Empowering Firm Owners by Separating Voting from Buying and Selling Shares

This paper discusses a new system of firm governance. In the system, the responsibility for voting the shares of a firm (“voice”) is given to the people who ultimately provided the money, who, however, have to delegate it to proxy voting institutions. The system helps overcome collective action problems and conflicts of interest within firms, and it reduces the private benefits of control. The disadvantages for firm governance may be relatively modest. However, since the new system of voice is a conceptual innovation, the analysis of its effects is rather tentative. Further research and experimentations are required for firmer conclusions.     

Simple Strategy-Proof Approximately Walrasian Mechanisms

This note provides an indirect analysis of the incentive properties of the Walrasian mechanism. It presents mechanisms under which truth-telling is a dominant strategy in finite exchange economies (in contrast to the Walrasian mechanism) and whose outcomes (generically) approximate Walrasian ones for large economies. These mechanisms provide new insights on the well-know trade-off between efficiency and incentive compatibility in finite economies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D50, D71, D78.     

基于博弈的国有粮食购销企业委托-代理关系的优化

在国有粮食购销企业委托-代理关系中,中央政府与地方政府之间是一种完全信息动态博弈,而政府与国有粮食购销企业之间是一种不完全信息动态博弈.要优化国有粮食购销企业的委托-代理关系,应合理划分中央政府与地方政府在粮食调控上的权责,有效改善国有粮食购销企业的激励机制和监督约束制度.     

A Simple Test of a Screening Procedure for Economics Faculty: A Note

This article discusses a graphical framework for classroom presentation of interactions between balance-of-payments flows and foreign exchange market equilibrium.     

Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value

We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the Shapley value payoffs. We extend our results to implement the weighted Shapley values. Finally, we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility environments. The modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure, and implements the Shapley values of the super-additive cover of the environment. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72.     

机制设计理论综述

机制的新理解和激励相容概念使得机制设计框架得以确立,显示原理极大简化了分析框架。公共品经济难以有效权衡配置效率、自愿参与和激励相容。公共品提供的占优策略均衡机制,在拟线性环境和一般性经济环境下分别导致帕累托严格无效和独裁。在贝叶斯环境下,对于公共品经济和私人品经济,帕累托效率与自愿参与均难以兼容。其中,公共品不兼容性在极限角度仍成立。纳什执行及其拓展试图使在所设机制下的所有均衡结果对于社会选择目标而言都最优。放松关于信息结构和理性的假定,理论的最新发展围绕信息结构内生化、机制稳健化以及计算机制设计问题展开。     

欧盟环境政策体系与其实施机制对中国的借鉴

欧盟是世界上政治、经济一体化程度最高的区域性组织,拥有比较完善的环境政策体系,其政策内容也随着经济社会的发展不断得到深化。但是,欧盟环境问题的地域性表现十分突出,这与我国在处理环境问题时所面临的客观条件有一定的相似性。因此了解、学习欧盟在制定和实施环境政策过程中如何妥善处理联盟与其成员国关系,对于我国制定与实施环境政策,从而有效地解决不同区域间的环境问题有一定的借鉴意义。     

金融监管机制改革与完善的新审视

由于我国实行银行业、保险业、证券业分业经营,目前的监管机构“一行三会”也主要建立在分业经营基础上,金融风暴的出现以及国内金融混业经营的趋势使我们不得不重新审视我国现行的金融监管机制,混业经营以及金融业不断发展的国际趋势使我们不得不反思我国现行金融监管机制的缺陷及未来可能产生的风险,并进一步思考对现行金融监管机制进行改革和完善的建议。     

Using a Simple Contest to Illustrate Mechanism Design

This article describes a simple classroom activity that illustrates how economic theory can be used for mechanism design. The rules for a set of contests are presented; the results typically obtained from these contests illustrate how the prize structure can be manipulated in order to produce a particular outcome. Specifically, this activity is designed to show how changing the prize structure can impact both the contestants’ average efforts and the effort level of the hardest-working contestant. The activity can be run in a 50-minute class, has instructions that fit on a single piece of paper, and, although it can be run in large classes, requires only six students.     

增长极战略的实现机制与中国实践模式的重构

增长极理论是20世纪50年代新古典区域均衡发展理论遭遇危机之后的新选择,但自其诞生以来由于缺乏成功案例的支持而备受争议。我国区域非均质、不平衡使得增长极模式备受推崇,但在发展中同样遭遇困境。鉴于理论与现实鲜明的反差,以增长极的实现机制为切入点剖析了该理论的不足,指出我国三大增长极在实践中存在政府依赖刚性、自我发展能力弱、关联效应差等问题,认为完整的增长极实现机制应包括形成机制、运行机制和扩散机制,并从这三大机制入手重构了中国增长极的实践模式,提出相关政策建议。     

Procedurally fair and stable matching

Summary. We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al. , 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and endstate fairness.Received: 9 September 2003, Revised: 12 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C78, D63. Correspondence to: Flip KlijnWe thank two referees and a co-editor for helpful comments and suggestions. B. Klauss and F. Klijns research has been supported by Ramón y Cajal contracts of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The work of the authors has also been partially supported by Research Grant BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and by the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA. This paper is part of the Polarization and Conflict Project CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 funded by the European Commission-DG Research Sixth Framework Programme. This article reflects only the authors views and the Community is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.     

Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381]

Ma (in Econ. Theory 8, 377–381, 1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (Econometrica 58, 1475–1480, 1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented – and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 – is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as “symmetric.” We thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. B. Klaus’s and F. Klijn’s research was supported by Ramón y Cajal contracts of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The work of the authors was also partially supported through the Spanish Plan Nacional I+D+I (BEC2002-02130 and SEJ2005-01690) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR2005-00626 and the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA).     

消费者渠道选择意愿形成机制研究

多渠道营销背景下的消费者渠道选择问题备受关注,从匹配的视角出发,在解释了以往研究产生矛盾结论的原因的基础上,分析了影响消费者渠道选择的三个要素：产品特性、渠道特性、消费者特性及其测量维度,并分析了上述三因素之间的匹配机理和不同匹配类型下消费者的渠道行为,以此为多渠道营销企业制定渠道策略提供有价值的理论指导。     

企业债券的设计与营销

与国债市场相比,我国企业债券市场的发展一直显得相对滞后与缓慢,其原因除了融资观念的局限和融资政策的不完善之外,还与企业债券本身缺乏吸引力有关。本文通过借鉴成熟资本市场企业债券发行的成功经验,说明加快我国企业债券市场发展,改善企业融资结构的关键在于企业债券的创新与营销策略,提高企业债券的投资价值     

卖空压力与公司现金持有——基于中国卖空管制放松的准自然实验证据

使用中国股票市场的卖空管制放松政策作为准自然实验,本文考察由此产生的卖空压力对公司现金持有的治理效应。使用双重差分方法的研究结果表明,卖空管制放松使公司现金持有程度降低了11.23%;横截面差异检验结果表明,公司面临的产品市场竞争程度越低、破产风险越高或者公司自身的融资约束程度越低,卖空管制放松对公司现金持有的治理效应越强;卖空管制放松显著提升了公司现金持有的市场价值。     

商业银行信用风险评估指标体系的构建研究

商业银行信用风险评估是商业银行信用风险管理工作的依据和基础,其前提是要为信用风险评估建立科学合理的评估指标体系。商业银行信用风险评估指标体系的建立一方面需要基于对影响信用风险各因素的正确分析,另一方面需要遵循指标选取的一般性原则。商业银行信用风险评估指标体系作为商业银行信用风险评估模型的重要组成部分,对指标体系的充分合理应用和不断完善将逐步提升中国商业银行信用风险防范的能力。     

消费者跨渠道购买行为研究评述与展望

消费者跨渠道购买行为是指多渠道零售环境下,消费者在购买决策过程的不同阶段运用不同渠道的行为。文章基于文献研究法,从定义、影响因素和企业管理策略三个方面对消费者跨渠道购买行为的国内外相关研究进行了梳理和评述,阐述了消费者跨渠道购买行为的定义,总结了消费者跨渠道购买行为的影响因素,归纳了企业对消费者跨渠道购买行为的管理策略并进行了评述,分析了未来研究方向,得出消费者跨渠道购买行为可以细分为消费者跨渠道搭便车行为和消费者跨渠道保留行为,研究结果为多渠道零售企业进行渠道设计和多渠道顾客管理提供了决策参考。     

“低碳城市”的实现机制研究

低碳城市正在成为世界城市发展的新亮点。首先分析了低碳城市的内涵与特征,及其在我国建设低碳城市的重要意义;其次,构建了低碳城市的实现机制,从城市规划、城市投资生产到城市生活消费等方面分阶段设计其实现路径,形成政府主导、投资主体配合、市民以及其他社会机构积极参与的低碳城市发展模式,实现城市经济增长与低碳排放目标的相互协调。     

Strategy-proof size improvement: is it possible?*

The number of assigned agents (i.e., size) is an important parameter in object allocations. While size maximality clashes with individual rationality and strategy-proofness, it can still be possible to increase the size over a mechanism while keeping these properties. To pursue this research, we devise a size comparison criterion to investigate the possibility of size increase. A mechanism size-wise dominates another mechanism if the latter never assigns more agents than the former, and at some problem, assigns more agents than . We obtain arguably mild conditions for a mechanism to not be dominated size-wise by an individually rational and strategy-proof mechanism. Moreover, whenever there are at least as many objects as the total number of agents, we find conditions, different from those previously mentioned, for a mechanism to not be dominated size-wise by an individually rational and group strategy-proof mechanism. These results have implications for deferred-acceptance, top trading cycles, efficiency-adjusted deferred-acceptance, serial dictatorship, and Boston mechanisms.