分工演进对贸易政策的影响分析——基于交易成本的考虑

贸易政策同贸易理论是紧密联系在一起的.引入交易成本来分析分工演进对贸易政策的影响,不考虑交易成本条件下,贸易自由对于分工演进的国家是有利的;考虑交易成本条件下,随着分工演进,国家之间更加倾向于贸易谈判,最终结果为贸易自由化.但是由于各国交易效率不同,交易效率高的国家在贸易中获得的利益更多,而交易效率低的就会实行更多贸易保护.因此,我国需要降低交易成本,加强分工演进的速度,处理好国际之间的贸易摩擦.     

Specialization,product development,evolution of the institution of the firm,and economic growth

This paper considers the effects of the division of labor on economic growth and welfare in a general equilibrium environment where changes in individual specialization and product development can proceed simultaneously. The nature of the dynamic equilibrium is shown to depend on the interaction of transaction efficiency, economies of specialization, and economies of complementarity. Where the dynamic equilibrium involves evolution in the division of labor, this will be associated with increased per capita real income and hence economic growth. It is also shown that the emergence of firms is an aspect of the evolution of division of labor if transaction efficiency for a producer good is lower than that for labor used to produce this good.     

Uncertainty, Insurance, and Division of Labor

This paper develops an equilibrium model to investigate the relationships between transaction uncertainties, risk aversion, insurance, specialization, per capita real income, and productivity progress. It is shown that transaction uncertainties can restrict the division of labor; the level of division of labor decreases with the degree of risk aversion; insurance will promote the equilibrium level of division of labor, per capita real income, and productivity.     

THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND ROUNDABOUT PRODUCTION: ALLYN YOUNG REVISITED

Abstract.  This paper investigates Allyn Young's two important doctrines concerning the division of labor and roundabout production. First, apart from advancing the state of knowledge, the progressive division of labor that can occur within a given population encourages the adoption of more specialized, differentiated intermediate goods in the production process. Second, the level of division of labor and the extent of the market depend on each other. Using a general equilibrium model with increasing returns to specialization, economies of complementarity between intermediate goods, and transaction costs, we demonstrate that the level of division of labor and the number of intermediate goods increase concurrently as transaction conditions are improved.     

论比较优势的成本基础——从生产成本向“全成本”的拓展

贸易理论的历史演进表明,比较优势是一国参与国际分工和贸易的基本动因。古典、新古典和新贸易理论分别从劳动生产率、要素禀赋、生产规模等不同视角论证了基于生产成本的比较优势,进而可表达为"相对生产成本不等式"。随着制度、生态环境、"可持续性"等要素在国际贸易中日趋重要,使用制度要素所形成的交易成本、使用生态环境要素所形成的环境成本、耗费"可持续性"要素所形成的代际成本也逐步成为比较优势的成本基础。于是,可将使用或耗费广义要素的代价理解为"全成本",它构成了一国参与国际分工和贸易的比较优势的基础。     

Specialization, Information, and Growth: A Sequential Equilibrium Analysis

Pricing costs and information problems are introduced into a framework with consumer-producers, economies of specialization, and transaction costs, to predict the endogenous and concurrent evolution of the division of labor and of information concerning economic organization acquired by society. Concurrent evolution generates endogenous growth based on the tradeoff between gains from information about the efficient pattern of the division of labor—which can be acquired via experiments with various patterns—and experimentation costs, which relate to the costs of discovering prices. The concept of Walras sequential equilibrium is developed to analyze the social learning process which is characterized by uncertainties in the direction of the evolution and by a certain trend of the evolutionary process.     

