Trade,foreign direct investment or acquisition: Optimal entry modes for multinationals

We examine multinationals' optimal entry modes into foreign markets as a function of market size, FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs. Our results highlight why large countries are more likely to attract acquisition investment, while intermediate sized countries may be served predominantly through trade, even in the presence of high tariffs. Small countries are most likely to experience either FDI or no entry. We also show how these results vary with the competition intensity in the host country.FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs are crucial not only in determining whether to engage in FDI or trade, but they are also shown to influence the acquisition choice as trade and FDI threats influence the acquisition price. Finally, we explore the welfare implications of tariff reductions for both the local firm and the multinational and investigate political motives to impose endogenous tariffs that influence not only the welfare of a local firm, but also the entry mode of the multinational.     

Tariffs as Signals of Uncompetitiveness

In this paper, a domestic and a foreign firm compete as Cournot duopolists in the domestic market. The foreign firm has incomplete information about the costs of the domestic firm, but the domestic government and the domestic firm are completely informed. It is shown that the domestic government can use its tariff to signal about the costs of the domestic firm. In the separating equilibrium, the domestic government signals the uncompetitiveness of the domestic firm by setting a lower tariff than is optimal under complete information.     

Uniform Versus Discriminatory Tariffs

We analyze the non‐cooperative interaction between two exporting countries producing differentiated products and one importing country when governments use optimal policies to maximize welfare. The analysis includes product differentiation, asymmetric costs, and Bertrand competition. For identical exporting countries we demonstrate that the importing country always prefers a uniform tariff regime while both exporting countries prefer a discriminatory tariff regime for any degree of product differentiation. If countries are asymmetric in terms of production cost then the higher‐cost exporter always prefers the discriminatory regime but the lower‐cost exporter prefers the uniform regime if there is a significant cost differential. With cost asymmetry the announcement of a uniform tariff regime by the importer is not a credible strategy since there is an incentive to deviate to discrimination. This implies an international body can play a role in ensuring that tariff agreements are respected.     

Power in the multinational corporation in industry equilibrium

Recent theories of the multinational corporation introduce the property rights model of the firm and examine whether to integrate or outsource firm activities locally or to a foreign country. This paper focuses instead on the internal organization of the multinational corporation by examining the power allocation between headquarters and subsidiaries. We provide a framework to analyse the interaction between the decision to serve the local market by exporting or FDI, market access and the optimal mode of organization of the multinational corporation. We find that subsidiary managers are given decision power to run the firm at intermediate levels of host country competition. We then provide comparative statics on the optimal organization of the multinational corporation for changes in fixed FDI entry costs, trade costs, as well as changes in information technology.      

Trade liberalization and trade performance of environmental goods: evidence from Asia-Pacific economic cooperation members

In this article, we study the impact of trade liberalization, including reductions in both tariff and nontariff trade barriers, on environmental goods (EGs) exports. Using bilateral trade data from 20 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation members, we find that tariff reduction in an exporting country has a larger positive impact on its exports of EGs than tariff reduction in an importing country. Our results also show that a lower nontariff barrier in an importing country increases its imports of EGs. A considerable amount of heterogeneity also exists in subsample results based on countries’ income levels.     

Corporate social responsibility and marketing channel coordination

We analyze a simple linear demand bilateral monopoly situation where one of the firms, either the up-stream manufacturer or the down-stream retailer, is socially concerned in terms of its desire to enhance its end-customers’ welfare in addition to the traditional profit motive. Two cases are explored: the up-stream producer exhibits corporate social responsibility (CSR) in one case and the down-stream retailer in the other. In the two-stage game, the retailer makes their quantity-setting decision in stage-two, given the two-part tariff (wholesale price and fixed franchise fee) set by the stage-one producer. In this setting, among other things, we find that the optimal channel-coordinating tariff is very different from the standard pure profit-maximizing two-part tariff. For example, if either firm in the supply/marketing chain exhibits CSR, we show the optimal wholesale price does not equal the manufacturer’s marginal production cost, nor does the fixed fee equal the monopoly profit earned by the retailer. Finally, we find that our two-part tariff CSR model provides a theoretical rationale for the empirical finding of little to no correlation between CSR and firm profits.     

