Technological Change and Transition: Relative Contributions to Worldwide Growth During the 1990s*

In this paper we use the Kumar and Russell [American Economic Review (2002) Vol. 92, pp. 527–548] growth‐accounting procedure to examine cross‐country growth during the 1990s. Using a data set comprising developed, newly industrialized, developing and transitional economies, we decompose the growth of output per worker into components attributable to technological catch‐up, technological change and capital accumulation. In contrast to the study by Kumar and Russell, which concludes that capital deepening is the major force of growth and change in the world income per worker distribution over the 1965–90 period, our analysis shows that, during the 1990s, the major force in the further divergence of the rich and the poor is due to technological change, whereas capital accumulation plays a lesser and opposite role. Finally, although on average we find that transitional economies perform similar to the rest of the world, the procedure is able to discover some interesting patterns within the set of transitional countries.     

Energy consumption and economic growth: evidence from non-OPEC oil producing states

According to the US EIA (2009, www.eia.doe.gov), out of the 15 largest oil producing nations in the world, 7 are not OPEC members, namely Brazil, Canada, China, Mexico, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America (USA). This paper investigates the causal relationship between energy consumption and economic growth for these non-OPEC oil producing countries. Real GDP per capita is used to measure economic growth; whereas; energy consumption is represented by four sub-variables (electric power, oil, natural gas, and coal energy). Using a panel data covering (1969–2009), this study employs the Pedroni (Econometric Theory, 20, 597–627, 2004) approach to determine cointegration and the (Econometrica, 55, 251–276, 1987) two-step procedure to explore short and long run causal effects. The results suggest that there are long run relationships between the real GDP, labour force, real capital, oil consumption, electricity consumption, gas consumption and coal consumption. Further analyses show that real GDP and oil consumption Granger cause real gross capital formation in the short run; real gross fixed capital and electricity consumption cause oil consumption in the short run; and also oil consumption and gas consumption cause electricity consumption in the short run.     

Spatial growth with exogenous saving rates

Economic growth has traditionally been analyzed in the temporal domain, while the spatial dimension is captured by cross-country income differences. Data suggest great inequality in income per capita across countries, and a slight but noticeable increase in inequality across nations between 1960 and 2000. Seeking to explore the mechanism underlying the temporal evolution of the cross sectional distribution of economies, we develop a spatial growth model where saving rates are exogenous. Capital movements across locations are governed by a mechanism under which capital moves toward locations of relatively higher marginal productivity, with a velocity determined by the existing stock of capital. This augments the capital accumulation equation by a nonlinear diffusion term. Our results suggest that under diminishing returns, the growth process leads to a stable spatially nonhomogeneous distribution for per capita capital and income in the long run. Insufficient savings may lead to the emergence of persistent poverty cores where capital stock is depleted in some locations.     

Introducing the supply side into the LBS Model

This Briefing Paper describes a new version of the London Business School model, which incorporates our most recent research on the supply side. The changes reflect the desire to improve the specification of the supply-side of the model, and to capture the effects of taxes on the incentives to save, invest and to work, while still retaining the basic features of the income-expenditure framework. The main features of the new model are: - Gross domestic product is determined as the sum of the outputs of five sectors. Previously GDP was determined by the demand side as the sum of the expenditure components. - Domestic demand for the output of the private sector depends on domestic absorption and on the price of this output relative to import prices. Overseas demand for exports depends on world economic activity and on the price of exports relative to the world price of exports. - Supply depends on the capital stock, real unit labour costs and real raw material prices. In the short run, input prices are allowed to affect the mix between goods which are exported and those which are supplied to the domestic market. In the long run, however, the mix depends only on the price of exports relative to the price of domestically supplied goods (i.e., relative profitability). - In the short run, disequilibrium in the goods market is reflected in adjustments to prices, inventories and the external balance. - Since gross domestic product is determined by summing the output of each sector, output decisions are reconciled with expenditure decisions by making imports the difference between final expenditure and aggregate supply. - In the long run, increases in government expenditure crowd out private expenditure, but the effect takes several years to come through. - A cut in corporation taxes which is not financed by higher taxes elsewhere boosts the supply side by raising investment and the capital stock, but not by enough to raise revenues sufficiently to pay for the tax cut. Private sector saving increases but not by enough to fund higher public sector borrowing, so the current account goes into deficit. - In the short run, both supply and demand factors influence economic activity; in the long run, the path of the economy depends only on population growth, capital accumulation and technical progress.     

