Real Output Co‐movements in East Asia: Any Evidence for a Monetary Union?

The East Asian region has experienced astonishing economic growth and integration over the past few decades. It is generally believed that a high degree of integration in the region would greatly shape the economic structure of each individual economy and has direct implications for the effectiveness of domestic stabilisation policy and policy coordination. This paper empirically examines the feasibility of forming a monetary union in East Asia by assessing the real output co‐movements among these economies. As suggested by the optimum currency area (OCA) theory that losing monetary independence would be the major cost for adopting a common currency, it would be less costly for the economies to form a monetary union if the business cycles are synchronised across countries. The cointegration test and the Vahid and Engle (1993 ) test for common business cycles are conducted to examine their long‐run relationship and short‐run interactions in real outputs, respectively. Our study found that some pair countries in the region share both the long‐run and short‐run synchronous movements of the real outputs. In particular, the short‐run common business cycles are found in some pairs of ASEAN economies consisting of Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia, and in the Northeast Asian region consisting of Hong Kong, Korea and Mainland China, as well as between Japan and Taiwan. These findings have important implications for the economies in terms of adjustment costs when considering the adoption of a monetary union.     

Financial versus Monetary Mercantilism: Long‐run View of Large International Reserves Hoarding

The sizeable hoarding of international reserves by several East Asian countries has been frequently attributed to a modern version of monetary mercantilism – hoarding international reserves in order to improve competitiveness. From a long‐run perspective, manufacturing exporters in East Asia adopted ‘financial’ mercantilism – subsidising the cost of capital – during decades of high growth. They switched to hoarding large international reserves when growth faltered, making it harder to disentangle the monetary mercantilism from the precautionary response to the heritage of past financial mercantilism. Monetary mercantilism also lowers the cost of hoarding, but may be associated with negative externalities leading to competitive hoarding. From this viewpoint, this paper makes three observations on the East Asian reserve accumulation. First, the recent large hoarding of reserves in Japan and Korea occurred in the aftermath of the growth strategy that combined export promotion and credit subsidisation (financial mercantilism). Second, whether the ultimate motive is mercantilist or precautionary, the ongoing reserve hoarding in Asia contains an element of competitive hoarding, which is likely to have negative externalities among countries involved. Finally, China's hoarding of reserves partly reflects the precaution against the financial fragility that is likely to follow the slowing of economic growth.     

Monetary autonomy in emerging market economies: The role of foreign reserves

This paper examines trends in monetary autonomy and their interactions with financial integration, currency regimes and foreign reserves for recent decades in emerging Asian and Latin American economies. Our main findings are the following: First, most emerging Asian economies have increased monetary autonomy mainly due to changes in currency regimes toward floating regimes, while emerging Latin American economies have shown mixed results on monetary autonomy. Second, in all sample economies, the accumulation of foreign reserves has contributed to retaining monetary autonomy, probably implying the role of foreign reserves as an anchor for monetary autonomy in emerging market economies.     

Foreign Exchange Reserves and Import Demand: Evidence from Latin America

This paper investigates the impact of foreign reserves, domestic real income and relative import prices on import demand for seven Latin American countries. We differentiate empirically between the short‐run and long‐run impact of reserves, income and prices on imports. The paper has three main results. First, we show that there exists a unique long‐run relationship among real imports, real income, relative import prices and real foreign exchange reserves for all seven countries. Second, we find that increases in foreign exchange reserves exert a significant positive effect on import demand in both the long run and the short run in all countries. However, the economic impact of foreign exchange reserves is rather small. Finally, we find that the long‐ and short‐run impact of real domestic income on import demand is positive as well, while the effect of relative prices is negative.     

An Asian Currency Unit: Simulations for Its Effects on East Asia

An Asian currency unit (ACU) is necessary to deepen Asian financial markets and to convert national currencies into a single monetary policy. However, the experiences of the European Currency Unit and the European Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in 1992–93 have indicated the danger of the so‐called gradual approach. This study evaluates the effects of welfare should the ACU indicator become a long‐term constraint of the People's Republic of China and Japan, the big two in East Asia. Our results indicate that the constraints of countries’ own baskets (e.g. real effective exchange rates) are still better before the launch of a true single currency. That is, pegging to an ACU indicator could hardly be sustained in the long‐run if East Asian countries have not reached a consensus about a regional monetary union.     

