Ignorance Is Bliss as Trade Policy

Consider domestic consumers that purchase from foreign firms. A presumption would be that consumers prefer being informed when quality is uncertain and exogenous. However, in a multifirm framework based on previous models, consumers can be worse off if they are informed of the quality. Further, in the Salop-circle model, consumers may prefer not learning even though expected high-quality output is greater with learning. Moreover, the possibility that consumers prefer uncertainty increases with the probability that products are of low quality. Essentially, the benefit of screening quality (better matching) can be less than its cost (higher prices from market segmentation).     

Bliss,Catastrophe, and Rational Policy

Lotteries with infinite expected utility are inconsistent with the axioms of expected utility theory. To rule them out, either the set of permissible lotteries must be restricted (to exclude, at a minimum, “fat-tailed” distributions such as that underlying the St. Petersburg Paradox and power laws that are popular in models of climate change), or the utility function must be bounded. This note explores the second approach and proposes a number of tractable specifications leading to utility functions that are bounded both from above and below. This property is intimately related to that of increasing relative risk aversion as first hypothesized by Arrow (1965).     

International migration and “educated unemployment”

This paper provides a novel explanation of “educated unemployment”, which is a salient feature of the labor markets in a number of developing countries. In a simple job-search framework we show that “educated unemployment” is caused by the prospect of international migration, that is, by the possibility of a “brain drain”. In addition, the analysis shows that a developing country may end up with more educated workers despite the brain drain and educated unemployment.     

Environment versus growth — A criticism of “degrowth” and a plea for “a-growth”

In recent debates on environmental problems and policies, the strategy of “degrowth” has appeared as an alternative to the paradigm of economic growth. This new notion is critically evaluated by considering five common interpretations of it. One conclusion is that these multiple interpretations make it an ambiguous and rather confusing concept. Another is that degrowth may not be an effective, let alone an efficient strategy to reduce environmental pressure. It is subsequently argued that “a-growth,” i.e. being indifferent about growth, is a more logical social aim to substitute for the current goal of economic growth, given that GDP (per capita) is a very imperfect indicator of social welfare. In addition, focusing ex ante on public policy is considered to be a strategy which ultimately is more likely to obtain the necessary democratic-political support than an ex ante, explicit degrowth strategy. In line with this, a policy package is proposed which consists of six elements, some of which relate to concerns raised by degrowth supporters.     

A “Managerial” trade union and economic growth

By setting up a simple Romer-type [Romer, P.M., 1989. Capital accumulation in the theory of long-run growth. In: Barro, R.J. (Ed.), Modern Business Cycle Theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA] endogenous growth model embodying a political trade union (rather than the traditional economic labor union), this paper explores the effects of unionization on unemployment, growth and welfare by highlighting the essence of internal conflict within the union. It is shown that the conflicting interests between the leadership and membership within the union play a decisive role in the unemployment, growth and welfare effects of unionization. Given the fact that taxation is another potential candidate besides unions in explaining the poor performance of a macro-economy, we re-examine the taxation effects within the growth model with equilibrium unemployment caused by the presence of the trade union and compare our findings with those for the traditional full-employment growth model. In general, we find that the taxation effects of income and consumption crucially depend not only on the institutional arrangements for taxing unemployment benefits, but also on the way the government budget is balanced.     

Crime and punishment in the “American Dream”

We observe that countries where belief in the “American dream”(i.e., effort pays) prevails also set harsher punishment for criminals. We know that beliefs are also correlated with several features of the economic system (taxation, social insurance, etc). Our objective is to study the joint determination of these three features (beliefs, punitiveness and economic system) in a way that replicates the observed empirical patterns. We present a model where beliefs determine the types of contracts that firms offer and whether workers exert effort. Some workers become criminals, depending on their luck in the labor market, the expected punishment, and an individual shock that we call “meanness”. It is this meanness level that a penal system based on “retribution” tries to detect when deciding the severity of the punishment. We find that when initial beliefs differ, two equilibria can emerge out of identical fundamentals. In the “American” (as opposed to the “French”) equilibrium, belief in the “American dream” is commonplace, workers exert effort, there are high powered contracts (and income is unequally distributed) and punishments are harsh. Economists who believe that deterrence (rather than retribution) shapes punishment can interpret the meanness parameter as pessimism about future economic opportunities and verify that two similar equilibria emerge.     

Subjective probabilities on “small” domains

The Savagian choice-theoretic construction of subjective probability does not apply to preferences, like those in the Ellsberg Paradox, that reflect a distinction between risk and ambiguity. We formulate two representation results—one for expected utility, the other for probabilistic sophistication—that derive subjective probabilities but only on a “small” domain of risky events. Risky events can be either specified exogenously or in terms of choice behavior; in the latter case, both the values and the domain of probability are subjective. The analysis identifies a mathematical structure—called a mosaic—that is intuitive for both exogenous and behavioral specifications of risky events. This structure is weaker than an algebra or even a λ-system.     

