Bertrand Games and Sharing Rules

We consider asymmetric Bertrand games with arbitrary payoffs at ties or sharing rules, and identify sufficient conditions for the zero-profit outcome and the existence of Nash equilibria. Subject to some technical conditions on non-tied payoffs the following hold. If the sharing rule is strictly tie-decreasing all players but one receive zero equilibrium payoffs, while everybody does so if non-tied payoffs are symmetric. Mixed (pure) strategy Nash equilibria exist if the sharing rule is (norm) tie-decreasing and coalition-monotone. I would like to thank Fernando Branco, the audience at Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona), ISEG (Lisbon), University of Mannheim, ESEM 2003 (Venice), EARIE 2005 (Porto), two anonymous referees, and the editor Dan Kovenock for very useful comments. This research received financial support under project POCTI/ECO/37925/2001 of FCT and FEDER.     

Price Competition Between Teams

This study uses an experimental approach to examine whether markets are sensitive to the internal incentive structure of the competitors. Toward this goal, we modeled the competitors in a price competition duopoly game as three-player teams. Each player simultaneously declares a bid (price) and the team whose total bid was lower won the competition and was paid accordingly. The losing team was paid nothing, and in case of a tie, each team was paid half its price. This duopoly game was studied under two conditions; a cooperative treatment in which the team's profit was divided equally amongst its members and a non-cooperative one in which each individual member was paid her own bid. Whereas the Nash equilibrium is for each player in either treatment to demand the minimal price possible, we predicted that convergence to the competitive price would be much faster in the cooperative treatment than in the non-cooperative one. The experimental results firmly confirmed this prediction.     

基于团队氛围的知识共享与服务创新互动关系研究

服务创新活动的开展越来越依赖良好的团队氛围,团队氛围已经成为服务创新的关键因素。首先对知识共享的涵义、作用机制,以及团队氛围和服务创新等相关理论进行了概述,分别讨论了知识共享和团队氛围对团队服务创新的影响,并构建了基于团队氛围的知识共享与服务创新的作用过程模型,以揭示在团队氛围情景下服务创新与知识共享的互动机制。团队氛围和知识共享都会促进团队的服务创新,并且前者还调节着后者对服务创新的作用关系,而服务创新的要素改进也对知识共享有推动作用,其中信息交互在两者的互动中起着至关重要的作用。本文以期通过分析团队氛围和知识共享对服务创新的作用以及影响路径,为服务创新的实践活动提供理论指导和研究方法。     

The Study on the Sharing Information in Supply Chains

In this paper, we discuss the relationship between the sharing of information of supply chains and the supply chain management; we also discuss the function of information share, and the obstacles in sharing information. As we all know, information share between enterprises in supply chains is necessary and possible, but the existence of obstacles of sharing information in supply chains is also a severe challenge in practice. This paper tries to find right ways for enterprises to build the real trade partners＇ relationship and realize transferring the information smoothly in all these three levels among the partners in supply chains.     

虚拟团队生命周期管理对策研究

从虚拟团队生命周期的角度对虚拟团队各阶段面临的问题进行考察,从制度建设、人际信任和技术保障3个方面分析具体的挑战,并针对这些问题和挑战提出应对策略和管理方法。     

高管团队环境扫描与知识共享对企业动态能力和绩效影响的实证研究

对高管团队的环境扫描和知识共享影响企业动态能力的作用途径和边界条件进行了实证分析。数据分析结果表明:高管团队的管理经验共享会使高管团队环境扫描对资源获取和整合能力的正向影响更为显著;高管团队的市场知识共享会强化高管团队的环境扫描与资源整合能力和流程改进绩效之间的正向作用关系。     

