Does Bank Consolidation Hurt the Small Business Borrower?

The recent wave of mergers in the commercial banking sector in the United States has led to tremendous industry consolidation. Some fear that such consolidation will leave the small business borrower with fewer opportunities to obtain bank credit. This study uses regression analysis to empirically determine if consolidation has caused larger banks to abandon relationship loans extended to small businesses over time. If so, this leaves small business borrowers with two distinctly different choices, a low interest rate loan from a large bank for those small business borrowers who qualify or a high interest rate loan from a small bank for those who do not. The results of this study support this theory, and find consolidation has raised small business loan rates at small banks and lowered rates at large banks, ceteris paribus.     

Objective measures as a predictor of late payments by high‐risk borrowers

Manufactured homes (also known outside the US as prefabricated homes) are a viable housing option for low‐income buyers, but traditional mortgages are not available for purchase of manufactured homes because of a perception of higher risk of default among purchasers of manufactured homes. Research suggests that creditscoring models which incorporate objective data such as income, debt‐to‐income ratio and credit history result in an accurate and objective predictive tool to estimate likelihood of late payments and default among traditional home buyers. This study showed that these same models can be applied similarly to purchasers of manufactured homes. A Tobit model was developed to evaluate which factors most accurately predict default and late payment behaviour among borrowers who purchased a manufactured home. The model showed that when decomposed into the probability of making a late payment and number of late payments, credit score and income are both significant predictors in both sets of borrowers of both the probability of making a late payment and the number of late payments. The higher the credit score, the less likely the borrower is to make a late payment.     

Doha development agenda: implications for the US and world cotton markets

This study analyzed two scenarios that considered a reduction of the US aggregate measure of supports (AMS) payments by 60% over a five-year period. In the first scenario, which considered a unilateral action by the US, the targeted AMS payments reduction would require a 12% cut in the US target price and an 8% cut in the loan rate. This would lead to a 3% decline in US cotton production, a 3% rise in world cotton price, and a 26% decline in US cotton net farm income at the end of the implementation period. The second scenario analyzed the case in which the US AMS payments reduction is concomitant with multilateral tariff and subsidy eliminations from the rest of the world. Under this scenario, fewer cuts in the US loan rate and target price (i.e. 9 and 4%) were required to achieve the 60% AMS reduction because of market liberalization from the from the rest of the world. However, US cotton producers' net farm income still declined by 18%.     

Impact of mortgage soft information in loan pricing on default prediction using machine learning

We analyze the impact of soft information on US mortgages for default prediction and provide a new measure for lender soft information that is based on the interest rates offered to borrowers and incremental to public hard information. Hard and soft information provide for a variation in annual default probabilities of approximately 3%. Soft information has a lesser impact over time and time since origination. Lenders rely more on soft information for high-risk borrowers. Our study evidences the importance of soft information collected at loan origination.     

美国次按贷危机剖析

随着美国住房价格逐渐回落,利率不断上升,次贷的借款人越来越难以按期偿付贷款,导致次贷及相关的证券投资产品损失严重,一些贷款机构、投资银行、对冲基金纷纷出现巨额亏损,甚至倒闭,由房价引发次按贷危机的爆发。次按贷危机暴露出评级机构对结构性金融产品信用评估体制上的缺陷和中间人的道德风险严重。次按贷危机对全球各种金融产品价格产生很大的冲击．并从各个方面都对全球经济产生了深远的影响。     

Niedrigzinsen bei Bausparkassen — ein Urteil des Bundesgerichtshofs

At the end of February 2017 the Federal High Court of Justice rules that building societies are allowed to terminate old contracts ahead of schedule. A lot of old contracts are problematic in the viewpoint of building societies due to high deposit interest rates. High deposit interest rates are dangerous for building societies in times of low interest rates, especially if low interest rates are long-lasting. The Federal High Court of Justice follows the opinion of the building societies that during saving periods, building societies can be seen as borrowers, and borrowers have the (exceptional) right to terminate contracts after ten years, which is established in the German Civil Law. A microeconomic intertemporal consumption model calculates this as an overreaction byf the Court: Building societies should only be allowed to reduce deposit interest rate to be compensated for non existing loan contracts.     

Credit access for high-risk borrowers in financially concentrated markets: Do SBA loan guarantees help?

