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1.
Hans Gersbach 《Constitutional Political Economy》2004,15(1):3-25
In this paper we examine how taxes, subsidies and the design of constitutional agendas should be regulated in order to allow for an efficient allocation of public goods and a limitation of tax distortions. We show that if public goods are socially desirable, the simple majority rule, combined with taxation constrained to majority winners or a ban on subsidies, can achieve several desirable objectives. Equal treatment regarding taxes and subsidies is undesirable. Super majority rules and equal treatment of all citizens with respect to taxes and subsidies, however, are first-best provided public goods are socially undesirable. Finally, we suggest that constitutions with amendments eliminate excessive taxation and allow treatment rules to universally improve welfare. 相似文献
2.
The Nature of Constitutions 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:1
Following Thomas Hobbes, public-choice economists have theorized that constitutions arise from agreements among subordinates to establish private rules for their own transactions with each other. They then supposedly delegate to a sovereign the obligation to enforce these rules. The sovereign then violates the constitution by instituting wrong-headed rules to govern the subordinates' relations with each other. Instead, it seems more realistic to see constitutions as arising from subordinates' agreements with each other to resist excessive appropriations by the sovereign. An advanced constitution is a substitute for this original type of agreement, which only works well when the subordinates' numbers are small, as in some hunter-gatherer societies. An advanced constitution arises only from subordinates' threats of the sovereign and marshals the sovereign's own instruments of force against him. 相似文献
3.
Hyeon O. Lee 《International economic journal》2015,29(2):259-284
This paper studies a dynamic general equilibrium model with habit persistence in preferences and fiscal policies of taxation and expenditures. Preference takes a subtractive form of habits (the marginal rate of substitution between the agent's own consumption and habit stocks is constant), and technology is linear in aggregate capital (the economy grows without a limit in the long run). We find a continuum of competitive equilibrium paths in conjunction with a unique balanced growth path in the growing economy, in which habits represent both envy/jealousy and altruism/admiration. In addition, in the social optimum under second-best fiscal policies, we show the existence of indeterminacy in transitional allocations along with a unique balanced growth path. Thus, we find that the introduction of habits influences the patterns of the transitional paths but has no impact on the balanced growth path in either competitive or social optimum allocations. The second-best fiscal policy, therefore, restores the socially optimal balanced growth rate but fails to select the unique transitional path among multiple competitive equilibrium paths in the imperfectly competitive economy. 相似文献
4.
Summary. By adding endogenous investment to a flexible-price, money-in-the-utility-function model, this paper studies the role that physical capital plays in stabilizing the real side of the economy when the monetary authority follows interest-rate feedback rules. We show that with inelastic labor supply equilibrium uniqueness is ensured under both active and passive monetary policies. For the case where money affects both preferences and technology, the uniqueness result remains true under active monetary policy. With endogenous labor supply, the uniqueness result holds again regardless of the stance of monetary policies for the case with separable leisure, but indeterminacy remains likely under both active and passive monetary policies when leisure is nonseparable.Received: 19 December 2001, Revised: 12 May 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
E52, O42.We are grateful to Jess Benhabib and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.
Correspondence to: C.K. Yip 相似文献
5.
This note presents an alternative parameterization of any scoring rule that satisfies the score-expansion property. This parameterization is based on the vector that specifies, for every number of alternatives k, k ≥ 3, the minimal size of a coalition that can veto an alternative which is preferred by everybody outside the coalition. Our result sheds new light on the commonly used plurality and Borda rules, as well as the inverse plurality rule and any “vote for t alternatives rule”. 相似文献
6.
Guido Baldi 《Journal of Economic Policy Reform》2016,19(2):185-194
In this paper, we analyze the impact fiscal policy rules have on budget deficits and forecasting biases in official budget outlooks. Persistent budget deficits and over-optimistic budget forecasts have been observed in many countries in the past, especially in the euro area. To prevent such developments from happening in the future, fiscal rules have been revised or implemented with the aim to strengthen both preventive (ex-ante) and corrective (ex-post) elements of fiscal rules frameworks. Do such ex-ante and ex-post rules differ in their effects? In an attempt to answer this question, we build a two-period model and distinguish between ex-ante rules that apply to budget forecasts and ex-post rules that apply to realized budget deficits. Our model indicates that effectively enforced ex-post rules are more effective than ex-ante rules at reducing budget deficits. Interestingly, ex-ante rules differ from ex-post rules in their effects on forecasting biases. Only ex-post sanctions reduce forecasting biases, while ex-ante rules have no impact on such biases. In addition, we show that political stability and the size of government increase the effectiveness of fiscal rules. If, however, financial markets have a disciplining effect on governments, the effectiveness of fiscal rules is reduced. Our results imply that if fiscal policy rules cannot be effectively enforced, reforming other areas such as electoral rules or financial market regulations might be a more promising approach to ensuring sound public finances than fiscal policy rules. 相似文献
7.
