License and Entry Strategies for an Outside Innovator Under Duopoly with Combination of Royalty and Fixed Fee

We consider a choice of options for an innovating firm to enter the market with or without licensing its new cost-reducing technology to an incumbent firm using a combination of royalty and fixed license fee, or to license its technology without entry. When the innovating firm licenses its technology to the incumbent firm without entry, the optimal royalty rate for the innovating firm is zero. When the innovating firm enters the market with a license, its optimal royalty rate is positive. In that case if cost functions are concave, the optimal royalty rate is one such that the incumbent firm drops out of the market with negative fixed fee, and license without entry strategy and entry with license strategy are optimal; if cost functions are strictly convex, there is an internal solution of positive optimal royalty rate with positive or negative fixed fee and entry with license strategy is optimal.     

North-South technology transfer through licensing

The incentives of Southern governments to protect intellectual property rights are examined when Northern innovating firms license technology to Southern firms in a game with asymmetric information. Southern firms may or may not be able to imitate after they license the technology, and Northern firms do not know whether the Southern firm can imitate. The form of the licensing contract and the distribution of the gains from licensing will affect the incentives of Southern countries to protect patents. Southern consumers gain from patent infringement but at the expense of Southern firms that cannot acquire licenses at the most favorable terms.     

Entry deterrence/accommodation with imperfect strategic thinking capability

Both through empirical research and laboratory experiments it has been shown that managers are heterogeneous in strategic thinking-i.e., not all the managers can accurately conjecture their competitors’ behavior and actions. In this paper, we examine the entry deterrence/accommodation strategy of an incumbent firm facing a potential entrant that may behave less strategically than the incumbent in the way of conjecturing competitors’ actions and beliefs. We adapt the Cognitive Hierarchy model to capture this heterogeneity among the managers of the entrant firm and the incumbent firm. Surprisingly, we show that the incumbent can deter entry by investing in expanding the market size and the competition may increase the incumbent’s incentive to invest in market expansion. If entry does occur, the market expansion in our model also benefits entrant comparing to the case without market expansion. This feature of our result sets it apart from the standard result in the entry deterrence literature, which tends to suggest that incumbent has to either over-invest in actions harmful to entrant if entry occurs. In our model investing in expanding the market size makes the entrant to update its belief about the incumbent’s strategic thinking capability downward and thus, decreases the entrant’s expected profitability, which in turn deters entry. Our research has important implications especially for emerging markets given that the lack of management talent is a particularly severe problem among local firms in emerging markets and multinational companies pioneer in the emerging markets with great market expansion opportunities have to face the potential entry of local companies.     

Learning to export: Export growth and the destination decision of firms

I find evidence that the geographic expansion of firm exports occurs slowly over time and that a large share of export growth is due to incumbent exporters entering new destinations. New exporters enter large countries and destinations with characteristics similar to their domestic market. Less similar, distant or less developed countries are entered by firms already exporting to other destinations. I formulate a dynamic general equilibrium model to test if these patterns are due to firms learning how to export (as other recent empirical findings have suggested) or other factors considered in the literature. In this model, heterogeneous firms experience learning in the form of market entry costs that depend on export history. Using Russian firm level data, I find that learning plays a significant role in explaining the observed entry patterns, which standard trade models cannot account for.     

Tie-in contracts with downstream competition

A tie-in contract has frequently come under scrutiny for its role as an exclusionary device. A firm that is a monopolist in a primary market can utilize such contracts to exclude a more efficient rival in a secondary market. When the firms sell through competing retailers, the leveraging firm may offer tie-in contracts to the retailers inducing them to purchase both primary and secondary products entirely from it such that the rival is excluded. We examine whether such tie-in contracts are profitable for an incumbent firm under different conditions of (i) the ability to commit to prices by the upstream firms and (ii) downstream competition among the retailers. We show that when retailers compete in prices, then regardless of whether the entrant is able to commit to its own prices, an exclusionary tie-in strategy is profitable (not profitable) for the incumbent when it is able (unable) to commit to prices. However, when retailers compete in quantities, the entrant’s commitment ability does matter. Specifically, an exclusionary tie-in strategy (i) may be unprofitable for an incumbent when both upstream firms are able to commit to their prices, depending on the degree of cost advantage of the entrant; (ii) is always profitable when it alone can commit to its price; and (iii) is unprofitable when both upstream firms cannot commit to their prices. Our results extend to situations where the products are complementary or substitutes and where the retailers may be asymmetric in nature.     