共享经济下消费者信任形成机制的实证研究

基于传统的信任理论研究,考虑共享主体的个人特征,建立了共享经济下信任形成机制的基本框架。以房屋共享领域的小猪短租为实例,通过基于SPSS软件的相关分析和基于LISREL软件的路径分析,研究了共享主体的个人特征对信任形成机制的影响。得出如下结论:在线评分趋于同质性,不能有效决定共享信任;短租日记和预定历史显著相关,即房东参与积极性影响共享信任;被催促数与预定历史正相关,产品信息已不能满足消费者需求,共享主体个人特征才是影响信任形成的关键因素。     

科研团队社会资本、个体动机对个体知识共享行为的影响——基于多层线性模型的跨层次分析

将团队社会资本分为结构资本、关系资本和认知资本,将个人动机分为互惠动机、兴趣动机、关系动机和利他动机,采用多层线性模型方法并利用调研数据,从团队和个人两个层次探究了科研团队的社会资本和个体动机对个体显性知识共享行为和隐性知识共享行为的影响。结果显示:个人动机和科研团队社会资本对个体的显性知识和隐性知识共享行为都产生正向影响,其中个人动机的影响作用更为显著;社会资本在3个个人动机变量与显性知识共享行为之间发挥调节作用。     

大学创新团队成员心理契约与知识共享

大学创新团队进行科技创新的重要前提是实现知识共享,但是较少有实证研究探索心理契约在知识共享中的作用。通过对30所高校514名大学创新团队成员的问卷调查,研究结果表明：知识共享意愿是知识共享的前提,心理契约中的团队责任和成员责任对知识共享意愿具有直接的正向影响,同时团队责任还可以通过影响成员责任间接影响知识共享意愿。研究结论对于在大学创新团队管理实践中如何促进知识共享的发生有一定的启示作用。     

Revenue Sharing,Competitive Balance and the Contest Success Function

Abstract. This paper investigates revenue sharing in an asymmetric two‐teams contest model of a sports league with Nash behavior of team owners. The innovation of the analysis is that it focuses on the role of the contest success function (CSF). In case of an inelastic talent supply, revenue sharing turns out to worsen competitive balance regardless of the shape of the CSF. For the case of an elastic talent supply, in contrast, the effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance depends on the specification of the CSF. We fully characterize the class of CSFs for which revenue sharing leaves unaltered competitive balance and identify CSFs ensuring that revenue sharing renders the contest closer.     

Delegation and Information Sharing in Cournot Duopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper it is assumed that ownership and management are separated. Contrary to the classical result of information sharing in a Cournot duopoly with private cost information, the paper shows that information sharing is no longer always a dominant strategy and expected consumer surplus is no longer always decreased. The paper determines the circumstances under which information is exchanged and analyzes its welfare consequences.      

论中国农村土地产权制度股份制改革

根据中国国有企业"股份制改革"以及农业"股份合作制改革"实践的分析,针对当前农村土地产权不明晰这一问题,应对农村土地产权制度"股份制改革",以探索中国传统农业向现代农业的市场化改革新的思路。     

软科学研究资源共享研究

分析了软科学研究资源共享的内在动力,指出了当前我国软科学研究资源共享存在的障碍,并对软科学研究资源共享平台进行了初步设计。     

核心能力共享的逻辑

首先给出了核心能力共享的定义，继而从核心能力共享可行性的基础分析、学者对于核心能力共享的论述和企业共享实践等多方面论证了核心能力共享的逻辑，以期澄清人们对于核心能力共享的一些错误认识，为核心能力理论研究开拓新的视角和领域提供重要参考。     

知识发酵与知识共享

在知识发酵理论的基础上,从仿生学和生物进化角度重新审视知识共享问题,剖析了知识共享的内在机理,提出了知识共享发酵模型,分析了各种知识共享类型的特征,并就如何提高组织内部的知识共享效果提出了相关建议。     

