A Characterization of Robust Sunspot Equilibria

In nonconvex environments, a sunspot equilibrium can sometimes be destroyed by the introduction of new extrinsic information. We provide a simple test for determining whether or not a particular equilibrium survives, or is robust to, all possible refinements of the state space. We use this test to provide a characterization of the set of robust sunspot-equilibrium allocations of a given economy; it is equivalent to the set of equilibrium allocations of the associated lottery economy. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D51, D84, E32.     

The Identification of Preferences from Equilibrium Prices under Uncertainty

The competitive equilibrium correspondence, which associates equilibrium prices of commodities and assets with allocations of endowments, identifies the preferences and beliefs of individuals under uncertainty; this is the case even if the asset market is incomplete. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, D80.     

Joint Adjustment of House Prices, Stock Prices and Output Towards Short‐run Equilibrium

A dynamic IS‐LM model including houses and stocks as additional assets will be analysed in this paper. Providing also housing services, a major consumption item for most households, houses create an additional link between the monetary and the real sector, distinct from the traditional wealth effect channel. We analyse the adjustment path of output, house prices and stock prices after policy shocks within a rational expectation setup. Depending crucially on the elasticity of housing services demand, different reaction patterns of asset prices will emerge. The results are contrasted with relevant empirical findings, particularly Lastrapes (Journal of Housing Economics, 11 (2002), pp. 40–74), leading to the identification of plausible elasticity ranges. The analysis sheds new light on the ongoing discussion about demand effects from changing real estate wealth and about determinants of house price fluctuations.     

Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium

Summary We show by an example that the sunspot equilibria of a competitive economy are not equivalent to the correlated equilibria if sunspots generate transfers between (extrinsic) states of nature (through a contingent commodities market). Nevertheless, we prove that the sunspot equilibrium allocations of a standard overlapping generations economy coincide with the (strategic form) correlated equilibrium allocations of a natural market game mimicking the economy.     

A Unifying Pair of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Existence Results

For games with a measure space of players a tandem pair, consisting of a mixed and a pure Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence result, is presented. Their generality causes them to be completely mutually equivalent. This provides a unifying pair of Cournot-Nash existence results that goes considerably beyond the central result of E. J. Balder (1995, Int. J. Game Theory24, 79-94, Theorem 2.1). The versatility of this pair is demonstrated by the following new applications: (i) unification and generalization of the two equilibrium distribution existence results by K. P. Rath (1996, J. Math. Econ.26, 305-324) for anonymous games, (ii) generalization of the equilibrium existence result of T. Kim and N. C. Yannelis (1997, J. Econ. Theory77, 330-353) for Bayesian differential information games, (iii) inclusion of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence results of P. R. Milgrom and R. J. Weber (1985, Math. Oper. Res.10, 619-632) and E. J. Balder (1988, Math. Operations Res.13, 265-276) for games with private information in the sense of J. C. Harsanyi (1967, Manage. Sci.14, 159-182). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.     

Equilibrium vengeance

The efficiency-enhancing role of the vengeance motive is illustrated in a simple social dilemma game in extensive form. Incorporating behavioral noise and observational noise in random interactions in large groups leads to seven continuous families of (short run) Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) that involve both vengeful and non-vengeful types. A new long run evolutionary equilibrium concept, Evolutionary Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (EPBE), shrinks the equilibrium set to two points. In one EPBE, only the non-vengeful type survives and there are no mutual gains. In the other EPBE, both types survive and reap mutual gains.     

Equilibrium Dynamics in a Two-Sector Model with Taxes

In this paper we are concerned with the equilibrium dynamics of a two-sector model of endogenous growth with distortionary taxes. We show that for certain parameters values and tax schemes every equilibrium orbit—except the steady state solution—is non-interior; i.e., there are times in which one of the sectors is inactive. This analysis confirms that in multisector models the set of easily checkable, universal conditions that can guarantee the interiority of equilibrium solutions is rather limited. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D90, E22.     

人民币均衡汇率最优决定研究

随着经济全球化和国际贸易、国际结算的迅猛发展,汇率成为经济中一个主要变量,影响着一国的经济,被企业社会所广泛关注。均衡汇率模型的核心是分析基本经济因素变化对均衡汇率的影响,并利用它们之间存在着的系统联系来估计均衡汇率。     

Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games

We study the existence of uniform correlated equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games. The correlation devices that we use are either autonomous (they base their choice of signal on previous signals, but not on previous states or actions) or stationary (their choice is independent of any data and is drawn according to the same probability distribution at every stage). We prove that any n-player stochastic game admits an autonomous correlated equilibrium payoff. When the game is positive and recursive, a stationary correlated equilibrium payoff exists. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.     

When inefficiency begets efficiency

Summary. Collective consumption decisions taken by the members of a household may prove inefficient. The impact on market performance depends on whether household inefficiencies are caused by inefficient net trades with the market or by inefficient distribution of resources within households. Inefficient internal distribution always results in inefficient equilibrium allocations. This leads us to consider competitive forces as disciplinary device for households. Competition of households for both resources and members can eliminate or reduce inefficient internal distribution.Received: 5 February 2003, Revised: 12 January 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D10, D51, D62.This paper is an abbreviated and revised version of Gersbach and Haller (2003). It addresses issues raised during seminar presentations at the University of Texas, Austin, and the Center for Economic Studies (CES), Munich. The hospitality and financial support of CES, the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Vienna, and the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Clive Bell for helpful comments and two referees for thoughtful suggestions.     

