主权债务危机下的船舶融资市场

近期，欧美以及日本等发达经济体的主权债务危机愈演愈烈，对航运市场及需要强大资金支撑的船舶融资市场构成了巨大的威胁。本期我们选编了相关文章，供读者参考。     

Duration of sovereign debt renegotiation

In the period since 1990, sovereign debt renegotiations take an average of five years for bank loans but only one year for bonds. We provide an explanation for this finding by highlighting one key difference between bank loans and bonds: bank loans are rarely traded, while bonds are heavily traded on the secondary market. In our theory, the secondary market plays a crucial information revelation role in shortening renegotiations. Consider a dynamic bargaining game with incomplete information between a government and creditors. The creditors' reservation value is private information, and the government knows only its distribution. Delays in reaching agreements arise in equilibrium because the government uses costly delays to screen the creditors' reservation value. When the creditors trade on the secondary market, the market price conveys information about their reservation value, which lessens the information friction and reduces the renegotiation duration. We find that the secondary market tends to increase the renegotiation payoff of the government but decrease that of the creditors while increasing the total payoff. We then embed these renegotiation outcomes in a simple sovereign debt model to analyze the ex ante welfare implications. The secondary market has the potential to increase the government ex ante welfare when the information friction is severe.     

Analytics of sovereign debt restructuring

This paper develops a simple theoretical model to analyse recent proposals on restructuring of sovereign bonds. We find that collective action clauses (CACs) inserted in bonds resolve the inefficiencies caused by intra-creditor coordination problems providing that all parties have complete information about each other's preferences. In such a world, statutory mechanisms, such as international bankruptcy courts, are unnecessary. This is no longer the case when the benefits from reaching a restructuring agreement are private information to the debtor and its creditors due to inefficiencies caused by the debtor-creditor bargaining problem.     

欧洲债务危机对中国经济的影响分析

随着希腊经济危机的加剧,成为全球关注的热点。由于,欧盟在处理希腊债务危机的问题上没有得到有效的解决,使得希腊债务危机进一步蔓延,导致银行危机与债务危机并发,逐渐扩散的整个欧元区,大致欧洲出现了严重的债务危机。本文通过对欧洲债务危机的分析,着重研究欧洲债务危机对中国经济的影响。     

Optimal reserve management and sovereign debt

Most models currently used to determine optimal foreign reserve holdings take the level of international debt as given. However, given the sovereign's willingness-to-pay incentive problems, reserve accumulation may reduce sustainable debt levels. In addition, assuming constant debt levels does not allow addressing one of the puzzles behind using reserves as a means to avoid the negative effects of crisis: why do not sovereign countries reduce their sovereign debt instead? To study the joint decision of holding sovereign debt and reserves, we construct a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model calibrated to a sample of emerging markets. We obtain that the reserve accumulation does not play a quantitatively important role in this model. In fact, we find the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all. This finding is robust to considering interest rate shocks, sudden stops, contingent reserves and reserve dependent output costs.     

欧洲主权债务危机对中国的影响及启示

对中国的欧洲主权债务危机从形成到逐步影响中国的各个方面进行详尽分析和探讨,包括对汇率、对外贸易、金融政策等的影响,指出应以欧洲主权债务危机为戒,改进中国地方政府债务的监管体制.     

Consequences of the debt crisis

The indebtedness of the developing countries to foreign creditors which has expanded rapidly over the past few years rose by a further 18% last year and by the end of the year had reached the estimated level of $626 billion. The debt servicing for this sum amounted to $131 billion.¹ The rescheduling operations required as a result of the accumulating payment difficulties reached a volume of $40 billion. According to the Mexican Minister of Finance, the restructuring of Mexico's foreign debts alone was the largest multilateral support operation in modern financial history.²     

Infrastructure,returns to scale and sovereign debt

This paper explores the nexus between the issue of sovereign debt and investment in infrastructure, emphasizing the case of economies of scale. The focus is on debt contracts that are incentive compatible. It is shown that public and private financial institutions may need to lend amounts above some threshold to force the borrowing sovereign to take full advantage of any economies of scale that may be present. Low levels of lending may or may not result in default. Sufficiently high amounts of lending may be needed to ensure repayment and may prove to be mutually beneficial.     

Credit cycle dependent spread determinants in emerging sovereign debt markets

We address credit cycle dependent sovereign credit risk determinants. In our model, the spread determinants' magnitude is conditional on an unobservable endogenous sovereign credit cycle as represented by the underlying state of a Markov regime switching process. Our explanatory variables are motivated in the tradition of structural credit risk models and include changes in asset prices, interest rates, implied market volatility, gold price changes and foreign exchange rates. We examine daily frequency variations of U.S. dollar denominated Eurobond credit spreads of four major Latin American sovereign bond issuers (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela) with liquid bond markets during March 2000 to June 2011. We find that spread determinants are statistically significant and consistent with theory, while their magnitude remarkably varies with the state of the credit cycle. Crisis states are characterized by high spread change uncertainty and high sensitivities with respect to the spread change determinants. We further document that not only changes of local currencies, but also changes of the Euro with respect to the U.S. dollar are significant spread drivers and argue that this is consistent with the sovereigns' ability to pay.     

