城市化会恶化空气质量吗?——来自新兴经济体国家的经验证据

空气污染分为产业公害型和城市生活型两种类型,前者因产业集聚而成,但可对污染进行集中处理,被称为"生产效应",后者因人口集聚而生,被称为"生活效应"。城市化是否恶化了空气质量取决于两种效应的权衡。文章以11个新兴经济体国家在1990~2009年的面板数据为样本,利用Kaya恒等式和面板数据模型分析了城市化对空气质量的影响。研究结果表明,新兴经济体城市化与空气污染之间存在U型曲线关系。可以认为,城市化率为59%是城市化对空气污染影响由负变正的拐点,当城市化率低于59%时,城市化的"生产效应"大于"生活效应",城市化并不必然带来空气质量的恶化。因此,应该充分发挥污染集中处理的"生产效应",采取各种有效措施,为我国城市化发展提供相应的环境支撑和保障。     

中国城市化速度预测分析

国际经验表明,城市化率在50％-70％的区间是城市化的减速时期,2015年中国城市化率为55.61％,未来中国城市化将向减速转变,这种转变对中国城市化趋势、城市发展和城市体系结构将产生重要影响.本文简述中国城市化发展历史,运用多种方法预测了未来30年中国城市化率变化,结果表明,2016-2050年中国城市化增速趋缓,按三种预测方法平均计算,年均提高0.793个百分点,2020、2030、2040和2050年城市化率分别为60.34％、68.38％、75.37％和81.63％.城市化增速趋缓将导致我国城市化发展累积的金融风险、房地产风险等显露,也使城市化对经济增长的拉动作用减弱.未来我国城市化发展重点应实现由数量扩张向质量提升转变.     

中国经济增长、能源消费与城市化关系的实证研究

本文利用1978年至2011年的相关数据对能源消费和城市化与经济增长之间关系进行了实证研究.研究结论表明：我国能源消费、煤炭消费和城市化与经济增长之间存在着协整关系且具有长期均衡关系,能源消费总量和城市化与经济增长存在着正相关关系.短期内,城市化率和经济增长到煤炭消费存在单向Granger因果关系.城市化率和经济增长到能源消费存在单向Granger因果关系.长期内,城市化率和煤炭消费与能源消费总量之间存在单向Granger因果关系,能源消费、煤炭消费和城市化率与经济增长之间不存在双向Granger因果关系.从脉冲响应函数和方差分解结果可以看出,能源消费总量和城市化率对经济增长的影响保持持续上升态势,并且城市化对经济增长的作用远大于能源消费和煤炭消费对经济增长的作用.城市化对能源消费和煤炭消费的贡献率具有持续拉动作用,而相反能源消费和煤炭消费对城市化贡献率的影响不明显.最后,本文针对实证结果,提出了相关结论以及实现能源、经济和社会可持续发展的政策建议.     

辽宁老工业基地的工业化、城市化及其路径选择

辽宁的重工业对其城市发展和城市化发挥了积极的推动和支撑作用。但1970年代后期以来,辽宁工业化率特别是重工业比重随经济体制转轨和国企改革出现了一定程度的下降,相反,人口城市化率则在经历了1960、1970年代的下降后重现生机,持续上升,工业化与城市化的关系由同向变动逆转为异向变动。文章通过对辽宁工业化和城市化过程的考究,探讨了其工业化、非农化与城市化的关系,提出了进一步推进辽宁工业化和城市化的新思路。     

城市化和财政支农对全国居民总体收入差距的影响分析——基于城乡差距的实证

本文运用1978—2009年我国城市化率、城乡差距、财政支农和基尼系数的时间序列数据对城市化和财政支农对全国居民总体收入差距的影响进行了实证分析。结果表明：随着我国城市化水平的提高和财政支农力度的加大,基尼系数将呈现倒U型变动。目前城市化和财政支农水平正处于拐点水平附近,提高城市化率,加大财政支农的力度,基尼系数会变小。基于这些结论,文章最后提出了一些加快城市化进程、增加财政支农,进而改善收入分配的对策。     

土地流转、户籍制度改革与中国城市化:理论与模拟

本文试图建立一个统一的理论框架,在考虑到劳动力异质性的基础上分析土地制度、户籍制度和城市化的关系。为此,本文构建一个包含农村和城市两类异质劳动力以及农村和城市两类区域用地的内生城市化模型,引入土地流转和人口迁移的限制,研究土地制度和户籍制度改革对城市化和居民福利的影响。模型理论分析表明:(1)在严格的土地控制和户籍限制下,只有拥有较高人力资本的农村劳动力会迁往城市;(2)无论是允许土地流转还是户籍制度松绑,将有更多农村劳动力迁往城市,城市劳动力产出增加,农村劳动力福利大幅改善,城市劳动力的福利仅有少许下降,城市化率提高。反事实检验发现:允许1单位农村"宅基地"流转置换为0.5单位城市建设用地,则2000年和2011年城市化率比实际值分别提高1个和2.5个百分点;若劳动力摩擦程度整体下降0.3个单位,则2000年城市化率比真实值提高2个百分点,2011年提高3个百分点。本文的政策启示为:土地流转和户籍制度松绑的联合改革能够加快中国城市化进程及促进城市化红利的共享。     

河北省房地产业带动效应分析

房地产业是随着工业化、城市化进程而发展起来的一个重要行业,城市化是房地产发展的重要推动力量.世界各国的经验数据表明,当一个国家城市化率达到30%以后,城市化进程将大大加快,直到城市化率达到70%左右才逐渐稳定下来.钱纳里认为,在人均GDP560～1120美元时,工业化将进入加速发展阶段.     

