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Pierpaolo BattigalliMarciano Siniscalchi 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,106(2):356-391
We provide a unified epistemic analysis of some forward-induction solution concepts in games with complete and incomplete information. We suggest that forward induction reasoning may be usefully interpreted as a set of assumptions governing the players' belief revision processes, and define a notion of strong belief to formalize these assumptions. Building on the notion of strong belief, we provide an epistemic characterization of extensive-form rationalizability and the intuitive criterion, as well as sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome in generic games with perfect information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82. 相似文献
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We investigate the effects of order-of-play (simultaneous, unobserved sequential and fully observed sequential play) and form of presentation (extensive vs. normal) in three simple two person games: battle-of-the-sexes with and without outside option and a three strategy game which differentiates between virtual observability (VO) and iterated elimination of dominated strategies as principles of equilibrium selection. VO predicts that knowledge of the order of play alone will affect the distribution of strategies chosen. We contrast this with the predictions of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. We report results from 1800 one-shot games conducted in 6 sessions with 120 subjects and analysed as panel data. The form of presentation strongly affects the distribution of outcomes and strategies. Information about order of play shifts the distribution of strategies away from the distribution in simultaneous play and towards the distribution in fully observed play, especially in the less complicated games presented in normal order. Order-of-play effects are less evident as complexity of the game increases. Extensive form presentation appears to induce sequential thinking even in simultaneously played games. 相似文献
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We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We propose a new concept, evolutionary robustness, which is stronger than the previous concepts. Evolutionary robustness ensures dynamic stability for replicator dynamics in doubly symmetric games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, 72. 相似文献
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战略联盟组织的稳定性、组织治理与信用约束机制 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
本文运用博弈论的分析框架分析了战略联盟组织不稳定性的原因在于战略联盟组织的中间组织性质所导致的战略联盟组织对机会主义行为约束的弱化,进而揭示了战略联盟组织稳定的关键在于组织内成员的博弈支付结构和博弈者对未来的预期。在此基础上,从组织治理结构的角度提出了稳定战略联盟组织应建立有效的信用约束机制的结论,阐述了这一机制的目标和内容,并针对我国战略联盟组织所面临的问题提出了相应的对策。 相似文献
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通过对战略贸易政策在贸易的政治经济学、不确定性、不完全承诺和不完全信息等四个方面的新进展进行讨论,得出结论:新贸易理论的新进展使得脱胎于发达国家的战略贸易政策更加接近发展中国家市场经常失灵的现实,从而对发展中国家的贸易政策有重要的指导意义。 相似文献
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战略性激励论——现代人力资源管理精髓理念及其在企业的应用 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
现代企业人力资源管理的核心理念可以用“战略性激励”五个字来概括。企业人力资源战略管理所面临的一个基本任务,就是通过人力资源管理应对高绩效工作系统、满足利益相关群体需要以及全球性等三大挑战,来获取和保持企业在市场竞争中的战略优势。制度激励与管理激励是人力资源激励的一体两面,二者在实践中是辨证地整合在一起的。对于正处于转型期的中国企业来说,以制度性激励为核心建立人力资源战略管理框架,具有重大现实意义。 相似文献
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从战略动量的研究视角,试图在前人的研究基础上,通过实证研究探讨基于变革的战略动量的构成维度及其对战略变革过程的影响。研究表明战略变革动量包括战略变革洞察力、战略变革授权、战略变革集体承诺三方面的构成维度;较强的战略变革洞察力和战略变革集体承诺能同时从变革速度和变革幅度两个方面促进战略变革有效实现,而战略变革授权能促进变革幅度,而对变革速度的影响作用不显著。 相似文献
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随着科学技术的迅速发展,战略管理的研究也出现了新的趋势。从战略管理理论学派、历史演化、战略选择以及战略管理工具4个方面阐明了国外学者研究的新动向。 相似文献
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Can economically efficient outcomes be obtained and sustained in the absence of externally enforced property rights? We study the evolutionary properties of a game that exhibits two well-defined Nash equilibria: one generates an inefficient outcome while the other set generates an efficient outcome supported by the potential for retaliation. Although standard forward-looking refinements eliminate the efficient equilibrium, neither equilibrium type satisfies strict evolutionary stability criteria. However, both types of equilibrium define strategies that are neutrally stable, which makes them vulnerable to drift in dynamic environments. We conduct computer simulation experiments in which players learn adaptively via a tournament selection mechanism called sophisticated experimentation. Our simulations demonstrate that while the system spends a disproportionately high proportion of time in the inefficient equilibrium set, the efficient equilibrium is pervasive as the system drifts back and forth between the equilibrium sets, never settling on one or the other. 相似文献
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企业间合作的战略性选择及其相关稳定性维护 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
企业间的合作及合作关系的管理是当今学术界研究的中心问题。分析传统企业与合作企业差异化、合作企业的类型特点,才能更好地把握企业间合作的选择动机、战略优势,促进企业间合作关系管理的稳定性。 相似文献
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知识经济时代的到来,知识将取代资本成为重要的资源。本文主要对战略联盟中知识共享(Knowledge Sharing)进行了模型论证,得到了当企业认为合作而获得联盟租金及学习剩余所付的边际成本和为此得到的边际收益相等时,企业不但愿意联合,而且所获得的收益最大的结论;对知识共享策略进行了博弈模型分析,指出企业应该如何进行知识共享,其结论将对企业正确探索战略发展方向提供理论依据。 相似文献
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论战略管理会计与企业核心竞争力 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
企业战略管理的需要和传统管理会计的局限性产生了战略管理会计,战略管理会计是有效提高企业核心竞争力的决策支持平台,核心竞争力的要素包括创新能力、资源优势、管理协调和企业文化。 相似文献
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Thomas Tröger 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,102(2):375-402
Two bargaining parties play the Nash Demand Game to share a pie whose size is determined by one party's investment decision. Various investment levels are subgame-perfect. Adding the investment decision to Young's evolutionary bargaining model yields the following long-run outcome: efficient investment prevails and the investor's share of the pie approximates die maximum of (i) the smallest share that induces efficient investment, even if the investor expects to appropriate the available pie from every inefficient investment, and (ii) half of the pie. The result favors forward induction to subgame consistency and equity theory to hold-ups. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, L14. 相似文献
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本文主要从战略成本管理和企业核心竞争力的概念出发,在与传统成本管理的比较中深入剖析了战略成本管理的特点和优势,以及战略成本管理与企业竞争力的关系,并结合河南联通公司案例就如何实施战略成本管理来提升企业核心竞争力进行了探讨。 相似文献
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战略联盟关系资本能给企业带来关系性租金,从而提升企业的竞争优势。但是,与一般企业管理不同,战略联盟管理更加复杂,其复杂性主要体现在如何妥善处理联盟企业之间的合作关系。因此,战略联盟管理需要加强关系资本管理,通过增加专用性资产投资、促进信任和承诺的循环递进,以及构建有效的冲突协调机制,从而建立和维护战略联盟关系资本。 相似文献