成都创建国家环境保护模范城市的启示

成都市创建国家环境保护模范城市活动进一步改善了城市创业环境和人居环境,全面提升了城市服务功能与综合价值,提高了公众生活质量,使成都市初步走上了环境和经济相互促进,人与自然和谐共生的可持续发展道路,呈现出经济快速发展、环境清洁优美、生态良性循环的良好态势。从成都创建国家环境保护模范城市实践中,我们可以得到以下启示:创建国家环境保护模范城市是构建和谐社会,落实科学发展观,全面建设小康社会,提高城市综合实力与城市竞争力的前提;创建国家环境保护模范城市必须承担发展经济和保护生态的双重任务,并且需要建立持续增长的投入机制;国家环境保护模范城市建设更需要注重生态型社会的建设。     

Licensing a new product with non-linear contracts

Abstract .  This paper looks at a situation where a licensor owns a patent on a technology that allows the production of a new good. The licensor seeks to license its innovation to a set of producers that differ according to their marginal cost of producing an existing good. We show that the licensor is able to obtain the profit a monopolist would achieve by producing the new good. The equilibrium licensing contract specifies both a fixed fee and a royalty scheme based on the production of a licensee.     

Strategic trade policy under asymmetric information with screening

The design of strategic rent-extracting trade policies requires information that may be private, such as the cost structure of an industry or parameters of the demand function. As a consequence, under asymmetric information, the design of these policies is problematic. We propose screening menus consisting of different instruments (tariff vs. quota) designed to solve this informational issue. We first use a simple model that examines a Cournot duopoly between a domestic firm and a foreign firm with linear demand and cost functions, with both firms supplying a homogeneous good on the domestic market. In this scenario, if the government does not have information regarding the demand parameter, which is known by both firms, a menu consisting of a rent-extracting tariff for a low demand parameter and a rent-extracting quota for a high demand parameter maximizes the government's objective function. This menu leads the domestic firm to reveal private information. We then generalize this framework to a scenario with imperfect information regarding the firms' marginal cost. Finally, we discuss the issue of quotas generating public revenues and study the case of a menu consisting of a tariff and a free quota.     

Congestion with heterogeneous commuters

We study a congestion model where a continuum of heterogeneous commuters make a binary choice between riding a bus and driving private vehicles for their commutes. Formulating the model as a large game, we establish the existence and uniqueness of a nontrivial Nash equilibrium and analyze how a gasoline tax affects the allocation of commuters between public transportation and private vehicles at the equilibrium. Based on the analysis, we provide a sufficient condition under which a gasoline tax is Pareto improving. We also prove the existence of a socially optimal policy that minimizes the aggregate loss to all commuters.     

An economic theory of leadership turnover

In an infinite-horizon stochastic model, a coup not only disciplines a dictator's policy towards a group of “kingmakers”, but also enables a kingmaker to become a dictator. Greater competition for the dictator's position, a lower impact of the dictator's policy on the kingmakers, or lower risks of staging a coup raises the benefit of a coup relative to its opportunity cost and so raises the probability of a coup. Since periodic shocks affect the efficacy of the dictator's policy, a bad enough shock makes it too costly for even talented dictators to avert a coup. More talented dictators are able to survive more negative shocks, so the worst shock in a dictator's reign is informative about the probability of a coup. Conditional on the worst shock, the probability of a coup is independent of a dictator's duration in office. The unconditional probability declines with duration.     

A middle income trap in a small open economy: Modeling the Argentinean case

This paper presents a model of the conditions that may lead a small open economy towards a middle income trap. This situation has shown to be pervasive in Latin America. As Argentina is a salient instance of this phenomenon, we develop a stylized model of its economy at the first decades of the XXth century. It consists of a general equilibrium model of an open emerging economy, which is a price-taking primary goods exporter. A growth process is triggered by an increase of commodity prices, due to an upward jump of the world demand of these goods. The economy goes through several phases of growth, starting from a subsistence stage. Once decreasing returns set in, the economy reaches a steady state. Only a sustained high demand of its export products allows the economy to thrive. Otherwise, the economy gets entrapped in a middle income level.     

