Can financial statement analysis beat consensus analysts’ recommendations?

We examine whether investors can exploit financial statement information to identify companies with a greater likelihood of future earnings increases and whether stocks of those companies generate 1-year abnormal returns that exceed the abnormal returns from following analysts’ consensus recommendations. Our approach summarizes financial statement information into a “predicted earnings increase score,” which captures the likelihood of 1-year-ahead earnings increases. We find that, within our sample of consensus recommendations, stocks with high scores are much more likely to experience future earnings increases than stocks with low scores. A hedge portfolio strategy that utilizes our approach within each consensus recommendation level generates average annual abnormal returns of 10.9 percent over our 12-year sample period, after controlling for previously identified risk factors. These abnormal returns exceed those available from following analysts’ consensus recommendations. Our results show that share prices and consensus recommendations fail to impound financial statement information that helps predict future earnings changes.     

Do star analysts know more firm-specific information? Evidence from China

Using a unique database in China, we extend the literature to further distinguish the information production role of star vs. non-star analysts. We confirm the general conclusion of a positive association between analyst coverage and stock return synchronicity measured by a firm’s R² in China. The findings from star analysts, however, show that star analyst coverage actually decreases stock return synchronicity. We contend that the firm-specific human capital in star analysts helps the analysts overcome the challenges of information production in an emerging market. The superior firm-specific human capital argument of star analysts is further supported by the negative association of star analysts’ firm-specific experiences and stock return synchronicity. Our conclusions are robust to different specifications of star analyst presence and different definitions of analysts’ firm-specific experiences. We also find that star analysts exhibit a more accurate earnings forecast than non-star analysts.     

Do dividend initiations signal a reduction in risk? Evidence from the option market

We investigate whether dividends convey information about the risk of a company by examining the reaction of implied volatility in the option market to the announcement of a dividend initiation. Implied volatility decreases after the announcement and the magnitude of the decline in volatility is positively related to both the magnitude of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the equity markets and the size of the dividend. Additionally, firms with weaker (stronger) corporate governance experience larger (smaller) declines in implied volatility. Cross sectional analysis shows that a one-standard deviation decline in measures of risk increases the 2-day CAR by 74–137 basis points. Our results suggest that dividend initiations signal declining firm risk.     

Why Do Firms Switch Banks? Evidence from China

This article uses a sample of matched firms-banks data in China over the period 1999–2012 to determine the drivers of firms switching behavior from one bank relationship to another. The results show that the principal driver of a switching action is the credit needs of the firm. The binding force of the Communist Party in state-owned banks and enterprises would suggest that switching should be a rare phenomenon in Chinese commercial relations. But switching occurs. The findings support the extant literature that transparent firms are able to switch more readily than opaque firms. The results also suggest that banks that develop their fee income services are more effective in locking-in their borrowers and that firms tend to switch from state-owned banks to smaller non-state owned banks. However, in other areas switching does not conform with the mainstream explanations.     

Why Are CEOs Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural Estimation

I evaluate the forced CEO turnover rate and quantify effects on shareholder value by estimating a dynamic model. The model features learning about CEO ability and costly turnover. To fit the observed forced turnover rate, the model needs the average board of directors to behave as if replacing the CEO costs shareholders at least $200 million. This cost mainly reflects CEO entrenchment rather than a real cost to shareholders. The model predicts that shareholder value would rise 3% if we eliminated this perceived turnover cost, all else equal. The model also helps explain the relation between CEO firings, tenure, and profitability.     

Why do loans contain covenants? Evidence from lending relationships

Despite the importance of banks’ role as delegated monitors, little is known about how non-price terms of loan contracts are structured to optimize information production in a lending relationship. Using a large sample of corporate loans, this paper examines the effect of relationship lending on covenant choice. Consistent with information asymmetry theories, covenant tightness is relaxed over the duration of a relationship, especially for opaque borrowers. In contrast, the effect of lending relationship intensity on the number of covenants included in a loan follows an inverted U shape. I discuss potential explanations for this finding.     

Do financial analysts compel firms to make accounting decisions? Evidence from goodwill impairments

Review of Accounting Studies - This paper examines whether financial analysts’ presence compels recognition of goodwill impairments. Analysts could impact managers’ impairment decisions...     