Voting for Burden Sharing Rules in Public Goods Games

We experimentally investigate whether groups of heterogeneous agents can reach an agreement on how to share the costs of providing a public good. Thereby, we explore the performance of different burden sharing rules being implemented either endogenously or exogenously. In case of an endogenously implemented burden sharing rule, subjects vote for different burden sharing schemes either by unanimity or majority vote. Despite the fact that preferences for the allocation schemes differ among agents, most groups agree upon a common scheme, and consequently avoid an uncoordinated action. Our results reveal both the opportunities and risks of burden sharing negotiations. We find average efficiency levels to increase in case an agreement is reached. If groups however fail to agree upon a common rule, cooperation collapses and efficiency levels decrease compared to a voluntary contribution mechanism being exogenously imposed. Most importantly, agents who face a voting decision on average receive higher payoffs than agents in an exogenously implemented voluntary contribution mechanism and do not earn less than participants in any externally determined burden sharing rule.     

Policy Rules and Monetarist Arithmetic

This note demonstrates the existence of an important equilibrium path overlooked in the literature on monetarist arithmetic. Pleasant monetarist arithmetic is possible when the interest‐elasticity of money demand exceeds unity. In this case, tight money may lead to a transitory increase in seigniorage, the retirement of government debt, and lower inflation in both the short run and the long run. The set of equilibrium paths is sensitive, however, to the form of the policy rule. Pleasant monetarist arithmetic is not an equilibrium if the policy rule fixes the share of the fiscal deficit financed by seigniorage. Both pleasant monetarist arithmetic and the tight‐money paradox are equilibrium paths when the government's commitment to low money growth is conditional on inflation remaining below its previous level.     

项目型团队中共享领导的实证分析

随着社会的进步与发展,各项工作都逐渐转向以团队为载体的工作模式,由此也就需要对传统意义上“一个人主管、其他组织成员跟随”的领导模式进行更深层次的思考。近年来,各项研究表明,领导权可以在团队领导和团队成员之间共享,即共享领导。本文首先对项目型团队中共享领导现象、团队角色认知及团队绩效进行系统阐述,而后在相关文献综述的基础上,构建研究框架和研究模型,通过大量的问卷调查结果进行实证研究,分析共享领导、团队成员角色认知、团队绩效间的关系。研究结果表明,项目性团队中共享领导对团队成员角色认知产生正向影响,团队成员角色认知对团队绩效产生正向影响,同时,团队成员角色认知对共享领导和团队绩效关系产生中介效果。     

团队模式下人力资源选拔理论与方法的改进——基于"个体-团队"匹配视角的分析

随着越来越多的企业在业务运作中采用了团队这一组织模式,如何有效的进行团队人力资源选拔与配置成为当前研究与实践共同关注的焦点。个体与团队的匹配是团队高效运作的重要前提。文章在对团队人力资源选拔的特殊要求以及“个体一团队”匹配的概念模型进行剖析的基础上,从工作分析、人力资源测评方法和测验工具三个方面对团队模式下的人力资源选拔的理论模型进行了改进,并分别给出了一些实际应用的操作方法。     

Optimal Reimbursement and Malpractice Sharing Rules in Health Care Markets

When health care sponsors such as HMOs or PPOs can use "utilization reviews" in order to indicate to the provider what type of treatment to administer to the patient based upon a diagnosis that is established by the provider, it is possible to implement the "first best" levels of investment in cost control efforts and in aggressiveness of treatment. The implementation of the "first best" requires the utilization of the prospective reimbursement rule accompanied by the removal of all malpractice liabilities from the provider. In contrast, when the type of treatment cannot be enforced by the payer, implementation of the "first best" is not feasible if the payer places a higher weight on the welfare of consumers than that of providers in its objective function. In this case, the reimbursement scheme deviates from the prospective rule, and the provider assumes liability to part of the cost incurred by society as a result of unsuccessful medical outcomes. When the payer can enforce treatment only partially by establishing bounds on the range of acceptable treatments, a minimal acceptable standard will be established and the outcome will be an intermediate case between the above two extremes.