How fiscal rules can reduce sovereign debt default risk

The economic literature has been forceful on the role of fiscal institutions in attenuating economic fluctuations. In particular, the implementation of fiscal rules has gained importance in the toolkit of macroeconomic stabilization policies. This paper studies the effect of fiscal rule implementation on sovereign default risk and on the probability of capital flow reversals for a large sample of countries including both developed and emerging market economies. Results indicate that fiscal rules are beneficial for macroeconomic stability, as they significantly reduce both sovereign risk and the probability of a sudden stop in countries that implement them. These results, which are robust to various empirical specifications, have important policy implications specially for countries that have relaxed their fiscal rules in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.     

Renegotiation, collective action clauses and sovereign debt markets

Collective action clauses (CACs) are provisions specifying that a supermajority of bondholders can change the terms of a bond. We study how CACs determine governments' fiscal incentives, sovereign bond prices, and default probabilities in environments with and without contingent debt and IMF presence. We claim that CACs are likely to be an irrelevant dimension of debt contracts in current sovereign debt markets because of the variety of instruments utilized by sovereigns and the implicit IMF guarantee. Nonetheless, under a new international bankruptcy regime like that recently proposed by the IMF, CACs can increase significantly the cost of borrowing for sovereigns, contrary to what is suggested in previous empirical literature.     

欧美债务危机对我国电子商务业的影响及策略探析

尽管欧美债务危机的肆虐使得我国电子商务业面临业务扩展受限,行业盈利率下降,融资困难等问题。但同时也为国内电子商务业提供了市场机会增加,转型意识得以提升,获得定向宽松政策扶持,海外投资和效益凸显等机遇。因此,国内电子商务业应积极通过转变发展方式,审慎选择融资渠道,提高非系统风险防范力度等措施实现自身又好又快发展。     

The international debt crisis and the banks

When the international debt crisis broke in 1982 it appeared for a time that the crisis might engulf the international banking system. What part did the banks play in the creation of the problem? What was their role in overcoming the crisis? Dr. Otmar Emminger, former President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, answers these questions and names the consequences the crisis will have on the international banking industry.     

Interaction in euro area sovereign bond markets during the financial crisis

Applying a t-DCC-GARCH model to daily spread data, four phases of interaction in euro area sovereign bond markets are identifi ed between January 2008 and June 2013. The initial period (January-October 2008) is followed by a general rise in pairwise correlation values between November 2008 and late 2009/early 2010. Interaction then declines on a piecemeal basis up to early 2012. In autumn 2012, coinciding with the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions programme by the European Central Bank, there is evidence of some reengagement of bond markets with one another. Policy then seems to have had an infl uence on euro area sovereign bond market behaviour. While it can act to calm markets, policy may also be unduly infl uencing market dynamics and raising moral hazard issues.     

“Rules of thumb” for sovereign debt crises

This paper investigates the economic and political conditions that are associated to the occurrence of a sovereign debt crisis. We use a new statistical approach (Classification and Regression Tree) that allows us to derive a collection of “rules of thumb” that help identify the typical characteristics of defaulters. We find that not all crises are equal: they differ depending on whether the government faces insolvency, illiquidity, or various macroeconomic risks. We also characterize the set of fundamentals that can be associated with a relatively “risk-free” zone. This classification is important for discussing appropriate policy options to prevent crises and improve response time and prediction.     

The debt crisis and IMF policy

The discussions anticipating the annual joint meeting of the IMF and the World Bank in Berlin this autumn have again drawn the increased attention of a broader public to the debt problems of the developing countries. Alternative groups are planning to hold an anti-congress, in which especially the role of the IMF and the World Bank in this connection are to be subjected to a critical examination. The following article describe the basic points of criticism.     

Central banking after the Latin American debt crisis

Stabilization and structural reform that has characterized Latin America as of late is based upon an increasing adherence to sound fiscal and monetary policies. The economic deprivation brought on by the debt crisis has served as a powerful impetus behind these developments. The macroeconomic policies leading up to the crisis have been put aside in favor of a legal framework of transparent budgetary practices and an independent central bank. Fraga's article analyzes the recent evolution of the central banks in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela.     

Crisis costs and debtor discipline: the efficacy of public policy in sovereign debt crises

Recent debate on the reform of the international financial architecture has highlighted the potentially important role of the official sector in crisis management. We examine how such public intervention in sovereign debt crises affects efficiency, ex ante and ex post. Our results shed light on the scale of capital inflows and the implications for debtor country output of such a regime. The efficacy of measures such as officially sanctioned stays on creditor litigation depend critically on the quality of public sector surveillance and the size of the costs of sovereign debt crises.