Why Do Shoppers Use Cash? Evidence from Shopping Diary Data

Recent studies find that cash remains the dominant payment choice for small‐value transactions despite the prevalence of alternative payment methods such as debit and credit cards. An important policy question is whether consumers truly prefer using cash or merchants restrict card usage. Using unique shopping diary data, we estimate a payment choice model with individual heterogeneity, controlling for merchants' acceptance of cards. Based on a policy simulation imposing universal card acceptance among merchants, we find that overall cash usage would decrease by only 8.0 percentage points, implying that cash usage in small‐value transactions is driven mainly by consumer preferences.     

Changes in analysts’ stock recommendations following regulatory action against their brokerage

Review of Accounting Studies - Despite the importance of sell-side analysts in the capital markets, we know little about the effectiveness of routine monitoring of the sell-side industry. We...     

Why are firms unlevered?

In this paper, we examine why firms have no debt in their capital structure. We reject the hypothesis that zero-leverage policies are driven by entrenched managers attempting to avoid the disciplinary pressures of debt. These firms do not have weaker internal or external governance mechanisms. The debt initiation decisions of these firms are not preceded by shocks to their entrenchment, such as takeover threats or the emergence of activist blockholders. Our evidence supports the hypothesis that these firms are financially constrained. Zero-debt firms are small, young, conserve cash from cash-flow, and are more likely to lease their assets. When they have access to a line of credit, they face stricter covenants and higher all-in costs than comparable control firms. They lose market share in economic downturns, consistent with the financial constraints explanation, but inconsistent with theories of predation which suggest that they may be voluntarily stockpiling debt capacity.     

How gradualist are Chinese reforms? Evidence from rural income determinants

Gradualist reform (GR) is a strategy that implements partial and incremental reforms at the beginning but gradually deepens the reforms over time. Using income determinants in rural China as the measure of the GR hypothesis, this paper provides a direct test of the widely accepted claim that China has followed a GR strategy. In the sense that reform deepens, production factors should become more important income determinants over time. Our difference-in-difference analysis, based on a large panel dataset from fixed-site rural surveys conducted between 1986 and 2002, shows that the efficiency of return to production factors deteriorated over time instead. Households that had more production resources, such as land and labor, or that devoted more labor and time to entrepreneurial activities experienced better income growth in the 1980s, but households with better political status did so in the 1990s. Further difference-in-difference analyses show that these income patterns are related to an inefficient credit allocation due to government interference in the 1990s compared to market mechanisms in the 1980s. Overall, the empirical evidence on the income determinants and on rural finance does not support the GR hypothesis on China's reform path.     

Who was informative? Performance of foreign and local analysts’ stock recommendations during the Asian financial crisis

This paper examines the performance of foreign and local analysts’ stock recommendations in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea during the financial crisis of 1997–1998. Unlike most of the prior studies, our results provide strong evidence that neither of the two groups held a complete information advantage over the other during the period of crisis. Using a large dataset of analysts’ recommendations, we show that foreign analysts’ buy recommendations were more informative than local analysts’ buy recommendations, while the opposite held for sell recommendations, i.e. local analysts’ sell recommendations were more informative than foreign analysts’ sell recommendations. Our results provide evidence that neither of the frequently advanced explanations regarding relative performance of foreign and local analysts hold during the period of extreme uncertainty.     

How Integrated are Credit and Equity Markets? Evidence from Index Options

We study the extent to which credit index (CDX) options are priced consistent with S&P 500 (SPX) equity index options. We derive analytical expressions for CDX and SPX options within a structural credit-risk model with stochastic volatility and jumps using new results for pricing compound options via multivariate affine transform analysis. The model captures many aspects of the joint dynamics of CDX and SPX options. However, it cannot reconcile the relative levels of option prices, suggesting that credit and equity markets are not fully integrated. A strategy of selling CDX volatility yields significantly higher excess returns than selling SPX volatility.     

