The globalisation–welfare state nexus: Evidence from Asia

How globalisation influences social expenditure has been examined for industrialised countries. Globalisation has often been shown to be positively associated with social expenditure in established industrialised countries, a finding that corroborates the compensation hypothesis. Scholars have focused on industrialised countries, because social expenditure is difficult to measure in developing countries. I use new data on social expenditure for Asian non‐OECD countries. Globalisation is measured by the new KOF Globalisation Index. My results do not suggest that globalisation influenced social expenditures in Asia. Neither do the results suggest that the nexus between globalisation and social expenditures varied across high‐income countries, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, and lower‐income Asian countries or across Asian regions. It is conceivable that Asian citizens did not demand increasing social support when globalisation proceeded rapidly because they enjoyed family and other private assistance. Asian countries also have weaker tax and labour market institutions than OECD countries and have therefore more difficulties in increasing social expenditure.     

The Effect of Government Ideology on an Exchange Rate Regime: Some International Evidence

This paper comprehensively investigates the effect of government ideology on the type of exchange rate regime that a country implements via multinomial logit and multinomial probit models for 147 countries in the period 1974–2009. Our results clearly indicate that a left‐wing government increases the likelihood that a country implements a flexible regime in the classifications of exchange rate regimes. Nevertheless, evidence is weaker when using the de jure IMF course classification, which is set up by Ilzetzki et al. ( 2008 ). In a deeper investigation, we find that left‐wing governments are more likely to choose a flexible regime relative to a fixed one in our sample of OECD, non‐OECD and non‐Eurozone countries, as the impacts from government ideology on the determinant of the choice of exchange rate regime in Eurozone countries disappear. More importantly, we present many explanations for exchange rate regime choices when macroeconomic conditions, political constraints and institutions impact the choice of exchange rate regime.     

The Evidence on Globalisation

Globalisation is blamed for many socioeconomic shortcomings. I discuss the consequences of globalisation by surveying the empirical globalisation literature. My focus is on the KOF indices of globalisation that have been used in more than 100 studies. Early studies using the KOF index reported correlations between globalisation and several outcome variables. Studies published more recently identify causal effects. The evidence shows that globalisation has spurred economic growth, promoted gender equality and improved human rights. Moreover, globalisation did not erode welfare state activities, did not have any significant effect on labour market interaction and hardly influenced market deregulation. It increased, however, within‐country income inequality. The consequences of globalisation thus turn out to be overall much more favourable than often conjectured in the public discourse.     

Growth is (really) good for the (really) rich

This paper analyses the relationship between mean income and the income of the rich. Our methodology closely follows that of Dollar and Kraay (Journal of Economic Growth, 2002, 7, 195), but instead of looking at the bottom of the distribution, we focus on the top. We use panel data from the World Top Incomes database, which collects top income data from several countries using tax returns as the raw source. We define the “rich” as earners in the top 10%, 1%, 0.1% and 0.01% of the income distribution. Using data since 1980, we find that economic growth is good for the rich in the sense that the mean income of the top decile of the distribution grows in the same proportion as that of the whole population. However, we also find that the income of earners in the top percentile of the distribution and above grows faster than average income: therefore, economic growth is really good for the really rich. We also find that during economic downturns the average income of top earners responds proportionally less to changes in mean income than during economic expansions. Our results are consistent with the increase in inequality that has been recently observed at the top part of the distribution in many countries, and they are robust to different specifications, country samples and time observations.     

Does economic globalisation affect income inequality? A meta-analysis

A large volume of econometric literature has studied the impact of economic globalisation on income inequality around the world. However, reported econometric estimates vary substantially, which makes it difficult to draw valid conclusions. This paper presents a quantitative summary and analysis of existing estimates regarding the globalisation–inequality relationship. We use a new data set consisting of 1,254 observations from 123 primary studies. By applying meta-analysis and meta-regression methods, we obtain several main findings. First, globalisation has a (small-to-moderate) inequality-increasing effect. Second, while the effect of trade globalisation is small, financial globalisation shows a more sizeable and significantly stronger inequality-increasing impact. Third, we find an average inequality-increasing impact of globalisation in both advanced and developing countries. Fourth, education and technology moderate the impact of globalisation on income inequality.     

Globalisation and Inter‐occupational Inequality: Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries

How does globalisation affect inter‐occupational wage inequality within countries? This paper examines this by focusing on two dimensions of globalisation: openness to trade and openness to capital flows, using a relatively new data set on occupational wages. Estimates from a dynamic model for 15 OECD countries spanning the period 1983–2003 suggest that increased openness increases occupational wage inequality in poorer OECD countries as predicted by the Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model, but for the more advanced OECD countries, we find no significant effect. The absence of the expected result for the latter category can be due to a rapid increase in the supply of skilled labour, to outsourcing of skilled jobs or because changes in the trade flows are too small to have any significant effect in those countries.     