Will the Renminbi Emerge as an International Reserve Currency?

The global reserve system can be strengthened by increasing the role of alternative currencies. A gradual evolution to a multicurrency system reduces pressure on a single reserve currency issuer from an ever‐growing balance‐of‐payments deficit. It also allows countries to better diversify their foreign exchange holdings. Given the continuing strong economic growth in the China and its growing influence on the world economy, the renminbi will likely emerge as a new international currency. However, this is contingent on the China accepting a more convertible capital account and developing an efficient financial system. Internationalising the renminbi will likely be a gradual and drawn‐out process. Simulations show that, with greater convertibility, the renminbi could gradually become an international currency within Asia and beyond – sharing from 3 to 12 per cent of international reserves by 2035.     

International reserves and the global financial crisis

This study examines whether pre-crisis international reserve accumulations, as well as exchange rate and reserve policy decisions made during the global financial crisis, can help to explain cross-country differences in post-crisis economic performance. Our approach focuses not only on the total stock of official reserves held by countries, but also on the decisions by governments to purchase or sell reserve assets during the crisis period. We introduce new data made available through the IMF Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) Reserve Template, which allow us to distinguish interest income and valuation changes in the stock of official reserves from the actively managed component of reserves. We use this novel data to gage how (and whether) reserve accumulation policies influenced the economic and financial performance of countries during and after the global crisis. Our findings support the view that higher reserve accumulations prior to the crisis are associated with higher post-crisis GDP growth.     

我国货币中性的实证研究

国际金融危机爆发以来,降低利率、增加流通中货币成了各国政府解决金融危机的共同做法,货币对于经济的积极作用再次引起人们的关注。过于宽松的货币政策能持续多久,会不会造成严重的通货膨胀,进而破坏经济的健康发展,也同样引起人们的关注。本文对我国1978-2009年的流通中货币、利率、物价指数对GDP的影响进行了实证研究,结果表明流通中货币不是实际GDP增长的格兰杰原因,货币是中性的;GDP的实际增长率是实际利率的格兰杰原因,名义利率和GDP没有因果关系;GDP和物价指数没有格兰杰因果关系,通货膨胀不能促进经济的增长。     

Can leading indicators assess country vulnerability? Evidence from the 2008–09 global financial crisis

We investigate whether leading indicators can help explain the cross-country incidence of the 2008–09 financial crisis. Rather than looking for indicators with specific relevance to the recent crisis, the selection of variables is driven by an extensive review of more than eighty papers from the previous literature on early warning indicators. Our motivation is to address suspicions that indicators found to be useful predictors in one round of crises are typically not useful to predict the next round. The review suggests that central bank reserves and past movements in the real exchange rate were the two leading indicators that had proven the most useful in explaining crisis incidence across different countries and episodes in the past. For the 2008–09 crisis, we use six different variables to measure crisis incidence: drops in GDP and industrial production, currency depreciation, stock market performance, reserve losses, and participation in an IMF program. We find that the level of reserves in 2007 appears as a consistent and statistically significant leading indicator of who got hit by the 2008–09 crisis, in line with the conclusions of the pre-2008 literature. In addition to reserves, recent real appreciation is a statistically significant predictor of devaluation and of a measure of exchange market pressure during the current crisis. We define the period of the global financial shock as running from late 2008 to early 2009, which probably explains why we find stronger results than earlier papers such as Obstfeld et al. (2009, 2010) and Rose and Spiegel (2009a,b, 2010, 2011) which use annual data.     

