Wealth Distribution and Optimal Inheritance Taxation in Life-cycle Economies with Intergenerational Transfers

Intergenerational transfers are introduced into a general equilibrium life-cycle model in order to explain observed levels of wealth heterogeneity. In our overlapping generations model, heterogenous agents face uncertain lifetime and leave both accidental and voluntary bequests to their children. Furthermore, agents face stochastic employment opportunities. The model is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the US economy. Our results indicate that bequests only account for a small proportion of observed wealth heterogeneity. The introduction of an inheritance tax increases both welfare, as measured by the average lifetime utility of a newborn, and equality of the wealth distribution.
JEL classification : D 31; D 91; H 21; C 68; E 21     

Optimal Emissions Taxation under Imperfect Competition in a Durable Good Industry

This paper investigates optimal emissions taxation under imperfect competition in a durable good industry where products are sold (instead of rented). As a benchmark, attention is paid to the special case of monopoly with exogenously given product durability. In line with previous literature, the optimal emission tax in this benchmark model falls short of marginal damage (underinternalization). Extending the benchmark model either to the case of an oligopolistic market structure and/or to the case of endogenous product durability then provides two cases in which the optimal emission tax overinternalizes marginal damage.     

Optimal Design of Forest Taxation with Multiple-Use Characteristics of Forest Stands

The paper studies optimal forest taxation under uncertainty about future timber price when private forest owners value amenity services of forest stands and forest stands have public goods characteristics. It is assumed that preferences of forest owners can be described by a quasi-linear, intertemporal utility function which reflects risk aversion in terms of consumption and constant marginal utility in terms of amenity services. The comparative statics of current and future harvesting in terms of timber price risk, site productivity tax and yield tax are first developed. It is shown that, given the optimal site productivity tax, which is independent of the timber harvested and thus non-distortionary, it is desirable to introduce the yield tax at the margin; it both corrects externality due to the public goods characteristic of forest stands and serves as a social insurance device. The optimal yield tax is less than 100% and depends on the social value of forest stands, timber price risk and properties of compensated timber supply. In the general case the 'inverse elasticity rule – according to which the optimal yield tax is negatively related to the size of the substitution effects – may not hold. Under certainty, the desirability of the yield tax, given the optimal site productivity tax, depends only on the existence of public goods characteristic and is thus a pure Pigouvian tax.     

论税收伦理

最适税收理论运用了福利经济学的工具,在传统的税制设计目标的论述中增加了分析的力度。但是,它拘泥于经济学上的功利主义福利分析方法,仅仅涉及一个人怎样在不同的时间里分配他的满足,而不关心满足的总量怎样在个人之间进行分配;仅仅考虑人的需求,而不考虑环境的需要,助长了税收经济主义的倾向,导致了生态环境的蓄意破坏,税收公平性的失调。税收效率固然重要,但正义和可持续性也必不可少。必须在生态哲学观基础上研究我国的税收制度,才能促使经济、社会和环境的和谐发展。我们的税收命题不仅仅是"取之于民,用之于民",而应该是"取之于民和自然,用之于民和自然"。     

Social Comparisons and Optimal Taxation in a Small Open Economy

In this paper, we analyze how international capital mobility affects the optimal labor and capital income tax policy in a small open economy when consumers care about relative consumption. The main results crucially depend on whether the government can tax returns on savings abroad. If the government can use flexible residence‐based capital income taxes, then the optimal policy rules from a closed economy largely carry over to the case of a small open economy. If it cannot, then capital income taxes become completely ineffective. The labor income taxes must then indirectly also reflect the corrective purpose that the absent capital income tax would have had.     

Environmental Taxation and Strategic Commitment in Duopoly Models

In this paper, we address the issue of optimalenvironmental taxation under imperfect competition.The problem is analysed for three different types ofduopoly models, the Cournot open and closed loopmodels, and the Stackelberg model. We explicitlyanalyse the role of strategic behaviour. Each firm hasto make a choice of output level and of the level ofa strategic variable. The choice of this strategicvariable affects both marginal cost and emissions. Wecompare the properties of these three duopoly models,and derive and compare optimal environmental taxes. Weshow that whether the optimal tax is lower or higherthan marginal environmental costs depends on theinformation transmission and the effect of thestrategic variable on marginal costs. In addition, thedifferences in market shares, and the influence of thetax on the cost structure play important roles, indetermining optimal emission taxes.     

Optimal Social Insurance with Linear Income Taxation*

We study optimal social insurance aimed at insuring disability risk in the presence of linear income taxation. Optimal disability insurance benefits rise with previous earnings. Optimal insurance is incomplete even though disability risks are exogenous and verifiable so that moral hazard in disability insurance is absent. Imperfect insurance is optimal because it encourages workers to insure themselves against disability by working and saving more, thereby alleviating the distortionary impact of the redistributive income tax on labor supply and savings.     

On Environmental Taxation under Uncertain Environmental Damage

This paper addresses optimal taxation, when therelationship between the consumption of a`dirty' good and the resulting environmentaldamage is uncertain and treated as a randomvariable by policy makers. The main purpose isto analyze how increased uncertainty, measuredas a mean preserving increase in the spread ofthis random variable, affects the optimalcommodity tax on the dirty consumption good. Incase the only task of government is to correctthe environmental externality, and if thepreferences are characterized by nondecreasingabsolute risk aversion, we find that thecommodity tax on the dirty consumption goodincreases in response to additionaluncertainty. If, on the other hand, thegovernment provides a public good and uses alump-sum tax in addition to the commodity tax,it is possible that the commodity tax decreasesas a response to additional uncertainty, evenif the preferences are characterized bynondecreasing absolute risk aversion. A similarresult emerges, although for different reasons,if the lump-sum tax is replaced by a laborincome tax.     