Revisiting the nexus between globalisation and the shadow economy: Untying the influences of de jure versus de facto globalisation

This paper examines the relationship between globalisation and the size of the shadow economy, focusing on the differential effects of de jure and de facto globalisation. Using panel data on over 120 countries from 1991 to 2017, the results suggest that globalisation reduces the prevalence of the shadow economy. Furthermore, after differentiating between de jure and de facto globalisation, we find that both de facto and de jure globalisation are effective in curbing the spread of the shadow economy, with de jure globalisation showing a marginally larger impact. However, once we disaggregate the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries, the results show that it is mainly the OECD countries driving this result while the influence of globalisation is statistically insignificant in non-OECD countries. These results withstand a series of robustness analyses and offer important policy implications.     

Are Southern‐poor Countries’ Governments more Profligate than their Northern‐rich Counterparts? Fiscal Criteria and Impulse Responses

This study examines the health of public finances in different geographical regions by emphasising the discrepancies in North versus South and rich versus poor countries. The last decade's debt and deficit figures depicting a general fiscal consolidation across regions and income levels show signs of worsening. When the fiscal criteria are adjusted for cyclical factors, fiscal pressure appears in most countries since the end of the 1990s, but has been more persistent in poor countries, and in Asia. The dynamics of governments’ reaction to debt accumulation reveals, however, that most regions exhibit consistent anti‐debt policies to various degrees. The exception is the Latin American and Caribbean region where results suggest a lack of debt‐fighting policies. Among income categories, rich countries generate the highest primary surpluses when confronted with debt accumulation.     

When Ethics are Compromised by Ideology: The Global Competitiveness Report

The Global Competitiveness Report raises ethical issues on multiple levels. The traditional high ranking accorded the US is largely attributable to fallacies, poor science and ideology. The ideological bias finds expression in two ways: the inclusion of indices that do not provide competitive advantage, but that fit the Anglo/US ideology; and the exclusion of indices that are known to offer competitive advantage, but that do not fit the Anglo/US ideology. This flaw is compounded by methodological problems that raise further doubt as to the reliability and validity of the survey results. The resultant false high ranking of the US, a strong proponent of Anglo/US capitalism, pseudo-legitimizes the propensity of US-dominated institutions and entities to persuade, coerce and, in the worst-case force other countries and their constituents to adopt Anglo/US practices and behaviours. This is ethically reprehensible because research shows that these practices and behaviours, when compared with other approaches, are sub-optimal in the results they produce for individuals, corporations and nations. The report also unjustly and unnecessarily stigmatizes entire groups of countries with little conceivable benefit to anyone. Given the report’s gravitas through the profound global influence it exerts on the decisions of top government and business leaders, these are serious ethical and economic issues.     

Globalisation and Corruption,Revisited

This paper presents new empirical evidence on the determinants of corruption, focussing on the role of globalisation and inequality. The estimates for a panel of 102 countries over the period 1995–2005 point to three main results: (i) Detection technologies, reflected in a high level of development, human capital and political rights reduce corruption, whereas natural resource rents increase corruption; (ii) Globalisation (in terms of both trade and financial openness) has a negative effect on corruption, which is more pronounced in developing countries; (iii) Inequality increases corruption, and once the role of inequality is accounted for, the impact of globalisation on corruption is halved. In line with recent theory, this suggests that globalisation – besides reducing corruption through enhanced competition – affects corruption also by reducing inequality.     

Agricultural Liberalisation and the Least Developed Countries: Six Fallacies

Today, agriculture remains the most distorted sector of the world economy. Therefore, agricultural liberalisation in the Doha negotiations is rightly the top priority. But the public‐policy discourse on the subject remains fogged by a number of fallacies. These fallacies probably originated with the leadership of the World Bank but have now been embraced by the IMF, OECD, Oxfam and the leading academic critics of globalisation. The paper identifies six fallacies and offers evidence and analysis to debunk them: (1) Agricultural border protection and subsidies are largely a developed‐country phenomenon. (2) Developed‐country agricultural subsidies and protection hurt the poorest developing countries most. (3) Developed‐country subsidies and protection hurt the poor, rural households in the poorest countries. (4) Developed‐country agricultural protection and subsidies constitute the principal barrier to the development of the poorest developing countries. (5) Agricultural protection reflects double standard and hypocrisy on the part of the developed countries. (6) What the donor countries give with one hand (aid), they take away with the other (farm subsidies).     

Globalisation,Women's Economic Rights and Forced Labour

Globalisation critics are concerned that increased trade openness and foreign direct investment exacerbate existing economic disadvantages of women and foster conditions for forced labour. Defenders of globalisation argue instead that as countries become more open and competition intensifies, discrimination against any group, including women, becomes more difficult to sustain and is therefore likely to recede. The same is argued with respect to forced labour. This article puts these competing claims to an empirical test. We find that countries that are more open to trade provide better economic rights to women and have a lower incidence of forced labour. This effect holds in a global sample as well as in a developing country sub‐sample and holds also when potential feedback effects are controlled via instrumental variable regression. The extent of an economy's ‘penetration’ by foreign direct investment by and large has no statistically significant impact. Globalisation might weaken the general bargaining position of labour such that outcome‐related labour standards might suffer. However, being more open toward trade is likely to promote rather than hinder the realisation of two labour rights considered as core or fundamental by the International Labour Organisation, namely the elimination of economic discrimination and of forced labour.     

