美国次级债危机产生条件的警示

一．美国次级债危机的产生条件 （一）次级债的由来 美国抵押贷款市场的“次级”（Subprime）及“优惠级”（Prime）是以借款人的信用条件作为划分界限的。次级抵押贷款是指美国向信用分数较低、收入证明缺失、负债较重的人提供住房贷款,其利率通常比最优级贷款利率高2％～3％。     

美国贷款利率水平对我国贷款利率水平影响的实证检验

本文对美国国内贷款利率与中国国内贷款利率进行了协整分析,通过实证检验发现,由于中国经济实际开放性所限,国内贷款利率水平受国际贷款利率影响存在三个月左右的时滞。此外,在我国汇率改革之前,我国贷款利率与国外贷款利率之间关系微弱。但是,自从我国进行汇改之后,我国贷款利率与国外贷款利率之间关系紧密,两者之间存在格兰杰因果关系。     

固定利率住房抵押贷款定价研究——基于隐含期权视角

由于缺乏经验,我国商业银行固定利率住房抵押贷款定价存在不合理性,既影响了固定利率住房抵押贷款业务的健康发展,又导致了借贷双方风险与收益的不匹配。在市场利率服从几何布朗运动的基础上．本文从隐含期权视角出发构建固定利率住房抵押贷款单位风险收益最大化模型,并求出最优解,为商业银行固定利率住房抵押贷款定价提供理论和技术参考。     

国际贷款利率水平对我国贷款利率水平的影响

在开放经济条件下,跨国公司在全球进行融资时会比较各国融资成本,因此,各国的贷款利率之间存在一定的联系,各国利率之间存在内在联系。本文对美国国内贷款利率与中国国内贷款利率进行了分析,通过实证检验发现,由于中国经济实际开放性所限,中国国内贷款利率水平受国际贷款利率影响存在三个月左右的时滞。此外,在我国汇率改革之前,我国贷款利率与国外贷款利率之间关系微弱。但是,自从我国进行汇改之后,我国贷款利率与国外贷款利率之间关系紧密,两者之间存在格兰杰因果关系。     

基于Stackelberg博弈模型农业供应链应收账款融资策略分析

本文主要研究农业供应链金融,分别构建农产品供应商与银行的收益函数,将其期望收益利润最大化,运用逆向求解法逐步分析供应商的生产产量决策,以及银行的最优贷款利率的决策。研究结果表明,Stackelberg博弈存在均衡解,并分别求解了供应商的最优生产量与银行最优贷款利率的满足条件。     

商业银行小额贷款利率定价研究

在开拓小额贷款市场的同时控制和降低贷款风险的问题上,很多学者做了各种各样的理论分析并提出对策建议,不少商业银行也做了一些成功的尝试,其中的贷款利率定价问题是最核心的问题之一。本文主要针对小额贷款的贷款利率定价问题进行分析研究,利用贷款利率定价传统模型在贷款利率定价上做进一步的尝试,得出如下结论:小额贷款的利率确定应高于现行贷款利率水平,存在一个较高的最优利率区间,商业银行在此区间进行贷款定价不仅可以有效覆盖小额贷款风险,还有利于开拓中小企业客户和农村市场并作为银行新的利润增长点,进而有利于解决中小企业融资难和农民贷款难问题。     

缜思密断,全面剖析次贷风波的秘密

次贷风波从2006年春季在美国开始逐步显现,其直接原因是美国的利率上升和住房市场持续降温。在2006年之前的5年里,由于美国住房市场持续繁荣,加上当时美国利率水平较低,美国的次级抵押贷款市场迅速发展。而随着美国短期利率的提高,次级抵押贷款的还款利率也大幅     

美国利率市场化进程及其对我国银行业的启示

正美国利率市场化的推进情况美国利率市场化的实质是银行业存款利率的自由化和市场化。与目前中国金融业所面临全面利率市场化改革不同,美国银行业的贷款利率一直是"无管制"或自由化的。在20世纪80年代之前,美国银行业流行将优惠利率作为其信贷资产的定价基准利率。20世纪80年代之后,美国银行业更频繁地将定存(CD)、伦敦同业拆放利率(LIBOR)乃至联邦基金利率(Fed Funds rate)作为贷款的定价基准。而在整个利率体系之中,特别是自     

