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1.
Eileen Chou Margaret McConnell Rosemarie Nagel Charles R. Plott 《Experimental Economics》2009,12(2):159-179
This paper focuses on instructions and procedures as the reasons that subjects fail to behave according to the predictions
of game theory in two-person “guessing game” (beauty contest game) experiments. In this game, two individuals simultaneously
choose a number between 0 and 100. The winner is the person whose chosen number is the closest to 2/3 of the average of the
two numbers. The weakly dominant strategy is zero. Because of the simplicity of the game, the widespread failure of subjects
to choose the weakly dominant strategy has been interpreted as evidence of some fundamental inability to behave strategically.
By contrast, we find that subjects’ behavior reflects a lack of understanding of the game form, which we define as the relationships
between possible choices, outcomes and payoffs. To a surprising degree, subjects seem to have little understanding of the
experimental environment in which they are participating. If subjects do not understand the game form, the experimental control
needed for testing game theory is lost. The experiments reported here demonstrate that the failure to act strategically is
related to how the game is presented. We test how well subjects are able to recognize the game under a variety of different
presentations of the game. Some subjects fail to recognize the game form when it is presented abstractly. When the game is
transformed into a simple isomorphic game and presented in a familiar context, subjects do choose weakly dominant strategies.
While our results confirm the ability of subjects to make strategic decisions, they also emphasize the need to understand
the limitations of experimental subjects’ ability to grasp the game as the experimenter intends. Given these limitations,
we provide suggestions for better experimental control. 相似文献
2.
3.
《Journal of Behavioral Finance》2013,14(1):6-28
Empirical evidence suggests that prices do not always reflect fundamental values and individual behavior is often inconsistent with rational expectations theory. We report the results of fourteen experimental asset markets designed to examine whether the interactive effect of subject pool and design experience (i.e., previous experience in a market under identical conditions) tempers price bubbles and improves forecasting ability. Our main findings are: 1) price run-ups are modest and dissipate quickly when traders are knowledgeable about financial markets and have participated in a previous market under identical conditions; 2) price bubbles moderate quickly when only a subset of traders are knowledgeable and experienced; 3) the heterogeneity of expectations about price changes is smaller in markets with knowledgeable and experienced traders, even if such traders only represent a subset of the market; and 4) individual forecasts of prices are not consistent with the predictions of the rational expectations model in any market, although absolute forecast errors are smaller for subjects who are knowledgeable of financial markets and for those subjects who have participated in a previous market. In sum, our findings suggest that markets populated by at least a subset of knowledgeable and experienced traders behave rationally, even though average individual behavior can be characterized as irrational. 相似文献
4.
Motivated by problems of coordination failure in organizations, we examine how overcoming coordination failure and maintaining
coordination depend on the ability of individuals to observe others’ choices. Subjects’ payoffs depend on coordinating at
high effort levels in a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial
incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or
start with high incentives, which usually yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the
key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all individuals in their experimental group (full
feedback) or observe only the minimum effort (limited feedback). We find three primary results: (1) When starting from coordination
failure the use of full feedback improves subjects’ ability to overcome coordination failure, (2) When starting with good
coordination the use of full feedback has no effect on subjects’ ability to avoid slipping into coordination failure, and
(3) History-dependence, defined as dependence of current effort levels on past incentives, is strengthened by the use of full
feedback.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at
.
JEL Classification C92, D23, J31, L23, M52 相似文献
5.
The main activity of a Welfare State is to impose taxes in order to collect money to provide services. In this paper, we want
to test subjects’ perception of these two issues in the laboratory. In particular, using a real-effort experiment as a tool,
we aim at measuring both the labor supply and the consensus as the level of taxation and the efficiency of the Welfare State
vary. Our finding is that subjects significantly react to a change in the tax rate, while the performance of the Welfare State
affects subjects’ preferences but not their labor supply. 相似文献
6.
We use a large-scale internet experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers that are programmed to follow
one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process,
fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We explore how subjects’ performances depend
on their opponents’ learning algorithm. Furthermore, we test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage
in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms
are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. 相似文献
7.
Bodo Sturm 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2008,40(4):467-487
We discuss selected methodological problems of previous Double Auction (DA) experiments and test the hypothesis that a Multiple
Unit Double Auction (MUDA) is able to prevent market power in an emissions trading market. Additionally, we analyze how the
information subjects receive about the market structure and different levels of subjects’ experience influence the behavior.
Based on a larger number of independent observations than analyzed in previous studies, the experiment generates two main
results. First, emissions trading markets ruled by a MUDA realize a high degree of efficiency even under market power conditions.
However, a MUDA is, in general, not able to restrict market power. We observe persistent price discrimination in two market
power environments, i.e., the distribution of profits is strongly shifted in favor of the strong market side without greatly
harming efficiency. This result is independent of the information to subjects about the market structure. Second, when subjects
are experienced, the efficiency is higher and the ability of the strong market side to exercise market power declines strongly.