基于SVAR模型分析居民消费价格指数的外部冲击因素

持续高位的居民消费价格指数(以下简称CPI)使得货币与财政政策制定当局面临着很大的压力,而造成CPI高位运行的外部性因素更是给政策调控带来了很多不确定性。对于诸如人民币汇率变动、外汇储备变动以及国际市场大宗商品价格(以下简称CRBI)变动对国内通货膨胀冲击,采用结构变量自回归模型(SVAR)对CPI的外部性冲击因素进行分析,结果显示在短期内CRBI对CPI有一定的输入性影响,汇率变动有一定程度抑制作用,但长期这种作用会发生逆转;外汇储备的变动主要作用于国内货币供给,对CPI产生非常显著的正向冲击。     

US–China rivalry: The macro policy choices

Stylised representations of recent US and Chinese tax reforms, tariffs against imports and alternative Chinese monetary targeting are examined using a calibrated global macro model that embodies both trade and financial interdependencies. For both countries, unilateral capital tax relief and bilateral tariffs are shown to be ‘beggar thy neighbor’ policies. As large economies, both enjoy ‘optimal tariffs’, even bilaterally, though net outcomes are shown to depend on the allocation of revenues. Bilateral tariffs are most advantageous for the US if the additional revenue finances indirect tax relief. Once US bilateral tariffs are imposed, China is a net loser irrespective of its policy response, though a currency float is shown to cushion the effects on its GDP in the short run. Equilibria in normal form non-cooperative tariff games have the US imposing tariffs while China liberalises.     

The arrival of the Euro and its implications for Asia

The third stage of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) commenced on January 1, 1999 with the launch of the European single currency, the euro. The first round of participants comprises 11 of the 15 European Union (EU) nations, dubbed “Euroland.” The potential implications of EMU for Asia are immense. The euro's emergence as an international currency and its impact on Asia can be assessed in 3 different domains: (1) as a medium of exchange for Europe's trade with Asia; (2) as a store of value in stocks and bonds in world capital markets; and (3) as part of official foreign exchange reserves of Asian central banks. Our analysis suggests that there is potential for the euro to play a bigger role in EU-Asia trade links, which will be underpinned by the collective importance of Euroland as a much-enlarged trading and investment partner for Asia. However, in the short term at least, Asian equity markets are unlikely to benefit from significant inflows of capital from the EU as the former have been decimated by the region's financial crisis. As for Asian bond markets, rapid deterioration of sovereign ratings of countries in the region over the past 12 months would make it difficult for Asian companies to raise funds through euro-denominated debt instruments. As for official foreign exchange reserves, the bulk of Asian reserves is currently held in US dollar assets. Judging from Asian trade and debt figures, it seems unlikely that the euro would challenge the US dollar as a reserve currency any time in the near future. Nevertheless, in the longer term, the euro's introduction could make it easier for Asian central banks to diversify their reserves from the greenback to the euro. The internationalization of the euro is likely to happen only gradually, whether in terms of international trade denomination and settlement, denominating international financial assets, or as a reserve currency. Since the magnitude of shock that the single European currency would bring to the international monetary system is still unknown, only very tentative conclusions for the impact on Asian countries can be drawn at this point in time.     

The Complementary Nature Between Technological Progress and Capital Accumulation in India's Long‐Run Growth Transitions

This article develops a multiple‐regime, learning‐by‐doing model, in which technological progress and capital accumulation are complementary factors in long‐run growth transitions. The model accurately predicts India's long‐run growth transitions over the period 1953–2007, with the first phase (1980–2002) being ‘technology’ driven and the second phase (2003–2007) capital accumulation driven. Given the complementary nature between technological progress and capital accumulation, one of the main challenges facing Indian policy makers in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis is to maintain high saving/fixed investment rates. The analysis also provides a critique of the ‘total factor productivity view’ of India's growth performance.     