中美消费贷款定价比较及其启示

利率至今尚未完全放开的中国与市场经济条件下的美国,在消费贷款定价方面存在诸多差异,如影响两国消费贷款定价的因素、消费贷款定价的模型与模式以及消费贷款的实际利率计算方法等都不完全一样,然而,人民币利率市场化却指日可待。因此,我国商业银行有必要借鉴美国经验,尽快构建适应利率市场化需要的消费贷款定价模式、实现计息方法和还款方式的多样化,从而增强其市场竞争能力。     

什么是次贷危机

次贷是次级按揭贷款，是给信用状况较差，没有收入证明和还款能力证明，其他负债较重的个人的住房按揭贷款。相比于给信用好的人放出的最优利率按揭贷款，次级按揭贷款的利率更高。对贷款人而言，由于还款的可能性不太高，那么贷款利息就要高。对金融机构而言风险大，收益也大。放出这些贷款的机构，为了资金尽早回笼，于是就把这些贷款打包，发行债券，同样，次贷的债券利率当然也比优贷的债券利率要高。     

Information Losses in a Dynamic Model of Credit

This paper examines dynamic information losses associated with loan terminations. We assume that the aggregated returns of current borrowers contain information about the mean returns to future borrowers. In a competitive loan market, the value of this information is not fully internalized by individual borrowers and lenders, and loan decisions fail to be first best. Introducing heterogeneous borrowers, who know their own risk characteristics better than lenders, safer borrowers are less willing to borrow when risk premia rise. As they cease borrowing, the information generated in credit markets becomes noisier and this tends to increase risk premia. The model produces alternating and persistent periods of “tight” and “loose” credit.     

西方银行贷款定价理论评述

作为金融中介理论的重要组成部分，银行贷款定价理论围绕对银行行为的探讨而展开，已形成了较完整的理论体系。本文选择三种有代表性的银行贷款定价理论——基于市场结构的贷款定价、基于关系型贷款的定价和最前沿的基于风险的贷款定价理论进行介绍与评价，以期为我国银行贷款定价实践提供理论指导。     

Do Loan Loss Provisions Affect the Credit Fluctuations in China’s Banking System?

ABSTRACT

The global financial crisis of 2008 sparked new ideas on pro-cyclical transmission in the financial system. The accounting treatment method of loan loss provisions differs between the accounting standards that banks use and the supervisory rules of banks. This fundamental difference has attracted wide attention from academics and regulators. This article studies whether bank loan loss provisions affect credit fluctuation in China’s banking system. We divide loan loss provisions into discretionary and non-discretionary loan loss provisions. We find that non-discretionary loan loss provisions result in greater credit fluctuation, whereas discretionary loan loss provisions have no significant impact on credit fluctuation. Further evidence shows that the relation between non-discretionary loan loss provisions and credit fluctuations does not vary among different types of banks. Overall, our study shows that non-discretionary loan loss provisions can increase credit fluctuation and therefore strengthen banks’ pro-cyclical behavior.     

The Effect of Forward‐looking Criteria and IFRS on the Informativeness of Banks’ Loan Loss Allowances: Evidence from Korea

This study analyses how forward‐looking criteria (FLC) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), as well as changes in accounting principles, affect the informativeness of banks’ loan loss allowances. The results indicate that although the relationship between non‐performing loans and loan loss allowances strengthened after the application of FLC, the relationship between non‐performing loans and loan loss allowances weakened and that between net charge‐offs and loan loss allowances strengthened after the application of IFRS, presumably because banks delayed the reflection of insolvent loans on loan loss allowances in the latter case. Moreover, the introduction of IFRS did not improve the ability to predict the future charge‐off scale using loan loss allowances, referred to as the ‘informativeness of loan loss allowances’. This result occurred because IFRS's incurred loss model does not incorporate the impact of macroeconomic situations into loan loss allowances in the early stage, although it does enhance the accuracy of loan loss allowances. By exploring the effect of accounting principles on the determinants of loan loss allowances, this study has implications for the assessment of loan loss allowances, capital adequacy and asset quality for stakeholders such as depositors, creditors, capital markets and financial supervisory authorities.     