Optimal Redistributive Income Taxation and Efficiency Wages*

In this paper, we integrate efficiency wage setting with the theory of optimal redistributive income taxation. In doing so, we use a model with two skill types, where efficiency wage setting characterizes the labor market faced by the low‐skilled, whereas the high‐skilled face a conventional, competitive labor market. We show that the marginal income tax implemented for the high‐skilled is negative under plausible assumptions. The marginal income tax facing the low‐skilled can be either positive or negative, in general. An increase in unemployment benefits contributes to a relaxation of the binding self‐selection constraint, which makes this instrument particularly useful from the perspective of redistribution.     

Public Saving and Policy Coordination in Aging Economies

In the coming decades, the share of people of working age will fall significantly in most developed countries. According to optimal taxation theory, public debts should be reduced before the baby‐boom generation retires. I find that if debts are instead maintained at current levels, welfare may be reduced substantially in countries with a large public sector and/or a large demographic change. Since population aging will be less dramatic in the United States than in Europe and Japan, capital will move from Europe and Japan to the United States. These capital movements will facilitate the US demographic transition but aggravate the transition in most European countries.     

Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Black Markets

Received November 21, 2000; revised version received May 19, 2001     

国外的生态税收政策与我国生态税制建设构想

20世纪90年代以来,一些发达国家为了解决环境问题,纷纷展开生态税收改革,建立起了比较完善的生态税制,使税收在环境保护中发挥了巨大作用.我国应借鉴其先进经验,建立并完善我国的生态税制,以实现经济的可持续发展.     

Environmental Input-Output Models for Life-Cycle Analysis

The Leontief input-output model has beenapplied for macro environmental analysis since1970, and life cycle analysis has been used inindustrial design over the last decade. Thispaper presents two extended environmentalinput-output models for life cycle analysis inpollutant abatement and towards resourcerecycling. It is demonstrated that thesuggested models are systematic tools that canbe used for integrated environmental analysisand planning.     

依法治税存在的问题及对策

依法治税是新时期做好税收工作的基本点。建立符合社会主义市场经济体制要求的税收立法机制;完善税收法律体制,树立法律权威;强化税收执法和税收司法,有效制止和惩治税收违法犯罪活动是现阶段依法治税的目标和任务。     

Age‐related Optimal Income Taxation*

In most countries, average income varies with age. In this paper we investigate if and how it is possible to enhance the redistributive mechanism by relating tax payments to age. Using an OLG model where some individuals are low skilled all their life while others are low skilled when young but high skilled when old, we first show how an age dependent optimal income tax can Pareto improve upon an age independent income tax. We then characterize the optimal age dependent income tax. A tax on interest income is part of the optimal tax structure.     

Optimal Dynamic Taxation with Distinctive Forms of Social Status Attainment

We examine the role of both consumption‐ and wealth‐induced social comparisons in setting dynamic optimal income taxation. Under complete information, state‐invariant labor income taxes are used to remedy the externality caused by consumption‐induced social comparisons, while state‐contingent capital income taxes are used to remedy the externalities caused by both consumption‐ and wealth‐induced social comparisons. Under incomplete information, distinct types of agents are subject to an identical marginal capital income tax, which removes social comparisons. To solve the information problem, low‐productivity agents could be subject to a lower marginal labor tax than high‐productivity agents, which contradicts the traditional result in the Mirrlees–Stiglitz models.     

依法治税和纳税服务——基于国家税收和公共税收的视角

依法治税和纳税服务是现阶段税收的两大任务。对两者的认识,不能孤立地或对立地看,而是要在社会主义市场经济下的税收应是国家税收和公共税收的统一的视角下加以把握。从这一认识出发,我们就能真正做到坚持依法治税,优化纳税服务,服务科学发展,就能探索出一条中国特色社会主义市场经济条件下的纳税服务新路。     

Optimal Taxation of Risky Human Capital*

In a two‐period life‐cycle model with ex ante homogeneous households, earnings risk, and a general earnings function, we derive the optimal linear labor tax rate and optimal linear education subsidies. The optimal income tax trades off social insurance against incentives to work. Education subsidies are not used for social insurance, but they are only targeted at offsetting the distortions of the labor tax and internalizing a fiscal externality. Both optimal education subsidies and tax rates increase if labor and education are more complementary, because education subsidies indirectly lower labor tax distortions by stimulating labor supply. Optimal education subsidies (taxes) also correct non‐tax distortions arising from missing insurance markets. Education subsidies internalize a positive (negative) fiscal externality if there is underinvestment (overinvestment) in education because of risk. Education policy unambiguously allows for more social insurance if education is a risky activity. However, if education hedges against labor‐market risk, optimal tax rates could be lower than in the case without education subsidies.     

刍议信息化纳税信息服务的优化

我国的纳税信息服务(即税收宣传)与税收咨询工作存在着受传统模式影响较深、内容相对简单、效率相对低下等问题,应借鉴国际先进经验,强化人力资源的培训,构建统一服务平台,完善质量监管体系等,以实现信息化纳税信息服务的优化.     

浅议电子商务的税收征管

数字革命催生下的电子商务是一种不同于任何传统商务活动的新兴的商务交流方式,这种交流方式给税收工作带来了许多新的挑战,建立健全完善的电子商务税务征管制度和对策是应对这些挑战的有力武器,也是社会发展的必然要求.通过对电子商务的概念、特征以及国内外发展状况和电子商务对国际税收和税收征管工作的影响的全面分析,提出四种对策来实现和完善对电子商务的税收征管工作.