M. Remzi Sanver 《Economic Theory》2006,28(2):453-460
Summary. By a slight generalization of the definition of implementation (called implementation by awards), Maskin monotonicity is no more needed for Nash implementation. In fact, a weaker condition, to which we refer as almost monotonicity is both necessary and sufficient for social choice correspondences to be Nash implementable by awards. Hence our framework paves the way to the Nash implementation of social choice rules which otherwise fail to be Nash implementable. In particular, the Pareto social choice rule, the majority rule and the strong core are almost monotonic (hence Nash implementable by awards) while they are not Maskin monotonic (hence fail to be Nash implementable in the standard framework).Received: 12 April 2004, Revised: 18 March 2005, JEL Classification Numbers:
D 79.I thank François Maniquet, Efe Ok and Ipek Ozkal-Sanver for their valuable contributions. The paper is part of a project on Electoral System Design supported by Bilgi University Research Fund. 相似文献
8.
In a monopolistic competition macromodel with endogenous market structure, the fiscal multiplier is shown to consist of two components. The first depicts the response of output to a fiscal expansion through the conventional channels that disregard the role of market imperfections. The second component captures the effects of firms' market power as well as the policy-induced change in market structure. The latter effect—which has not been taken into account in existing studies—is shown to be quite significant in raising the fiscal multiplier (even above unity) and in improving consumers' welfare when the labour market is competitive. 相似文献
9.
Conventional wisdom has it that the absolute (purely negative) veto is ineffective when overridable by a simple majority. That is flatly false. The examples that prove this surprising fact are themselves surprisingly ordinary yet oddly resistant to direct observation. They reveal virtues of a neglected institutional design.JEL classification: D71, D72 相似文献
10.
Constitutional political economy mostly distinguishes between rules and actions, with rules selected prior to actions within those rules. While we accept the coherence of this distinction, we pursue it within an open rather than closed scheme of analysis. Doing this entails recognition that societies rarely exhibit universal agreement about constitutional provisions. Recognizing the incomplete character of constitutional agreement points to the existence of margins of contestation. Along those margins, political entrepreneurship will be active in promoting support for alternative constitutional interpretations. Within open systems of creative and entrepreneurial action, constitutional reinterpretation is continually injected into society. Acquiescence in the presence of power does not imply agreement about its use. Rather, acquiescence means the constitutional contestation becomes an element of ordinary politics and not an activity that is prior to ordinary politics. It also means that emergent dynamics supplements comparative statics as a method of analysis. 相似文献
11.
Utilizing the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed among countries, we investigate how public income shocks have different long run economic effects dependent on constitutional arrangements. We find that (i) the so-called ‘resource curse’ is present in democratic presidential countries—but not in democratic parliamentary countries, (ii) being parliamentary or presidential matters more for the growth effects of natural resources than being democratic or autocratic, and (iii) natural resources are more likely to reduce growth when proportional electoral systems are in place than when the electoral systems are majoritarian. The two first effects appear very robust, the last effect less so. 相似文献
12.
We study the impact of the domestic stability pact on the accuracy of budget forecasts of Italian municipalities. Identification of the causal effect exploits a quasi-natural experiment generated by the removal in 2001 of the fiscal restraints on budget decisions for municipalities with fewer than 5000 inhabitants and by stricter budgetary restrictions and severe penalties for noncompliers in 2002. We find that relaxing fiscal rules had a sizeable impact on budget forecast errors, especially in 2002. In fact, revenue (expenditure) forecast errors for municipalities with fewer than 5000 inhabitants became 26% (22%) larger than in the past. 相似文献
13.
Roger D. Congleton Andreas Kyriacou Jordi Bacaria 《Constitutional Political Economy》2003,14(3):167-190
This paper analyzes agreements between governments that determine the division of policy-making power between central and regional governments. Our analysis demonstrates that initial circumstances and political risks affect the degree of centralization that will be adopted, and that asymmetric forms of federalism are often consequences of ongoing negotiations between regional and central governments over the assignment of policy-making authority. We analyze three settings where gains from constitutional exchange may exist: (i) the under-centralized state, (ii) the over-centralized state, and (iii) the constitutional convention. In each case, an asymmetric form of federalism is the predicted outcome, although the degree of asymmetry differs according to starting point. Modern and historical examples are used to illustrate the relevance of our analysis. 相似文献
14.