However, the variability of behavior is large and the strong market side is still able to realize supracompetitive profits
in some groups.
相似文献
8.
This study reports a laboratory experiment wherein subjects play a hawk–dove game. We try to implement a correlated equilibrium
with payoffs outside the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoffs by privately recommending play. We find that subjects are
reluctant to follow certain recommendations. We are able to implement this correlated equilibrium, however, when subjects
play against robots that always follow recommendations, including in a control treatment in which human subjects receive the
robot “earnings.” This indicates that the lack of mutual knowledge of conjectures, rather than social preferences, explains
subjects’ failure to play the suggested correlated equilibrium when facing other human players.
We are grateful for financial support provided by the Purdue University Faculty Scholar program and the Asociación Méxicana
de Cultura, as well as for the valuable research assistance provided by Shakun Datta and Marikah Mancini. We received helpful
comments from Shurojit Chatterji, David Cooper, Arthur Schram, Ricard Torres, an anonymous referee, and from conference and
seminar participants at Royal Holloway, the University of Amsterdam, Purdue University, the Economic Science Association and
the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. 相似文献
9.
We report the results of experiments conducted over the internet between two different laboratories. Each subject at one site
is matched with a subject at another site in a trust game experiment. We investigate whether subjects believe they are really
matched with another person, and suggest a methodology for ensuring that subjects’ beliefs are accurate. Results show that
skepticism can lead to misleading results. If subjects do not believe they are matched with a real person, they trust too
much: i.e., they trust the experimenter rather than their partner.
JEL Classification C9 相似文献
10.
The paper presents the results of an economic experiment in which the effects of fees on allocative efficiency of tradable
utilization permits (e.g. pollution permits) are explored. Laboratory subjects (university students) play the roles of firms
whose generic product requires a specific input or permits. Scarcity is exogenously introduced by a fixed supply of tradable
production permits. Three treatments are compared: No fee imposed (N); a fixed tax per permit (T); and partial retraction
of permits and subsequent redistribution by auction (A). Treatments T and A represent two different ways of imposing fees,
which are designed to be revenue equivalent. Our results indicate that, after controlling for deviation of permit prices from
a prediction based on fundamentals, fees have an impact on distribution of permits. Interestingly, a fixed tax enhances efficiency
compared to the case of no fees while retraction and reallocation by auction tends to reduce efficiency. Apparently, subjects’
decision making is affected by the imposition of fees, but how and to what extent depends on the method used. 相似文献
11.
Since 1945, both Spain and Portugal have experienced significant market transformations. These countries were both led by
dictators for many years until the mid 1970s when each moved toward more democratic governments and more open markets. As
a result, each experienced significant changes in output with Spain’s becoming a model for proper market based transformations.
Although Portugal’s transformation has been less impressive it experienced improvements too. This paper uses a Parente and
Prescott (J Polit Econ 102(2), 298–321, 1994; 2000) type model to investigate the recent transformations in each of these countries and quantify the extent to which barriers
to technological adoption may have played for these two development experiences. Our results indicate that from 1945 to 2003
these barriers have fallen considerably but remain high, and are somewhat higher in Portugal than in Spain. 相似文献
12.
This paper tests between fads and bubbles using a switching regression to distinguish between competing models. Two main
features of the bubbles model distinguish it from the fads model. First, the bubbles model implies that returns are drawn
from regimes which differ in the way returns vary with deviations from fundamental prices. Second, the bubbles model implies
that deviations from fundamental price will help predict regime switches. Using US data for 1926–89, we find evidence which
is consistent with the fads model even when we allow for variation in expected dividend growth rates and expected discount
rates. However, the restrictions which the fads model implies for a more general switching-regression specification are rejected.
The rejections point in the direction of the bubbles model, although not all of the implications of the bubbles model are
supported by the data.
First Version Received: October 2000/Final Version Received: October 2001 相似文献
13.
The organized wholesale electric power markets in the United States are characterized by structural market power, and would
not produce competitive results absent administrative intervention. Market power mitigation is a fundamental and permanent
part of the market design for the organized wholesale electricity markets. Market power mitigation is essential to FERC’s
policy of relying on competition to regulate electric wholesale power prices, consistent with its mandate under the Federal
Power Act. Controversy has arisen about how to ensure that the markets clear on the basis of offers that have been determined
to be competitive. Specifically, the issue is what institution and function is best situated to provide the initial critical
determination about whether a participant’s offer is competitive. Despite recent clarification of FERC policies on the market
monitoring function, the roles of market administrators and market monitors are a potential source of confusion and counterproductive
institutional conflict. The FERC should refine and clarify its policy in this area by according exclusive responsibility to
institutional, independent market monitors to monitor participants’ conduct and the potential for the exercise of market power
through ex ante review of cost-based offers used in market power mitigation, subject to review by FERC. 相似文献
14.