The Small Business Administration's (SBA) loan guarantee program was established to correct financial capital market inefficiencies and improve small business access to financial capital. However, the SBA loan guarantee program has been criticized for its failure to improve the performance of financial capital markets available to small businesses. This study considers the financial capital market failure created by lenders' monopoly power (specifically, financial market concentration) in financial capital markets. Based on this potential market failure, a model is derived to evaluate the behavior of lenders and borrowers in financial capital markets. Using the national Survey of Small Business Finance, this study compares the financial characteristics of small business borrowers with and without SBA loan guarantees, and provides a qualitative assessment of the SBA's ability to correct financial capital market inefficiencies. When considering only the interaction between borrower quality and the degree of financial market concentration, high-risk borrowers in high concentration financial markets have a higher probability of receiving an SBA loan guarantee than low-risk borrowers in low concentration financial markets. However, when other factors influencing the demand for financial capital are included in the model, only the borrower attributes (credit risk and age) are significant. While the SBA loan guarantee program appears to partially mitigate the effects of the market failure caused by financial market concentration for high-risk borrowers, the program appears to be better designed to address borrower risk, rather than credit market failure.     

Conflicts of Interest? The Ethics of Usury

Social attitudes toward usury (here defined using the archaic meaning as the taking of interest on loans) have changed dramatically over the centuries. From antiquity until the Protestant Reformation, usury was regarded as an inherently evil activity. Today, with few exceptions, usury is met with moral indifference. Modern objections to usury are limited to protest against "excessive" interest rates rather than interest per se. With this change in focus, the very meaning of the term "usury" has also changed. Many early pronouncements against the taking of interest emphasized the plight of the poor, but ironically, the poor actually pay the highest rates of interest in the modern American economy. Despite the universality of usury, some socio-economic subcultures still manage to avoid the taking or giving of interest. Orthodox branches of both Judaism and Islam have maintained bans on usury throughout the centuries and up to the present time. This is especially interesting in the case of Judaism, given the popular cultural image of the Jew as usurer. Jewish free loan systems may actually offer a model for modern loan programs that can be designed to aid poor borrowers, who are frequently shut out of mainstream financial services.     

The Higher Cost of Follow-Up Loans

This paper uses unique data and looks at the interest margin for follow-up finance vis-à-vis first round-finance. Applying data for asset values, we examine the substitution between collateral and interest margins. Consistent with the theories of Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987) and the empirical evidence of Cressy (1996b), we find that a trade-off between collateral and interest margins exists. Our main result indicates that follow-up finance is more expensive for loans but not for overdrafts. We suggest that a relatively fixed asset base (Land and Buildings), as seen in higher security to loan values, raises the price and risk of successive financial increments. This explains the higher relative cost of follow-up finance to borrowers.     

A Theory of Discouraged Borrowers

This paper examines the implications for the SME financing market of Application costs that vary between firms, and of imperfect screening of applicants by Banks. Under these conditions 'Discouraged Borrowers' can exist. These are good borrowers who do not apply for a bank loan because they feel they will be rejected. The paper shows that, under a range of assumptions, the scale of discouragement in an economy depends upon the screening error of the banks, the scale of Application costs and the extent to which the bank interest rate differs from that charged by the moneylender. Discouragement is shown to be at a maximum where there is some, but not perfect, information.     

Risk transfer versus cost reduction on two-sided microfinance platforms

Microfinance can be an important tool for fighting global poverty by increasing access to loans and possibly lowering interest rates through microlending. However, the dominant mechanism used by online microfinance platforms, in which intermediaries administer loans, has profound implications for borrowers. Using an analytical model of microlending with intermediaries who disburse and service loans, we demonstrate that profit-maximizing intermediaries have an incentive to increase interest rates because much of the default risk is transferred to lenders. Borrower and lender interest rate elasticities can serve as disciplining mechanisms to mitigate this interest rate increase. Using data from Kiva.org, we find that interest rates do not affect lender decisions, which removes one of these disciplining mechanisms. Interest rates are high, around 38% on Kiva. In contrast, on an alternative microfinance platform that does not use intermediaries, Zidisha, interest rates are only around 10%, highlighting the dramatic impact of intermediaries on interest rates. We propose an alternative loan payback mechanism that still allows microfinance platforms to use intermediaries, while removing the incentive to increase interest rates due to the transfer of risk to lenders.     

Financial Turmoil Still Ahead？

Asub-prime mortgage refers to a type of loai3 that is normally made to borrowers who do not qualify for market interest rates,often due to a variety of risk factors,such as their income level,size of the down payment,credit history,or employment status. As a result of the borrower＇s low credit rating, a conventional mortgage cannot be offered because the lender views the borrower as having a greater-than-average risk of defaulting on the loan. Lending institutions often charge interest on sub-prime mortgages at a rate that is higher than a conventional mortgage in order to compensate for this added risk. Recently,     

Protecting Minority Homeowners: Race,Foreclosure Counseling and Mortgage Modifications

Millions of minority homeowners are at risk of losing their homes as a result of the housing crisis due to mortgage foreclosure and home repossession. One consumer‐oriented policy response to this crisis is mortgage default counseling for borrowers. This study examines the rate at which minority borrowers seek default counseling and the resulting correlation between counseling and the probability that a borrower obtains a modification of his/her original mortgage contract terms. The results suggest that African Americans are more likely to be counseled, relative to Whites. However, Latinos or other non‐White groups are no more or less likely to be counseled. The probability of loan modifications among counseled African Americans is also higher than other counseled borrowers. These results suggest that counseling policies and the public subsidy of default counseling may be one approach for promoting consumer financial well‐being of these households, but also suggest counseling efforts might be better designed for other minority groups. These results also have implications for the application of counseling to other mortgage decisions, such as refinance .     

