Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

Relative wages, labor specialization and bargaining patterns

The goal of this paper is to study the effects of centralized and decentralized bargaining patterns on wage inequality when there are two different types of labor, skilled and unskilled. We present two models where labor is specialized between firms, that is, there are two types of firms, each one employing one type of labor. We show that the revenue shares of the production factors in each type of firm and the union power are crucial determinants of the relative wage. In contrast, the relative expected wage is the same across models and bargaining patterns.     

Strategic Environmental Policy Under Incomplete Information

This paper introduces incomplete information into recent analyses of strategic environmental policy. It is shown how asymmetric information between planners and producers affects national incentives to impose strategic environmental standards on domestic industries in international oligopolistic competition. Relative to the full-information case, incomplete information is likely to mitigate allocative distortions originating from strategic behaviour. A countervailing effect, tending to raise distortion, is however revealed from the analysis. This effect is absent when governments intervene in free trade through direct production subsidies. The results suggest that incentives to capture foreign rents are less reduced due to private information, when environmental standards, rather than direct production subsidies, are the strategic instrument.     

Informed trade,uninformed trade and stock price delay

The probability of informed trading (PIN), a measure of information-based trading risk, has been broadly applied to empirical studies on asset pricing. However, it is still controversial whether PIN measures exclusively the risk of firm-specific private information or it also captures the private interpretation of market wide public information. This article examines the relevance of PIN to the delayed response of stock prices to market-wide information. We find that PIN significantly explains individual stock price delay even controlling for size, liquidity and risk, and low-PIN stock prices adjust to market information more rapidly not only because of a notably high level of informed trading but also an even much higher level of uninformed trading. Our findings support the notion that PIN also captures the private skilled interpretation of public common factor information by sophisticated investors, and provide new empirical evidence on how information-based trading affects the speed at which stock prices adjust to information.     

Welfare Effects of Foreign Direct Investment: Cost Saving vs. Signaling

We compare the effects of two types of foreign direct investment (FDI) (viz., FDI for trade cost saving and FDI for signaling foreign cost of production) on consumer surplus, profit of the host-country firm and host-country welfare. We show that the effects are dramatically different. If the reason for FDI is to save trade cost, FDI (compared to export) always makes the consumers better off and the host-country producer worse off, while the effect on host-country welfare is ambiguous. However, if the FDI is to signal the foreign cost of production, FDI (compared to export) always makes the host-country producer better off and increases host-country welfare, while it makes the consumers almost always worse off.     

金融市场中的区块链技术:场景应用与价值展望

在抽象的区块链技术与友好的金融应用之间进行弥合,探讨新的信用生态在缓解信息不对称过程中的应用场景,进一步展望了区块链对整个金融业态的价值贡献、限制以及其他可能性。     

Efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining with private information

We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that an increase in the efficiency wage effects does not necessarily increase the wage level at equilibrium, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the firm is stronger than the union and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then an increase in the efficiency wage effects increases for sure the wage at equilibrium.JEL Classification: J41, J50, J52We thank Juan Dolado and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Vincent Vannetelbosch is Chercheur Qualifié at the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique. The research of Ana Mauleon has been made possible by a fellowship of the Fonds Européen du Développement Economique Régional (FEDER). Financial support from the Belgian French Communitys program Action de Recherches Concertée 99/04-235 (IRES, Université catholique de Louvain) is gratefully acknowledged.     

不对称雇主学习、外部选择与雇员谈判力

本文在非合作博弈（策略式）单边不对称信息讨价还价框架下,按照外部约束（而不是威胁点）的思路来模型化外部雇主的竞争,以分析不对称雇主学习的程度对处于信息劣势的通用性雇员谈判力的决定作用。本文提出的框架弥补了已有文献的一些不足,同时为不对称雇主学习这一劳动经济学概念提供了一个讨价还价理论基础。     

Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information

Summary. While actual bargaining features many issues and decision making on the order in which issues are negotiated and resolved, the typical models of bargaining do not. Instead, they have either a single issue or many issues resolved in some fixed order, typically simultaneously. This paper shows that, when there is incomplete information, such an approach removes an important avenue for information transmission: the bargaining agenda itself. Compared to the standard model, pooling on offers by the informed is reduced and a signaling equilibrium arises when the agenda is determined endogenously. Signaling is carried out by use of an issue-by-issue bargaining agenda. Received: September 3, 1997; revised version: May 11, 1998     

The one constant: a causal effect of collective bargaining on employment growth? Evidence from German linked‐employer‐employee data

A large number of articles have analysed ‘the one constant’ in the economic effects of trade unions, namely that collective bargaining reduces employment growth by 2–4% points per year. Evidence is, however, mostly related to Anglo‐Saxon countries. We investigate whether a different institutional setting might lead to a different outcome, making the constant a variable entity. Using linked‐employer‐employee data for Germany, we find a negative correlation between being covered by a sector‐wide bargaining agreement or firm‐level contract and employment growth of about 1% point per annum. However, the correlation between employment growth and collective bargaining is not robust to the use of panel methods. We conclude that the results of the literature using cross‐section data might be driven by selection.     

A New Variant of the Winner's Curse in a Coasian Contracting Game

We examine behavior in a Coasian contracting game with incomplete information. Experimental subjects propose contracts, while automaton property right holders or robot players with uncertain preferences respond to those proposals. The most common pattern of proposals observed in these games results in too many agreements and, in some games, payoffs that are stochastically dominated by those resulting from rational proposals (which imply fewer agreements). In this sense, we observe a winner's curse similar to that observed in bidding games under incomplete information, such as the common value auction (Kagel, J.H. and Levin, D. (1986) American Economic Review. 76, 894–920) and the takeover game (Samuelson, W. and Bazerman, M.H. (1985) In Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 3. JAI Press, Greenwich, pp. 105–137; Ball, S.B., Bazerman, M.H., and Carroll, J.S. (1990) Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 48, 1–22; Holt, C. and Sherman, R. (1994) American Economic Review. 84, 642–652). While the naïve model of behavior nicely predicts the winner's curse in those previous bidding games, it does not do so here. Instead, an alternative model we call the guarantor model explains the anomalous behavior best. Hence, we suggest this is a new variant of the winner's curse.     

中国信贷市场匹配机制的再设计

我国的银行信贷市场呈现二元结构--目标客户与非目标客户信贷市场.两者有着不同的运行机制.目标客户信贷市场的议价过程存在一个类似企业求婚的递延接受程序,市场的运行结果稳定.非目标客户信贷市场不存在导致稳定结果的分散化匹配程序,市场广度和深度不够.为提高非目标客户信贷市场的稳定性和运行效率,我们建议通过公布银行信贷方案、设立非目标客户信贷中心、设立中央化的匹配清算所等,把分散化的议价过程变成中央化的匹配程序,从而完善和降低中小企业的交易成本,为中小企业的发展拓展广阔空间.