劳动分工、交易效率与产业集群演进

文章运用古典经济学与新兴古典经济学思想,考察了劳动分工、交易效率与产业集群演进的互动关系,认为产业集群的形成与发展是一个劳动分工深化、交易效率提高的过程。在此基础上,文章对杨小凯的基于专业化经济的劳动分工模型进行了拓展和深化,以便对产业集群的演进机制进行深入分析。模型分析结果支持了文章的观点。因此,产业集群的形成与发展有其自身的内在规律。当前,政府更为紧迫的是要注重产业集群软环境的建设,以此降低交易费用,促进产业集群的持续、健康发展。     

集群中企业的纵向分解

集群内企业间的分工不断深化的过程,在本质上是集群内企业不断纵向分解的过程.其根本的动力来自于产业的本地化.产业的本地化对集群内企业的生产成本和交易费用都将产生影响.笔者还发展了一个几何模型,并用其说明集群内企业的均衡纵向规模的决定和变化.     

公共物品、分工演进与经济增长

在新兴古典经济学框架内,公共物品既能通过提高交易效率来促进分工演进并最终带来经济增长,也可通过改善劳动效率直接促进产出的增加,经济增长中的两难冲突发生于专业化经济和公共物品对劳动时间这一资源的争夺,资源的最终分配取决于三个重要的经济参数即专业化经济系数、公共物品的交易效率系数和劳动效率系数的大小和变化情况。文章最后从历史经验的角度来论证主要结论的正确性。     

资源诅咒:一个新兴古典经济学框架

本文从分工这一角度出发,在一个包含偷抢的新兴古典经济学框架下分析自然资源对经济增长的效应,内生化了资源诅咒假说.分析表明,丰富的人均资源本身会提高分工的门槛,使得人们难以形成有效的分工结构,从而抑制经济增长.另外,由于资源丰富国家往往伴随高的偷抢水平,这也降低了分工合作的可能性及其经济绩效.本文的政策含义是,为了避免资源诅咒效应,必须打破现存的资源依赖格局,构建良好的制度基础,实现分工深化以促进经济增长.     

Optimal Fiscal Policies,Congestion and Over‐entry*

By shedding light on market imperfections and the congestion of public goods, we show that free entry in a market equilibrium will lead to excessive entry relative to the social optimum. Moreover, by specifying a generalized congestion function, it is also shown that different fiscal policies, including labor income tax, capital income tax and government expenditure, play a distinct role in terms of remedying market distortions. Specifically, optimal income taxes decrease with the degree of market imperfections in order to remove the monopoly inefficiency, while they increase with the degree of congestion in order to remedy the adverse externality caused by congestion distortion. Since a higher degree of increasing returns to an expansion in the variety of intermediate goods is found to intensify the congestion effect of government infrastructure expenditure, the optimal rule of government expenditure proposed by Barro (1990) should be modified.     

An Inframarginal Analysis of the Ricardian Model

This paper shows that a 2 × 2 Ricardian model has a unique general equilibrium, and the comparative statics of the equilibrium involve discontinuous jumps. If partial division of labor occurs in equilibrium, the country producing both goods would impose a tariff, whereas the country producing a single good would prefer unilateral free trade. If complete division of labor occurs in equilibrium, both countries would negotiate to achieve free trade. In a model with three countries, the country which does not have a comparative advantage relative to the other two countries, and/or which has low transaction efficiency, may be excluded from trade.     

论二元经济结构的转化趋向

促使二元经济结构转化是发展中国家经济发展的一个关键,然而,现有文献不能为经济结构的转化趋向提供有说服力的解释,这影响了人们对二元经济问题的认识及转化路径的选择。本文认为二元经济反差源于两部门不同的分工水平,结构转变的趋向必须在分工演进的视角下才可能得到解释。基于此,本文构建了一个新兴古典经济学模型,证明了随着分工组织的演进和分工水平的提高,二元经济结构转变体现为一个工业化,以及在此基础上的服务业的兴起和城市化水平提高的过程,而促使分工演进的关键是交易效率提高,或者说交易费用降低,理论推导的命题能够得到经验数据的支持,这样就内在一致地解释了二元经济结构在产业和空间等方面的转化趋向。     