Microfinance Performance and Social Capital: A Cross-Country Analysis

In recent years, the microfinance industry has received a substantial amount of cross-border funding from both public and private sources. This funding reflects the increasing interest in microfinance as part of a more general trend towards socially responsible investments. In order to be able to secure sustained interest from these investors, it is important that the microfinance industry can show evidence of its contribution to reducing poverty at the bottom of the pyramid. For this, it is crucial to understand under what conditions microfinance institutions (MFIs) are able to reduce poverty. This paper contributes to this discussion by investigating the relationship between the extent to which social capital formation is facilitated within different societies and the financial and social performance of MFIs. This focus on social capital formation is important, because in many cases MFIs use group loans with joint liability to incentivize asset-poor borrowers to substitute the lack of physical collateral by their social capital. Hence, the success of a large part of the loan relationship between MFIs and their borrowers depends on the social capital those borrowers can bring into the contract. We carry out a cross-country analysis on a dataset containing 100 countries and identify different social dimensions as proxies for how easy social capital can be developed in different countries. We hypothesize that microfinance is more successful, both in terms of their financial and social aims, in societies that are more conducive to the development of social capital. Our empirical results support our hypothesis.     

Coercion in the selling of credit life insurance

Credit life insurance, which repays some or all of a borrower's outstanding debt in the event of death, has been a controversial subject for many years. Critics assert that, despite regulations that limit tied sales, pressure on loan officers to generate fee income through cross selling creates an incentive for coercion of borrowers. Allegedly, some sales techniques leave the consumer with the false impression that the purchase of credit insurance was necessary to obtain the loan. This article measures the frequency with which creditor efforts to sell credit insurance transform the sales message from persuasive to coercive. A methodology is developed for measuring the impact of coercive selling pressure applied to borrowers at the point of sale. Data used to measure the effect of coercive pressure are taken from an extensive survey of borrowers conducted during 1993. Not only are public policy concerns about coercion in the selling of credit insurance addressed, but more generally the article offers a methodology to quantify the influence of the customer's point-of-sale experience on the decision to purchase any financial service. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

个人住房抵押贷款的借款人风险分析

个人住房抵押贷款已逐渐成为个人买房的必由选择。对银行和借款人而言,住房消费贷款的长期风险都较高。本文对个人住房贷款中,借款人的潜在风险进行了深入分析,并联系当前实际提出相应的控制、防范风险的措施。     

Lending Risk in MFIs: The Extreme Bounds of Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Factors

Using 1,234 microfinance firms in 106 countries, this study investigates the determinants of default on the microcredit debt obligation of borrowers. Using the variant of extreme bounds analysis that systematically tests the fragility of coefficient estimates, we examine the importance of 42 variables in explaining default risk. At the micro level, the results from the modeling of model uncertainty reveal that regulation, cost per loan/cost per borrower, loan balance, borrower per loan officer, and the number of loan officers are robust factors. From the macroeconomic context, the time required to start a business and human capital are the determinants of default on debt obligations.     

利率与银行贷款行为微观机理研究

利率是经济生活中的一个重要变量,它影响着银行的贷款,也通过它与银行贷款之间互动进而影响着宏观经济.本文从利率与银行的日常行为的关系出发,建立了一个模型,通过模型揭示了利率与银行贷款行为之间的互动,认为利率与贷款数量之间是非线性的关系,并通过模拟数据进一步发现由于利率所处数值不同,同样的利率的变化导致的贷款数量的变化是不一样的.     

Determinants of indebtedness among young adults: Impacts of lender guidelines,explicit information and financial (over)confidence

For most people, borrowing money is a necessary aspect of life in the 21st century. Wisely handled, loans give consumers access to consumption too expensive for most individuals to purchase with cash, such as homes and cars. However, history shows that taking on too much debt can be detrimental for the individual consumer as well as society as a whole. In this paper, we investigate determinants of over‐indebtedness among young adults. We perform three studies in a setting focused on buying and borrowing money for a home. We show that, compared with an overall mortgage amount, explicit information about monthly payments reduces the tendency to take on too much debt (Study 1), that the amount borrowed depends on standards regarding the loan amount communicated through guidelines from the lender (Study 2), and that borrowers who are overconfident about their financial abilities tend to borrow more than less confident individuals (Study 3). These determinants and their policy implications are discussed.