The quality of innovation and the extent of the market

I present a comprehensive model of international trade in technology that considers both the demand for inventions and the supply of inventions. On the demand side, domestic and foreign firms make strategic technology adoption decisions. On the supply side, inventors compete to sell licenses for their technology to domestic and foreign firms. Countries benefit from international trade in technology because they obtain the best invention from a larger pool of inventions. International trade in technology increases the extent of the market for inventions and thereby improves the quality of innovation. Technology trade lowers prices, increases outputs, and increases the volume of trade in differentiated products. When traded products are not close substitutes, international markets for technology generate gains from trade. The results of the analysis are robust to the possibility of technology transfer either through expropriation or imitation. Protection of intellectual property rights preserves incentives for entry of inventors and improves the quality of innovation.     

Quality wars in the North

This paper investigates two stylised facts about quality wars between Northern firms and a Southern copycat firm in the North. First, due to low wage, a foreign or Southern copycat firm may enter the market of a developed economy inhabited by a high‐quality firm and a low‐quality domestic copycat. When the products of the high‐quality firm and the foreign copycat are vertically differentiated, the foreign copycat firm may choose an intermediate quality between the quality levels of domestic high‐ and low‐quality firms. In the second scenario where the products of the high‐quality firm and the foreign copycat are horizontally differentiated, the quality of the foreign copycat may surpass that of the domestic high‐quality firm. As the wage gap between the developed and developing countries widens, the foreign copycat is more likely to survive in the markets of developed economies.     

Exit and Upgrading in Response to Entry: The Case of Gasoline Retailing

Spatial competition models have established the importance of localized competition in determining competitive outcomes. However, few empirical studies attempt to determine to what extent actual local market conditions affect strategic decisions. This paper uses data provided by the acquisition of the Vancouver area Super‐Save chain of retail gasoline stations by ARCO to study the role of geographic space in competition, and the spatial response of the major competitors in the market to entry. The possibility of both accommodating and aggressive capacity responses by the major incumbent firms to entry are considered. While the empirical results show that proximity to ARCO increased the probability that a station shuts down, proximity to ARCO can explain only a limited amount of shutdown after ARCO’s entry. There is no evidence that incumbent firms used station locations and capacity changes to respond aggressively to ARCO’s entry with a spatial predation strategy.     

Towards a comprehensive model of entry timing in the ICT industry: Direct and indirect effects

We propose and contrast a model that integrates the factors influencing entry timing and the way entry timing influences firm performance, using a sample of firms that carry out international activities from the Information and Communications Technology Industry (ICT) in Spain. We found that capabilities are the main factor influencing firm performance. We also demonstrate that entry timing plays a significant mediator role in this relationship. Furthermore, we found that the utility strategy, which combines efforts in costs and differentiation, is a basic factor that explains and reinforces sustainable competitive advantages for those firms that enter early into the market. Managers need to analyse the implications of entry timing at length. In this sense, managers should evaluate if they have a suitable configuration of capabilities for entering the market successfully. They should also try to consolidate first mover advantages (FMAs), developing hybrid strategies that combine low cost and differentiation.     

Creative destruction and regional productivity growth: evidence from the Dutch manufacturing and services industries

Do firm entry and exit improve the competitiveness of regions? If so, is this a universal mechanism or is it contingent on the type of industry or region in which creative destruction takes place? This paper analyses the effect of firm entry and exit on the competitiveness of regions, as measured by total factor productivity (TFP) growth. Based on a study across 40 regions in the Netherlands over the period 1988–2002, we find that firm entry is related to productivity growth in services, but not in manufacturing. The positive impact found in services does not necessarily imply that new firms are more efficient than incumbent firms; high degrees of creative destruction may also improve the efficiency of incumbent firms. We also find that the impact of firm dynamics on regional productivity in services is higher in regions exhibiting diverse but related economic activities.     

How to protect your premium product from low-price competitors: Price,quality, or portfolio adjustment?