Gunther Tichy 《Empirica》2011,38(1):107-130
An analysis of the monetary authorities’ reports for 2005 to 2007 reveals that they were well aware of the risks of the financial
crisis. They, however, tended to overemphasise the risks outside their control and to neglect those, at least partially under
their control. Central banks should and could have acted already in 2005. Academic studies and their own assessments clearly
indicated an accumulation of risks. Monetary authorities didn’t react as (1) they believe in self-regulating markets, and
(2) in monetary instruments’ ineffectiveness to prevent bubbles, as well as (3) their tendency to assigning an extremely low
probability to potential risks. This is not untypical for expert assessments: Risk assessment for complex systems is extremely
complicated. If feasible at all, it would require extraordinarily complex techniques to take into account the tight coupling
of system components and their complex interaction. This will not be possible in the foreseeable future. As a result reducing
the system’s complexity appears to be the only way to reduce the probability and the severity of future financial crises. 相似文献
15.
Tetsuo Yamamori Kazuhiko Kato Toshiji Kawagoe Akihiko Matsui 《Experimental Economics》2008,11(4):336-343
We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of communication in a dictator game, while maintaining subjects’
anonymity. In the experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for his/her share before
the dictator dictates his/her offer. We found that the independence hypothesis that voice does not matter is rejected. In
particular, if the request is for less than half of the pie, the dictator’s offer increases as the recipient’s request increases.
Additionally, there is no dictator who is other-regarding and, at the same time, does not react to the recipient’s request.
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
16.
This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to study how subjects’ decision making may be affected by the timing
of participation payments (or show-up fees). The experiment follows Davis et al. (J. Econ. 30:69–95, 2004) where subjects were asked to make a sequential purchase decision and were given the opportunity to purchase information
about the value of a good prior to a decision to purchase the good itself. There, subjects purchased information less often
than expected which was interpreted as risk-seeking behavior. Here, we test a payment hypothesis by varying the timing of
the participation payment. Payment of a show-up fee before the decision-making stages of the experiment increases information
purchase, which we interpret as an increase in risk-averse behavior. 相似文献
17.
Timo Tammi 《Constitutional Political Economy》2011,22(4):373-397
Many people may suffer from moral biases when making allocation decisions having consequences to others. This means that some
factors hinder people from finding, or constructing, their true social preferences in those situations. As a counterforce
to this, numerous devices of moral priming have evolved—such as parenting, formal education as well as various formal and
informal contracting procedures. This paper focuses on the influences of social identity and the perceived fairness of contracting
procedures on subjects’ behaviour in situations of allocation decisions. The analysis of experimental data suggest, first,
that males are less likely than females to engage in other-regarding behaviour in a pre-agreement situation where two active
players divide an endowment among themselves and a third, passive, player. However, this difference disappeared after the
joint contract of the rule of dividing the endowment was made. Second, it was found that students of economics are less likely
than other students to behave in an other-regarding way before the contract; this difference remained also in decisions after
the contract was made. Finally, both a random selection mechanism and a majority voting mechanism were rated fair by the majority
of the subjects. However, the data suggests that fairness ratings are positively associated with compliant behavior only in
the case of the majority voting mechanism. 相似文献
18.
This paper presents an experimental study of dynamic indefinite horizon R&D races with uncertainty and multiple prizes. The
theoretical predictions are highly sensitive: small parameter changes determine if we should expect technological competition,
and if so whether it is sustained, or if the market converges into one with entrenched leadership and lower aggregate R&D.
The subjects’ strategies are far less sensitive. In most of the treatments, the R&D races tend to converge to entrenched leadership.
We propose and apply a quantal response extension of Markov perfection that is qualitatively and largely quantitatively consistent
with the experimental observations. 相似文献
19.
The paper considers what can be inferred about experimental subjects’ time preferences for consumption from responses to laboratory
tasks involving tradeoffs between sums of money at different dates, if subjects can reschedule consumption spending relative
to income in external capital markets. It distinguishes three approaches identifiable in the literature: the straightforward
view; the separation view; and the censored data view. It shows that none of these is fully satisfactory and discusses the
resulting implications for intertemporal decision-making experiments.
JEL Classification C90, C91, D90, D91, D11, D12 相似文献
20.
We use laboratory experiments to examine the effect of firm size asymmetry on the emergence of price leadership in a price-setting
duopoly with capacity constraints. Independent of the level of size asymmetry, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of our
timing game predicts that the large firm is the price leader. Experimental data show that price leadership by the large firm
is frequent, but simultaneous moves are also often observed. Profit outcomes in the previous period affect the subjects’ decisions
to announce or wait in a way that hampers convergence to the equilibrium. Furthermore, while both small and large firms display
a strong tendency to wait to announce their price when firm size asymmetry is low, they often set prices early when size asymmetry
is high. Prices are higher when price setting is sequential rather than simultaneous and when firm size asymmetry is high.
Hence, price leadership by either type of firm has an anti-competitive effect that is more pronounced when the size difference
between firms is large. 相似文献