Did the German Minimum Wage Reform Influence (Un)employment Growth in 2015? Evidence from Regional Data

Using the variation across space, age and sex and the variation across space and sectors, we analyse the relationship between the minimum wage and (un)employment growth in 2015. We use difference‐in‐differences specifications and instrument the bite of the minimum wage by the lagged bite. The results provide stable evidence that a higher minimum wage bite is related to a higher growth rate of regular employment. We also find stable evidence that a higher minimum wage bite is related to a lower growth rate of marginal employment. These results are consistent with a transformation of marginal to regular jobs. The relationship to total employment is slightly positive in our preferred specification but insignificant or negative in others. For unemployment, we find a positive relationship between the bite of the minimum wage and unemployment growth in our preferred specification but insignificant or negative results in others.     

Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies

I introduce a microfounded model of campaign finance with office-seeking politicians, a continuum of voters, and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies. Lobbies make contributions to politicians according to a common agency framework. Politicians use contributions to finance their electoral expenditures. Voters are not fooled by electoral expenditures: they are influenced in a way that is consistent with the equilibrium behavior of lobbies and politicians. The model is used to: (i) determine the relation between campaign spending and the deviation from the median voter's preferred policy; (ii) show the informational value of lobbies' contributions; (iii) evaluate the welfare implications of restricting campaign spending; and (iv) interpret the empirical finding that campaign expenditures have a very low effect on election outcome. Although in equilibrium advertising provides voters with useful information, under reasonable parameter values, a ban on campaign contributions makes the median voter better off. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D72, D82, M37.     

Electoral Balancing in Federal and Sub-national Elections: The Case of Canada

The major premise of this study is that in federal countries voters can balance and moderate national policy by dividing electoral support between different parties in federal and sub-national elections. We compare the non-concurrent federal and provincial elections in Canada to assess the balancing properties of sub-national elections. The balancing hypothesis implies that the federal incumbent party may suffer additional electoral losses in provincial elections. We use several statistical tests - ordinary OLS, fixed effect and unbalanced random effect cross-section time series - to analyze Canadian electoral data for the period of 1949-1997. All tests sustain that the incumbent party at the federal level loses votes in provincial elections.     

德国依靠科技创新率先走出危机

2010年,德国经济实现了快速复苏,并率先走出危机,成为带动欧洲经济增长的火车头。“加大创新力度、调整产业结构、保持国际竞争优势”的政策取向是其关键内因。德国研究与创新专家委员会在报告中表示：2010年德国国家创新体系在危机中表现出色。本文对2010年德国科学技术发展总体情况进行了介绍。     

Sequential voting with abstention

Dekel and Piccione [2000. Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary elections. J. Polit. Economy 108, 34–55] have proven that information cascades do not necessarily affect the properties of information aggregation in sequential elections: under standard conditions, any symmetric equilibrium of a simultaneous voting mechanism is also an equilibrium of the correspondent sequential mechanism. We show that when voters can abstain, these results are sensitive to the introduction of an arbitrarily small cost of voting: the set of equilibria in the two mechanisms are generally disjoint; and the informative properties of the equilibrium sets can be ranked. If an appropriate q-rule is chosen, when the cost of voting is small the unique symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous voting mechanism dominates all equilibria of the sequential mechanism.     

Taxes, Transfers, and Voter Behavior in U.S. Midterm Elections

The effects of changes in per capita real GDP, real taxes and real government transfer payments on midterm congressional election outcomes during the 1946–2002 period are examined. Voters are found to take all of these, except taxes and transfers at the state and local government levels, into account in casting their ballots. However, the weights they place on each are found not to be the same. Consequently, the common practice of summarizing the economic conditions faced by voters through disposable income seems to be inappropriate. Also, omission of tax and transfer variables from the vote equation, and using vote swing rather than vote share as the dependent variable is found to result in underestimation of the coefficient of per capita GDP growth.