In a game-theoretic framework, I analyze how a brand manufacturer can thwart new entrants into its market. Three strategic options are considered, a price adjustment of the premium product, a quality adjustment of the premium product and a portfolio adjustment of adding a fighter brand. In a basic setup, I show that the incumbent's best response to entry is to choose a portfolio adjustment. If, however, the incumbent is uncertain about whether the rival firm will enter the market, a price adjustment of the premium product might be the better alternative if launching the fighter brand is associated with costs. Moreover, if technological progress improves the efficiency of product development, a combined quality and portfolio adjustment might be the best alternative for the incumbent.     

Firm Heterogeneity,Endogenous Quality,and Traded Goods Prices

A model with endogenous quality and firm heterogeneity is developed. Firms can invest in quality, and quality investment is relatively skill intensive. The model is used to account for two findings in the empirical literature on traded goods prices, lacking a formal explanation in the theoretical literature thus far. First, the model provides a theoretical explanation for Schott's (Quarterly Journal of Economics 2004, 119, 647) empirical finding that relatively skill‐abundant countries export higher priced goods. Firms in these countries invest more in quality and therefore sell higher quality, higher priced goods. Second, the opposite effects of importer market size on traded goods prices at the firm level (positive) and at the aggregate level (negative) identified in the empirical literature can be explained with the model. In a larger market, the incentive to invest in quality is larger for each firm, leading to higher firm‐level prices. Due to a selection effect, also less productive firms selling goods of lower quality can export to larger markets, implying lower aggregate prices.     

One‐Way Compatibility,Two‐Way Compatibility and Entry in Network Industries

We study the strategic choice of compatibility between two initially incompatible network goods in a two‐stage game played by an incumbent and an entrant firm. Compatibility may be achieved by means of a converter. We derive a number of results under different assumptions about the nature of the converter (one‐way vs two‐way), the existence of property rights and the possibility of side payments. With incompatibility, entry deterrence occurs for sufficiently strong network effects. In the case of a two‐way converter, which can only be supplied by the incumbent, incompatibility will result in equilibrium unless side payments are allowed and the network externalities are sufficiently low. When both firms can build a one‐way converter and there are no property rights on the necessary technical specifications, the unique equilibrium involves full compatibility. Finally, when each firm has property rights on its technical specifications, full incompatibility is observed at the equilibrium with no side payments; when these are allowed the entrant sells access to its network to the incumbent which refuses to do the same and asymmetric one‐way compatibility results in equilibrium.     

The entry‐mode decision of Chinese outward FDI: Firm resources,industry conditions,and institutional forces

How do Chinese firms make their entry‐mode decision for their outward investments? Based on the three theoretical perspectives that balance the “strategy tripod,” our study conducted empirical tests using survey data collected from outward‐investing Chinese firms. We found that the cost advantage of the investing firm and learning opportunities in the host industry have positive effects on the likelihood of a Chinese firm opting for wholly owned subsidiary against joint‐venture entry mode, while the market attractiveness of the host industry, host‐country restrictions, cultural barriers, and cognitive pressures have negative effects. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

A theory of serial entrepreneurship

The contribution of serial entrepreneurs to entrepreneurial activity is significant: in Europe, 18–30% of entrepreneurs are serial; in the US, their contribution is about one-eighth. Yet, theories of entrepreneurship and industry dynamics presume that all firms are launched by novice entrepreneurs and firm failure is synonymous with exit from entrepreneurship. We propose a theory of serial entrepreneurship in which an entrepreneur has three occupational choices: maintain his business in operation, shut it down to enter the labor market to earn an exogenous wage, or shut it down to launch a new venture while incurring a serial startup cost. In equilibrium, a high-skill entrepreneur shuts down a business of low quality to become a serial entrepreneur, launching and subsequently closing firms until a high quality business is found; a low-skill entrepreneur shuts down a business of low quality to enter the labor market, never to become a serial entrepreneur. A decrease in the wage or serial startup cost, or an increase in the startup capital, enhances the contribution of serial entrepreneurs to entrepreneurial activity and promotes new firm formation (by increasing entrepreneurship and the number of new firms that survive), but its effect on the exit rate of new firms is ambiguous. We show the model is consistent with evidence relating to the impact of an entrepreneur’s characteristics and prior experience in entrepreneurship on the survival of his firm and his entry into and survival in entrepreneurship.     

