VMCI 下基于批发价决策权转移的供应链效率改进研究

本文在VMCI 模式下,考虑销售努力水平对市场需求的影响,研究批发价决策权由供应商转移至零售商的两级供应链效率改进问题。假定零售商决策批发价和销售努力水平,供应商决策寄售量,建立了零售商主导的Stackelberg 博弈模型,证明了集中决策下的最优解和分散决策下的均衡解均存在且唯一,集中决策下的寄售因子大于分散决策下的对应值。随后,引入收入共享与销售努力成本共担契约,论证了系统中寄售因子保持不变、批发价降低,且当契约参数满足一定条件时,可实现帕累托改进,实现供应链的效率改进。最后,分析了契约参数对于系统决策变量及利润的影响。     

基于利他行为下的闭环供应链决策研究

随着行为运营管理的发展,利他、公平、信任等行为得到广泛的关注。文章构建一个由供应商和零售商的闭环供应链,供应商负责旧产品回收再加工。将利他行为引入到供应链中,研究利他属性对供应链决策的影响。研究发现,在该模型的供应链中,供应商的利他属性,对于供应链的回收率、零售商的利润、供应商的效用、供应链的整体利润都是有益的。而零售商的利他行为,有利也有弊,带来的效益是局部的。然后通过数值分析对结论作出解释和说明。     

具有自营平台的制造商与零售商的竞争与合作模型

本文研究了由1个制造商和1个零售商组成的供应链中的竞争与合作定价问题,其中制造商具有平台直销渠道。本文建立了竞争下的Stackelberg博弈模型,并分析了解的唯一性和合理性,然后给出合作定价模型和各渠道的定价策略,结果表明制造商和零售商最优策略是降低线下渠道销售价格而线上平台销售价格不变。通过对比表明供应链合作所增加的收益等于非合作下零售商的收益,并证明了顾客对线下渠道购买偏好越高,合作所增加的收益越大。进一步地,分析了在合作的情况下制造商是否放弃通过平台直销渠道销售商品的问题,并给出双渠道下供应链总利润比单渠道下总利润高的判定条件。最后给出一个算例,对所获得的结论进行验证和补充。     

库存与运输联合优化利润分配研究

零售商和供应商库存运输联合优化(ITIO)利润分配是关系到双方切身利益,库存运输联合优化业务能否顺利开展,供应链能否开拓新的利润增长点,供应链能否提高竞争力的重要问题.本文把讨价还价模型引入ITIO利润分配中,建立了ITIO利润分配讨价还价模型,并使用逆向归纳法解出模型的完美贝叶斯均衡,再对ITIO利润讨价还价的完美贝叶斯均衡进行比较分析.研究发现:当ITIO利润分配在第一阶段达成协议时,双方利润分配份额大小不仅受自身的耐心程度影响,还要受对方的耐心程度影响;耐心程度越高供应商在第一阶段的报价不一定越高;具有较高分散优化利润的供应商不一定总报较低的价格;当ITIO联合优化利润分配进入第二阶段,那么零售商在第二阶段的最优利润分配比例与其分散优化利润和ITIO联合优化利润正相关,与其对供应商分散优化利润分布估值下限负相关.     

供应链中牛鞭效应的需求信息模型分析

本文研究了市场需求信息服从AR(2)平稳可逆时间序列模型的简单二级供应链牛鞭效应.在零售商采用移动平均法预测市场需求,采用订货点法确定向供应商的订货量的前提下,对供应链牛鞭效应的影响因素进行了分析.分析表明对于服从AR(2)平稳可逆时间序列模型的需求,根据模型参数L、ρ1、ρ2的具体情况,采用适当的历史数据期数,可有效降低供应链牛鞭效应.     