略论文化市场均衡中的第三方力量

主要考察文化市场均衡问题。回顾了国内外文化市场研究的现状,明确了文化市场中的第三方概念,讨论了文化市场中供给、需求和由它们形成的文化市场均衡类型,分析了第三方对于文化市场所产生的影响,并提出了繁荣文化市场的若干建议。     

不完全市场、惩罚函数及一般均衡

不完全市场一般均衡分析框架使我们更加了解现实金融市场中资产价格的形成机制,使用带有惩罚函数的同伦跟踪算法计算不完全市场经济一般均衡模型均衡(GEI),有效地克服了由于市场不完全引起的消费者资产组合无限扩张和需求函数不连续等传统GEI模型计算所固有的困难.     

试论两种不同类型的多重均衡模型的局限性

多重均衡模型是金融危机研究中重要的理论模型之一 ,本文研究发现 ,在危机文献中有很多所谓的“多重均衡模型”并非NASH均衡模型 ,而是不同预期下的市场均衡模型。本文分析了这种差别和多重均衡模型的局限性 ,从投资者对市场风险预期出发分析了“预期自我实现”的作用 ,对金融危机的传染提出新的解释并澄清了有关“基本面”和“预期自我实现”理论上的分歧。     

基于创造性破坏的产业创新均衡分析

创新作为企业最基本的活动，已经成为产业组织理论中的热点问题。蕴含创造性破坏思想的产业创新带来了产品的更新换代，本文对产业创新模型为的研发投入进行了分析，发现存在三种可能的均衡结果，分别为静态均衡，两期循环和非增长陷阱，产业稳定增长要避免非增长陷阱的情况。在对静态均衡进行了福利分析之后，发现企业在利润最大化目标下决策的经济增长速度可能会高于或低干社会最优水平，潜在的可能就是经济高速增长与高消费者福利不能同时满足。     

Noisy Directional Learning and the Logit Equilibrium

We specify a dynamic model in which agents adjust their decisions toward higher payoffs, subject to normal error. This process generates a probability distribution of players’ decisions that evolves over time according to the Fokker–Planck equation. The dynamic process is stable for all potential games, a class of payoff structures that includes several widely studied games. In equilibrium, the distributions that determine expected payoffs correspond to the distributions that arise from the logit function applied to those expected payoffs. This “logit equilibrium” forms a stochastic generalization of the Nash equilibrium and provides a possible explanation of anomalous laboratory data.     

台湾公益彩券盈余配额公平性之探讨

本研究收集台湾省2007年1月至2009年5月公益彩券营业报告数据，运用Excel软件内键函数追行统计分析，研究主轴是要探讨各县市获得彩券盈余补助款的公平性．研究结果发现各县市民聚“购买彩券总金额”与“分得盈余补助总金额”两者仅部分相关，但是民泉“平均购买彩券金额”与“平均获得盈余补助金额”两者呈现不相关，换言之多购买彩券县市的民众未必能多获得补助款，彩券计算公式权数不公允，致使同为台湾省国民却有不同之公益补助款。公益补助款关系着地方民众生活质量，以租税公平角度而言，享有基本额度补助款是每位国民都可提出的正当要求，但依据本研究分析结果，发现差距颇大，其中以彰化县民众最为吃亏，综合研究结果，本研究建议公益彩券计算公式有必要进一步修正与改追。     

On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium When Workers Are Risk Averse

This paper revisits the normative properties of search‐matching economies when homogeneous workers have concave utility functions and wages are bargained over. The optimal allocation of resources is characterized first when information is perfect and second when search effort is not observable. In the former case, employees should be unable to extract a rent. The optimal marginal tax rate is then 100%. As search effort becomes unobservable, an appropriate positive rent is needed and the optimal marginal tax rate is lower. Moreover, the pretax wage is lower in order to boost labor demand. Finally, in both cases, nonlinear income taxation is a key complement to unemployment insurance.     

间接税改革的宏观经济效应:一般均衡分析

建立一个研究中国整体经济的可计算一般均衡(CGE)模型.对我国现行税制间接税税率调整,间接税向直接税转化,间接税调整对储蓄、投资的影响等措施的宏观经济效应进行分析,提出一些可供选择的税收政策改革方案.在此基础上,指出了本CGE模型的局限与改进方向.     

Minimum-Effort Coordination Games: Stochastic Potential and Logit Equilibrium

This paper revisits the minimum-effort coordination game with a continuum of Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. Noise is introduced via a logit probabilistic choice function. The resulting logit equilibrium distribution of decisions is unique and maximizes a stochastic potential function. In the limit as the noise vanishes, the distribution converges to an outcome that is analogous to the risk-dominant outcome for 2 × 2 games. In accordance with experimental evidence, logit equilibrium efforts decrease with increases in effort costs and the number of players, even though these parameters do not affect the Nash equilibria. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92.     

团队生产的纳什均衡及合作博弈空间

本文在霍姆斯特姆所做贡献的基础上认为团队生产问题在本质上等同于囚徒困境问题,并指出霍姆斯特姆的实施强制契约的解决方法存在逻辑漏洞,在现实社会中一般是无效的.本文依据社会经济人个人效用最大化的条件定义了团队生产的合作战略博弈空间,合作战略博弈空间的均衡极点(即个人效用最大化点)就是团队生产收益分配博弈的纳什均衡解.如果个人收益的总和等于集体收益的最优值,那么个人理性与集体理性之间就达到统一,处于帕累托最优状态,即不存在道德风险;反之,则说明存在道德风险.并给出了在团队生产中通过改变合作战略博弈空间达到帕累托最优的一个特例,指出了科学合理地改变合作战略博弈空间在社会经济发展中的重要作用