Do financial analysts' long-term growth forecasts matter? Evidence from stock recommendations and career outcomes

Prior literature portrays long-term growth (LTG) forecasts as nonsensical from a valuation perspective. Instead, we hypothesize that LTG forecasts signal high effort and ability to analyze firms' long-term prospects. We document stronger market response to stock recommendation revisions of analysts who publish accompanying LTG forecasts. We also hypothesize and find that these analysts are less likely to leave the profession or move to smaller brokerage houses. Consistent with Reg. FD's intention to promote fundamental analysis of long-term earnings prospects, post-Reg. FD observations drive our results. Overall, we identify previously undocumented benefits accruing to analysts who publish LTG forecasts.     

Why do managers avoid EPS dilution? Evidence from debt–equity choice

Survey evidence reveals that managers prefer to avoid dilution of earnings per share (EPS), though financial theory suggests it is irrelevant in firm valuation. We explore contracting and behavioral explanations for this apparent paradox using a large sample of debt–equity issuers. We first provide evidence that firms with greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are more likely to use EPS as a performance measure in bonus contracts. After controlling for possible endogeneity related to compensation contract design, we find that managers are more likely to avoid earnings dilution when their bonus compensation explicitly depends upon EPS performance. This effect is increasing in the magnitude of bonus compensation for this subset of firms; we document no such associations for the firms that do not use EPS in setting bonus pay. Additional tests of firms’ speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios and firms’ debt conservatism levels indicate that explicitly rewarding executives on EPS performance helps to resolve underleveraging problems. We also find that clientele effects are associated with managers’ aversion to earnings dilution. Our findings provide a deeper understanding of the factors that underlie the use of accounting performance in compensation contracts and new evidence on the implications of the contracting role of accounting in firm decision-making.     

Why Do Banks Go Abroad?—Evidence from German Data

This paper provides empirical evidence on the determinants of foreign activities of German banks. We use regionally disaggregated panel data for the years 1981–98 and distinguish foreign direct investment from total foreign assets of domestic banks, of their foreign branches and of their subsidiaries. Foreign activities are found to be positively related to demand conditions on the local market, foreign activities of German firms, and the presence of financial centers. This supports the hypothesis that German banks follow their customers abroad. Exchange rate volatility has some negative impact. EU membership and the abolition of capital controls seem to have exerted a greater influence on foreign assets than on FDI of German banks, thus weakly supporting the hypothesis that the two are substitutes.     

Why are Stock Splits Declining?

The percentage of firms undertaking stock splits has fallen from a peak of 23% in 1982 to less than 1% in 2009. Controlling for time trends and other economic determinants, the declining incidence of stock splits is significantly associated with a drop in household investors’ equity holdings and with a rise in household income. We also report a decline in the size of split factors that is associated with an increase in institutional ownership of equity and with an increase in household income. Collectively, the evidence is consistent with firms responding rationally to changes in investor characteristics.     

Are directors’ dealings informative? Evidence from European stock markets

Are directors’ dealings reports informative for outside investors? We analyze short-term announcement effects for 2782 companies from eight European countries between January 2003 and December 2009. We find significant announcement effects in four out of eight countries after directors’ dealings reports have been disclosed. For most countries, the magnitude of the announcement effect depends on transaction size, firm size, book-to-market ratio, and multiple trades by different insiders on the same trading day. The results are stronger for purchases than for sales. For France, Ireland, and Sweden, we find tentative evidence that the corporate position of an insider is connected to the size of the announcement effect.     

Why do (or did?) banks securitize their loans? Evidence from Italy

This paper investigates the ex ante determinants of bank loan securitization by using different econometric methods on Italian individual bank data from 2000 to 2006. Our results show that bank loan securitization is a composite decision. Banks that are less capitalized, less profitable, less liquid and burdened with troubled loans are more likely to perform securitization, for a larger amount and earlier.     

Why do firms engage in selective hedging? Evidence from the gold mining industry

The widespread practice of managers speculating by incorporating their market views into firms’ hedging programs (“selective hedging”) remains a puzzle. Using a 10-year sample of North American gold mining firms, we find no evidence that selective hedging is more prevalent among firms that are believed to possess an information advantage. In contrast, we find strong evidence that selective hedging is more prevalent among financially constrained firms, suggesting that this practice is driven by asset substitution motives. We detect weak relationships between selective hedging and some corporate governance measures but find no evidence of a link between selective hedging and managerial compensation.