不同博弈结构下基于利他偏好的双渠道供应链价格决策分析

本文将利他偏好引入双渠道供应链, 分析在供应商Stackelberg博弈、零售商Stackelberg博弈及Nash博弈3种结构中的渠道最优定价, 以及其所受利他偏好和博弈结构的影响。研究表明： 直销价不受利他偏好和博弈结构的影响; 批发价与供应商利他程度成反比, 与零售商利他程度成正比, 且其在供应商主导时最高, 零售商主导时最低; 零售价在不同博弈结构中受利他偏好的影响不同, 且其在Nash博弈中最低, 在其他两种博弈中, 利他程度更高的一方作为主导者时零售价更低。最后通过数值分析得出： 供应链成员的利润及总利润都与利他偏好有关, 且供应链成员利润在自身作为主导者时可达到最大,供应链总利润在Nsah 博弈中最大。     

制造商创新决策下的零售商信息共享策略

本文通过构建由单个制造商和两个零售商组成的二级供应链， 研究了信息不对称条件下的零售商信息共享和制造商产品创新策略， 并分析了横向信息泄露和创新的纵向溢出效应对零售商信息共享决策的综合影响。 发现在一定条件下， 制造商进行产品创新能够激励零售商自发共享市场需求信息， 尤其当制造商的创新能力较强时， 两零售商即使在信息泄露的情况下也有动机向制造商共享市场需求信号，并实现供应链各成员期望收益的 Pareto 改进。 当零售商没有动机自发共享信息时， 制造商可以通过一定范围内的补贴进行激励， 实现双方期望收益的提升。     

基于收益共享的供应链中断协调研究

本文假定市场需求不确定和供给存在中断危机，同时考虑订货过剩损失和缺货成本，研究了由零售商、主供应商和备份供应商组成的供应链网络，构建了收益共享合同协调模型，通过相关参数的设定达到供应链协调。供应链协调时的供货量及整体利润均大于分散模型；备份供应商的供货量及利润随着中断危机的增大而增加，零售商利润也随之增加。     

考虑渠道权力结构和风险规避的闭环供应链差异定价机制研究

本文研究了渠道权力结构和参与者的风险规避态度对闭环供应链差异定价机制的影响.假设制造商为风险中性者而零售商是风险规避者,利用均值——方差理论得到了制造商的期望利润函数和零售商的期望效用函数,在此基础上探讨制造商主导、零售商主导和垂直纳什均衡3种渠道权力结构下的闭环供应链差异定价策略与利润分配问题.本文还分别比较了不同权力结构下新制造产品和再制造产品的最优批发价格、最优零售价格、制造商的最优期望利润以及零售商的最优期望效用,推导了零售商的风险规避系数对最优价格和最优产量的影响,最后结合算例仿真了渠道成员利润(效用)随风险规避系数和消费者偏好系数等参数的变化规律,结果表明:制造商和零售商形成垂直纳什均衡时的闭环供应链绩效最优,其次是制造商主导的闭环供应链,最差的是零售商主导的闭环供应链.     

基于顾客比价行为的双渠道供应链定价决策研究

本文在考虑顾客比价行为的前提下,构建一个制造商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链系统,分析比价顾客的比例对于制造商与零售商在分散决策和集中决策模式下供应链整体利润、销售价格的变化,并通过算例验证研究结论。结果表明,随着比价顾客比例的提高,零售商销售价格上升,顾客体验价值上升,供应链整体利润在集中决策模式下较高,且呈上升趋势。     

Non-Discriminatory Pricing,Partial Backward Ownership,and Entry Deterrence

This article demonstrates that entry deterrence can occur when downstream incumbents hold non-controlling ownership shares of a supplier that does not price-discriminate. Such backward ownership implies a rebate on the input price for the incumbents and a competitive disadvantage for downstream entrants. An industry can use non-controlling ownership to change the pricing of a supplier in a way that appears to be accommodating but in fact deters entry. The supplier benefits from an obligation or a commitment to supply the customers under equal terms, as this induces profitable sales of ownership stakes to incumbent downstream firms.     

企业兼容竞争的博弈分析

本文以双寡头博弈模型为基础，考察了产品兼容对企业价格和利润的影响，就在位企业和新进入企业如何利用兼容策略增强其竞争力进行了分析。本文的结论是，借助于历史销售优势和适当的兼容策略，优势企业可以设置策略壁垒来阻止潜在进入者的进入和胁迫市场内的竞争对手退出市场，劣势企业也可以凭借生产兼容性能相当优越或单向兼容的产品参与市场竞争。     

When should a firm expand its business? : The signaling implications of business expansion

We examine an incumbent's trade-off between the improved efficiency that business expansion facilitates and the signaling role that business expansion plays in conveying information to potential entrants about the state of demand. We demonstrate that both separating and pooling equilibria survive the Intuitive Criterion. Essentially, in contrast to models with asymmetric information about unit cost, incumbents' benefits from investing in a signal are not necessarily monotonic in the state of demand. We investigate how the extent of informativeness of the outcome depends on the enhanced efficiency that the incumbent's expansion facilitates and the priors of the entrant.     