Quota-Induced Cycles

We present a new framework to compare the dynamic effect of tariffs and quotas in the presence of oligopoly. Suppose that the domestic and the foreign firm play a quantity-setting game over time in a perfectly stationary economy. A Markov-perfect equilibrium has the foreign firm exporting at the constant rate under a tariff. In contrast, under the quota the rate of exports changes monotonically over the course of each year, causing seasonal fluctuations in domestic production. Quota-induced cycles can make dynamic market segmentation possible and raise profits for both the firms above what they earn under the equal-import tariff.     

Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

Export market participation with sunk costs and firm heterogeneity

In this article we investigate the importance of sunk costs, firm characteristics and spillovers from nearby exporters on a firm's decision to participate in exporting. The empirical analysis involves the estimation of a nonstructural, discrete choice, dynamic model with firm heterogeneity. By using panel data for Estonian companies from 1994 to 1999 we find that: (i) both sunk costs and observable firm characteristics are important determinants of export market participation; (ii) previous history matters, in that, if a firm has been exporting the previous period or the period before, it significantly increases the likelihood of the firm exporting in the current period; (iii) larger firms with high capital intensity and foreign ownership are more likely to be exporters; (iv) operating in an export-oriented industry increases a firm's likelihood of exporting.     

Endogenous Timing in a Strategic Trade Policy Game: A Two-Country Oligopoly Model with Multiple Firms

This paper examines strategic trade policy games where the number of firms in the importing and exporting countries differs and all firms play as Cournot oligopolies. Under the assumption of linear demand and constant marginal cost, we show that, if the number of firms in the exporting country exceeds that in the importing country by more than three, the government of the exporting country chooses to move as a leader, imposing an export tax on firms. The government of the importing country then becomes a follower and imposes an import tariff. This lies contrary to the previous study, which assumed that there is only one firm in each country.     

Market size and entry in international trade: Product versus firm fixed costs

This paper develops a theoretical framework to infer the nature of fixed costs from the relationship between entry patterns in international markets and destination market size. If fixed costs are at the firm level, firms take advantage of an intrafirm spillover by expanding firm‐level product range (scope). Few firms enter with many products and dominate international trade. If fixed costs are at the product level, an interfirm spillover reduces the fixed costs to export for all firms producing the product. The resulting entry pattern consists of many firms exporting different varieties of the same product. Using cross‐country data on firm and product entry, I find empirical evidence consistent with product‐level costs. More firms than products enter in larger markets offering their consumers lower prices and a greater variety of goods within the product category.     

On the International Linkages between Trade and Merger Policies*

In a three‐country model, this paper investigates linkages between merger incentives of exporting firms and the trade policy of an importing country. When exporting firms come from only one country, the tariff response of the importing country reverses the welfare effects of a merger in the exporting country. If there exist two exporting countries, a merger creates two types of conflicting international externalities. First, a merger in one exporting country increases profits of all firms. Secondly, non‐merged firms lose if the importing country is free to raise its tariff in response to a merger of foreign exporters.     

TARIFF POLICY AND WELFARE IN AN INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY WITH CONSUMER‐FRIENDLY INITIATIVE

The purpose of this paper is to explore how strategic tariff policy and welfare are affected by the consumer‐friendly initiative of foreign exporting firms. We define a firm that is consumer‐friendly or non‐profit‐based if it considers both its own profit and consumer surplus. This paper extends Brander and Spencer by taking the consideration of consumer‐friendly firms into an international duopoly, and within such context examining the tariff policy and welfare. The consumer‐friendly initiative that leads to trade liberalization is a ‘Win‐Win‐Win’ solution in the sense that it is not only beneficial for foreign exporting firms, but also for the government and consumers of the importing country.     