Flirting with the enemy: online competitor referral and entry-deterrence

Internet retailers often compete fiercely for consumers through expensive marketing efforts like search engine advertising, online coupons and a variety of special deals. Against this background, it is somewhat puzzling that many online retailers have recently begun referring their website visitors to their direct competitors. In this paper, using an analytical model, we examine this counterintuitive practice and posit that an entry deterrence motive can potentially explain this marketplace puzzle. Specifically, we develop a model where two incumbents compete for consumers” business while facing a potential entrant who is deciding whether to enter the market. In addition to setting the price, each incumbent firm could potentially display a referral link to its direct competitor. Our analysis reveals that when confronted with a potential entry, an incumbent may refer consumers to its competitor, intensifying the market competition that could result in shutting off the entrant. Furthermore, we show that when referral efficiency is exogenous, it is possible that in equilibrium only one incumbent refers its customers to competitor (i.e., one-way referral) or both incumbents refer their customers to each other (i.e, two-way referral). When referral efficiency is endogenous, the ex-ante symmetric incumbents may choose asymmetric referral efficiencies ex-post. We extend the model in a number of directions including making the entrant share endogenous and allowing incumbents to be asymmetric. Overall, our results indicate that firms may be motivated by entry deterrence to voluntarily refer consumers to their direct competitors even when they are paid nothing for the referral.     

Entry encouragement

In this paper, we investigate the possibility that a dominant firm will encourage rather than deter entry of a potential competitor. We find that entry can be encouraged by a dominant firm in order to induce a new entrant to resolve the demand uncertainty in a new market. We propose a specific incentive mechanism that the incumbent can use to encourage entry and find plausible circumstances under which entry encouragement is a dominant competitive strategy.INSEADInstituto de Analisis EconomicoINSEAD     

Can Mergers to Monopoly,Price Fixing,and Market‐Division Agreements Raise Welfare?

Naked market division, price fixing agreements and mergers which result in dominant positions have long been opposed by the courts and the government because of the high likelihood that they will result in a reduction in output and an increase in price. We show that the opposite may be true if the market is characterized by marketing spillovers. When marketing investment is required to educate consumers about the general capabilities or qualities of a product, marketing efforts by one producer will benefit rival producers. A theoretical model of these types of markets shows that marketing spillovers can forestall entry altogether or force incumbent firms to engage in ‘limit marketing’ that leaves the market underserved from a welfare‐maximizing perspective. Under these circumstances, market output and social welfare are potentially raised not only through horizontal agreements among competitors, but also through cost‐raising strategies and commitments to predatory behavior by incumbent firms.     

Export Premium,Self‐selection and Learning‐by‐Exporting: Evidence from Chinese Matched Firms

This study empirically focuses on examining the hypotheses of export premium (exporters are more productive than non‐exporters), selection‐into‐exporting (more productive firms are ones that tend to become exporters) and learning‐by‐exporting (new export market entrants have higher productivity growth than non‐exporters in the post‐entry period). The propensity score matching method is used to adjust for observable differences of firm characteristics between exporters and non‐exporters, allowing an adequate ‘like‐for‐like’ comparison. We also use the difference‐in‐difference matching estimator to capture the magnitude of different productivity growth between matched new export market entrants and non‐exporters in the post‐entry period up to two years. Drawing on 2,340 Chinese firms in the period 2000–02, we find evidence for export premium and self‐selection, and once the firm has entered the export market there is additional productivity growth from the learning effect, in particular in the second year after entry.     

Free in-network pricing as an entry-deterrence strategy

This paper analyzes the entry-deterring power of free in-network pricing with multiple incumbents. Free in-network pricing may deter entry since it creates network externality that intensifies competition. One may expect that a particular entry-deterrent strategy adopted by all incumbents would have more entry-deterring power than when it is adopted by some incumbents only. However, we show that when free-in network plan has entry-deterrence power with two incumbent firms, sometimes one incumbent offering free in-network plan may have more entry deterrence power than both firms offering free in-network plans. In other words, we find that an asymmetric adoption of entry-deterrence strategies by the incumbent firms may be the best for entry deterrence. This result highlights the importance of the strategic choice of the pricing plan as a function of not only the likelihood/cost of entry but also of the plan choices of other firms, and may partially explain the asymmetric strategies used by competing firms.