negotiations, and the rarity of open access preferential trading arrangements.     

Computational Analysis of the Menu of US‐Japan Trade Policies

We have used the Michigan Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model of World Production and Trade to calculate the aggregate welfare and sectoral employment effects of the menu of US‐Japan trade policies. The menu of policies encompasses the various preferential US and Japan bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) negotiated and in process, unilateral removal of existing trade barriers and global (multilateral) free trade. The welfare impacts of the FTAs on the United States and Japan are shown to be rather small in absolute and relative terms. The sectoral employment effects are also generally small but vary across the individual sectors depending on the patterns of the bilateral liberalisation. The welfare effects on the FTA partner countries are mostly positive though generally small, but there are some indications of potentially disruptive employment shifts in some partner countries. There are indications of trade diversion and detrimental welfare effects on non‐member countries for some of the FTAs analysed. In comparison to the welfare gains from the US and Japan bilateral FTAs, the gains from both unilateral trade liberalisation by the United States, Japan and the FTA partners, and from global (multilateral) free trade are shown to be rather substantial and more uniformly positive for all countries in the global trading system. The US and Japan FTAs are based on ‘hub’ and ‘spoke’ arrangements. We show that the spokes emanate out in different and often overlapping directions, suggesting that the complex of bilateral FTAs may create distortions of the global trading system.     

Third-country effects on the formation of free trade agreements

The recent proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) has resulted in an increasingly complex network of preferential trading relationships. The economics literature has generally examined the formation of FTAs as a function of the participating countries' economic characteristics alone. In this paper, we show both theoretically and empirically that the decision to enter into an FTA is also crucially dependent on the participating countries' existing FTA relationships with third countries. Accounting for the interdependence of FTAs helps to explain a significant fraction of FTA formations that would not otherwise be predicted by countries' economic characteristics.     

Why some countries trade more,some trade less,some trade almost nothing: The effect of the governance environment on trade flows

We examine the effect of a country's governance environment on its propensity to trade. Using an updated framework of governance environment, we classify countries based on the dominant mode of governance into three types: (1) rule-based (strong public rule of law), (2) relation-based (weak rule of law and strong informal network based on private relations), and (3) family-based (absence of both public rules and private network). We then examine how different governance types affect trade patterns among 44 countries representing 89% of world trade. We find that overall, rule-based countries trade more than relation-based or family-based countries. A large positive effect on trade flows exists between two highly rule-based countries and between two relation-based countries. Any trade relationship involving a family-based country negatively affects trade flows, even between two family-based countries. Our study contributes to the trade literature by examining the effects of different types of governance environment on trade flows and more successfully explaining why some countries still trade almost nothing even after scholars and policy makers have convincingly proven that freer trade leads to higher welfare for a country.     

The effects of cross-regional free trade agreements under a vertical industry structure

This paper examines the effects of a cross-regional free trade agreement (FTA) on tariffs, welfare, and the incentives for multilateral free trade in a three-country model with a vertical industry structure. We show that the FTA induces member countries to reduce their tariffs on nonmember countries. On the other hand, a nonmember country lowers its tariff on final-good imports, but raises its tariff on intermediate-good imports. Also, the FTA makes member and nonmember countries better off. After the FTA is enacted, member and nonmember countries have an incentive to support multilateral free trade, so an FTA acts as a building block for multilateral trade liberalization.     

Third-country effects on the formation of free trade agreements

The recent proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) has resulted in an increasingly complex network of preferential trading relationships. The economics literature has generally examined the formation of FTAs as a function of the participating countries' economic characteristics alone. In this paper, we show both theoretically and empirically that the decision to enter into an FTA is also crucially dependent on the participating countries' existing FTA relationships with third countries. Accounting for the interdependence of FTAs helps to explain a significant fraction of FTA formations that would not otherwise be predicted by countries' economic characteristics.     

Multilateral,Regional and Bilateral Trade‐Policy Options for the United States and Japan

We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to simulate the economic effects on the United States, Japan, and other major trading countries/regions of the Doha Round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations and a variety of regional/bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) involving the United States and Japan. We estimate that an assumed reduction of post‐Uruguay Round tariffs and other barriers on agricultural and industrial products and services by 33 per cent in the Doha Round would increase world welfare by $686.4 billion, with gains of $164.0 billion for the United States, $132.6 billion for Japan, and significant gains for all other industrialised and developing countries/regions. If there were global free trade with all post‐Uruguay Round trade barriers completely removed, world welfare would increase by $2.1 trillion, with gains of $497.0 billion (5.5 per cent of GNP) for the United States and $401.9 billion (6.2 per cent of GNP) for Japan. Regional agreements such as an APEC FTA, an ASEAN Plus 3 FTA, and a Western Hemisphere FTA would increase global and member country welfare but much less so than the Doha multilateral trade round would. Separate bilateral FTAs involving Japan with Singapore, Mexico, Chile and Korea, and the United States with Chile, Singapore and Korea would have positive, though generally small, welfare effects on the partner countries, but potentially disruptive sectoral employment shifts in some countries. There would be trade diversion and detrimental welfare effects on some non‐member countries for both the regional and bilateral FTAs analysed. The welfare gains from multilateral trade liberalisation are therefore considerably greater than the gains from preferential trading arrangements and more uniformly positive for all countries.     