Has Globalisation Affected Collective Bargaining? An Empirical Test, 1980–2009

We investigate whether globalisation has affected the nature of collective bargaining in OECD and emerging countries. The main innovations over the existing empirical literature are (i) the consideration of three distinct aspects of collective bargaining (union density, decentralised bargaining and the extent of government intervention), (ii) the reliance on a sample with a larger cross‐sectional and time dimension (44 countries from 1980 to 2009), and (iii) the application of a more appropriate empirical methodology (dynamic panel data models). We find that globalisation, on average, depresses unionisation but neither affects the degree of decentralisation nor government intervention in collective bargaining. We also uncover significant heterogeneity effects, both across countries and over time.     

Why Do Governments Privatize Abroad?

Privatization through global equity market placement has largely contributed to financial market development and integration. Despite the relevance of the fact, the reasons underlying governments' choice to sell shares of privatized companies abroad are still poorly understood. This paper presents new evidence for a sample of 233 share issue privatizations in 20 OECD countries, showing that redistribution concerns and the objective of domestic financial market development make domestic privatization more likely. However, if budget constraints are binding, governments tend to sell abroad a larger quantity of shares, particularly when corporate governance at home is weak.     

Labour Market Institutions and Household Consumption Insurance within OECD Countries

This paper tests empirically whether the effect of idiosyncratic income shocks on aggregate consumption depends on institutional features of national labour markets. The results show that, in a sample of 15 OECD countries, institutional heterogeneity is a significant determinant of the response of household consumption to country‐specific income shocks. This is consistent with the idea that institutionally provided social insurance may help increase income stability when people differ in their ability to access financial markets and smooth consumption fluctuations.     

Conflict Resolution and Social Protection in an Era of Globalisation: External Dimensions to Europe's Social Policy

Globalisation has marginalised many nations in the South, there are systematic mechanisms via which this occurs. It has also raised inequality between nations, and polarised the world into rich and poor nations. Accompanying international economic marginalisation, a simultaneous growth in violent internal conflict has taken place in developing countries. From both the standpoint of common humanity and security considerations, the marginalising and unequalising effects of globalisation need to be abated via measures to protect the vulnerable. This will also help to stem the tide of internal conflict in the developing world. In this connection Europe, along with its policies and interventions, can be of value.     

Inter-country distancing,globalisation and the coronavirus pandemic

Originating in China, the coronavirus has reached the world at different speeds and levels of strength. This paper provides an initial understanding of some driving factors and their consequences. Since transmission requires people, the human factor behind globalisation is essential. Globalisation, a major force behind global well-being and equality, is highly associated with this factor. The analysis investigates the impact globalisation has on the speed of initial transmission to a country and on the scale of initial infections in the context of other driving factors. Our cross-country analysis finds that measures of globalisation are positively related to the spread of the virus, both in speed and in scale. However, the study also finds that globalised countries are better equipped to keep fatality rates low. The conclusion is not to reduce globalisation to avoid pandemics, but to better monitor the human factor at the outbreak and mobilise collaboration forces to curtail diseases.     

Grappling with Globalisation: Challenges for Economic Governance

This paper examines the key domestic institutional challenges posed by globalisation in terms of the following questions: how does economic globalisation differ from other types of economic integration, what is its impact on the extant national institutions of economic governance, what institutional innovations are required to cope with the challenges, and how can institutional change be made politically feasible? It identifies three perspectives on how national governments may respond – retreat, hold fort, or rearticulate. It concludes that though governments need to devise policies to attract MNEs, indulging in races‐to the‐bottom is not the only route, perhaps not even a desirable route. Second, to attract FDI, governments must afford labor flexibility. How they actually implement it will vary within and across countries, depending on the capacities and the willingness of governments to undertake institutional reform. Labour flexibility can be made politically feasible by increasing the levels of social insurance to protect displaced labour and by instituting programmes that increase their skills and employability.     

Three decades of globalisation: Which countries won,which lost?

The world average exports-to-GDP ratio increased from 17% in 1985 to 27% in 2015. Hence, world exports have grown much faster than world GDP. However, despite this overall trade integration, which is a key aspect of globalisation, the exports-to-GDP ratios have declined for 29 of the 118 countries with such data from 1985 to 2015. Some countries have been driving globalisation, while others have become marginalised. This paper examines three decades of globalisation to shed some light upon which countries might be considered winners and which countries might be considered losers of globalisation. After summarising the evolution of income and income per capita, we examine the evolution of exports and net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Contradictory to previous decades, we show there are now many countries from all income groups that have either experienced marginalisation or been driving globalisation. We then use novel regression analysis to review the robustness of generally accepted drivers of globalisation and marginalisation, with education and macroeconomic stability being the two most robust determinants.