地方财政体制权责不对称问题研究 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
地方财政体制权责不对称已经成为分税制后我国地方财政管理体制运行十年来的一个较为突出的问题。主要表现为:事权划分原则性不强且缺乏法制化基础导致了政府间事权下移,地方政府级次过多与”倒轧账”式的分税模式引起了地方政府间财权上移,转移支付制度不规范造成了地方政府间财力差距日益扩大。为此,我们应选择相应的治理对策来完善我国地方财政体制。 相似文献
15.
Optimal fiscal policy is indeterminate in a dynamic and stochastic environment. The complete characterization of the fiscal
policy requires the use of identification constraints. In the literature either capital taxes or debt have been restricted
to be not contingent on the state of nature. We propose a different type of identification constraints to have both policy
variables state-contingent. Three alternative identification conditions are considered: (i) restrictions on the dynamic and
stochastic behavior of the debt path; (ii) an exogenous debt path, and (iii) an exogenous belief function. The main result
indicates that the optimal capital tax is zero and constant over the business cycle for any of the identification conditions
used, suggesting that is optimal for the government to use debt return as a shock absorber, keeping capital taxes constant.
The result is quite different from the previous literature, which obtains very volatile capital taxes.
JEL Classification:
E62, H21.
We are grateful to Alfonso Novales, Víctor Ríos-Rull, Javier Vallés and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.
We acknowledge financial support from Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (Ruiz and Pérez: BEC 2003-039; Manzano: BEC
2002-01995). Baltasar Manzano also acknowledges support from Xunta de Galicia (PGIDIT03PXIC30001PN, PGIDIT03CSO30001PR). 相似文献
16.
Private information, money, and growth: Indeterminacy, fluctuations, and the Mundell-Tobin effect 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:1
We introduce an informational asymmetry into an otherwise standard monetary growth model and examine its implications for the determinacy of equilibrium, for endogenous economic volatility, and for the relationship between steady-state output and the rate of money growth. Some empirical evidence suggests that, for economies with low initial inflation rates, permanent increases in the money growth rate raise long-run output levels. This relationship is reversed for economies with high initial inflation rates. Our model predicts this pattern. Moreover, in economies with high enough rates of inflation, credit rationing emerges, monetary equilibria become indeterminate, and endogenous economic volatility arises. 相似文献
17.
"财政自利"与"财政立宪"研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
财政自利是政府作为“经济人”的一种必然现象。财政自利不仅可以发生在政府与社会公众之间,而且也发生在政府之间。唯有对政府财政活动进行立宪约束,才能从根本上制约政府的过分自利而损害社会或下级政府的行为发生。本文主要从依法建立民主理财、民主决策监督机制,实现纳税人对政府的有效约束以及依法建立政府间合理分权制衡机制等两个方面比较全面的分析了政府财政自利的约束和制衡。 相似文献
18.
Martin Kolmar 《Constitutional Political Economy》2000,11(4):371-374
In a recentcontribution to Constitutional Political Economy, Azariadis andGalasso argued that due to the fact that constitutions allowfor a partial precommitment of the individuals, constitutionalrules are a good means to guarantee an efficient level of redistributionbetween generations. I argue that constitutional rules have noinherent advantage with respect to commitment compared to otherrules. However, the beneficial role of constitutions stems fromtheir ability to create a focal point that helps to solve theequilibrium selection problem. 相似文献
19.
"单位-街居"制消解后,我国社区具有了二元属性,并由此衍生出混合型双重事权结构。这一事权结构要求从筹资模式、预决算监督、拨付程序等方面重新确立社区财政制度的构建原则。我国现行社区财政制度存在设计片面、社区经费来源不足、资金使用效率低及社区建设投资缺乏协调等缺陷,严重制约了社区功能的发挥。要构建面向社区的公共财政制度,应厘清政府和社区职能分工、发掘社区自治潜力、构建综合性经费拨付机制。 相似文献
20.
Rui J.P de Figueiredo Jr. 《Journal of public economics》2003,87(12):2677-2701
Forty-three of the fifty states of the United States have granted item veto authority to their governors as part of state constitutions. In this paper, I test explanations of why and when a legislature would cede institutional power. Using data from 1865 to 1994, I show that these measures are most likely proposed by fiscal conservatives who fear the loss of power in the future; in order to protect their interests for those periods when they will be in the minority, they implement institutions such as the item veto which will limit future, liberal legislatures. The results therefore shed light on two important substantive areas. First, by showing how the choice of budgetary institutions is endogenous to the political process, it clarifies that political factors must be considered in addition to social efficiency to understand the adoption of budget institutions. Second, it provides evidence in support of theories that have posited that electorally weak groups will heavily ‘insulate’ policies in periods in which they momentarily hold power (e.g.
[Moe, 1989] and [de Figueiredo, 2002]). 相似文献