论交易效率改进、自由选择与二元经济转型

本文通过三种产品的非线性模型再现杨小凯的城市化及二元经济理论,并讨论杨小凯在三种产品线性模型中省略了的不完全分工结构及存在户籍限制下的城乡人均真实收入差异问题。在实行二元经济转型的城乡统筹发展战略中,应该牢牢抓住提高分工水平这一经济发展的根本途径;城镇对提高全社会分工水平和人均真实收入具有重要意义,各地应根据不同情况选择合适的城市发展模式,加快城镇的发展;取消限制农村劳动力向城镇转移的户籍制度,消除对农民的歧视政策,降低农民进城的交易成本,为以非农收入为主的农民进入城镇创造便利条件;把农村基础设施建设摆在促进城乡交易效率改进、提高社会分工水平进而实现二元经济转型的战略地位,加快其发展进程。     

技术范式创新、价值网络重构与内生分工优势协同演进

依据产品市场需求变化的一般特征,探究了技术范式创新及其实现条件;依据技术范式轨迹转移对嵌入在产品结构体系中企业排序的影响,探究了技术范式创新下价值网络重构;根据市场交易效率对价值网络重构下企业内生分工演进的影响,探究了内生分工企业比较优势提升问题。最后,总结性揭示了技术范式创新、价值网络重构与内生分工优势的协同演进机理。     

Walrasian Equilibrium Computation, Network Formation, and the Wen Theorem

The paper studies the Walrasian equilibrium theory of division of labor for large economies with weakly convex production techniques and with the presence of transaction costs. Earlier results published by Wen are revised and generalized so that the new versions can be applied to a much larger category of economic models. A simple example demonstrates how the theoretical results can be used for Walrasian equilibrium computation and equilibrium network structure identification.     

农村居民消费结构变动的影响因素分析——基于新兴古典经济学与偏最小二乘回归的经验证据

分工演进表现为分工网络的细化、生产专业化与消费多样化的进程。笔者根据新古典经济学理论,选择一组涵盖专业化水平、交易效率和经济绩效的指标,运用偏最小二乘回归对农村居民消费结构变动的影响因素进行实证分析,结果显示了影响因素的阶段性差异。     

国外企业本质理论的演进与评述

本文在回顾企业理论演进史的基础上．比较与评述了各流派企业本质理论的主要观点。本文认为,各流派对企业本质的认识,从分析与讨论的焦点来看,集中体现为生产、交易与契约3个概念;而从认识与方法论来看．主要包括分工、交易成本与熊彼特传统3个角度。因此,对企业本质的认识还远未结束。     

Economic Development,International Trade,and Income Distribution

This paper applies the inframarginal analysis, which is a combination of marginal and total cost-benefit analysis, to investigate the relationship between division of labor, the extent of the market, productivity and inequality of income distribution. The model with transaction costs and exogenous and endogenous comparative advantages shows that as trading efficiency is improved the general equilibrium discontinuously jumps from autarky to partial division of labor with a dual structure, then to the complete division of labor where dual structure disappears. In this process different groups of individuals with different trading efficiency become involved in a certain level of division of labor at different stages of development. As the leading group becomes involved in a higher level of division of labor leaving others behind, a dual structure emerges and inequality increases. As latecomers catch up dual structure disappears and inequality declines. When the leader goes to an even higher level of specialization, dual structure occurs and inequality increases again. Inequality decreases again as the latecomers catch up. Hence, the equilibrium degree of inequality fluctuates in this development process. The relationship between inequality and productivity is neither monotonically positive nor monotonically negative. It might not be an inverted U-curve. The key driving force of economic development and trade is improvement in trading efficiency. Received January 8, 2002; revised version May 2, 2002 Published online: December 5, 2002     

Who should bear the resource cost of electronic transaction?

Using a search theoretic model of money, we examine an optimal allocation of the resource cost of electronic transaction. A transaction using cash incurs a buyer its carrying cost, while an electronic transaction incurs data-processing cost to the payment platform which then raises the resource cost from buyers or sellers using the electronic payment system. An equilibrium allocation of the resource cost implies the seller-take-all-burden scheme by which the payment platform can maximize the volume of electronic transactions by raising the resource cost only from sellers. However, the socially optimal allocation of the resource cost implies the buyer-take-all-burden scheme by which the resource cost should be raised only from buyers in order to maximize welfare.