A dynamic decision-theoretic model of technology adoption for the competitive firm

In this article, the technology adoption problem of the competitive firm is revisited. The firm is assumed to allocate a quasi fixed factor between a traditional and a new technology. In the presence of costs of adjustment and learning, the adoption problem is formulated as an optimal control problem.     

Optimal policy for environmental goods trade in asymmetric oligopolistic eco-industries

In this paper, we examine the optimal structure of an environmental tax to pollution, a production subsidy to a domestic eco-industry, and an import tariff on environmental goods (EGs) in a two-country model where the home country imports EGs from the foreign country. Home and foreign firms that produce EGs engage in Cournot competition. We then assume that the number of the home local firms which produce EGs is constant, but that of the foreign firms is variable. Our main findings are as follows: (I) The optimal environmental tax level may be lower than the Pigouvian level even if the tax has a positive impact on the output of EGs produced by a domestic firm. (II) The optimal tariff level may be positive when the country implements the first best policy combination in a closed economy regarding the environmental tax and the subsidy. (III) The optimal subsidy level may be positive, and then the subsidy may be substitutive for the import tariff on EGs.     

An analysis of the MFN clause under asymmetries of cost and market structure

Abstract.  We conduct a welfare comparison of MFN and tariff discrimination in an oligopoly model of trade between two exporting countries and one importing country. While MFN dominates tariff discrimination from a world welfare perspective when exporting countries are asymmetric with respect to either cost or market structure, such need not be the case when both types of asymmetries co‐exist. In particular, when high‐cost exporters are merged and the cost disadvantage of the merged unit relative to competing firms is of intermediate magnitude, tariff discrimination can be welfare preferred to MFN (even when the average tariff is actually lower under MFN). JEL classification: F13, F12     

Sunk costs of exporting and the role of experience in international trade

This paper estimates the importance of destination‐specific sunk costs of exporting and investigates the role of firms' previous experience in international trade for the decision to export to a market. While destination‐specific sunk costs are important, firms' experience in international trade can help to overcome these costs more easily. In particular, import experience from a market is found to facilitate exporting to this country and export experience from other markets can increase the probability of exporting to a country. This latter effect turns out to be conditional on the characteristics and number of markets served by a firm.     

Explaining Export Performance through Inputs: Evidence from Aggregated Cross‐country Firm‐level Data

Which trade barrier related to intermediate inputs forms a greater burden on the export performance of firms in developing countries? Using aggregated cross‐country firm‐level data covering 43 mostly developing economies, this paper estimates the marginal importance of the impact of various intermediate input trade cost barriers, namely tariffs, non‐tariff barriers (NTBs) and services barriers, on firms' export behavior. In a cross‐sectoral setting, this paper takes the firm's export performance in goods as a central focus to study the effects of these different trade barriers through the exporting firm's choice of use of intermediate inputs. The results show that the most significant trade barriers on inputs that impede export performance in developing countries are mainly NTBs and restrictions of services.     

FIRM‐LEVEL INVESTMENT AND EXPORT DYNAMICS*

This article characterizes the complementarity between exporting and investment in physical capital. We argue that new investment allows young exporters to grow faster and survive longer in export markets while reducing their vulnerability to productivity or demand shocks across markets. We structurally estimate our model using detailed firm‐level data. We find that the choice of cost structure has a large impact on model performance and the estimated costs of exporting or investment. Using detailed capital and output tariff rates, we quantify the impact of policy change on aggregate export and investment growth.     

On tariff and quality innovation in a market with discrete preferences

In a market for a quality-differentiated good with heterogeneous set of consumers and a local firm facing competitive imports from abroad, we examine private and social incentives for quality innovation. For differential tariff regime, we show that both the private and social gains increase with the tariff protection for the low-quality segment of the domestic market for any given tariff on high-quality imports. But for some very high costs of innovation, the local firm may not undertake a socially desirable innovation. The pro-competitive effect, on the other hand, ensures that quality-distortion-at-the-bottom occurs only for very high levels of tariffs.