The Effect of Urbanization and Industrialization on Energy Use in Emerging Economies: Implications for Sustainable Development

This article investigates the impact of two important socio‐economic variables—urbanization and industrialization—on energy consumption in a panel of emerging economies. The results indicate that income increases energy consumption in both the long run and the short run. In the long run, urbanization decreases energy consumption, while industrialization increases it. Long‐run dynamics are important as evidenced by the estimated coefficient on the error correction term. These results have implications for sustainable development. Economic growth policies designed to increase income and industrialization will increase energy consumption. Since most energy needs in emerging economies are currently met by the burning of fossil fuels, economic growth and industrialization policies will be at odds with sustainable development.     

Growth, development and natural resources: New evidence using a heterogeneous panel analysis

This paper explores whether natural resource abundance is a curse or a blessing. To do so, we firstly develop a theory consistent econometric model, in which we show that there is a long run relationship between real income, the investment rate, and the real value of oil production. Secondly, we investigate the long-run (level) impacts of natural resource abundance on domestic output as well as the short-run (growth) effects. Thirdly, we explicitly recognize that there is a substantial cross-sectional dependence and cross-country heterogeneity in our sample, which covers 53 oil exporting and importing countries with very different historical and institutional backgrounds, and adopt the non-stationary panel methodologies developed by Pesaran (2006) and Pedroni (2000) for estimation. Our results, using the real value of oil production, rent or reserves as a proxy for resource endowment, reveal that oil abundance has a positive effect on both income levels and economic growth. While we accept that oil rich countries could benefit more from their natural wealth by adopting growth and welfare enhancing policies and institutions, we challenge the common view that oil abundance affects economic growth negatively.     

Long‐term rates: lower for longer

With the Federal Reserve and other central banks likely to start raising interest rates from next year, the focus is now on how high interest rates might ultimately go. Long‐term analysis of the path of interest rates in the world's main economies suggests that interest rates tend over time to gravitate towards a level reflecting long‐run growth and inflation. But there is scope for real interest rates to depart substantially from growth for lengthy periods of time. Based on our long‐run forecasts for growth and inflation we take the view that long‐term interest rates are likely to settle in at levels a bit lower than their recent historic averages. Structural changes in the world economy and vulnerabilities in the advanced economies are also likely to slow the process by which long‐term rates rise from current levels to their steady state positions. OE forecasts for long‐term rates in the major economies are generally lower at the 1‐year and long‐term horizons than consensus.     

Oil exports and the Iranian economy

This paper presents an error-correcting macroeconometric model for the Iranian economy estimated using a new quarterly data set over the period 1979Q1–2006Q4. It builds on a recent paper by the authors, Esfahani, Mohaddes, and Pesaran (in press), which develops a theoretical long-run growth model for major oil exporting economies. The core variables included in this paper are real output, real money balances, inflation, exchange rate, oil exports, and foreign real output, although the role of investment and consumption are also analysed in a sub-model. The paper finds clear evidence for the existence of two long-run relations: an output equation as predicted by the theory and a standard real money demand equation with inflation acting as a proxy for the (missing) market interest rate. The results show that real output in the long run is influenced by oil exports and foreign output. However, it is also found that inflation has a significant negative long-run effect on real GDP, which is suggestive of economic inefficiencies and is matched by a negative association between inflation and the investment–output ratio. Finally, the results of impulse responses show that the Iranian economy adjusts quite quickly to the shocks in foreign output and oil exports, which could be partly due to the relatively underdeveloped nature of Iran's financial markets.     

WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM THREE DECADES OF RESEARCH ON THE PRODUCTIVITY OF PUBLIC CAPITAL?