Cooperative behavior and information sharing in the e-commerce age

In this research, we consider a supplier-e-tailer supply chain where the e-tailer offers a full return policy (i.e., full refund) to its consumers and both the supplier and the e-tailer have their own information about the product demand of online selling. In this setting, we investigate what effective mechanism can be utilized to motivate the supplier and the e-tailer to share their information and also eliminate information distortion simultaneously, and how the e-tailer's return policy impacts the value of information sharing. Our results show that when the two-part tariff mechanism is implemented, both the supplier and the e-tailer would share their information conditionally. As a result, both the supplier and the e-tailer have their motivations to distort the shared information. However, the cooperative wholesale price with profit sharing is an effective mechanism to be utilized to motivate the supplier and the e-tailer to share their information truthfully and create a win-win solution. Furthermore, our results show that comparing to the two-part tariff mechanism, the cooperative wholesale price mechanism has a competitive advantage to help both the supplier and the e-tailer achieve higher profits. In addition, our results also indicate that both the supplier and the e-tailer have stronger motivation to implement an information sharing arrangement when a full return policy is offered to consumers.     

Properties of lot-sizing rules under lumpy demand

When a lot-sizing problem is viewed from a context of buyer–supplier relationships, an important phenomenon frequently encountered by the supplier is a so-called lumpy demand. However, there has been very little attention devoted to study the behaviour and performances of lot-sizing rules under the situation of lumpy demand. This paper presents both analytical and experimental studies of lot-sizing rules for lumpy demand situations. The analytical study is based on the assumption that constant demand occurs for every fixed number of periods. In the experimental study, both the quantity of and the time between demands are allowed to vary. The studies show that analytical results provide good insights in understanding the behaviour and performances of lot-sizing rules when more realistic situations are addressed in the experimental study. The paper also confirms that the results of lot-sizing studies under the situation of non-lumpy demand cannot be entirely generalised to the situation with lumpy demand.     

Inventory decisions for substitutable products with stock-dependent demand

We study a retailer’s inventory policy for two products. The products are substitutable and have inventory dependent demand, so a higher inventory level of a product increases its sales. We model the joint effect of demand stimulation and product substitution on inventory decisions by considering a single-period, stochastic demand setting. We provide the first order optimality conditions for the profit maximizing order quantities and interpret them using marginal analysis. We also consider two heuristic solutions that separately account for either demand stimulation or product substitution. Our numerical analysis reveals that the optimal policy by appropriately using sales information that quantifies substitution and demand stimulation can produce significantly higher profits. The profit benefits are lessened under certain circumstances, such as when the two products have similar critical fractile values, suggesting that in such instances the heuristics may be used effectively.     

Target pricing: Demand-side versus supply-side approaches

The practice of target pricing has been a key factor in the success of Japanese manufacturers. In the more commonly known demand-side approach, the target price for the supplier equals the manufacturer's market price less a percent margin for the manufacturer but no cost-improvement expenses are shared. In the supply-side approach, cost-improvement expenses are shared and the target price equals the supplier's cost plus a percent margin for the supplier. Using a general oligopoly and Cournot duopoly models, we characterize the equilibrium and optimal policy for each approach under various conditions. We find that sharing cost-reduction expenses allows the manufacturer using the supply-side approach to attain competitive advantage in the form of increased market share and higher profit, particularly in industrial conditions where margins are thin and price sensitivities are high.     

Productivity Dynamics and the Role of ‘Big‐Box’ Entrants in Retailing

We use a dynamic model to measure the impact of the entry of large stores on incumbents’ productivity separate from demand while accounting for local markets and the endogeneity of entry. Using data on all retail food stores in Sweden, we find that incumbents’ productivity increases after the entry of large stores and that the magnitude of the increase declines toward the upper part of the productivity distribution. Our findings highlight that large entrants drive productivity.