Bank competition and optimal monetary policies under alternative reserve accounting schemes

The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical analysis of the implications of increased competition among depository financial institutions for the optimal conduct of monetary policy with respect to the ultimate goals of price and output stability. In the context of a general equilibrium model which includes rational expectations and a market for bank deposits, it is shown that a rise in bank rivalry for deposits produces a more steeply sloped LM schedule. Under a system of lagged required reserve accounting, this fact has no effect on the optimal conduct of monetary policy, which requires an operating procesure designed to target a market interest rate. However, under a system of contemporaneous reserve accounting, this fact implies that less emphasis should be placed on a market interest rate as a variable upon which the Fed's setting of reserves should be conditioned.     

Donor Altruism and the Transfer Paradox in an Overlapping Generations Model

This paper examines the transfer problem between two countries when a donor exhibits altruistic utility toward a recipient in a one‐sector overlapping generations model. We demonstrate that if the donor has a larger marginal propensity to save than the recipient, the donor's altruism never contributes to donor enrichment irrespective of the degree of the donor's altruism. Donor enrichment occurs only if the donor has a smaller marginal propensity to save and a sufficiently high level of altruism. These findings imply that the altruism of a donor toward a recipient does not necessarily explain the motivation to voluntarily provide a transfer.     

Critical mass of users versus critical mass of services in a multiproduct information service system

In this paper we study the economic behaviour of the suppliers of a set of advanced telecommunications services with a joint adoption cost (common access facilities, learning process, etc.). In fixing the two-part tariffs for their services the suppliers have to share the burden of leaving to the users a surplus sufficient to cover the adoption cost. The lack of coordination in supplying a critical mass of services or in the pricing decisions has high changes to result in suboptimal or unviable diffusion of the new technology as a whole. We present a static optimization model of user behaviour, and derive access and usage demand with a two-part tariff and a joint adoption cost. We compare noncooperative and cooperative market equilibria in a duopoly with perfect information; finally we discuss the extension of our analysis to the case of imperfect information in a dynamic setting.     

The economics of posted prices in a concentrated market where demand is uncertain

This paper analyses the theory of the optimal output decision for a firm whose policy is to post a non-negotiable price for a good or service in a concentrated market where the demand facing the firm is determined, in part, by a random variable. The theoretical findings are the opposite of those in competitive markets; Proposition 1 states that the optimal output of a risk-averse firm is expected to be larger than that of a risk-neutral firm if the expected payoff of its marginal profit is less than or equal to 1. Proposition 2 states that the optimal output of a risk-seeking firm is expected to be smaller than that of a risk-neutral firm if the expected payoff of its marginal profit is greater than 1.     

Commitment and choice of partner in a negotiation with a deadline

This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and, moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition between the buyers.     

Privatisation in Russia Has Led to Criminalisation

Abstract
Russia has recently embarked on a dramatic program of privatisation as part of the process of shock therapy which aims to convert the command economy to a market economy. This program has been undertaken in the absence of a well-developed set of institutions needed for the proper functioning of a market economy. These institutions include a legal system, a related system of property rights, a credit system, a system of commercial banks, classified advertising, an accounting system and others including a sound currency and a social safety net. In the absence of these institutions the incentives facing agents in economic transactions have been perverted. This has led to criminalisation of the economy, dramatic falls in production, loss of confidence in all aspects of commerce, and political instability. The recent Russian experience of privatisation has important lessons for other economies in transition, for developing economies and for economic theory.     