The last three decades have witnessed a great deal of research effort devoted to measuring the private output elasticity of public capital. The wide range of available estimates have precluded any consensus so far, however. This paper reconciles the empirical findings of the literature by quantitatively analyzing a sample of 578 estimates collected from 68 studies for the 1983–2008 period. Using meta‐regression analysis, we show how study design characteristics and publication bias can explain a large fraction of the variation across estimates. We find a short‐run output elasticity of public capital supplied at the central government level of 0.083, which increases to 0.122 in the long run. If, in addition, only core infrastructure at a regional/local level of government is considered, these estimates are almost doubled. The average output elasticity of public capital amounts to 0.106. Our results suggest that public capital is undersupplied in OECD economies.     

Exogenous uncertainty and the identification of structural vector autoregressions with external instruments

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification (point‐identification) of structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) with external instruments considering the case in which r instruments are used to identify g structural shocks of interest, r ≥ g ≥ 1. Novel frequentist estimation methods are discussed by considering both a “partial shocks” identification strategy, where only g structural shocks are of interest and are instrumented, and a “full shocks” identification strategy, where despite g structural shocks being instrumented, all n=g+(n?g) structural shocks of the system can be identified under certain conditions. The suggested approach is applied to investigate empirically whether financial and macroeconomic uncertainty can be approximated as exogenous drivers of US real economic activity, or rather as endogenous responses to first moment shocks, or both. We analyze whether the dynamic causal effects of nonuncertainty shocks on macroeconomic and financial uncertainty are significant in the period after the global financial crisis.     

Does Trade Liberalization Cause a Long Run Economic Growth in Turkey

Based on ‘endogenous’ growth theory, the paper examines the effect of trade liberalization on long-run income per capita and economic growth in Turkey. Although the presumption must be that free trade has a beneficial effect on long run growth, counter examples can also be found. This controversy increases the importance of empirical work in this area. Using the most recent data we employ multivariate cointegration analysis to test the long run relationship among the variables in hand. In a multivariate context, the effect of determinants such as increasing returns to scale, investment in human and physical capital are also included in both theoretical and empirical works. Our causality evidence between the long run growth and a number of indicators of trade liberalizations confirms the predictions of the ‘new growth theory’. However, the overall effect of the possible breaks and/or policy change and unsustainability in the 1990s looks contradictory and deserves further investigation.     

Diversification by Urbanization: Tracing the Property‐Finance Nexus in Dubai and the Gulf

This article explores the role of liberalized real estate markets in shaping financial‐sector development in the Arab Gulf region. Since 2001, record oil revenues and the inflow of repatriated wealth into the region have generated immense demand for new, productive destinations for surplus capital. Gulf Cooperation Council states have subsequently undergone rapid growth that is intimately tied to the regulatory transformation of urban real estate markets and the circulation of surplus capital from oil rents to the ‘secondary circuit’ of the built environment. With an emphasis on the city of Dubai, we employ the notion of diversification by urbanization to trace the re‐regulation of real estate markets and highlight how these strategies have subsequently shaped Gulf financial markets. Through an examination of the impacts of real estate mega‐project development on local banking credit, equities and Islamic financial markets, we reframe recent urbanization in the region as a process of financial re‐engineering, and identify the emergence of capital groups whose accumulation activities are tightly connected to both the real estate and financial circuit.     

Global growth to 2024: reversion to which mean?