城市化模式探析——一个后发优势视角

我国的城市化水平落后于世界平均水平,且滞后于工业化发展.一段时间以来,关于如何选择城市化模式的争论较多,主要存在两种观点:一种观点认为城市化就是农村劳动力往大城市转移;另一种观点则建议通过城镇化来加快城市化进程.改革开放以来,我国大规模、快速引进外资,促使工业化水平大幅度上升,工业化发展在我国具有后发优势.同时,我国的城市化与外资也具有一定的相关性.结论表明,组团式的大城市模式,是遵循城市化发展规律,发挥我国后发优势的一种适宜的城市化模式.     

我国城市化和工业化的非同步性原因浅析

城市化是生产力不断发展的结果．它同工业化一起推动经济发展重心从乡村转移到城市。我国现阶段的工业化率超过50％．而城市化率不到40％．这和城市化滞后的情况给整个国民经济的发展带来消极的影响。为此，我国必须大力加快城市化的进程，培育更多的“增长极”，以保持与工业化的协调发展，从而带动整个国民经济的持续、快速和健康发展。     

工业化、城市化对能源强度的影响——基于我国省际动态面板数据的实证研究

利用1992-2012年我国省际面板数据,建立动态面板数据模型,分析收入、工业化和城市化对能源强度的影响.结果表明:能源强度、收入、工业化与城市化存在着长期的均衡关系;收入对能源强度具有显著的负向影响,而工业化、城市化对能源强度具有显著的正向影响;工业化对能源强度的影响效应大于收入与城市化,只有收入增长到能抵消工业化和城市化的影响时,三者的联合效应才会使能源强度降低.从政策角度看,降低能源强度,不能仅依靠提高收入的经济政策,而重点在提升工业化、城市化的内在质量,推行资源节约、环境友好的新型工业化与城市化.     

Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income

We estimate the interrelationships among economic institutions, political institutions, openness, and income levels, using identification through heteroskedasticity (IH). We split our cross‐national dataset into two sub‐samples: (i) colonies versus non‐colonies; and (ii) continents aligned on an East–West versus those aligned on a North–South axis. We exploit the difference in the structural variances in these two sub‐samples to gain identification. We find that democracy and the rule of law are both good for economic performance, but the latter has a much stronger impact on incomes. Openness (trade/GDP) has a negative impact on income levels and democracy, but a positive effect on rule of law. Higher income produces greater openness and better institutions, but these effects are not very strong. Rule of law and democracy tend to be mutually reinforcing.     

Inflation,money, interest rate,exchange rate,and casuality: the case of Egypt,Morocco, and Tunisia

This study provides further evidence of the inflationary efects of the rates of growth of money supply, gross domestic product, efective exchange rate, and imported inflation for Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia using quarterly data from 1964 to 1990. In addition, it examines the Granger causality between inflation and money supply as well as between inflation and the real exchange rate in the countries under consideration. Most of the results are consistent with extant theory and empirical evidence.     

Country terms of trade: trends,unit roots,over-differencing,endogeneity, time dummies,and heterogeneity

The debate about the Prebisch-Singer thesis has focused on primary commodities with some extensions to manufactures. We analyse trends in country terms-of-trade for goods and services rather than those for commodities according to the World Bank income classification. We find that the natural logarithm of the terms of trade for all groups except for the poorest has common unit roots, but none has individual unit roots. As low-income countries have no unit roots over-differencing is inefficient and biases significance levels in first differences against the fall in the terms of trade. For the low-income countries the terms of trade of goods and services are falling at a rate that is significantly negative without and with endogeneity treatment by system GMM. A comprehensive analysis of the effects of time dummies supports the result of falling terms of trade for low-income countries. When all coefficients are country-specific 50% of all low-income countries have falling terms of trade in a simultaneous equation estimation using the SUR method. Food and financial crisis have no effect on the number of countries with falling terms of trade, but (dis-)improve the terms of trade or the significance of the results for a very small number of countries.     

Quality of judicial institutions,crimes, misdemeanors,and dishonesty

We investigate the extent to which quality of judicial institutions has an impact on individuals’ propensity for criminal and dishonest behavior and on their views regarding the acceptability of dishonesty and law-breaking. We use micro data on residents of 25 European countries and employ alternative measures of judicial quality as perceived by the residents of these countries. As an instrument for judicial quality we employ the procedures with which prosecutors and judges are appointed to their posts in each country. As alternative instruments, we employ an index of de jure institutional quality as well as its components, which provide similar results. The findings show that an increase in the perception of the quality of judicial institutions, such as an improvement in judicial independence or the impartiality of the courts, has a deterrent effect on dishonest and criminal acts. A higher perceived quality of the judicial system also makes individuals less likely to find acceptable a variety of dishonest and illicit behaviors, suggesting that institutions help shape the beliefs of the society. We obtain the same results when we analyze the sample of immigrants, whose cultural attributes should be (more) related to their countries of origin, rather than their countries of residence, and thus should be arguably uncorrelated with the factors that can impact the instrument. We show that people’s beliefs in the importance of the family, in the fairness of others, and the importance of being rich are not impacted by judicial quality, suggesting that judicial quality is not a blanket representation of underlying cultural norms and beliefs in the society.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.