Syndicated Leveraged Loans During and After the Crisis and the Role of the Shadow Banking System

In an article published in this journal in 1998, Nobel laureate Merton Miller argued that one of the best weapons available to national economies in their defense against the macroeconomic effects of banking crises is the availability of non‐bank financial institutions and products—or what we now refer to as the “shadow banking system.” Although Miller may have exaggerated the independence of bank‐ and market‐based sources of financing, the author argues that events during and after the recent crisis have shown Miller's claims about the importance of non‐bank investors in the provision of credit to be fundamentally correct. Critics of securitization and the shadow banking system tend to focus on the subprime mortgage story in which the sudden re‐pricing of credit risk and the resulting disappearance of investment demand for ABCP, private‐label mortgage‐related ABS, and ABS CDOs created unexpected and significant downward price pressure on those asset types. But the leveraged loan market tells a very different story. In contrast to the near complete disappearance of private mortgage securitizations, the extraordinary recovery of the U.S. syndicated leveraged loan market demonstrates that the relation between commercial and shadow banking has proved to be a highly productive and resilient one—and very much a two‐way street. When leveraged loans and CLOs experienced problems from 2007 through 2009 due primarily to the widespread liquidity and credit market disruptions that affected essentially all structured credit products, institutional investors in leveraged loans disappeared and the leveraged loan primary market imploded. But when institutional participants recognized the value of the underlying asset—corporate loans—and regained confidence in shadow‐banking products, leveraged lending by banks recovered quickly and dramatically. This outcome is viewed as vindicating Professor Miller's statement about the benefits of shadow markets and securitization— namely, the role of non‐bank investors in diversifying the risk of credit creation while at the same time improving the price discovery process in different markets. The recent history of the U.S. leveraged loan market demonstrates that shadow banking system participants play a critical role in meeting the total demand for such loans, and that the ebbs and flows from institutional leveraged loan markets are strongly connected with the health and integrity of the underlying leveraged bank loan market.     

Banking deregulation and credit risk: Evidence from the EU

This paper studies the effect of banking deregulation on credit risk. Its theoretical model shows that a bank is willing to invest more resources in screening borrowers when there is an entry threat, even though loan rates are driven lower. Thus, deregulation may result in improved loan quality and lower credit risk. This result is tested using bank-level balance sheet data and macroeconomic data for the European Union. The data reveal that competition intensified after the completion of the Second Banking Directive, while loan quality improved in most markets. Evidence is found that the loan quality improvement is associated with lower interest margin.     

我国个人住房贷款利率合理水平探讨

本文从个人住房贷款利率水平影响因素角度入手，运用中美两国住房贷款利率水平比较的方法对我国当前的个人住房贷款的合理利率水平进行分析。得出了我国目前的个人住房贷款利率水平偏高的基本结论，认为我国商业银行拥有高于国外同行的超额利润，房贷存在“暴利”，我国浮动利率住房贷款利率水平合理的范围应当在4-5％左右。     

Bank reputation in the private debt market

We examine the impact of lead arrangers' reputation on the design of loan contracts such as spread and fees charged. Controlling for the non-randomness of the lender–borrower match (self-selection bias), we find that the reputation of top tier arrangers leads to higher spreads, and that top tier arrangers retain larger fractions of their loans in their syndicates. These larger spreads are especially pronounced for borrowers without credit rating that have the most to gain from the certification assumed by virtue of a loan contract with a top tier arranger. This certification channel differs from the one found in public markets, where certification leads to a reduced spread offered to the best clients. These differences between public and private markets can be explained by differences in the way they operate and are structured. Interestingly, the effect is strongest for transactions done after the changes in the banking regulations (including the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994) that led to significant consolidations in the banking industry, including among the largest commercial banks.     

The influence of thrift competition on bank business loan rates

This article assesses the competitive influence of thrift institutions on the pricing of commercial loans made by commercial banks. Using detailed survey information on the rates that individual banks charge for various types of commercial loans, we attempt to determine which of various proposed weightings of thrift institutions, when incorporated in measures of market concentration, best explains loan rates. After considering several weighting schemes, including those designed to approximate current regulatory practice in analyzing the competitive impact of proposed bank mergers, we find that in all but one of the cases examined, the use of a positive weight for thrift institutions explains bank loan rates, if anything, more poorly than does a weighting of zero for such institutions.     

Alternative Information Sources and the Information Content of Bank Loans

This paper examines the information content of bank loan agreements. We differentiate borrowers according to financial analysts' percentage earnings forecast errors and most recent forecast revisions. The empirical results suggest that banks rely on other indicators as initial screening devices to determine where to best deploy their evaluation and monitoring efforts. If these other indicators are reliable and signal-improving prospects, banks do little further investigation. However, if the indicators are noisy and signal-declining prospects, banks have incentives to expend resources to investigate the borrowers, resulting in the production of valuable information.