• We expect global GDP growth to average 3.5% per year (at PPP exchange rates) over the next ten years. This is lower than the 3.8% recorded in 2000–14 though not dramatically so. There will be a modest recovery in advanced economy growth ‐ but not to pre‐crisis rates. Emerging market (EM) growth will slow but remain faster than growth in the advanced economies. And with EM's share in world GDP much increased from 10–15 years ago, EMs will continue to provide a large proportion of world growth.
• EM growth is expected to run at around 4.5% per year in 2015–24, well down on the 6% seen in 2000–14. This includes a slowdown from around 10% to 5–6% in China ‐ but China's share in world GDP has risen so much that China's contribution to world growth will remain very substantial.
• Advanced economies are forecast to grow by 1.9% per year in 2015–24, a big improvement from the 1% pace of 2007–14 (which was affected by the global financial crisis) but below the 1990–2014 average. Indeed, the gap between forecast G7 GDP and GDP extrapolated using pre‐crisis trends in potential output will remain large at 10–15% in 2015–24.
• Global growth will remain relatively strong compared to much longer‐term averages: growth from 1870–1950 was only around 2% per year. But a return to such low growth rates looks unlikely; China and India were a major drag on world growth until the 1980s but are now fast growing regions.
• Our forecast is relatively cautious about key growth factors; the contribution of productivity growth is expected to improve slightly, while those from capital accumulation and labour supply fall back. Demographics will be a more severe drag on growth from 2025–40. Overall, risks to our long‐term forecasts look to be skewed to the downside.

     

Deciphering the UK's business investment performance

• ? Absent June 2016's Brexit vote, growth in business investment would have been much faster and the UK would be sharing in a global “investment boom”. Or so the Bank of England claims. But the reality is more complicated. What is striking is just how subdued investment growth has been across countries.
• ? Survey evidence presented by the Bank suggests that recent business investment growth has been less than a third of what might have been achieved absent Brexit. The UK has also been highlighted as an investment laggard among major economies.
• ? Headline investment growth has certainly been relatively weak since 2016. Uncertainty around future UK‐EU trading arrangements may have resulted in some investment being deferred or cancelled. And the Brexit‐related fall in sterling will have pushed up the cost of imported capital equipment, cutting demand.
• ? But a collapse in investment in the North Sea sector has had a significant effect on headline investment growth. On an excluding‐extraction basis, UK business investment rose at the same pace as the US (ex‐extraction) and faster than Japan in 2016 and 2017, while average annual growth rises from 1.0% to 2.4%.
• ? What is striking about the recent performance of business investment in the UK and other G7 members is how subdued growth has been across economies. Despite a favourable environment, no major advanced economy has seen investment rise at the type of rates that the Bank predicts the UK, but for Brexit, should be now enjoying.
• ? Sectoral shifts, the rise of intangible investment and the consequences of technooptimism offer some reasons as to why measured investment may have become less sensitive to economic upswings. These same factors suggest that 1990s‐style growth in private investment is unlikely in the UK (or elsewhere) even once Brexit uncertainty has cleared. Indeed, our own medium‐term forecasts see business investment growth across major economies continuing to run at a relatively subdued pace.

     

Inflation,output and stock prices: evidence from Latin America

Research in economics and finance documents a puzzling negative relationship between stock returns and inflation rate in markets of industrialized economies. The present study investigates this relationship for the developing markets of Peru and Chile. Fama's model of linkages between inflation and real economic activity constitutes the theoretical framework of this paper. The study tests whether the negative relationship between equity returns and inflation is a result of a ‘proxy effect’, namely, a negative relationship between inflation and real economic activity. The evidence for Peru and Chile does not provide strong support for Fama's hypothesis. It is shown that the negative relationship between the real stock returns and unexpected inflation persists after purging inflation of the effects of the real economic activity. The long‐run equilibrium between stock prices and general price levels is weak, as indicated by the findings of the Johansen and Juselius co‐integration tests. However, in both economies, stock prices and general price levels seem to show a strong long‐run equilibrium with the real economic activity. These findings suggest that in the long‐run, Fama's propositions A and B are supported for Peru and Chile. The disparity between traditional regression and co‐integration test results suggest that it may be prudent to re‐examine the proxy effect in the framework of a long‐run relationship before denying its validity. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Factor taxation and labor supply in a dynamic one-sector growth model

This paper studies a class of AK-type growth models with factor income taxes, public capital stock and labor–leisure trade offs. While a higher capital tax rate reduces economic growth in the short run, the long-term growth effect is ambiguous and remains ambiguous even if the level of tax rate is larger than the degree of government externality. A higher labor income tax rate has ambiguous growth effects both in the short and long runs. However, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor supply is sufficiently small, a higher labor tax rate always lowers economic growth in the long run, despite the existence of productive government taxation.     