后金融危机时期中国货币政策选择——基于美国QE2经济后果的分析

＂二次量化宽松政策＂（简称QE2）是美联储在国内经济提振乏力、失业率居高不下以及世界经济复苏不平衡的背景下启动的。QE2或许能够使美国走出通缩的泥潭,也有可能催生资产泡沫,酝酿新的金融危机,但却无疑给世界经济,尤其是新兴市场国家的经济继续复苏蒙上了一层阴影,全球热钱将更加泛滥,世界经济秩序将遭到破坏,各国外汇储备将进一步缩水等。对此,我国中央银行货币政策必须加强与财政政策的配合,适时调整外汇储备资产结构,扩大本币结算合作,积极应对QE2的挑战。     

Thresholds of financial development in the Euro area

We analyse the dynamics of financial development and economic growth in the Euro area as these countries went through considerably higher levels of financial development. Using a balanced panel data of 38 years from 1980 to 2018, we offer new evidence on the finance–growth nexus. We show the presence of non-linearity as there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between finance and growth in the long run. Estimating the thresholds in the finance–growth nexus, we notice a threshold effect at 74%–86% of GDP for domestic credit; 51% of GDP for stock turnover ratio; and 65% of GDP for stock market capitalisation. We notice that exceeding the threshold causes deceleration in economic growth as too much finance results in crowding out effect for productive economic activities. The panel Granger causality test results show that financial development should be associated with optimal growth performance. These findings in the Euro area provide some useful policy implications to the emerging and developing economies in designing their financial development strategies.     

The International Effects of China’s Growth,Trade and Education Booms

China’s international trade flows have increased by 500 per cent since 1992, far outstripping GDP growth. Likewise tertiary education enrolments have increased by 300 per cent. We simulate these changes using a multi‐sector growth model of the Chinese and USA economies. A decade of trade biased growth in China is found to raise USA GDP by approximately 3–4.5 percentage points and has a large impact on the demand for tertiary education in China. Despite these positive effects of growth, the results suggest that the expansion of China’s education sector per se has practically no long‐run impact on the USA economy.     

REAL CONVERGENCE AND PRICE LEVELS: LONG‐TERM TENDENCIES VERSUS SHORT‐TERM PERFORMANCE IN THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION

A cross‐country regression relating the relative price level to the relative GDP level is statistically significant and stable over time. Price and GDP levels for EU member countries tend to gravitate to that line. The conclusion that there is a shorter‐term trade‐off between fast real convergence and low inflation is unwarranted. Higher inflation is not a necessary companion of fast convergence. Giving up national currency, or pegging it to the euro, may prevent real convergence or precipitate divergence. A weak initial price level may be insufficient. While retaining national currency is not risk‐free, it allows a corrective devaluation.     

中国超额外汇储备的社会成本

依据持有1美元储备资产的社会成本等于私人部门从国外借入短期债务的成本和中央银行从其流动性资产中所获得的收益之间的差额的方法,采用EMBI利差数据计算了中国持有超额外汇储备的社会成本,约为GDP的1.5%。本文认为增加流动性的最优战略是增加储备与减少短期外债并用。     

A Framework for Assessing Global Imbalances1

Since the mid‐1990s and prior to the financial crisis external balances of systemically important economies widened significantly. This paper takes a long‐run perspective and reviews the main determinants of widening global imbalances. To this aim, we first provide a set of newly derived statistical measures: while large external imbalances are not new in economic history, their persistence, their concentration on one economy (the United States) and the specific role of emerging market economies make the present episode rather unique. Second, we argue that the observed pattern of imbalances can be mostly understood as a result of various structural changes in the global economy, which have allowed a widening trend of external positions. Three main features set the most recent period apart from past episodes of growing external imbalances: (i) the emergence of new players, in particular emerging market economies such as China and India, which are quickly catching up with the advanced economies; (ii) an unprecedented wave of financial globalisation, with more integrated global financial markets and increasing opportunities for international portfolio diversification, also characterised by considerable asymmetries in the level of market completeness across countries; and (iii) the favourable global macroeconomic and financial environment, with record high global growth rates in recent years, low financial market volatility and easy global financing conditions over a long period of time, running until the outburst of the financial crisis during the summer of 2007. These structural changes that have been supplemented by cyclical or policy‐induced factors ultimately facilitated the sudden, disorderly unwinding of global imbalances that is reflected in the current financial crisis.