Early claiming of social security benefits and labour supply behaviour of older Americans

The labour supply incentives provided by the early retirement rules of the United States Social Security Old Age benefits program are of growing importance as the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) increases to 67 and the labour force participation of older Americans starts to increase. These incentives allow individuals who claim benefits before the NRA but continue to work, or return to the labour force, to increase their future rate of benefit pay by having benefits withheld. Since the adjustment of the benefit rate takes place only after the NRA is reached, benefits received before the NRA can become actuarially unfair for those who continue to work after claiming. Consistent with these incentives, estimates from bivariate models of the monthly labour force exit and claiming hazards using data from the Health and Retirement Study indicate that early claimers who do not withdraw from the labour force around the time they claim are increasingly likely to stay in the labour force.     

Public Pension Benefits Claiming Behaviour: new Evidence from the Japanese Study on Ageing and Retirement

The present study explores public pension claiming behaviour among the Japanese elderly. First, we perform financial simulations, estimate expected utility and depict the typical patterns of pension benefits over a lifecycle. We show that a beneficiary's optimal retirement age depends on that beneficiary's mortality risk, discount rate, initial wealth and risk attitude. Second, we use individual‐level data from the Japanese Study on Aging and Retirement (JSTAR) to empirically examine the determinants of claim timing. We find evidence that most of the factors examined in the simulation are, indeed, significantly associated with early claiming among wage earners of pension benefits.     

QUANTIFYING THE LAFFER CURVE ON THE CONTINUED ACTIVITY TAX IN A DYNASTIC FRAMEWORK*

It is argued that the tax on continued activity should be removed by implementing actuarially fair schemes. However, these schemes cannot fund the expected Social Security (SS) deficit. This article proposes to give individuals a fraction of the actuarially fair incentives in the case of postponed retirement. SS faces a trade‐off between giving enough incentives to make individuals delay retirement and giving little increase in pensions in order to help finance its expected deficit. This trade‐off is captured by a Laffer curve. Finally, when the SS system aims to maximize welfare, the optimal tax on postponed retirement is still strictly positive.     

Do pensions foster education? An empirical perspective

The paper examines the effect of population ageing on public education spending. On the one hand, ageing is expected to have a negative effect on education, as an increasing number of retirees results in ‘intergenerational conflict’ and, hence, the condemnation of education expenditure. On the other hand, ageing, in combination with pay-as-you-go pension systems, offers incentives for the working-age generation to invest in the public education of the young in order to ‘reap’ the benefits (that is, higher income tax/contributions) of their greater future productivity. Empirical evidence derived from the application of a fixed effects approach to panel data for OECD countries shows that the increasing share of elderly people has a non-linear effect on education spending. This indicates a certain degree of intergenerational conflict. Nevertheless, we find that future population ageing, which reinforces the mechanism linking public education and pensions, reflects positively on education expenditure. Furthermore, by disaggregating total education expenditure by educational levels, we observe that this effect is led by levels of non-compulsory education, probably as a reflection of the direct connection to labor productivity.     

Employer pay policies, public transfers and the retirement decisions of men and women in Denmark

The empirical retirement literature measures individual responses to variations in income flows due to public transfers, private individual or employer-provided pensions. We estimate a model accounting for the incentive effects from these sources. A dynamic structural model is extended to allow both individual and employer heterogeneity. This is applied to a Danish matched panel of workers and establishments, spanning a period of reforms to a public early retirement programme. Employer-specific compensation is found to be an important determinant of work and retirement income flows. Employer effects on retirement age are only found among sub-samples where access to public transfers is limited.     

An inter-temporal general equilibrium analysis of the Australian age pension means test

The Australian age pension is somewhat unusual among developed countries in that it is means tested against both the claimant’s income and assets. While means testing of age pensions facilitates the aims of directing public pensions to those senior individuals most in need and of containing pension expenditures by governments, it also has the effect of changing the incentives of individuals to work and save. This paper examines the implications of the Australian means tested age pension for incentives of individuals to save and work, for government financial commitments and for the welfare of individuals. To this end, we develop an overlapping generations model of the Australian economy that incorporates the essential features of the Australian pension, superannuation and taxation policy settings and use it to explore the implications of several hypothetical policy changes that relax the means test of the age pension. Our results confirm that the existing means-tested, age pension represents a disincentive for some older Australians to work.     

The effect of transfers on household expenditure patterns and poverty in South Africa

This paper uses household level unit record data from South Africa to examine the behavioural and welfare impacts of private and public transfers. We allow for joint endogeneity of resource variables and the expenditure shares. Our results show that crowding out of private transfers as a result of the introduction of public pensions holds only for poor households and not for the non-poor. Both private transfers and public pensions significantly reduce poverty but private transfers have a larger impact on expenditure patterns. The results also reject the hypothesis of income pooling underlying the conventional unitary model by finding that the marginal impact on expenditures are different for public pension received, private transfer received and other resources flowing into the household. The principal conclusions are robust to changes in specification.     