Is infrastructure capital productive? A dynamic heterogeneous approach

This paper offers an evaluation of the output contribution of infrastructure. Using a panel time series approach and a large cross‐country dataset, the paper estimates a long‐run aggregate production function relating gross domestic product to human capital, physical capital, and a synthetic measure of infrastructure comprising transport, power and telecommunications. Tests of the cointegration rank allowing it to vary across countries reveal a common rank with a single cointegrating vector, which we interpret as the long‐run production function. Estimation of its parameters is performed using the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator, which allows for unrestricted short‐run parameter heterogeneity across countries while imposing the (testable) restriction of long‐run parameter homogeneity. The long‐run elasticity of output with respect to the synthetic infrastructure index ranges between 0.07 and 0.10. The estimates are highly significant, both statistically and economically, and robust to alternative dynamic specifications and infrastructure measures. Tests of parameter homogeneity fail to yield evidence that the long‐run parameters differ across countries. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Tighter labour markets to finally lift global wages

• Wage growth has been relatively slow since 2007 in advanced economies, but an upturn may be in sight. Slow productivity growth remains an issue but tighter labour markets make a positive response by wages to rising inflation more likely and there are signs that compositional and crisis‐related effects that dragged wage growth down are fading – though Japan may be an exception.
• Overall, our forecasts are for a moderate improvement in wage growth in the major economies in 2017–18, with the pace of growth rising by 0.5–1% per year relative to its 2016 level by 2018 – enough to keep consumer spending reasonably solid.
• Few countries have maintained their pre‐crisis pace of wage growth since 2007. In part this reflects a mixture of low inflation and weak productivity growth, but other factors have also been in play: in the US and Japan wage growth has run as much as 0.5–1% per year lower than conventional models would suggest.
• The link with productivity seems to have weakened since 2007 and Phillips curves – which relate wages to unemployment – have become flatter. A notable exception is Germany, where the labour market has behaved in a much more ‘normal’ fashion over recent years with wage growth responding to diminishing slack.
• ‘Compositional’ factors related to shifts in the structure of the workforce may have had an important influence in holding down wage growth, cutting it by as much as 2% per year in the US and 1% per year in the UK. There are some signs that the impact of these effects in the UK and US are fading, but not in Japan.
• The forecast rise in inflation over the next year as energy price base effects turn positive is a potential risk to real wages. But the decline in measures of labour market slack in the US, UK and Germany suggests wages are more likely to move up with inflation than was the case in 2010–11 when oil prices spiked and real wages fell.

     

HUMAN CAPITAL AND URBAN GROWTH IN ITALY, 1981–2001

Over the last decades of the XX century, human capital has emerged as a critical source of agglomeration economies fueling urban growth in advanced economies. Focusing on the Italian case, this paper assesses the contribution of human capital to urban growth, the latter gauged by employment growth between 1981 and 2001. A 10% higher share of college‐educated residents prompted a higher growth in employment in the 0.5–2.2% range. These results hold controlling for a wide set of urban characteristics and using an instrumental variable approach. By exploiting a spatial localization model, we disentangle the estimated effect into two components related to higher productivity and to higher life quality, respectively. We found that the former contributed to more than 60% of the effect at municipal level, and to over 90% at the wider local labor market level.     

Quasi‐fixed inputs and long‐run equilibrium in production: a cointegration analysis

This paper proposes a cointegration approach to testing the validity long‐run equilibrium in production, where capital and labour are taken as quasi‐fixed inputs. Previous studies consider only capital as the quasi‐fixed input and do not take account of the time series properties of the variables, assuming implicitly that they are stationary. The canonical cointegrating regressions (CCR) procedure is employed to test for cointegration in both the single‐equation and the seemingly unrelated regressions framework, and long‐run equilibrium conditions are tested. The evidence from US manufacturing reveals that capital and labour are not fully adjusted to their long‐run optimal values, casting doubt on the long‐run equilibrium hypothesis. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.