Trade-diverting free trade agreements,external tariffs,and feasibility

There has been a proliferation of preferential trade agreements within the last two decades. This paper analyzes the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on external tariffs in small economies where protection decisions are made politically. Our model determines tariff rates endogenously instead of assuming they are fixed during or after the formation of FTAs as commonly done in the literature. We show that when an FTA is established, the tariff rates that apply to non-members essentially decline. More importantly, we investigate the interaction between endogenous tariff determination and the feasibility of an FTA. We find that the expectation of tariff reductions under endogenous tariffs could make an otherwise feasible FTA if tariffs were fixed become infeasible. However, if domestic import-competing sectors are relatively smaller and the government places a significant weight on political contributions relative to social welfare, an FTA with endogenous tariffs may be more likely to be feasible than an FTA assumed to fix external tariffs.     

Increasing returns, multinationals and geography of preferential trade agreements

This paper uses a model of horizontal multinational enterprises to explore the relationship between transportation costs and trade policy cooperation. Tariffs have the effect of attracting foreign direct investment to the benefit of consumers in the host country. As transport costs fall, the incentive to impose tariffs falls and the benefits to cooperation rise. Thus, in a repeated game in which cooperation is limited by a self-enforcement constraint, a reduction in transport costs facilitates free trade. This logic is applied to a three-country model to examine preferential trade agreements. It is found that if any country is too distant from the others, then global free trade is not attainable. Rather, if two of the countries are within a critical distance of each other and distant from the third country, then the unique outcome is an exclusive free trade agreement between the two adjacent countries. Thus, the model predicts a strong regional bias in preferential trade agreements.     

Negotiating free trade

We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once. We show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining, and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome, leading to worldwide free trade. A model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection. Global free trade is not achieved when the political-economy motive for protection is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the model generates both “building bloc” and “stumbling bloc” effects of preferential trade agreements. In particular, we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form (a building bloc effect), and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden (a stumbling bloc effect). The analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges.     

The Impact of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment among Developed Countries

Previous studies find that a trade treaty positively impacts foreign direct investment (FDI). But does a trade treaty always have positive effects on FDI? What is the effect of bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) on bilateral FDI among developed countries? Based on the Knowledge‐Capital model, I hypothesize that bilateral FTA has negative effects on bilateral FDI in developed–developed country pairs, but positive effects in developed–developing country pairs. To test this hypothesis empirically, I conduct the within estimator, the Difference‐in‐Difference estimator and the Arellano–Bond estimator with panel data of bilateral FTA and outward FDI in 30 OECD countries and 32 non‐OECD countries between 1982 and 2005. The result supports the hypothesis. The existence of bilateral FTA decreases bilateral FDI in the OECD–OECD country pairs but increases bilateral outward FDI in the OECD–non‐OECD country pairs. The finding of negative effects of bilateral FTA on FDI is robust to different country classifications by gross national income (GNI) per capita and secondary school enrolment. Hence, the results are consistent with what Carr et al. (2001) predicts about the effects of trade cost on FDI in developed–developed country pairs and in developed–developing country pairs.     

Trade policy of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign lobbying

This paper studies the effect of foreign lobbies on trade policy of a country which is a member of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It uses a monopolistically competitive political economy model in which the government determines external tariffs endogenously. The effect of foreign lobbying under the FTA is examined empirically using Canadian industry-level trade data that allow differentiating of lobby groups by the country of origin. The analysis suggests that the presence of foreign lobbying has a significant effect on the domestic trade policy. The heterogeneity of foreign lobbies is also important: the presence of an organized lobbying group in an FTA partner country tends to raise trade barriers while an organized lobbying group of exporters from outside of the FTA is associated with less protection.     

中国自贸区战略实施的现状、效果、趋势及未来策略

随着全球经贸规则的加速重构,我国自贸协定的谈判和签署步伐明显加快,且签署协定的开放水平不断提升,协定实施对双边贸易也产生了显著的促进效果。未来,中国的自贸协定谈判将呈现出覆盖范围更广、开放层次更高、协定对象向重点国家和地区突破的态势。为了实现"形成覆盖全球的高标准自贸区网络"的目标,我国应通过积极参与构建超大型自贸区、将自贸区网络建设与"一带一路"倡议相结合、深化自身改革提供制度支撑、综合考量宏观收益开展自贸谈判、设计兼具稳定性和灵活性的自贸协定"范式"等策略来推进自贸区建设。