Gender and the social costs of claiming value: An experimental approach

This paper employs economic experiments to explore the social costs of claiming value in distributive negotiations. I use a reverse dictator game, a “Taking” game, to measure value claiming behavior and an Investment game to measure the social costs of claiming value in terms of trust offered by third parties to Takers. I observe social costs to claiming value and find that male Trustors impose higher social costs than female Trustors. Women reduce how much value they claim in the presence of social costs, but men do not. Takers anticipate this response and claim less when observed by a man.     

The future of public pensions in the OECD

Demographic changes are often presumed to put the future ofpublic pensions in jeopardy. However, public pension financesshould be sensitive to employment, wage and inequality growth.A few macroeconomic simulations show that, given modest assumptionsabout long-term employment and wage growth, the selected OECDcountries could continue to pay for public pensions. In particular,policies that can help to improve employment growth could beuseful everywhere. Obstacles to public pensions are more likelyto arise from political developments than from economic trends.     

Economic growth and stability with public pay-as-you-go pensions and private intra-family old-age insurance

This paper compares the steady-state and dynamic outcomes of two historical alternatives as a means of old-age insurance, namely, voluntary intra-family transfers from young to old members versus pay-as-you-go public pensions, in a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with children as a desirable good. We show that the shift from a private system of old-age support to public pensions increases the gross domestic product (GDP) per worker. Moreover, although in both cases the steady-state stock of capital, under myopic expectations, may be (globally) unstable depending on the size of the inter-generational transfer, we show that the existence of public pensions rather than private intra-family gifts considerably reduces the possibility of cyclical instability.     

Employee Stock Ownership and Participation in South Korea: Incidence, Productivity Effects, and Prospects

The paper examines employee stock ownership plans in South Korea. The incidence and characteristics of ESOPs in publicly traded manufacturing firms is reported. Korean employees do not participate in ESOPs either financially or in decision-making to the extent they could under the law. Evidence that tax incentives have very large effects on ESOP purchases is presented. Econometric estimates suggest that an increase in an average ESOP from 2% to 3% of total shares would lead to an increase in output of 2.6%. These results are broadly consistent with OECD countries, despite the smaller ownership shared and weaker employee decision-making participation in Korea. The policy analysis concludes that ESOPs in Korea are not suitable for pensions; that it is not in employee interests to purchase all shares through initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs); that incentives for longer stock-holding periods may be appropriate; that improvement in decision-making participation is desirable; and that changes in repayment methods could make it more attractive for employees to purchase shares.     

Is an unfunded social security system good or bad for growth? A theoretical analysis of social security systems financed by VAT

This study investigates how unfunded public pensions financed by value added tax (VAT), as discussed in Japan, affect economic growth and whether payroll tax (PT) or VAT is the more growth‐friendly tax structure for financing public pensions. We examine these issues using overlapping generations models with parental altruism and find that a public pension system financed by VAT may increase economic growth when bequests are operative. By contrast, when bequests are inoperative, public pensions hinder growth unless agents are sufficiently patient. Finally, public pensions financed by VAT are more growth‐friendly than those financed by PT.     

Public Pension Programs in Southeast Asia: An Assessment

This paper assesses public pension programs in select Southeast Asian economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam – henceforth referred to as the SEA6) and the key issues facing them. The criteria used in assessing pension systems are the philosophy of pension design, the extent of coverage, investment policies and performance, and administrative and compliance costs. The paper argues that three broad reform directions to strengthen public pensions merit consideration. The first direction is to enhance the professionalism of the existing provident and pension fund organizations, including their governance practices. The second direction is to strengthen the role of noncontributory budget‐financed pensions (e.g. social pensions). The third is to adopt a systemic perspective to pension reform that includes reforms in complementary areas (labor markets, public financial management practices, and the civil service); developing a financing‐mix of pensions; and lastly, improving effective coverage by exploring complementarities between health care and pension programs.     

Uncertain Pension Income and Household Saving

This paper investigates the relationship between household saving and pensions, and estimates both the displacement effect of pensions on private saving and the precautionary saving effect due to uncertainty in pension income. I estimate the savings equation implied by a simple life‐cycle model featuring income uncertainty using survey data for Dutch households, with subjective expectations on pension benefits and uncertainty. Exploiting exogenous variation due to pension fund performance, I find that households save significantly more due to uncertainty in pension income. Not controlling for uncertainty biases the estimated displacement effect of pensions on private savings towards zero.     

Public pensions and growth

This paper investigates the relationship between the size of an unfunded public pension system and economic growth in an overlapping generation economy, in which altruistic parents finance the education of their children and leave bequests. Unlike the existing literature, we model intergenerational altruism by assuming that children's income during adulthood is an argument of parental utility. Unfunded public pensions can promote growth when families face liquidity constraints preventing them from investing optimally in the education of their children. We consider two alternative ways of financing a public pension system, either by levying social contributions in a lump-sum manner or in proportion to labour income. We find that there is no case for unfunded public pensions in economies where bequests are operative. By contrast, there exists a growth-maximising size of the public pension system in economies where bequests are not operative and individuals are sufficiently patient.     