Introduction to special section on “Risk and Technology”

Technology has grown rapidly, a characteristic of our advancing civilization. Technology provides many valuable tools, but also introduces new risks. This special section of Technological Forecasting and Social Change provides the state of the art studies of risk and technology management.     

“Burden sharing” in sovereign debt reduction

We examine a concerted debt reduction deal between a sovereign debtor, a private creditor, and an official creditor, who insures the deposits of the commercial bank. Our results show that a weakening of the financial position of the commercial bank reduces the contribution of the commercial bank and increases that of the official creditor, without affecting the net terms faced by the debtor. This result is robust to changes in seniority. Moreover, leaving both creditor values unchanged requires that commercial banks retire debt at “unfairly” high prices, while official creditors make a net contribution.     

“Ex-ante” Taylor rules and expectation forming in emerging markets

The success of monetary policy in stabilizing inflation depends substantially on its influence on expectation formation of private agents. This paper provides a novel perspective on the expectation forming process of financial markets. Using forecasts for the short-term interest rate, the inflation rate, and output growth for 10 emerging markets in Latin-America, central and eastern Europe, we estimate expected (“ex-ante”) Taylor-type rules. We find evidence for significant differences in the expectation formation process in the sense that the well-known Taylor principle fairly holds for only some countries, while for the other countries it does not. The adaption of an explicit inflation targeting regime seems to explain this cross-country differences.     

Superstition and “lucky” apartments: Evidence from transaction-level data

Using a sample of apartment transactions during 2004–2006 in Chengdu, China, we investigate the impact of superstitions in the Chinese real estate market. Numerology forms an important component of Chinese superstitious lore, with the numbers 8 and 6 signifying good luck, and the number 4 bad luck. We find that secondhand apartments located on floors ending with “8” fetch, on average, a 235 RMB higher price (per square meter) than on other floors. For newly constructed apartments, this price premium disappears due to uniform pricing of new housing units, but apartments on floors ending in an “8” are sold, on average, 6.9 days faster than on other floors. Buyers who have a phone number containing more “8”’s are more likely to purchase apartments in a floor ending with “8”; this suggests that at least part of the price premium for “lucky” apartments arises from the buyers’ superstitious beliefs.     

Conspicuous consumption and “race”: Evidence from South Africa

A century ago, Thorstein Veblen introduced socially contingent consumption into the economic literature. This paper complements the scarce empirical literature by testing his conjecture on South African household data and finds that Black and Coloured households spend relatively more on visible consumption than comparable White households. Following the approach of Charles et al. (2009), this paper explores whether the differences in visible expenditures can be explained with a signaling model of status seeking. Moreover, it is assessed to which extent positional concerns motivate conspicuous consumption. Although the socially contingent share in visible consumption increases with income, different incentives to consume conspicuously seem to explain that, at every level of income, Black households spend relatively more on visible consumption than comparable White households. In contrast to the findings of Charles et al. (2009) where differential spending on conspicuous consumption can be found also within each group separately, the model's core hypothesis fails to hold within the group of White South Africans.     

Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopolies With Externality

We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with a negative externality. We find that quantity (price) competition yields a simultaneous‐move (sequential‐move) outcome under a significant negative externality. These results indicate that mixed duopolies yield the same results as private duopolies under a significant negative externality, which is in sharp contrast to the results in mixed duopolies without a negative externality. Unless the negative externality is insignificant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and public leadership is more robust than the private leadership as equilibrium. If optimal environmental tax policy is introduced, however, private leadership yields the greatest welfare and this an equilibrium outcome in the endogenous timing game under quantity competition.     

The “swing of the pendulum” from public to market support for science and technology: Is the U.S. leading the way?

The structure and financing of science and technology activities are undergoing a slow, but profound, change. This change can be briefly characterized as a shift from relying and supporting public science to a stronger emphasis on “market-based” incentives for science and technology. In this paper we analyze this shift in a historical perspective, discussing both the theoretical explanations and the empirical trends of the ongoing change. While we do not claim to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive identification of the causes of this shift, we argue that it is largely driven by the perception of a shift of the U.S. policy towards market-based, rather than publicly supported, incentives for science and technology. This, in turn—given the strong economic performance of the United States over the 1990s—has influenced policies in most OECD countries, especially in Europe.We conclude by analyzing the evolution of research in U.S. higher education and find two major trends: an increasing diversity in the number of institutions of different types other than universities and a steady and continuous public funding of the leading U.S. universities. This has allowed the construction of an infrastructure now used largely by the private sector, but it also noted that the United States has not compromised public support for core areas or in those fields in which there is a clear perception that market incentives are not sufficient for meeting the strategic targets of the U.S. policy. The implication is that there is a considerable policy diversity in the U.S. practice and that all aspects of this diversity should be considered when using the United States as a reference.