冲突管理方式对团队绩效的影响研究

通过实证验证了不同冲突管理方式影响不同类型团队绩效的研究模型与假设,并进行了讨论。采用陈国权（Guoquan Chen,2000）团队绩效以及Rahim和Magner开发的包括整合式、帮助式、支配式、折衷式、逃避式的冲突管理方式的5因子量表,通过有效的问卷调查,应用SPSS进行数据分析,进而验证工作团队中整合式呈显著正影响,帮助式呈不显著负影响,支配式呈不显著正影响,折衷式呈不显著负影响,逃避式呈不显著负影响;并行团队中整合式呈显著正影响,帮助式呈显著正影响,支配式呈正影响,折衷式呈显著负影响,逃避式呈显著负影响;项目团队中整合式呈显著正影响;帮助式呈不显著负影响,支配式呈不显著正影响,折衷式呈不显著负影响,逃避式呈不显著正影响;管理团队中整合式呈显著正影响,帮助式呈不显著正影响,支配式呈不显著正影响,折衷式呈不显著负影响,逃避式呈不显著正影响。     

WHY REWARDS ARE BETTER THAN SANCTIONS

Sanctions are said to fail because of the “rally‐round‐the‐flag effect”. This is the main reason why many advocate the use of positive incentives as a viable alternative. Not only do rewards provoke no defensive reaction, but they may elicit a rally in support of compliance – a “fifth‐column effect.” Yet, positive incentives are vulnerable to extortion – doing wrong in the hope of obtaining larger rewards. As a result, many conjecture that sanction threats and promises of reward are most efficient when used simultaneously. We put this conjecture to a test, staging a formal confrontation of the two forms of incentives. Our model pits a sanctioner and a target in a game allowing for the possibility of rally‐round‐the‐flag, fifth‐column, and extortion effects. The game yields unambiguous results: under no circumstances should a sanctioner prefer sanction threats to reward promises. This result holds despite the risk of extortion, a risk that proves to be less of a drawback than the rally round the flag.     

Nonlinear stochastic effects of substitution — an evolutionary approach

Technological innovations have been investigated by means of substitution and diffusion as well as evolution models, each of them dealing with different aspects of the innovation problem. In this paper we follow the well known research traditions on self-organisation models of complex systems. For the first time in the literature we show the existence of a specific niche effect, which may occur in the first stage of establishment of a new technology. Using a stochastic Master equation approach, we obtain analytical expressions for the survival probabilities of a new technology in smaller or larger ensembles. As a main result we demonstrate how a hyperselection situation might be removed in a stochastic picture and thresholds against the prevailing of a new technology in a step-by-step process can be overcome.     

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

A coopetitive model for the green economy

The paper proposes a coopetitive model for the Green Economy. It addresses the issue of the climate change policy and the creation and diffusion of low-carbon technologies. In the present paper the complex construct of coopetition is applied at macroeconomic level. The model, based on Game Theory, enables us to offer a set of possible solutions in a coopetitive context, allowing to find a Pareto solution in a win–win scenario. The model, which is based on the assumption that each country produces a level of output which is determined in a non-cooperative game of Cournot-type and that considers at the same time a coopetitive strategy regarding the low technologies, will suggest a solution that shows the convenience for each country to participate actively to a program of low carbon technologies within a coopetitive framework to address a policy of climate change, thus aiming at balancing the environmental imbalances.     

The stability of decision making in committees: The one-core

We study the stability of decision making in committees. A policy proposal introduced by a committee member is either adopted or abandoned in favor of a new proposal after deliberations. If a proposal is abandoned, it is in spite of the committee member who introduced it, who does not cooperate in any effort to defeat it. Shenoy (1980) proposes the one-core as a solution concept for this game, and shows that this solution may be empty. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable policy under the majority rule. This result highlights a trade-off between the size of a committee, the number of competing policy options, and the existence of a stable outcome. Our findings imply a tension between political stability and the existence of a large number of competing interests in democracies.     

A game-theoretic model of coalition formation among primates

This paper models the coalition formation process among primates as a sequential game. The population consists of individuals having distinct social ranks which is determined by the individual’s resource holding potential. Each member of the population is interested in gaining access to a food resource, either individually or via a coalition. At any given stage of the game, a player can either propose a specific coalition or he can be proposed to in order to join one. Hence, the strategy of a player consists of a sequence of decisions regarding who to propose to for the formation of a coalition and which proposals to accept or reject. We derive the preferences of the players over the various coalition structures under the assumption that the probability of a coalition to obtain the resource is given by a logistic distribution as a function of relative strengths of the players. We show that, given the primates’ strategic behavior, a variety of different coalition structures can emerge in equilibrium.