Social Security and Old Age Unemployment Risk with Efficient Wage Bargaining

I analyze a life‐cycle economy with old age productivity risk where wages, employment, and severance payments are set through efficient bargaining between risk averse unions and risk neutral firms. Allocations with limited union membership are second‐best inefficient as they generate too little labor supply in young age, too much consumption before retirement, too little employment of older workers (early retirement), and too little insurance against old age unemployment. Providing public transfers to early retirees (disability benefits or early pensions) might help to increase the degree of risk sharing at the cost of lower old age employment. Depending on whether absolute risk aversion is increasing or decreasing in consumption, these policies might or might not produce efficiency gains at equilibrium.     

The economic effects of constitutions: do budget institutions make forms of government more alike?

According to an influential theoretical argument, presidential systems tend to present smaller governments relative to parliamentary countries because the separation between those who decide the size of the fiscal purse and those who allocate it creates incentives for lower public expenditures. In practice, however, presidential and parliamentary countries come in many forms. In particular, variation in procedural rules that assign budget prerogatives across the popular branches of government may affect the underlying incentives that differentiate these types of regimes in terms of fiscal outcomes. More specifically, we argue that more hierarchical rules that concentrate budgetary power in the executive relative to the legislature do not only reduce the extent of the common pool problem but also limit the degree of separation of powers, which may have a countervailing effect. Consequently, the effect of the form of government on public expenditures is conditional on specific procedural rules. We test this hypothesis on a broad cross-section of countries and find that presidentialism has a negative impact on government size only when executive discretion in the budget process is low (that is, in a context of separation of powers). However, the negative effect of presidentialism on expenditures vanishes when the executive’s discretion over the budget process is higher. This result, in addition to highlighting that not all budget institutions have the same effect on incentives and outcomes, points out how important it is to go beyond broad characterizations of political institutions for explaining policy outcomes, and more generally, for moving forward the research agenda in constitutional political economy.     

Fewer Fish for Higher Profits? Price Response and Economic Incentives in Global Tuna Fisheries Management

This paper evaluates industry-wide economic incentives arising from changes in product prices in an industry exploiting a common renewable resource (tropical tunas) that is regulated via output limits. Changes in prices alter economic incentives by affecting revenues, profits, conservation, and nonmarket public benefits. Economic incentives in industries exploiting common resources have been examined from multiple angles. However, industry level variation in market prices arising from changes in public regulation has not been explored. We analyse the impact on economic incentives due to changes in output limits and market prices through estimation of ex-vessel price and scale flexibilities for imported skipjack and yellowfin in Thailand’s cannery market. The unitary scale flexibility, estimated from the General Synthetic Inverse Demand Systems, indicates no loss in revenue and even potential profit increases resulting from lower harvest levels that could arise from lower catch limits. However, for a revenue neutral or positive outcome to be achieved, the three inter-governmental tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, which manage the majority of the yellowfin and skipjack tuna in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, would have to coordinate multilaterally to set the catch limits for both species.     

Long-term unemployment, social assistance and labor market policies in Romania

Long-term unemployment in Romania has grown in both absolute and relative terms in the last few years, leading to increased expenditures, both absolutely and in relation to unemployment benefits, for the support allowance and social assistance programs and for pensions to labor force drop-outs. The paper uses a variety of data sources, including registration information, labor force surveys, and our own survey of registered unemployed (SRU) to describe these trends in the characteristics of Romanian unemployment and to examine differences across unemployment benefit (UB), short-term and long-term support allowance (SA) recipients. We employ the data to estimate the transition flow probability from the UB to the SA program; discuss the work incentives, income maintenance effects, and public costliness of the labor market and social insurance (including pension and disability) policies; and investigate the effects of the policies and of other characteristics of the unemployed and the areas where they live on the hazard for the escape rate from unemployment for UB and SA recipients separately.     

Bringing economic opportunity into line with environmental influence: A discussion on the Coase theorem and the Porter and van der Linde hypothesis

Environmental concerns and tightened environmental policy parameters have been associated with the notion of additional costs of compliance rather than with innovation and sustainability. The contrary, has also been suggested, claiming that strict environmental legislation merely serves as a catalyst for firms to retain obvious economic and environmental mutual gains–so called win–wins–laying around waiting to be collected. Such implications can be seen from the Porter and van der Linde writings, heavily criticised by Palmer et al. as being built on faulty examples. This paper supports that conclusion and uses property rights and transactions costs theories to find private incentives to explore the win–wins for those actors who have the largest potentials to diminish the pressure on our environment. By applying the Coase theorem, emphasising transaction costs and property rights, this paper argues that strong public support is needed to create private incentives for exploring economic and environmental win–win innovations. The public support suggested is to (A) extend producer responsibilities–where the same costs which may be neglected by the end consumers will, if transferred to the design owner, be viewed as a production cost–and to (B) enforce environmental public procurement. Both may be combined with a support to (C) actors (such as non-governmental organisations and consumer agencies) positioning themselves as information bridges by informing the consumers. The negative effects of asymmetric information among actors can, thereby, be diminished as well as the low interest to primarily care for the environment among common consumers.